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ABSTRACT
After three decades of state intervention throughout the
world the 1980s and 1990s have seen a marked reversal.
Instead of government control and centralized planning
there has been a renewed emphasis on market-oriented
strategy. Privatization constitutes one of the
cornerstones of this strategy.
The relationship between privatization and development is
complex because privatization transforms the institutional
framework through which people usually expound, negotiate,
and promote their individual and group interests.
In theory, privatization should assist in overcoming the
problems of poverty and sustainable development through
the "trickle down" effect. In this thesis, however, it
will be argued that privatization in developing countries
and in Jordan as a case study would not exclusively lead,
on the grounds of efficiency, to a successful cure for the
economic ills of those countries.
The thesis also developed and applied to Jordan a
methodology of analyzing privatization which departs from
the mainstream view. This methodology considers
privatization as one part of a whole system and can be
understood within the context of development only in terms
of the whole system. Thus, privatization is linked as an
economic,	 social and political phenomenon with
xvii
decentralization, participation, and development.
The thesis concluded that development may mean
decentralization, which certainly means participation, but
privatization will not necessarily secure participation.
It depends on how it is designed and implemented. If
privatization is to be sustainable and people-centred, it
_
has to be gradual, relatively crisis-free, untroubled and
unenforced, marked by the fusion of collective
participation from below (e.g., grass roots) and
individual participation in the market place. This will
depend exclusively on the commitment of the decision
makers and their vision of empowering the people.
INTRODUCTION
2Definitions of Privatization
The expansion of the public sector, in both size and
scope, has been a feature of post World War 2 economic
development, most markedly in Europe. Moreover, during the
1960s and 1970s, this sector dominated economic activities
in developing countries as well.
After three decades of state intervention throughout the
world the 1980s and 1990s have seen a marked reversal.
Instead of government control and centralized planning
there has been a renewed emphasis on market-oriented
strategy. Privatization constitutes one the cornerstones
of this.
Privatization has different meanings and different
definitions. As a concept it covers a wide range of
possibilities, from a change in the geometry of ownership
and control from the state to the private sector at one
end of the spectrum and the introduction of market
discipline within the context of liberalization and
deregulation at the other.
Ramanadham (1989, figure 1.1, p.5) traced three groups of
privatization measures. The first relates to ownership and
included total denationalization (management buy-out, Co-
operatives, and special shares), joint venture and
liquidation. The second concerns organizational changes to
holding company structures and changes within monolithic
structures such as leasing, competition and restructuring.
The third and final group of measures is operational and
3comprises contracting-out, incentive rewards, investment
criteria, pricing principles, targets, resorting to the
capital market and the rationalization of government
control.
Other scholars define privatization as the concept which
Hcovers the transfer from the public to the
private sector of the ownership and/or control
of productive assets, their allocation and
pricing, and the entitlement to the residual
profit flows generated by them" (Adam, et al.,
1992, p.6).
This definition implies the complete or partial sale of
state assets, leasing, and management contracting
arrangements.
Prager (1992) identified five definitions of
privatization; the first is the partial sale of state
assets, which does not imply attenuation of state control;
the second is a change in ownership and control; the third
is private ownership without any constraints on entry into
the industry; the fourth changes only patterns of control
rather than ownership (e.g. leasing SOE), and the fifth
leaves both ownership and fundamental decision-making with
the state while production, in contrast with service
provision, lies in private hands (e.g. management
contracts and contracting). Dieter Bos (1991) defined
privatization narrowly as the sale of public sector assets
and excluded issues such as contracting out,
debureaucratization and the promotion of competition by
market forces. Domberger and Piggot (1986, p.146) argued
that privatization means "policies designed to improve the
4operating efficiency of public sector enterprises through
increased exposure to competitive market forces". This
does not include deregulation. De Walle (1989) on the
other hand argued that the impact and implementation of
liberalization (exposure to market forces) and
privatization are quite different. Thus, he defined it as
the "transfer of ownership and control from the public to
the private sector, with particular reference to asset
sales" (De Walle, 1989, p.601). This definition is similar
to that of Hemming and Mansoor (1988) and also Rees
(1986). Other scholars believe that privatization is the
goal of SOE reform and the concept of reforming public
enterprises has been used as a synonym for privatization
(Galal, 1991) (Shiny, 1990) (Shiny and Nellis, 1991).
The Objectives of the Thesis 
This thesis, however, will adopt two different meanings of
privatization which both serve the objectives of the
study. The first is privatization as the transfer of
ownership and/or control (whole or partial) from the state
to the private sector. This definition does not include
SOE reform programmes, deregulation or liberalization
policies because these necessitate neither a change in
control and ownership nor a change in the source of supply
for goods and services. Thus, this definition employs the
term privatization as a means of divestiture. This
definition is employed exclusively in chapter 2 of the
thesis as a way of analyzing the economic rationale for
5privatization, particularly that of economic efficiency,
which is the first aim of the thesis. The second objective
of the thesis is to analyze the effect of privatization on
economic development within the context of
decentralization. In this domain, privatization equates
with functional decentralization, as opposed to
territorial decentralization, and this definition is
employed in chapter 41•
Both definitions of privatization employed by the
researcher will be argued to be complementary to a wider
effort by different scholars [particularly those of the
Neo-classical Political Economy (NPE) or what is called
the New Institutional Economics (NIE)] as well as other
international organizations (e.g. World Bank and IMF) to
reduce the extent of "government failure". Privatization
is introduced as a means of reducing the size of the
governmental apparatus and rolling back the boundaries of
state responsibility. In shifting responsibility from the
state to the market privatization transforms the
institutional framework through which people usually
expound, negotiate, and promote their individual and group
interests.
/Functional decentralization means the decentralization
of functions such as the functions of production or the
provision of services from the monopolistic centralized
bureaucracies to the market while territorial 
decentralization means the decentralization of government
decision making to the sub-national levels such as local
governments or authorities.
6The aim of this thesis is to assess the success of
privatization policies in tackling the main economic
problems of developing countries during the 1990s. Among
the important priorities are the alleviation of poverty as
well as balanced and sustainable development. There is no
easy solution to the challenge of achieving economic
development. Instead it requires discussion and
interaction with the needs of the people in order to bring
about new ideas and probabilities for economic
development.
In theory, privatization should assist in the task of
overcoming the problems of poverty and sustainable
development. It should benefit the poor through the
"trickle down" effect as private ownership and/or control
brings greater economic efficiency, more innovation,
improved responsiveness to consumer demands, and wider
choice for individuals. The argument of maximizing profits
also implies increased savings and greater investment
which in their turn produce rapid growth and higher
incomes, both symbols of development according to the
advocates of privatization.
In this thesis, however, it will be argued that the
experience of developing countries, which is derived from
the empirical work conducted on the issue of privatization
by different scholars, does not exclusively lead, on the
grounds of efficiency, to a successful cure for the
economic ills of developing countries. In this context,
7privatization is analyzed within the microeconomic
criteria of efficiency.
Another task of the thesis is to develop an analysis of
privatization which departs from the mainstream view. The
alternative approach, which is the outcome of an effort to
interpret commonalities in the privatization movements of
developing countries, will depend on linking privatization
as an economic, social and political phenomenon with
decentralization, participation, and development.
Development according to this approach means human
development, and the enhancement of capabilities as the
ultimate objective of development rather than growth in
GNP.
This thesis focuses on the impact of privatization on
development with special reference to the experience of
Jordan. The specific objectives of the thesis are:
1) to examine the effect of privatization on the role of
the state in development and question whether it will
necessarily imply a minimalist state.
2) to discover whether a change in the geometry of
ownership would crucially affect enterprise performance,
in the context of developing countries generally and of
Jordan. If not, what are the reasons for privatization?
83) to explore the impediments to the implementation of the
privatization programme in Jordan.
4) to investigate privatization and its impact on
participation, decentralization and development,
particularly within the context of establishing
participatory development.
To achieve the specific objectives of the thesis a large
number of empirical studies conducted by different
scholars have been reviewed in the various chapters2.
However, in particular, two empirical studies have been
carried out on the case of Jordan. The first attempted to
evaluate the economic performance of one of Jordan's SOE,
the Jordan Electricity Authority (JEA), and the second to
estimate the degree of fiscal decentralization in Jordan.
The empirical studies are set in the general context of
the theory and practice of privatization and
decentralization, and the broader experience of Jordan.
Moreover, the thesis provides for the first time a
complete record of the Jordanian authorities'
announcements and comments on the privatization plans
drawn up between 1986 and 1993.
2The large number of empirical studies was necessary
because the thesis employed an institutional approach in
which the analysis must be continuously monitored by
reference to cases, observation, and examples.
9The Methodology of the Thesis 
Given the developmental orientation of the thesis it has
been necessary to employ the institutional approach in
studying the case of privatization in developing countries
including Jordan. The main value in utilizing such an
approach is its holism. It considers privatization as one
part of a whole system and can be understood within the
context of development only in terms of the whole system.
Consequently, the thesis inquiry has been constructed in
a way that accommodates the historical, social,
political, and economic factors which comprise the whole
system. In this way the thesis represents a departure
point from the universal laws which stamp the analysis of
privatization in many studies. Studying privatization in
isolation can lead to the neglect of many major economic
and non-economic factors that affect the indispensable
dynamic required in a development study. In other words,
studying privatization without considering the whole
system could lead to judgements without having specified
all the relevant factors.
Moreover, the main purpose of employing this methodology
is its ability to explain rather than to predict specific
results. This requires a continuous reference to
observations and events. The holistic methodology forms an
integral part of the work of this thesis.
Outline of Research
The thesis is presented in two parts. Part I consists of
10
four chapters. Chapter 1 is devoted to a review of the
development economics literature on the role of the state
in development. This is necessary when viewing
privatization as an integral part of the shift in
development thinking during the 1970s and 1980s.
chapter 2 looks at the economic rationale for
privatization in developing countries within the context
_
of ownership change. In the first three sections the
chapter investigates the allocative role of the state, the
origins of public sector growth in developing countries,
and the empirical evidence of public enterprise
performance. In the four remaining sections the chapter
reviews the theoretical context of privatization by
analyzing the theory of the firm, the theory of X-
efficiency, the economic theory of property rights, and
the principal-agent theory. Chapter 3 assesses the
empirical evidence for privatization in developing
countries. This is rarely brought together in the
literature. This review has been constructed so as to
provide readers with different aspects of privatization in
developing countries. The second section of chapter 3
provides an efficiency comparison between public and
private enterprises, corresponding to the arguments in
chapter 2. The remaining six sections cover the wider
dimension of privatization. These are the factors
determining private investment, the relationship between
government size and economic growth, the relationship
between public enterprises and budgetary deficit, the
11
relationship between privatization and development, the
reasons behind privatization, and finally the relationship
between privatization and the distribution of gains and
losses.
The last chapter of this part is chapter 4. This chapter
is devoted to an investigation of privatization within the
context
	 of	 decentralization,	 participation	 and
_
development.
Thus, an alternative approach has been developed to imply
the use of concepts such as "choice", "participation",
"voice", "appropriate technology", "linkages", and
"territorial decentralization or devolution". The chapter
is divided into nine sections; the meaning of development,
growth vs. human development; privatization, choice, and
participation; privatization in the context of exit and
voice; the concept of decentralization; privatization vs.
territorial decentralization; paradigms of decentralized
development; decentralization in practice; the effect of
privatization on technological choice and the informal
sector; and the necessity of coordinating efforts for
development.
Part II looks at the broader experience of privatization
in Jordan within the general context of part I of the
thesis. This part comprises of three chapters. Chapter 5 
looks at the changes in the Jordanian economy which
occurred between 1952 and 1992 to provide an evaluation of
the different dimensions in Jordan's economic development.
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The institutional approach employed in this evaluation
encompasses the economic and non-economic factors which
had a significant impact on the country's route to
development.
In six sections Chapter 6 investigates the issues
surrounding the initiation of and the failure to
implement, privatization in Jordan. The sections are the
_
role of the state; objectives and reasons for
privatization of SOEs; performance of SOEs; privatization
progress to date; and finally the obstacles to
privatization. Chapter 7 examines the issues of
privatization, decentralization, participation, and
development within the context of Jordan. The chapter
explores government objectives in decentralization and
participation; the design of decentralization and
participation; decentralization in practice; measuring
decentralization and participation; the effect of
privatization policies on participation in agriculture by
small farmers; dissatisfaction and the institutional role;
democracy, participation, and privatization; current
thinking on decentralization and development; and the
important	 factors	 in	 the	 relationship between
privatization,	 decentralization, 	 participation	 and
development within the Jordanian context.
The conclusions of the thesis are provided in chapter 8.
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An Overview of the Conclusions 
Given the economic challenges facing decision makers in
developing countries and Jordan in particular it is
unlikely that privatization will lead to a minimalist role
for the state in economic development. What is required is
a new role with an improved quality of action. Decision
makers should look for long-term objectives rather than
_
depend on policies geared to short-term goals. The role of
the state then becomes strategic rather than crisis-
driven.
The institutional factors which characterise the markets
of developing countries and those of Jordan (e.g. the
domination of large monopolies, the lack of efficient
capital markets, inefficient property rights system) mean
that privatization through ownership change will not
necessarily mean enhanced efficiency. Alternatively, the
search for SOE problems in the context of each country may
provide a better understanding of the reasons behind the
difficulties of SOEs, taking into account the fact that
profitability does not necessarily mean economically
efficient. The conclusion, therefore, is that it is not
ownership but market structure and institutions that
determine the success or failure of privatization. The
case study of Jordan Electricity Authority shows that the
economic efficiency parameters suggested positive trends
even though there were losses in this SOE. Consequently
the problem of financial performance lies behind factors
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which are sometimes outside the direct control of the
enterprise.
From the review of the empirical evidence on the issue of
privatization in developing countries it is also
established that the reasons behind privatization in
developing countries are not based on clear-cut evidence
of the superiority of private ownership, the crowding-out
hypothesis, an over-extended public sector, a positive
relationship between privatization and development, or
large gains for the consumers. Rather privatization is a
reaction to financial crisis based on the budgetary
deficits resulting from the operation of such enterprises
and the subsequent pressure exerted by international aid
agencies such as the World Bank and the IMF. Within
Jordan, however, the reasons behind the initiation of the
privatization plan in 1986 were the deep economic
recession after 1985, the growing budgetary deficit, the
debt crisis, a desire to attract foreign investment, and
a series of imitation factors.
While the factors behind the initiation of the
privatization plan in Jordan were strong, they were not
sufficient to induce the government to start the
implementation phase. Obstacles to the privatization of
SOEs in Jordan rest on economic factors (the time needed
for the valuation of the enterprises, the need for
restructuring the enterprises, the lack of a regulatory
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capacity, and an inefficient capital market) and the non-
economic factors particularly those derived from the
special characteristics of the state-society relationship.
Given the experience of the top-down approach towards
development in developing countries and Jordan as a case
study, empowering people at the local level might be the
only viable alternative for human development during the
1990s. Such development cannot be achieved by a single
decision as is the case in privatization but requires
commitment to an institutional building process beyond the
scope and objectives of privatization. This also means
that within privatization as functional decentralization
there is a need for the interests of underprivileged
groups to be articulated at all stages of the
privatization process. Through the promotion of a more
open and interactive process an environment can be created
which is more conducive to improving public confidence in
the state privatization programme and more favourable to
its implementation. Employing the exit and voice options
simultaneously will lead to far better outcomes than when
employing privatization as a symbol of exit alone. The
latter approach may not increase territorial
decentralization nor even fiscal decentralization as the
measurement of decentralization ratios in developing
countries, including Jordan, reveals.
In summary, development may mean decentralization, which
certainly means participation, but privatization will not
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necessarily secure participation. It depends on how it is
designed and implemented. If privatization is to be
sustainable and people-centred, it has to be gradual,
relatively crisis-free, untroubled and unenforced, marked
by the fusion of collective participation from below
(e.g., grass roots) and individual participation in the
market place. This will depend exclusively on the
_
commitment of the decision makers and their vision of
empowering the people.
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1.1: Introduction
Political economy has assigned the state different roles
in development . Different groups of economists have given
different advice on the useful functions of the state.
This has varied from recommendations on maintaining law
and order, justice and defence to others who have assigned
greater responsibilities to the state in bringing about
development/.
During the 1980s, however, the policy of privatizing
state- owned enterprises (SOEs) became part of a general
effort to roll back the role of the state in development.
Within this context, the question to be asked in this
chapter is; how far has the change in development thinking
affected the recommended role of the state in development?
A survey of development theories throughout the last five
decades shows the way policy makers in developing
countries have been advised and even obliged to follow
conflicting views on their role in development.
An associated question, which may be difficult to answer,
is how far governments, particularly in developing
countries, have been affected by theoretical arguments.
This chapter is organized in four parts.
The first concentrates on the role of the state from a
historical perspective. This tries to answer the question
of whether there is a standardized role for the state in
'There are many definitions of the state, but the most
general one defines it as "the authoritative political
institution that is sovereign over a recognised territory"
(Luciani, 1990, p.xviii).
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development or whether the role changes from one country
to another and across time.
The second part is a review of development theories from
the 1940s and 1950s, or what might be called the high
development theory, and their likely affect on the role of
the state in development.
The third part is devoted towards reviewing the major
theories of neoclassical political economy, or what may be
called the new institutional economics. Finally the
counter arguments to the neoclassical counter-revolution
will be presented.
This literature review serves two purposes. Firstly it
shows the dynamism with which the thinking about
development has been changing during the last four decades
so that there is now no one simple prescribed role for the
state in development. Secondly, the chapter provides a
basis for the discussion in the next chapter on the role
of the public sector in developing countries. This will
enable an assessment of privatization policies to be
attempted.
1.2: Historical Perspectives 
The emergence of a strong role for the state in developing
countries (late late-comers) can be viewed from the
perspective of economic history2.
2Aks the chapter links the role of the state to
development thinking, mainly in post-1940s, this section
will not attempt to review the classical or the Marxist
theory on the role of the state, though both will be
referred to in the discussion devoted to the neoclassical
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One of the most famous historical perspectives during the
1950s and 1960s was that of W.W.Rostow. In his theory of
the stages of growth Rostow (1960) contended that
development is a linear path along which all countries
must travel in order to achieve modernization. The five
stages are; the traditional society; the preconditions for
take-off; the take-off; the drive to maturity; and the age
of mass-consumption. Rostow's argument was based on the
history of advanced countries which had, at various times,
passed the stage of "take-off", and the developing
countries now following them. As far as the role of the
state is concerned, Rostow argued that government has a
major role to play in development. Development was seen
primarily as a matter of economic growth, particularly in
providing capital and investment in social overheads. The
transitional stage required increasing food production,
expanding export earnings (through agriculture and/or
extractive industries), and increasing investment in
infrastructure. Rostow (1990) argues
H ...in different ways each of these three
inescapable tasks requires positive political
decisions in setting where the development must
compete with other political objectives.
Nowhere-not even in Britain or the United
States-did modern private-enterprise industrial
systems emerge without substantial government
action to facilitate the process"(Rostow, 1990,
p.xxiv).
During this period development economists mainly concerned
political economy and that of the dependency theory.
However, for further reading on the role of the state in
classical theory see Evans (1991) and on Harxist theory
see Lipton (1989).
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themselves with eradicating the major obstacle to
development, namely the lack of capital accumulation. In
practice they neglected the other two dimensions of food
production and exports.
Another historian, Gerschenkron (1962), criticised this
five stages theory for its linearity and studied European
industrialization in terms of challenge and response.
"...[T]he more delayed was the industrialization
process..., the more rapid the spurt of sudden
growth which was required to break through the
trammels of routine and stagnation"
(Gerschenkron, 1962, p.155).
Greschenkron argued that depending on a given country's
degree of economic "backwardness" (although the latter is
a relative term) new private institutions may emerge to
speed up the pace of industrialization or development.
However, the question was: when should the state take the
initiative and intervene in the economy? The answer
according to Greschenkron was that, when the degree of
backwardness exceeds the ability of private institutions
to eliminate it, the state may take the initiative and
even supply capital for nascent industries through its
banking system (Ibid, p.354). In other words, a country's
economic position relative to others affects the nature of
state intervention, offering the necessary "prerequisites"
for the take-off stage of development.
Thus, according to Gerschenkron, the English industrial
revolution during the eighteenth century was not a model
for that which followed in other European countries. In
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Germany, Italy and Soviet Russia (the late-comers)
development was different. In England it was more gradual
and less capital intensive, while in the late-comers,
there was a real need for larger plants and enterprises
which would benefit from economies of scale as well as
being more capital intensive. Thus, since capital was
scarce and the entrepreneur's ability to take the
initiative was weak in the late-comer countries, the state
would choose to intervene, as a substitute for the market,
to generate development. Hence, it would take command of
the economy by allocating resources as well as by
involving itself in the production process through the
establishment and management of its own firms.
Bates (1988a) also referred to the English special case or
what he called "exceptionalism n . In comparison with the
policies towards farmers in Europe, Bates argued that in
England the government followed protectionist policies
under the terms of the Corn Laws, through which it
favoured high agricultural prices 3 . Such policies were
exactly the opposite to those in European countries which
followed England, such as France, where consumers were
favoured at the expense of farmers.
Karl Polanyi (1957, p.138) attributed the birth of
3This protectionism was through a mechanism which
allowed farmers to export grain when the world price was
higher than the domestic price, whereas when it was lower,
imports were prohibited (Bates, 1988, p.512).
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economic liberalism in England to state provision of three
specific legislative acts: the reform of the Poor Law
(1834), which allowed a free market for labour; the Bank
Act (1844), which meant money was supplied by a self
adjusting mechanism; and the reform of the land laws and
repeal of the Corn Law (1846), which both created a world
pool of grain and foodstuffs to be traded in. He argued
that the transformation from liberalism to an
interventionist economic system originated from the
necessity to protect society from the threat of the
market.
"For if market economy was a threat to the human
and natural components of the social fabric, as
we insisted, what else would one expect than an
urge on the part of a great variety of people to
press for some sort of protection? This was what
we found" (Polanyi, 1957, p.150).
Another historical perspective has come from Pereira
(1993) who selected Britain, France and the United States
(the first industrial countries) as references. The
argument is that in the first stage of capitalism (the
mercantilism period) the state intervened to support the
process of primitive accumulation. According to Pereira,
government's role was a success under mercantilism but the
distortions created by excessive regulation and by royal
monopolies became overwhelming and gave rise to the
criticism made by the classical school that the state
distorted development (Pereira, 1993, p.1342).
However, Pereira has argued that state intervention in the
economy shows a cyclical pattern. In the expansion phase
of the cycle, state intervention increases in intensity in
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order to correct, through increasing state expenditure,
the distortions caused by the market. The state favours
the promotion of industrialization, the redistribution of
income, and regulation. After this phase, which persists
for several years, state intervention gives rise to
distortions such as fiscal imbalances, inflation,
uncompetitive international prices and the inefficient
performance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Thereafter,
state intervention will be weakened through new reform
policies such as privatization and deregulation which
enhance the role of the market. At the end of the reform
period a new process of state intervention will begin in
response to the instabilities inherent in the market
system. However, these new interventionist policies will
take a form different from those of the initial phase.
For Pereira this cyclical pattern was also related to the
political and historical cycles proposed by Hirschman
(1982).
Hirschman argued that societies swing between periods of
intense preoccupation with public issues designed to bring
about public happiness and welfare. Such periods are
characterized by highly beneficial outcomes for
individuals participating in public actions with the
result that beneficiaries demand more action from the
state. However, when corruption and the free riders
associated with public action start to accumulate, a
period devoted to the pursuit of private interest begins
when people start to look after their personal or private
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interests. Hirschman said that
"after a long immersion in purely private
concerns, the discovery of action directed to a
public purpose constitutes a liberating
experience" (Hirschman, 1982, p.126).
This gives rise to a new swing towards the public sphere.
Thus, historically, according to Pereira and Hirschman,
the role of the state in development takes a cyclical form
rather than a uniform or linear role.
Another dimension is the relationship between the role of
the state in development and the different philosophical
backgrounds economists have prescribed to that role.
Stigler (1965) argued that economists tend to propose
different roles for the state in economic affairs without
solid empirical evidence. Instead they tend to generalize
as an expression of personal taste (Stigler, 1965, p.7).
For example, he believed that Adam Smith's advocation of
private ownership and a limited role for the state was
based on two positions. The first of these was Smith's
belief in the ability of the individual to make the right
choices within a framework of national liberty. Stigler
argued, however, that Smith proposed numerous departures
from natural liberty because he (Smith) believed that the
participants in voluntary transactions were incompetent or
unaware of the external effects of their actions. The
second basis for Smith's belief was his distrust of the
state. Stigler argued that this latter position was
excessively dogmatic in comparison with the first because
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Smith gave no evidence, such as partial interests and the
wasteful allocation of resources, for this distrust
(Stigler, 1965, p.3). Stigler also provided similar
arguments against other classical economists, for example
John Stuart Mill and Alfred Marshall. Yet, the position of
Stigler towards other economists who advocated a greater
role for the state in economic affairs, such as Jevons and
Pigou, did not change. The lesson to be drawn from an
analysis of Stigler is that any philosophy defining the
role of the state should be based on evidence rather than
on personal taste. This lesson is similar to that
concluded by Bates:
"by focusing on the case of England, classical
and Marxian theorists have based development
studies on data that are profoundly misleading"
(Bates, 1988a, p.500).
To sum up, economic historians hold different views on the
role of the state in development. These roles vary from
country to country depending on the degree of backwardness
on the one hand and time cycles on the other.
1.3: The High Development Theory
1.3.1: The Keynesian Revolution
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s development economists such
as Rosenstein-Rodan, Nurkse and Kuznets shared the view
that there was a significant role for the state in lifting
an economy out of its backwardness. This consensus came
into being in line with Keynes' general theory (1936).
Hirschman (1984a) argued that Keynes had changed the
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position dominated by the classical economics of full
employment being a "special case" and introduced his view
of economics including substantial unemployment as the
reality. He argued that
"The Keynesian step from one to two economics
was crucial: the ice of monoeconomics had been
broken and the idea that there might be yet
another economics had instant credibility"
(Hirschman, 1984a, p.6).
The Keynesian theory achieved credibility because of its
applicability as a policy guide for Western governments
during the interwar depression and the Marshall Plan after
WW2. Such success cast doubts on the classical market-
oriented arguments and gave legitimacy to the adoption of
economic planning. Keynes had claimed that without state
intervention it was impossible to reach a situation of
equilibrium compatible with high levels of employment in
an economy. In 1926 Keynes saw the nationalization of the
Bank of England as a national responsibility. The bank was
no longer to function with a primary regard for the
profits of its shareholders (Keynes, 1926 as cited in
Mulji, 1990, p.126). Keynes was concerned with the
divergence between short-term benefits in the market place
and the longer-term vision necessary to achieve a steady
flow of investment. Mulji argued that "if Keynesian ideas
have been revolutionary in the 1930s, they were surely
conventional wisdom by the 1950s" (1990, p.128). Thus,
Keynes advocated an interventionist state that could
secure long-term benefits for society.
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1.3.2: Balanced-Growth
During the 1940s development economics arose as a distinct
field in the study of economics, beginning with the work
of Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) entitled "Problems of
Industrialisation of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe".
Rosenstein-Rodan emphasised the role of the state in
achieving capital formation and balanced growth. Planned
industrialisation through investment in large units vould
provide training for labour and introduce
complementarities, both unprofitable investments for
private entrepreneurs. Moreover, he argued that a backward
economic structure, in particular the narrowness of
domestic markets, does not offer sufficient incentives for
investors to choose the right pace or pattern of capital
accumulation.
Thus, there is a particular need for one type of physical
capital, "social overhead capital" i.e.; railways, roads,
canals and hydro-electric power stations. Segments of the
economy characterized by indivisibilities and economies of
scale must be created before private investors can decide
on their productive investment. The argument of
Rosenstein-Rodan rests on the objective of surmounting
indivisibilities in both demand and supply and the
emergence of external economies. The use of "social
overhead capital" helps to remove indivisibilities on the
supply side. Bottlenecks on the demand side, imposed by
the problem of market size can be removed if a number of
industries can be set up simultaneously (a big-push) using
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the advantages of economies of large scale. In other words
Rosenstein-Rodan characterized the entire growth
phenomenon as generalized external economies, a
characterization borrowed from Allyn Yong (1928) who
concluded that dynamic externalities arising from
investment can lead to increased output and more
sophisticated capital equipment as well as move the
economic system from equilibrium (as cited in Taylor and
Arida, 1988, p.166).
Another lesson to be drawn from Rosenstein-Rodan's work is
the role of expectation and its effect on investment by
other firms. Thus, the role of the state is to reduce the
uncertainty surrounding investment decisions.
Nurkse (1953) also shared the view that capital is the key
to development through his theory of the vicious circle of
poverty or the low-level equilibrium trap. Nurkse argued
that poor countries remain poor because of their low level
of per capita income which cannot supply sufficient
savings to increase capital accumulation and this make
increased output possible. He argued that, as external
economies are important for LDCs, several sectors need to
expand together within the context of balanced-growth.
However, although the Rosenstein-Rodan idea of an/Dig-push"
is not identical with the Nurkse concept of "balanced-
growth", Bliss argued that "balanced growth plus economies
of scale equals the big push" (Bliss, 1989, p.1193).
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Syrquin (1988) commented on the preceding approaches to
development (Rosenstein-Rodan, Nurkse as well as Lewis's
development model of the dual economy (1954) with an
unlimited supply of Labour) that all three shared certain
views concerning the functioning of LDCs economies;
"labour surplus in agriculture, low mobility of factors,
price inelastic demands, export pessimism, and a general
distrust of the market" (Syrquin, 1988, p.213). Lewis's
model was unique, however, in that it re-established the
classical mechanism of reinvested profits from capitalists
who save.
In general, the role of the state in development was
closely linked with that of promoting industrialization,
the key factor in achieving development. The central
identity between planned saving and planned investment
fitted well with the view of capital formation in the
Harrod-Domar growth model. As a consequence, planning was
necessary in order to ensure the appropriate levels of
saving and capital required to achieve the targeted rate
of growth.
There were two aspects of the structure of developing
countries which suggested an important role for foreign
aid in assisting them to enhance industrialization. These
were respectively the domestic saving constraint and the
foreign exchange constraint. Chenery and Bruno (1962)
developed the "two-gap" model which emphasised the
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limitations on policy choice in developing countries. The
effect of such constraints led international aid agencies
such as the World Bank to initiate a new policy in aiding
developing countries (Adler, 1972). This required planned
investment by the governments of developing countries as
a justification of their need for aid programmes.
In a more recent contribution to this literature Taylor
(1993) developed a "three-gap" model in which he added the
fiscal limitation factor [i.e.,public sector borrowing
requirement (PSBR)] as a further constraint on the
economy. In this model he focused on the role of public
capital formation in crowding-in private investment. He
argues that the "state and/or foreign assistance are
required to get new industrial activities underway" in
developing countries (Taylor, 1993, p.577). Historically,
he argued, the high-tech industries in developing
countries were either publicly owned or supported and were
never the product of the private sector alone. Thus, there
is an important role for the state in encouraging
investment in the private sector.
1.3.3: Externalities and Interdependence (Linkages) 
Scitovsky (1954) in his article "Two concepts of external
economies" rigorously analyzed Rosenstein-Rodan's concept
of external economy. He argued that external economies
arise only when interdependence among the members of the
economy is direct; in other words, not mediated through
market transactions. He realized the need in a backward
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economy for centralized investment planning because
"pecuniary external economies", which arise from
interdependence between firms, denoted a serious problem
if guided by a pricing system as a signalling device4.
Thus, market prices are only useful for coordinating
current production decisions. Investment allocation on the
other hand requires state intervention.
Moreover, the role of the state as investment planner
means that the state should "get the price right" in the
sense of reflecting the correct opportunity costs and
benefits (Little and Mirrlees, 1974). The essence of this
literature, particularly on the key shadow prices of
investment, foreign exchange and labour, has become the
cornerstone for planning, particularly in the evaluation
of state investment in developing countries.
Another advocate of state intervention was Hirschman
(1958) who introduced the strategy of "unbalanced growth"
4The technological externalities, in which the action
of one individual or firm directly affects the utility or
profit of another, are different from pecuniary external
economies which arise because of the interdependence among
producers through the market mechanism or prices.
Scitovsky gave the example that,
"investment in an industry leads to an expansion of
its capacity and may thus lower the prices of its
products and raise the prices of the factors used by
it. The lowering of product prices benefits the users
of these products; the raising of factor prices
benefits the suppliers of the factors. When these
benefits accrue to firms, in the form of profits,
they are pecuniary external economies" (Scitovsky,
1954, p.147).
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as well as a new concept of forward and backward
linkages5 . Hirschman criticised the "balanced growth"
doctrine and argued that it was impossible for an
underdeveloped economy to invest on all fronts
simultaneously. Instead, he suggested that development
could be seen as a "chain of disequilibria". Thus, his
proposal for accelerating development was to channel
investment towards projects and industries which possess
strong linkage effects. The logic behind the balanced
growth strategy was the insufficiency of entrepreneurial
motivation on the one hand, and the need to economize on
their abilities on the other. The implication of this
strategy was clear advice to LDC governments to invest in
large firms so as to benefit from economies of scale and
to invest in projects with strong linkages. As a result,
government efforts were concentrated on the industrial
sector which led to adverse effects on the agricultural
sector. This belief in industrial sector superiority may
derived from the following quotation from Hirschman.
... agriculture certainly stands convicted on the
count of its lack of direct stimulus to the setting
up of new activities through linkage effects: the
superiority of manufacturing in this respect is
crushing" (Hirschman, 1958, pp.109-110).
Thus, the development of LDCs was related to efforts to
adopt an industrialization policy producing mostly for
domestic markets. So the state's role in creating a wider
5Forward linkage means, utilizing the output of the
project as an input for other activities in the economy,
while backward linkage means, the opportunities created
for other activities to supply the project with inputs.
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industrial base was an inevitable condition for achieving
growth. This vision of industrial development was also
backed by another theoretical version of the international
economy.
1.3.4: Terms of Trade 
The contribution of another two economists, Singer (1950)
_
and Prebish (1959), provided further justification for a
more interventionist state role in development,
particularly in adopting import substitution
industrialization (ISI) on the one hand and protectionist
policies on the other.
In comparison with the previous economists, Singer and
Prebish contributions were more associated with developing
countries6.
In Singer's contribution the distribution of gains between
investing and borrowing countries was the key. He found
that the historical trend of international prices for the
primary goods in which LDCs possessed a comparative
advantage tended to decline over time. This has imposed
significant losses on the LDCs.
'The significance of Prebish's contribution can be
seen as being among the first theoretical contributions
from a developing country itself (Argentina). In other
words, the motivation behind his study was to promote
modernization and industrialization objectives in LDCs in
general, and in the Latin American region in particular.
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"It is a matter of historical fact that ever
since the seventies the trend of prices has been
heavily against sellers of food and raw
materials and in favour of the sellers of
manufactured articles" (Singer, 1950, p.477).
Singer's conclusion was that foreign investment in
developing countries should be directed towards changing
the structure of comparative advantages and comparative
_ endowments rather than developing an international trade
system based on the existing one. Thus, there is a need
for a complementary domestic investment which utilizes
domestic resources.
Moreover, the same line of thinking appeared in a
contribution by Prebish (1959), who was chairman of ECLA
(Economic Commission for Latin America), an international
organization created by the United Nations. Prebish argued
that development in the LDCs, and in Latin America in
particular, might face a real threat if it followed the
recommendations suggested by trade theory. His argument
can be summarized as follows.
Static comparative advantage as revealed by trade theory
depends on current prices for goods and cannot capture
secular trends. Prebish argued that there are differences
in the income elasticity of demand for imports and exports
between the developed (centre) and developing countries
(periphery).
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"It is a well-established fact that the income
elasticity of demand for imports in Latin
America primary commodities by the center is
generally lower than the income elasticity of
demand for Latin America imports of industrial
products from these centers" (Prebish, 1959,
p.252).
In other words, most peripheral countries must export an
increased amount of primary goods each year in order to be
_ able to continue importing the same amount of industrial
goods.
Prebish's solution to this problem was for the state to
intervene and play a key role in securing development in
LDCs.
His first recommendation was the adoption of import
substitution policies for industrialization.
[W] hen demand for imports tends to grow at
a faster rate than exports, import substitution
is necessary to correct this disparity, and then
imports constitute a declining proportion of
total demand for industrial goods" (Prebish,
1959, p.254).
The second recommendation was that the state should
intervene to counteract the tendency towards terms of
trade deterioration which would lead to future foreign
exchange shortages. For this different protection devices
are required.
"...the cost of spontaneous industrialization-by
the unrestricted play of market forces through
exchange depreciation- ... could be reduced or
avoided by protection, subsidies, an export tax,
or other forms of interference"( Ibid, p.257).
The Prebish-Singer effect on development policies and the
role of the state in development has been immense. The
movement in LDCs toward protectionism and (ISI) policies
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in the international economy can be seen in part as a
reflection of this line of thought.
In summary, it appears that development theorists during
the 1940s and 1950s have contributed significantly to
expanding the role of the state in development. Economists
realized the need for huge investment in LDCs in order to
benefit from economies of scale and linkages benefits.
They admitted in their analysis that market and price
signals cannot guide important investment nor provide the
resources which are needed. State intervention was
required for direct investment through SOEs and to induce
private investors through protectionist policies, which
were some times based on the infant industries argument
and, at other times, on the terms of trade argument'.
These theoretical viewpoints supported ISI policies while
simultaneously discouraging attempts to adopt an export-
oriented strategy.
1.3.5: Dependency School 
The inward development strategy was further supported by
the neo-Marxist school s (Baran, Sweezy, Magdoff) and the
dependency school (Frank, Cardoso and Amin) which
7The infant industry argument was the main growth-
related argument for protection and it was first
introduced by John Stuart Mill. For further analysis
review (Meier and Steel, 1989, pp.252-253).
(Tor further analysis of this school review Todaro
(1989, pp.100-107).
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emphasised that the international economic relations
between the centre and periphery nations were the major
factor in the "development of underdevelopment". The
conclusion of the school was "that in LDCs only the state
can mobilize the surplus in a way conducive to the
country's development" (Todaro, 1989, p.103). Such a
conclusion contradicted their view of the state. The state
according to dependency theory is an agent of
international, metropolitan capital interests which
extract surpluses from the developing and transfer them to
the developed nations. In continuing the path of
dependency, developing countries will lose their
endogenous technology because of an imposed technological
package transferred from the centre, which kills the local
one. This results in a widening of the technological gap
as well as increased dependency (Street and James, 1982,
p.680). These views were developing in the era of
political independence in LDCs.
1.3.6: The Consequences 
As the number of newly independent developing countries
rose during the 1950s and 1960s, economic independence
called for the rejection of the international division of
labour as instituted under the colonial administrations.
Industrialization as the major objective of development
found popular support among the peoples of the developing
countries, who were in the era of building their national
identities through "self-reliance". Within this context
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the Soviet model of development had a major influence.
Thus, the role of the state became parallel with increased
state intervention through direct investment in SOEs,
planning, regulation, protectionism and credit policies
through special development banks. This kind of state
intervention ran contrary to the theories of the
mainstream classical and neoclassical economists who had
dominated economic philosophy before the 1930s. However,
it clearly reflected acceptance of the dominant
theoretical development philosophies at the time. These
diagnosed the problem of backwardness but with the
assumption of an unlimited capacity for the state. In
other words, the theories implied that the state could
intervene to correct the march toward development without
incurring any problems. Bardhan noted that;
"In this literature the state was often left
floating in some behavioral and organizational
vacuum, making it easy to be used for a blanket
endorsement of indiscriminate state
intervention, the adverse effects of which for
both economic growth and income distribution are
now painfully obvious in many countries"
(Bardhan, 1990, pp.3-4).
As a result, during the 1970s and 1980s, the role of the
state came under attack from the neoclassical political
economy or what was called the New Institutional Economics
(NIE) school.
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1.4: The Neoclassical Counter-revolution'
During this period the emphasis of the neoclassical
counter-revolution in development policy was on the
solution of three main problems claimed to impede
development. Firstly, the problem of an over-extended
public sector; secondly, the problem of an over-emphasis
on physical capital formation, and finally the
proliferation of distorting economic controls (Toye, 1987,
pp.48-49). The pioneer of this counter-revolution was
Bauer (1972, 1984) (ibid, p.54).
Bauer (1984, p.6) attacked all forms of state investment.
The first form is when the state intervenes in order to
raise saving and investment and the second is when it
intervenes because of lack of entrepreneurship. He argued
that the requirement for entrepreneurship cannot justify
state ownership because, if a society lacks entrepreneurs,
there is no source from which the state sector can acquire
them. Two objectives constitute the essence of the
neoclassical counter-revolution. The first is pricism (to
get the price right) through laissez-faire policies and
the second is statism (reduce the scope of state
intervention to a minimal requirement). The current
literature merges the two, that is, free market with
minimum state intervention.
Among the first studies to focus on "getting prices
right", was the comparative study by Little, Scitovsky and
'This phrase was used by Toye (1987), Todaro (1989)
and Krugman (1993).
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Scott (1970) of industry and trade in some developing
countries. The study attributed the poor economic
performance of developing countries to the protectionist
policies of ISI. The distortions in prices (overvalued
exchange rates, wages, import prices) created by highly
protectionist policies need to be relaxed. The authors of
the study concluded that governments
"Should act more directly on prices, through
subsidies and taxes, and should also encourage
industry indirectly in other ways. A policy of
restricting imports, through protective tariffs
rather than controls, would involve greater use
of the price mechanism and decentralization"
(Little, et al., 1970, p.22).
They also advocated outward-oriented policies directed
towards exports. They said;
"We believe that developing countries would
benefit from adopting, in general, a more
decentralized approach with greater use of the
price mechanism; and, in particular, given that
there are good prospects for exports, a more
open approach to foreign trade with less
protection and use of controls" (ibid, p.21).
Thus, the emphasis of the current literature on the role
of the state in development has shifted towards attacking
the development theories of the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s as
well as introducing, in a new style, the argument of the
failure of government and the need for a minimalist role
for the state". Development policies have swung towards
2.°This new style is what is called neoclassical
political economy or the new institutional economics. The
"new" is different from the "traditional neoclassical"
school in four aspects. The first is that government in
the NIE is at least partially endogenous and its policies
are analogous to vested interests. Secondly, the invisible
hand does not work in the NIE because individuals and
groups use the political arena to secure or maintain
rents. Thirdly, the NIE challenges the traditional
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laissez-fair policies as the solution to the problems of
developing countries. This argument implies in itself a
minimal role for the state. There are four major schools
of thought which constitute the backbone of the
Neoclassical Political Economy (NPE) or what may be called
the New Institutional Economics (NIE)".
1.4.1: The Collective Action Theory 
The first school of thought in the NIE concerns collective
action and the elimination of "the free-rider problem"".
The incentive to free-ride was analyzed by Olson (1965).
He observed that, even when groups of individuals have
some common interest and as a result expect to organize a
lobby for that interest, rational individuals will not act
neoclassical theory assumption of a stable perfectly
competitive equilibrium because this means institutions
will be passive in the analysis. Finally, the NIE believes
that pareto optimality will not be freely chosen by most
societies because the incentive to achieve perfect
equilibrium is often small and the potential rent from
cartelization is large. However, both "new" and
"traditional" believe in individual rationality and the
assumption of utility maximizing behaviour (Colander,
1984, pp.2-3).
"The old institutionalists criticized the neo-
classical school for its individualism and abstract
models. For reading in the old institutionalist literature
and its differences from other schools of thought see Kapp
(1976), Wilber and Harrison (1978), Street and James
(1982), Mayhew (1987), Radzicki (1988), Tilman (1990),
Harvey and Katovich (1992).
"The "free rider" problem arises from two features
inherent in public goods. The first is nonexcludability as
once goods are provided, individuals can no longer be
excluded from their benefits. The second feature is
nonexhaution, as their value to existing beneficiaries is
not reduced by increasing the number of beneficiaries.
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in their group interest. The reason is that the cost of
lobbying for one individual will exceed the benefits he
may obtain. As a result each individual will try to be a
free-rider, in the sense of benefiting without any
contribution to the group.
It follows that the "logic" behind the services of
associations such as labour unions, professional
_
associations, farm organizations, cartels, lobbies and
even collusive groups without formal organization will be
similar to the case of the government providing public
goods. But the logic of such an explanation implies the
demise of such groups, "unless individuals support them
for some reason other than the collective goods they
provide" (Olson, 1982, p.20).
In practice governments exist because they possess a
monopoly over taxation. The existence of large
associations or organizations will depend on their ability
to provide "selective incentives" rather than on the
collective goods they provide".
Olson argues that small groups can engage in collective
action without selective incentives because their small
size enables them to provide feasible benefits for the
group members even when the fruits of individual efforts
are shared by the entire group.
Although there are many implications from the above logic,
"Olson said that a selective incentive "is one that
applies selectively to the individuals depending on
whether they do or do not contribute to the provision of
the collective good" (Olson, 1982, p.21).
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the most important is "distributional coalitions" which
"are oriented to struggles over the distribution of income
and wealth rather than to the production of additional
output" (ibid, p.44)". As a result those distributional
coalitions or special interest groups will tend to reduce
efficiency and growth wherever they operate.
In relation to the state, such special interest groups
will increase their technical efficiency by gaining access
to the state through their direct collective action. The
consequences will be an influence on state policies
through special legislation and regulations directed
towards the benefit of those groups rather than towards
the benefit of society. Thus, the role of the state and
the complexity of its regulations will increase.
Despite many criticisms the theory of collective action
has explained the reasons behind the dysfunctional role of
government, particularly through the latter's regulations
and protection of special interest groups". However, it
does not lead to the conclusion that the laissez-faire
option is a solution to the problem of government failure.
Bates (1988b) argued that markets will not solve the
interest groups problem because the latter are the
dominant force in the market. In the case of Africa Bates
showed how government intervention in the market place has
"For a more detailed analysis of the implications,
review Olson (1982, pp.36-74).
"For a review of the criticism of the theory see
Quiggin (1992) and Rogowski (1988).
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favoured the small minorities of rich farmers and urban
consumers. In this way the government has become an agent
of private interest because small farmers are weak and
cannot voice their demands because of their large number
and little incentive for cooperation and what may be
called the "encompassing organization effect". Furthermore
Bates argued that the current policies of market
_
orientation advised by international agencies such as the
IMF and the World Bank have given politicians more
influence over public policy. This is consistent with the
government objective of retaining power (Bates, 1988b, pp.
351-358). A similar conclusion was reached by Nafziger
(1990) in his review of three studies concerning the role
of the state in the development of African countries 16 . He
said that "regime survival in a politically fragile system
requires marshalling elite support at the expense of
economic growth" (Nafziger, 1990, p.150).
Another important implication of the theory is the pattern
of policy bias and relative influence across the time
horizon (O'Donnell, 1988) (De-Janvry and Sadoulet, 1989).
As development proceeds and massive urbanization takes
place, the industrial sector becomes larger which leads to
more influence by new emerging interest groups in the
"The studies are;
Speder,J. and Smith, S., The Development of Capitalism in
Africa" (London and New York: Methuen, 1986).
Lubeck,P.M. (ed.), The African Bourgeoisie:capitalist
development in Nigeria,Kenya, and the Ivory Coast
(Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987).
Kennedy,P., African Capitalism:the struggle for ascendency
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
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agricultural sector, particularly those of rich and
exporting farmers. This is because the incentive for the
large number of industrial workers to take collective
action is reduced as their number increases while the
emphasis on agriculture to supply food for the urban
population and the emphasis on increasing agricultural
exports will allow the emergence of a new interest group
in the agriculture sector composed, mainly, of capitalist
and exporting farmers.
Further implications for the theory of collective action
can be linked with Hirschman's (1970) theory of exit,
voice and loyalty. Hirschman defined voice "as any attempt
at all to change, rather than to escape from, an
objectionable state of affairs" (Hirschman, 1970, p.30).
However, one of the main factors affecting the activation
of voice is loyalty. Thus, as loyalty is related more to
smaller groups than to larger ones, distributional
interest groups will try to voice their demands rather
than to use the "exit" option. This can explain why poor
or larger groups such as small farmers often use the exit
option by emigrating from rural areas to cities. However,
Hirschman (1993) observed that "enlarging the opportunity
for exit can on occasion make for more rather than less
participation and voice" (Hirschman, 1993, p.177). That,
when it exists represents a collective action on its own.
The demonstration prior to the demise of the German
Democratic Republic came, as Hirshman argues, as a result
of the large number of people who escaped the German
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Democratic Republic to Federal Germany before the events
of 1989.
On the other hand, homogeneity of origin and the high cost
of exit for squatter communities can also explain their
strong collective action against opposing groups such as
the state and its instruments, the military and police,
when they are threatened with eviction from the state or
community-owned land (Hirschman, 1984b).
The theory of collective action is also essential in the
analysis of other neoclassical political economy theories.
One of its main links is with the international trade
theory of rent-seeking.
1.4.2: The International Trade Theory of Rent-Seeking
Activities 
In traditional trade strategies the division was between
the structuralist school, which advocated the use of
protectionist policies, and the specialization school,
which favoured the use of comparative advantage in an open
trade system. However, the motive for the state in
introducing protectionist policies was not under
investigation. Rather, more importance was given to the
negative impact of tariffs and import restrictions on
resource allocation and choice of technology".
"Magee (1984) classified the theories dealing with
the reasons for the existence of tariffs into three. The
first group represents the policy theories, where tariffs
exist to achieve policy goals (i.e., infant industry
protection, industry output or employment maintenance, or
government revenue). The second group comprises the terms-
of-trade theories, where tariffs exist as a tool of
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The concept of rent-seeking is defined as the expenditure
of scarce resources to establish, acquire, or maintain a
government -granted monopoly or government-granted
monopoly power (Buchanan, 1980) (Posner, 1980)(Tollison,
1982). In other words, the government in this context is
seen as an arena of competing interest groups which work
to implement protectionist policies in favour of their own
interests, and whose power base is further strengthened by
protectionist policy measures. Krueger (1974) developed a
model showing that import regimes with quantitative
restrictions enhance lobbying activities which generate
rents through the allocation of import licenses. She
observed that rent-seeking activities took the form of
bribery, corruption, smuggling and black markets. The cost
of rent-seeking is calculated by estimating the premium on
commodities sold on the black market and the premium on
import licenses. Her estimate of the cost of rent-seeking
was 7.3 percent of GNP in India during 1964 and 15 percent
of GNP in Turkey in 1968 18 . Krueger's conclusion was that
the social costs of tariffs are less than the costs
resulting from quantitative restrictions. Another model,
in which revenue seekers will compete to secure a share in
the disbursement and/or transfer of tariff revenue
international redistribution (they permit a country to
increase its welfare at the expense of others). The third
group, which is the section's focus, is the political
theories, which look to the domestic political
consideration of introducing them (Magee, 1984, p.41).
"For a review to the empirical estimates of the cost
of rent-seeking see Ampofo-Tuffuor, et al. (1991).
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resulting in the imposition of a tariff due to collective
lobbies action, was introduced by Bhagwati and Srinivasan
(1980).
In another contribution to this literature, Bhagwati
(1982), Bhagwati, Brecher and Srinivasan (1984),
Srinivasan (1985) introduced what they called Directly
Unproductive, Profit-seeking activities (DUP). The concept
of DUP activities is defined as activities which
"yield pecuniary returns but do not produce
goods and services that enter the utility
function directly or indirectly via increased
production or availability to the economy of
goods that enter a utility function" (Bhagwati,
1982, p.989).
The international trade approach includes all DUP
activities such as monopoly-seeking, tariff-seeking, and
revenue-seeking (Colander, 1984, p.8). Thus, tariff-
seeking lobbying, tariff evasion, and premium seeking for
a given number of import licenses are all examples of DUP
activities which, although providing profits for those who
engage in them, do not increase the output of the economy
but rather reduce the total production possibilities of
the economy. Thus, they become a negative-sum game rather
than a zero-sum game of import restrictions19.
Within this context poor economic performance becomes a
19The term Negative-Sum game was used by Tullock
(1980). He observed that while the cost of organizing
foreign exchange regulations was 7.3 percent and 15
percent in India and Turkey respectively, according to
Krueger (1974), the costs would be higher if the waste of
resources used in securing government jobs (i.e.,in
organizing foreign exchange) are added. He anticipated
that the costs may be ten times that calculated by
Krueger. Thus, it will be a negative-sum game (Tullock,
1980, p.24).
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result of the institutional imperfections caused by
government policies which impede the functioning of the
free market.
The conclusion of this theory is that the role of the
state should be minimized in order to close the door for
DUP seekers, and that competition in the market will
ensure the dissipation of rents20.
The other conclusion of the this literature is that
inward-oriented development strategies are likely to lead
to more resource wastage through DUP activities; an
outward-oriented strategy, therefore, will be the best
alternative for developing countries to follow
(Srinivasan, 1985, pp.53-58).
The main evidence this literature relies on to support its
validity is the success story of the dynamic export-
oriented policies of the East Asian countries (World
Bank,1987) (Balassa, 1988).
In sum, the international trade and development school
introduced the concept of rent-seeking within the context
of collective action in order to emphasise the cost of an
interventionist state on the one hand and the deficiency
of ISI policies on the other. In its final analysis, the
school advocates a minimum role for the state in
development and an export-oriented strategy.
20Tor further reading in the literature of rent-
seeking review Blomqvist and Mohammad (1986), Jr.Gif ford
(1987), Anam (1988) and Ampofo-Tuffuor (1991).
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1.4.3: The Public Choice Theory
Another theory which is closely connected to the trade
school above is the public choice theory which lies at the
heart of the neoclassical political economy.
This theory has applied the tools and methods of
neoclassical mainstream economics to the study of
politics. As Buchanan and Tollison (1982) wrote;
"Public choice theory essentially takes the
tools and methods of approach that have been
developed to quite sophisticated analytical
levels in economic theory and applies these
tools and methods to the political and
governmental sector, to politics, to the public
economy" (Buchanan and Tollison, 1982, p.14).
Thus, Public choice theory shares with neoclassical
mainstream economics the behavioral assumption that man is
a rational, utility maximizer.
In other words, the theory rests on the assumption that
rational individuals act in their own self interest both
in the market and the non-market place.
As welfare economics does not make any behaviourial
assumptions about the behaviour of bureaucrats and
politicians, Buchanan (1972) extended the assumption of
rationality and utility maximizing individuals to the non-
market or political scene. Thus, he argued that government
failure should be taken more into account than the
traditional emphasis on "market failure".
"...the post-Pigovian should not be allowed to
generate excitement and ultimately to modify
social policy by his alleged discoveries of
"market failure" without, and at same time,
acknowledging the comparable "failures" of his
proposed political-governmental correctives"
(Buchanan, 1972, p.22).
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On the basis of the rationality assumption there would be
no reason to assume that government or state intervention
would generate improvements in the efficiency of the
market. But rather they generate rent seeking activities.
The statement above is derived from Buchanan's (1987)
definition of politics and politicians:
"Politics is a structure of complex exchange
among individuals, a structure within which
persons seek to secure collectively their own
privately defined objectives that cannot be
efficiently secured through simple market
exchanges"(Buchanan, 1987, p.1434).
Within the above context individuals will use the state as
a means of taking these collective actions. Buchanan and
Tullock (1962) said that,
"Collective action is viewed as the action of
individuals when they choose to accomplish
purposes collectively rather than individually,
and the government is seen as nothing more than
the set processes, the machine, which allows
such collective action to take place. This
approach makes the state into something that is
constructed by men, an artifactu (Buchanan and
Tullock, 1962, p.13).
The question is what is the social cost of government
intervention in the voluntary exchange of the market?
Buchanan confined the social loss associated with a
distorted government policy to rent seeking activities on
three levels.
If an individual or groups are faced with the prospect of
differentially favourably or unfavourable government
action (i.e., tax treatment) they may waste resources
through first; engaging in lobbying efforts; second,
engaging directly in politics to secure access to decision
making power; and/or third making plans to shift into or
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out of the affected activity (Buchanan, 1980, p.14).
Consequently, political intervention will create disorder
and depress efficiency below the social optimum. In other
words, free market transactions are the only way to
produce maximum efficiency and equal the social optimum.
That is to say, free market competition leads to the
dissipation of rents.
"If, however, governmental action moves
significantly beyond the limits defined by the
minimal or protective state, if government
commences, as it has done on a sweeping scale,
to interfere piecemeal in the market adjustment
process, the tendency toward the erosion or
dissipation of rents is countered and may be
wholly blocked" (ibid, p.9).
The role of the state in the economy, therefore, should be
minimized to one of protection only; namely the protection
of individual rights, persons and property, and the
enforcement of voluntarily-entered private contracts. In
Buchanan's (1986) words the reason is that,
"Predation or invasion of rights, whether actual
or potential, give rise to appeals to the
protective capacity of the state, or, with
uncertainty in rights definition, to potential
litigation" (Buchanan, 1986, p.92).
The public choice theory in its observation of the role of
the state does not believe in its three oft-quoted
functions and reasons: "Social objectives", "national
goals", and the "social welfare function" (ibid, p.87). It
follows that the role of the state in "distributional
justice" does not exist because, in the words of'Buchanan
(1986):
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"There is distribution of rights, endowments,
and claims among persons, along with
historically determined rules that dictate
limits on exchanges in such rights. The
distribution is an existential reality. It is
that which exists; there is, and could be, no
other" (Buchanan, 1986, p.271).
As a result the state will only provide equal opportunity
through its protective role. The question, which remains
unanswered in this theory, is whether such a role can be
provided for by a passive or minimalist state,
particularly in the context of developing countries?
Another aspect which does not enter into the analysis of
this school is that of transaction costs and their role in
institutional change. However, these factors form the
framework of the next theory.
1.4.4: Transaction Cost Theory and Institutional Change
There was no place for transaction costs in the analysis
of the previous two theories (trade and public choice).
This theory thus differs from the previous two through its
questioning of causes and origins of state intervention in
the market place or economic affairs in general. The main
assumption is that institutions are transaction- cost
minimizing arrangements which may alter and evolve over
time as a result of changes in the nature and sources of
transaction costs (North, 1989).
Transaction costs 2/ have three main dimensions, one of
21There are many definitions of transaction costs but
the general one is the costs which are involved in
contracting. These are the direct costs (information,
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which is concerned with their role in economic
organization. The main contributor to this literature is
Williamson (1975, 1979, 1981, 1985) who has combined the
concepts of bounded rationality and opportunistic
behaviour 22 . In this dimension, transaction cost analysis
provides an analytical framework for explaining
contractual choices 23 . This dimension is also related to
the literature of incomplete information, Stiglitz (1988,
1993), and to the "agency problem" (Jensen and Meckling,
1976) (Sappington, 1991) (Carlos, 1991). However, a model
developed by Laf font and Tirole (1991) linked an agency-
theoretic approach to interest-group politics through
government regulation.
In the second dimension, transaction costs are associated
with the property rights literature pioneered by the work
of Coase (1960), Alchian (1959, 1961), and (Demsetz, 1967)
[as cited in Nabli and Nukont, 1989, p.1336]. This
literature explains the effect of technological and
negotiation, communication) and the indirect costs
(monitoring, enforcing) of the contract. Also, it might
include ex ante costs arising from "adverse selection".
The latter means (within the context of insurance), that
people who accepted the insurance premium in a given
insurance programme will be those with insurance risks
exceeding the stated premium. Thus, it will affect the
financial viability of any given insurance programme.
220pportunistic behaviour occurs when one party in a
contract has the incentive to bend, circumvent or violate
the terms of contract at the expense of one' or more
parties included in the contract. Cheating, shirking and
opportunism explicitly or implicitly are all examples of
opportunistic behaviour (Williamson, 1975, 1985).
23For a study of the implications of this literature
on public policy see Miller (1993).
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pecuniary externalities on the evolution of institutional
mechanisms which internalize externalities. These
institutional mechanisms, called property rights, may
reduce conflict, introduce cooperation and both reduce
transaction costs (Nabli and Nugent, 1989, p.1336).
The third dimension related to the neoclassical political
economy is concerned with institutional change and its
effect on the performance of the economy. This literature
is based on the work of North (1981, 1986, 1989, 1991).
Here the definition of transaction costs is different from
that adopted by Williamson". They are described as the
cost of
"defining, protecting and enforcing the property
rights to goods (the right to use, the right to
derive income from the use of, the right to
exclude, and the right to exchange" (North,
1991, p.28).
In contrast to the assumption of the utility-maximizing
individuals adopted by the international trade theory and
the public choice theory, institutions in this approach
are the main factors which shape the repeated interaction
of individuals in the political, social and economic
structure% As a result institutions tend to create order
"This dimension of transaction cost is associated
with the University of Washington. Introduced by Cheung
(1974, 1983) and elaborated, modified and developed by
Barzel (1982,1989), Leffler and Klein (1981), Hashimoto
(1979) and North (1981, 1984) (as cited in North, 1991).
25Institutions are defined as "rules, enforcement
characteristics of rules, and norms of behaviour that
structure repeated human interaction (North, 1989,
p.1321).
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and reduce the uncertainty derived from cheating, shirking
and opportunism, which constrains the choices of
individuals (North, 1989, pp.1320-1321). Moreover, such
institutions will determine the degree of transaction and
production costs in a society.
In any structure of property rights, there will be
positive transaction costs but, with growing
specialization and division of labour, societies tend to
establish, specify and enforce a structure of property
rights which minimizes transaction costs.
In modern Western societies the establishment of well-
specified and well-enforced property rights led to high
rates of growth and development while in traditional
societies with dense social networks exchanges tend to be
personal. As no specified property rights exist,
transaction costs tend to be low while production costs
are high because of limited specialization and division of
labour. As a traditional society develops, the cost of
transacting will rise because information is costly and
asymmetrically held by the parties to exchange. The
incentives to cheat and indulge in free-riding will also
increase without specified property rights and this will
lead to imperfect markets.
The question is: who determines the specification and
enforcement of property rights? According to North, the
development of the state as a third, unbiased party is the
most important factor in the establishment and enforcement
of an efficient structure of property rights. The second
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factor is the development of norms to constrain the
parties in interaction where high measurement costs, even
with the existence of the government, pose problems (i.e.,
opportunistic behaviour) (North, 1989, p.1320).
North argues that
"the new institutional economics must not be
only a theory of property rights and their
evolution but a theory of the political process,
a theory of the state, and of the way in which
the institutional structure of the state and its
individuals specify and enforce property rights"
(North, 1986, p.233).
Effective government is, therefore, an essential factor in
economic performance, but the problem with the state, as
North observed in his study of the history of political
systems is that the rise of state power leads to the
production of an inefficient structure of property rights
and with it an unequal distribution of coercive power to
the advantage of special interest groups. There are two
reasons for such behaviour. The first is the transaction
costs constraint. Inefficient property rights provide an
easier system for raising revenue for the state with much
lower monitoring and collection costs. The second reason
is the powerful interest group constraint. In other words
rulers can seldom afford efficient property rights because
they may offend their constituents and risk their
security.
As a result such a structure of property rights does not
produce economic growth (North, 1991, p.7).
In comparison with world economic history the contemporary
state's role in developing countries is seen to be similar
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to the model which has prevailed throughout history.
"The opportunities for economic and political
entrepreneurs are still a mixed bag, but they
overwhelmingly favour activities that promote
redistributive rather than productive
activities, that create monopolies rather than
competitive conditions, and that restrict
opportunities rather than expand them" (ibid,
p.9).
The conclusion of this theory is that unless government
_ establishes, specifies and monitors an efficient system of
property rights, similar to those existing in the Western
world, free markets will not equate with efficiency.
Efficient markets require unbiased governments which build
in incentives to create and enforce efficient property
rights while minimizing transaction costs in order to
achieve growth and development.
The work of North (1981) led to another explanation for
the behaviour of the state. This rests on the rational-
choice assumption and in the literature is called the
predatory rule of the state (Levi, 1988) 26 . Levi studied
the history of state revenue production. She focused on
rulers as revenue maximizers subject to changing
constraints. She argued that "rulers are predatory in that
they try to extract as much revenue as they can from the
population" (Levi, 1988, p.3).
The constraints on rulers are similar to those introduced
by North as impeding the existence of efficient property
rights (transaction cost and bargaining power), but with
26For a more recent review of this literature see
Cammack (1992).
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an additional one described as the discount rate
constraint. The latter deals with rulers' calculations
through the time horizon of the value of present against
future revenues. Levi's argument is that rulers redesign
their structure and policies to achieve the goal of
revenue maximization.
"Rulers will design institutions that they
believe will be efficient in promoting their
interests (which may overlap-but need not-with
the general welfare or with the interests of a
dominant class). More specifically, within the
limits of the constraints upon them, they will
devise revenue production policies that maximize
revenues to the state. However, as relative
prices change, institutions that once
facilitated exchange may begin to hinder
exchange or reduce return. Rulers will then try
to redesign state structures and rewrite state
policies" (Levi, 1988, p.16).
For that reason the implication of this approach is that
the state through its rulers will establish a structure
which increases its bargaining power, reduces its
transaction costs, and lowers its discount rates in order
to capture gains from exchanges of politics.
However North's approach criticized public choice theory
for its assumption of individual rationality because the
latter should be understood within the context of
institutional factors which determine such behaviour
(North, 1991, p.108).
Public choice theory started from a given structure of
property rights which characterised the sphere of the
Western countries and consequently led to the minimization
of transaction costs, the key factor determining economic
performance. Thus, it was not free market and rational
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choices but efficient institutions which led to rational
choices based on efficient information and secured
exchange in the market place.
Institutional change occurs gradually rather than in the
form of revolutionary breaks with the past and a result of
change in relative prices. However, the interest group
factor as well as the calculation of the rulers plays an
important role in the construction of inefficient and
growth-hindered systems of property rights. Rulers may
initiate an institutional change without interest group
pressure if the factor of ideology is costless (North,
1981, p.53)( North, 1991, p.138).
Matthews (1986) argues that institutional change has made
a positive contribution to economic growth. But the
presumption that the pursuit of self-interest tends to
promote the evolution of efficient institutions is not
totally correct because the involvement of the state with
institutions is inherent (Matthews, 1986, p.910).
In comparison with the other NIE schools, this one is more
pragmatic. It does not disregard the role of the state and
can explain the existence of inefficient markets in
developing countries as well as the role of the state in
maintaining such inefficiency.
Moreover, even in the developed world the theory can
provide a good analytical framework for the assessment of
a governmental policy role.
Russer (1992) examined the factors behind the incoherence
of United States agricultural policy and observed that the
64
reason was the combined role of the government as both
predatory and productive. In behaving as a predatory, the
government will concentrate on policies leading to the
transfer and redistribution of wealth towards its interest
groups. Such behaviour does not lead to efficiency but
rather assists to acquire balance and secure political
power. On the other hand, other governmental activities
are concentrated on the efficiency factor. The combination
of both roles has led to the incoherence of the
agricultural policy in the United States.
In developing countries, studies in the development of
land property rights, such as Feeny's (1988), can
demonstrate how contrasting systems of property rights
have produced different responses to a common set of
relative prices. Feeny examined the spread of state
bureaucracy into the rural hinterlands of South and
Southeast Asia in the late 19th century. He argued that
market prices established the value of productive assets,
and a shift in market prices led to a change in the
relative valuation of assets. As the latter increased in
value, people responded by demanding security through a
share in the legal rights of the assets. As South and
Southeast Asia became drawn into the world economy in the
late 19th century, relative prices, which dominated in the
international market, started to dominate domestic
economies. Because the structure of prices favoured
agriculture, resources were directed towards establishing
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rights in land. This was because privately owned land
would be more efficient than one without property rights.
There was in other words a need for state intervention to
supply the demand for such rights. But the problem, as
addressed by North and Levi in the analysis above, is how
and why rulers provide efficient property rights. Feeny
found out that Thai officials who established the system
of property rights were themselves land owners. Thus, the
private interests of the bureaucrats as well as the rulers
led to the development of a new system of property rights.
Another study by Ruttan (1989) shows that changes in
relative resource endowment (i.e., population and land)
and technical change (i.e.,irrigation system and high-
yielding price varieties) lead to shifts in the demand for
institutional change. The supply of institutional
innovations responded to such new demands by a shift from
share to lease tenure in the ithilippines between 1966 and
1976. It brought about the emergence of a subtenancy
arrangement because the leasehold arrangement paid rents
to the landlord below the equilibrium rent (Ruttan, 1989,
p.1378). The emergence of another efficient resource
allocation system (gamma system), as a result of the
supply of complete private property rights, was an
institutional innovation "designed to reduce the wage rate
for harvesting to a level equal to the marginal
productivity of labour" (ibid, p.1378). However, such a
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system increased efficiency but not equity".
In summary, the neoclassical political economy or the NIE
has emphasised that "government failure" in development is
greater than the presumed "market failure". Thus, the role
of the state has to be minimized to provide a protective
role similar to the one advocated by Adam Smith more than
two centuries ago.
Although the analytical frameworks were different between
the different NIE theories, the shared belief of this
literature in liberalization, privatization and export-
oriented policies has led the international donor agencies
as well as the Western countries to support a market-
oriented approach toward development which minimized the
role of the state to that emphasised in the literature
discussed above. To support their claim the neoclassical
theorists have emphasised the story of success in the East
Asian countries as evidence for their theoretical
justification of less state and more market. Such views on
the role of the state in East Asian countries have come
under attack from a number of theorists who believe that
the governments of those countries had in fact played a
major role in development. Another dimension of this
literature has recommended a new role for the state in
development which is more than minimalist. This literature
"Bardhan (1989) provided an important review of the
empirical literature as well as a comparison between the
Marxist and Neo-Marxist theorists views with that of the
NIE school.
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underlines a counter-counterrevolution in development
economics.
1.5:  The Counter-Counterrevolution28
The story of development success in the East Asian
countries was one of the main factors in support of the
case of liberalization. It was perceived as the only cure
for the problems of development in developing countries.
Other economists, however, realized the importance of
government intervention in guiding the success of those
economies.
Wade (1990), in his theory of the governed market (GM),
has claimed that the high economic performance of East
Asian countries was the result of a level and composition
of investment different from that which free market
policies per se, and interventionist policies per se would
have produced. The role of the state was a combination of
direct investment in certain key industries in the initial
phase of development and a package of policies which
employed certain incentives, controls, and mechanisms to
spread risk. The latter role enables the government to
guide or govern the market processes of resource
allocation in order to achieve efficient investment and
production results. Contrary to what neoclassical
political economists argued Wade said that
"The term has been used by Krugman (1993).
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"Government policies deliberately got some
prices "wrong", so as to change the signals to
which decentralized market agents responded, and
also used non price means to alter the behaviour
of market agents. The resulting high level of
investment generated fast turnover of machinery,
and hence fast transfer of newer technology into
actual production" (Wade, 1990, p.29).
Thus, it was not simply "get the price right" and a
minimum role for the state that resulted in the
exceptional achievements of those countries.
As Luedde-Neurath (1988) argued, it is the "directive" as
opposed to "promotional" forms of state intervention that
led to the Korean success (Luedde-Neurath, 1988, p.102).
Cases of important state intervention can be found in
other East Asian countries such as Singapore, Taiwan and
Hong Kong (Appelbaum and Henderson, 1992).
The other, and perhaps the most important, state
intervention was the "land reform" programme to
redistribute agricultural land in the initial phase of
development (Wade, 1990) (Koo and Kim, 1992). This land
reform has led to the elimination of the landlord class
and to the creation of a relatively egalitarian class
structure. Sachs (1989) argued (as cited in JR.James,
1992) that the broad distribution of land in East Asian
countries has contributed to the adoption of an outward-
oriented industrialization while in the case of Latin
American countries the unequal distribution of land led to
a resistance against the devaluation of exchange rates
because that would have result in the transfer of income
from workers and capitalists to a small elite of
landlords. Thus, in Latin American countries, overvalued
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exchange rates continued ISI policies which ultimately led
to the failure of economic development in Latin America
(JR.James, 1992, p.247).
Morris and Adelman (1989) also observed, in their
comparative quantitative study of 19th century economic
development, that development is more dependent on
effective initial institutions and human resources than on
other major sources of growth (i.e., market systems,
export policies and capital inflows). As a result the
shift in development strategy towards free markets and
export orientation can impose losses on the majority of
the population "if pursued in countries where institutions
cause a very narrow distribution of the proceeds from
economic change" (Morris and Adelman, 1989, p.1428). Thus,
the role of the state in East Asian countries has to be
understood through the study of their institutional
designs and the historical institutional changes which
have provided the basis for their success.
While the problem of the neoclassical political economy is
its concentration on the extent of state intervention
there is a need to concentrate on the quality of that
intervention (Bardhan, 1990)(Israel, 1991).
To provide an example, Krueger (1990) argued that
"government failure" in developing countries was due to
two reasons, the first being commission (widespread state
intervention in productive activities) and the second
omission (deterioration of the infrastructure). The
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solution according to Krueger is to understand the
comparative advantages of state intervention. In large
scale activities such as infrastructure and the provision
of information the state is in a good position to
intervene successfully. However, Krueger is one of the
strong advocates of a minimalist state role. The question,
therefore, is whether the comparative advantage activities
of the state as advocated by Krueger can be carried out by
a passive or minimalist state?
One of the major characteristics of the market is that it
cannot by itself create the appropriate industries, or
strategic investment. Thus, there is a need for direct
government intervention. However, government intervention
in the production process has to be decided pragmatically.
In the Korean case the government intervenes through its
SOEs for three reasons. Firstly it intervenes if there are
no private parties willing to take the risk; secondly,
there is a desire to exercise control over an industry
with multiple linkages; and thirdly, there is the
expectation that the negotiation position of the state
with foreign parties is better than that of private
investors, particularly in the supply of capital and
technology (Westphal, 1990).
Such intervention, had the Korean government followed the
recommendation of the neoclassical political economists,
would never have been achieved.
One of the major advantages from such intervention was the
apparent success in the process of learning and acquiring
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technological capabilities which, as Bardhan said, "belong
to the core of the development process" (Bardhan, 1990,
p.4).
Another important dimension in this literature is the
importance of understanding the main focus to be the
organizational structure and institutions rather than
getting the price right. The failure of the earlier high
development theory in identifying the informational
problem at the micro level and the neoclassical political
economy in identifying the problems of externalities leads
to different conclusions on the role of the state if they
are taken into account in the analysis; namely that the
role of government in establishing non-market institutions
is necessary to solve the problems of information,
coordination and externalities, particularly in the
context of developing countries. That is to say, in
developed countries many of the externalities are
internalized by non-market institutions (Stiglitz, 1989)
(Bardhan, 1990). This was the case in South Korea where
the relationship between the government and large private
enterprises constituted a quasi-internal organization. The
same could be said about Korea's financial system. It was
an internal capital market which allocated the resources
more efficiently than would have been possible in a free-
market financial system (Lee, 1992). In the same context,
Doner (1992) argued that the institutional approach should
understand the state as a component of the institutional
arrangement rather than as an exogenous actor.
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Thus, the role of the state in development is both to
reduce the wastage of resources and to initiate the
institutional building process. In other words there is a
need for the cooperation of rather than the domination of
the state. To achieve broader institutionalism there is a
need for a framework which combines private and public
sector arrangements, appreciates the coalitional bases of
such arrangements, and observes the importance of
providing political support for local firms as well as
pressurizing them to use market forces (Donar, 1992,
p.401).
As Datta-Chaudhuri (1990) argued, economic agents "do not
always correctly perceive the various trade or
technological possibilities open to them" (Datta-
Chaudhuri, 1990, p.33). However, the possibility of
successful state intervention cannot be generalized in all
cases. The justification will depend on the composition of
interest groups and their affect on the allocation of
resources. In the cases of South Korea and Taiwan, those
interest groups were directed more towards productive than
distributional activities (Castells, 1992) so they have
not only increased their share of the aggregate output but
also increased the size of the aggregate output itself for
the society.
The analysis of economic performance in South East Asian
countries has to be related to another important concept
of the state. That is the concept of "strong" and "soft"
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states".
In economic terms, strong states would be expected to be
more effective in taking correct economic decisions with
little regard for their political and social consequences.
Soft states, on the other hand, would employ ineffective
regulatory policies to protect incomes and avoid social
conflict. Thus, in Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan where
the states have been authoritarian and strong, high
economic records have been achieved. In India and Mexico
on the other hand, soft states have led to ineffective
intervention and increased corruption. It follows that
free-market oriented policies have more need for a strong
state than for a soft one and consequently the state has
to move beyond the limits of the minimalist state
advocated by the neoclassical political economists. This
inconsistency is apparent in this quotation from Lal
(1983) who said that in order to achieve efficiency " a
courageous, ruthless and perhaps undemocratic government
is required to ride roughshod over the newly-created
special interest groups"(Lal, 1983, p.33). Such
characteristics of government have to be viewed in the
context of North's analysis of the state. The result will
be an authoritarian government with an inefficient
property rights structure.
"The concept is attributed to Myrdal (1968) who
observed that the states of South Asian countries were not
effective in their performance because of their
undisciplined societies which need stronger states to
enforce the rules and regulations and achieve better
economic performance (Myrdal, 1970, pp.229-230).
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Fishlow (1991) contended that the capacity of autonomous
and developmental states in South East Asia has to be
understand within their institutional and historical
context. In comparison with Latin American countries the
public sector in the East Asian countries "was not an
employer of last resort, nor was it weakened by lack of
access to resources" (Fishlow, 1991, p.167)
_
Another attack on the neoclassical political economy
approach came from Banuri (1991). He argued that the main
deficiency of the neoclassical approach was its failure to
assess the conditions under which the state can play a
positive role.
"Beyond creating (minimalist) rules to enhance
the market, there is no policy advice. Nor,
except for resort to authoritarian tutelage, is
there guidance about creating and sustaining
political support, even for liberalization"
(Banuri, 1991, p.12).
Unlike, the neoclassical political economy Shapiro and
Taylor (1990) explained the conditions which delimit
appropriate strategic choices for the state. These
conditions are country size, internal vs. external
constraints, wages and income distribution, fiscal and
managerial capability of the state, industrial heritage,
and finally productivity growth and access to technology.
They argued that there is a peculiar asymmetry in the DUP
model. While they successfully presented the argument that
market failure is not automatically a justification for
government intervention, because it may produce even worse
results, they neglected to state that "government failure"
cannot justify the argument for a free market.
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"Whereby individuals coalesce to force a
political redistribution, but do not do the same
in the market place. The political arena is
depicted full of lobbyists and cartel builders,
while the economy is presented as being more or
less subject to competition" (Shapiro and
Taylor, 1990, p.876).
Taylor's (1991) expectation is that the development
strategy of the next decade will be inward-looking. Lack
of access to external sources of capital, particularly for
heavily indebted countries, and a growing protectionism in
the Northern countries may lead developing countries,
especially small and poor ones, to lack the necessary
stimulus for their development process.
Thus, there is a need for more government investment in
the agricultural sector to encourage private investment
(Taylor, 1993). A similar emphasis on government role in
the agricultural sector was raised by Adelman (1984). She
argues that a strategy of agricultural-demand-led
industrialization (ADLI) might prove to be more efficient
than a strategy of export-led growth, after the initial
stages of industrial development, in most middle-income
countries and large low income countries.
The role of the state through direct investment programmes
can enhance the supply of the domestic agricultural sector
(surplus creation rather than surplus extraction).
The argument in favour of the need for government
provision of infrastructural investment was also advocated
by Fenichel and Smith (1992) in their study of the failure
of integrated rural development in Zambia. They argued
that
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"The argument that agricultural problems in
Zambia, and other developing countries, are due
to market distortions caused by government
intervention ignores too many factors that bear
of farming efficiency" (Fenichel and Smith,
1992, p.1318).
Another advocate of an important role for the state within
the context of rural development is Chambers (1991). He
argued that the universal functions of the state are to
.maintain peace and the democratic rule of law, provide a
basic infrastructure and services, and manage the economy.
Another dimension in the literature of counter-
counterrevolution is a theoretical one. Krugman (1993)
argues that recent neoclassical literature has neglected
the importance of externalities and linkages for the
economy". The blind advocation of free market policies
and the emphasis on "government failure" in development
has directed the literature away from the high development
theory of the 1940s and 1950s. Krugman argues that the
theoretical ideas of external economies, strategic
complementarities, and economic development, which have
been forgotten, may continue to have practical
applications and should be revived. He has explained that
the failure of formalizing models in support of the high
development theory and the failure of the
industrialization idea as the essence of development were
the major reasons for neglecting the 1940s and 1950s
theories of development.
"Similar argument produced by Taylor (1991, p.109).
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Krugman's model of forward and backward linkages shows
that the concentration of manufacturing industries in one
region is due to factors of allocation (interaction of
economies of scale with transportation costs) in the
larger market (backward linkages) and the desire of
workers to have access to goods produced by other workers
(forward linkages) (Krugman, 1991). Also, the greater the
_
degree of economies of scale, the stronger the tendency
towards concentration (Krugman, 1993).
This model helps to emphasise the important role of
government promotion policies in directing investment
towards rural areas in order to induce the development of
such regions, which depends on the strategic
complementarity argument.
Another model has emphasised the important role of
pecuniary externalities in escaping the no-
industrialization trap in small economies. This was
introduced by Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989). This
model explored Rosenseteir-Rodan's idea of the big push
and introduced it in a formal model. It explained how
economies with small domestic markets could expand their
markets in order to escape the no-industrialization trap.
The focus of the model was on the contribution of
industrialization of one sector to expanding the size of
the market for other sectors. Such an analysis gives rise
to an important role for the state in coordinating
investments across sectors which is essential for
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industrialization.
The argument of the model is that the profit factor alone
cannot induce firms to invest as they lack the advantages
of economies of scale (the market size constraint). The
result is a no-industrialization trap. On the other hand,
a firm which employs labour from the traditional sector
will enlarge the market of other firms by increasing wage
- income and consequently the demand for manufactured goods.
As a result
"a programme that encourages industrialization
in many sectors simultaneously can substantially
boost income and welfare even when investment in
any one sector appears unprofitable" (Murphy, et
al., 1989, p.1024).
The second theme of the argument is concerned with another
important pecuniary externality. That is the one generated
by investment in "jointly used intermediate goods" such as
infrastructural investment and investment in training
facilities (ibid, p.1006). State provision of such
investment is necessary, and its high fixed cost would be
reduced if industrialization took place. This latter is
possible because many firms will use the facilities and
enable the government to recover costs, if not necessarily
show a profit.
The spirit of this model is consistent with that of high
development theory. The emphasis on externalities, and on
economies of scale, were important factors in the theories
of the 1940s and 1950s. Such a model seems to run counter
to the minimal state role in neoclassical political
economy.
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Another criticism of the neoclassical political economy
stems from the literature of the new growth theory (Romer,
1986). Romer assumes that the social returns on investment
are higher than private returns because of external
economies. In this model, technological externalities are
the driving force for long-term growth. However, these
externalities arise through the accumulation of knowledge
- (endogenous technological change). Exogenous technological
change is ruled out of the model. The consequence is that
any intervention by the state which results in shifting
"the allocation of current goods away from consumption and
toward research will be welfare-improving" (Romer, 1986,
p.1026). The role of the state in raising beneficial
technological externalities is important for long-term
growth, by fostering investment in knowLedge and human
capital. Such an argument contradicts the minimal state
argument of neoclassical political economy.
The implication of these models, as Krugman (1993) argues,
is that the economic theory of the free market is not
always the best but that "there is an intellectually solid
case for some government promotion of industry" (Krugman,
1993, p.32). Also, there is a need for a reorientation of
research towards failures of both market and government
rather than just on "government failure" alone.
Streeten (1993) pointed out Adam Smith's admission that
rent-seeking is also common in the private sector and that
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government action may contribute to its elimination.
Policies such as anti-monopoly and anti-cartel
legislation, import liberalization and the introduction of
competition in the public sector are examples of such anti
rent-seeking. He also refers to Baghwati's argument that
the creation of new rents can reduce or altogether destroy
existing rents and existing rent-seeking activities
(Streeten, 1993, p.1292)31.
Another criticism of rent-seeking theory (within the
context of rural villages in Asian countries) was provided
by Lipton (1989). He argued that there is a rent-avoiding
process which runs in parallel with rent-seeking
behaviour. For example, villagers can reduce the rent
payable to the local monopolistic moneylender, by
searching for alternatives which reduce their dependency
on rents (e.g., by adopting a less credit-intensive
product mix). Thus, the rent would be reduced (Lipton,
1989, p.1564).
Streeten's and Lipton's analyses provide arguments against
the case for the minimalist state. In the final analysis
Streeten argues that "for the proper working of markets,
strong, and in many cases expanded state intervention (of
the right kind, in the right area) is necessary"
(Streeten, 1993, p.1281). What is needed is a fundamental
structural change, a redistribution of assets and of
access to power which neither the market alone, nor a
31For further criticism of the theory of rent-seeking
and DUP activities review Samuels and Mercuro (1984),
McPherson (1984), and Miller (1992).
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neutral state, can provide. Hamilton (1989) argued that
the theoretical generalization about the value of
liberalization in Third World countries is incorrect
because the institutional differences between Western and
Third World countries are far greater than those assumed
by the theory. Furthermore, he believed that
liberalization is irrelevant within the context of
developing countries where the need is more for an
institution building process to enhance economic
efficiency.
It is surprising that agencies such as the World Bank have
been advocating free market policies, and arguing for the
simultaneous eradication of poverty and an increase in
participation of the poor in growth (World Bank, 1990?. In
the face of such asymmetric advice, there is a need for a
minimalist state for the first and an interventionist
state for the second. The poor lack access to assets and
particularly land. This implies a need for a better and
more equitable asset distribution which has to be
initiated by the state. The latter is what Bhagwati (1988)
argued for when he advocated a minimalist state. It is
difficult to see consistency between such different
suggestions.
The following quotation from Banuri (1991) suggests a
reason for "government failure" in development. He said
that
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"The failure of a state does not derive from its
refusal to adhere to a theoretical dogma. On the
contrary; it derives, in the short run, from its
abandonment of the goal of governance in favour
of theoretical certitudes; and in the long run,
from its inability or unwillingness to create or
modify institutions to facilitate the management
of conflicts which are forever changing in the
form and intensity" (Banuri, 1991, p.36).
1.6:  Conclusion 
.In this chapter, a survey of the literature on the role of
the state in development suggests that the theoretical
analysis is problematic. This derives from the complexity
of the subject itself. However, it is possible that the
literature is moving into a cyclical pattern as observed
by Hirschman (1982).
During the 1940s and 1950s, development economists
explained the process of development in terms of growth,
industrialization and capital accumulation but there was
no analysis of the institutional context for such
development. However, the failure to carry out successful
industrialization in developing countries, has led the
literature of high development theory to be put aside in
favour of the neoclassical approach to development. The
problem with this approach is that it provides a
generalized approach based on the belief in a minimalist
state. However, the introduction of the New Institutional
Economics (NIE) has provided a good analytical framework
for understanding the role of the state as one of the
several institutions which has to be included in the
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theoretical argument32.
The problem was that the state in some of the schools
(i.e, public choice and DUP) became an exogenous rather
than an endogenous actor in development. In other theories
such as transaction costs and property rights, the state
was employed in the analysis of institutional change. The
result was an abandonment of the concepts of externalities
and strategic complementarity towards one concentrated on
"government failure" caused by competitive rent seeking
and the collective action of special interest groups. The
consequences of this analysis became apparent in forcing
developing countries to adopt free market policies as a
reaction against government failure.
The recent literature of the 1990s shows that a minimalist
state cannot provide the conditions required by the
neoclassical political economists. The emphasis has been
placed on understanding the reason behind the development
success of the East Asian countries. Free market policies
appear to have been not the only reason for such success;
other interventionist policies have also been required. It
is necessary to understand each country's special
circumstances because the late-comers' conditions and
challenges may be entirely different from those which have
already achieved successful development. A revitalization
of the economic concepts used in the high development
theory of the 1940s and 1950s might provide a good guide
32For a sophisticated discussion of the importance of
the new institutional economics in evaluating the role of
the state, read Handoussa (1993).
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for a new role of the state in development. It will be
different from the previous role and better in the quality
of actions. However, decision makers should look for long-
term objectives rather than depend on policies for short-
term goals. The role of the state then becomes strategic
rather than crisis-driven.
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2.1: Introduction
In the preceding chapter it was asserted that the role of
the state in development has expanded, partially, through
the intellectual dominance of the high development theory
during the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s. One of the major
consequences of this theoretical dominance was the
creation of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the
developed and developing countries. Such a theoretical
explanation provides only one side of the economic
rationale for the role of the state. Another analytical
tool which can assist in understanding the expansion of
the public sector in mixed economies derives from the
theory of public economics.
Thus, the chapter will commence by presenting the
theoretical justification for the allocative role of the
state.
The 1950s, 1960s and 1970s were characterized by a rapid
expansion of the public sector in the developing countries
similar to that which had taken place in Europe during the
1940s. Within this context the subsequent section will
respond to the following questions: What were the main
reasons for such an expansion? Did they reflect a
theoretical dogma or did other factors have a significant
impact on the process? Were the reasons for the growth of
the public sector identical in all developing countries?
In relation to privatization which represents the main
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subject under investigation, the thesis will adopt two
concepts of privatization which serve two main objectives.
The first objective is the effect of privatization
policies on the economic performance of SOEs. In this
domain privatization is defined as the transfer of
ownership and/or control (whole or partial) from the state
to the private sector. This definition of privatization
does not include SOE reform programmes or deregulation and
liberalization policies because these necessitate neither
a change in control and ownership nor a change in the
source of supply for goods and services. Such a definition
employs the term privatization simply as a means of
divestiture.
The second objective of the thesis is to analyze the
effect of privatization on economic development within the
context of decentralization. In this domain, privatization
is considered to be functional decentralization, as
opposed to territorial decentralization, namely the
decentralization of decision making from the state to the
market.
This chapter will employ exclusively the first definition
of privatization in order to study the effect of ownership
change.
The analysis will be divided into two major fields.
The first will provide a review of the empirical evidence
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regarding the performance of public enterprises in
developing countries with the aim of establishing whether
the record of public enterprise performance worldwide
provides solid and conclusive evidence for the superiority
of private ownership. It will also examine whether
profitability means economically efficient.
The second area of investigation will be the economics of
privatization within the context of ownership change.
The purpose of this chapter is to argue that the really
significant differences in efficiency lie not in the realm
of ownership change but in the institutions which affect
the degree of competition in the market.
2.2: The Allocative Role of the State
Traditionally, the economic analysis of SOE pricing and
investment policies was concerned with allocative
efficiency and thus had a welfare economics orientation.
The theory of public economics justifies the allocative
role of the state in those activities which escape market
logic. This is referred to as pareto efficiency.
Pareto efficiency is the optimum allocation of resources
where no one individual can be made better off without
another individual being made worse off. Pareto efficiency
rests on the assumption of a competitive equilibrium. This
latter is a set of outputs, inputs and prices of factors
and commodities where producers cannot increase their
profits at the prevailing equilibrium prices with the
available production technology. Nor can consumers improve
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their welfare because of their budget constraints. Both
require that there is no excess in demand or supply of any
commodity or factors which would affect equilibrium
prices.
This pareto efficiency can only be achieved under certain
conditions such as output priced at the marginal cost of
production, no economies of scale, absence of
externalities in production or consumption, divisibility,
absence of risk and uncertainty in both technology and
taste'.
Market Failure 
When the market of any economy fails to meet the
conditions required for pareto efficiency (first-best
solution), government intervention, at least in principle,
will be justified to correct the failure of the market
(the second-best solution). Thus, government will
intervene when the competitive market mechanism fails to
provide an efficient allocation of resources.
The causes of "market failure" are traditionally grouped
into four main categories, namely the existence of public
goods and externalities, economies of scale, information
symmetries, and uncertainty. These four causes of "market
failure" imply two different kinds of state intervention
leading to state ownership in the first two groups and
regulatory intervention in the second two. However, it is
'For a more detailed analysis of the conditions of
pareto efficiency, see Brown and Jackson (1990, pp.18-24).
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difficult to draw the demarcation line separating state
intervention through direct production from intervention
through regulation because this will depend on the
judgement of policy makers as to what is appropriate to
correct a "market failure"2.
Traditionally, state ownership has been justified mainly
on the grounds of public goods production and on the
existence of a natural monopoly. The main reason for a
failure to produce public goods is lack of cooperation
between individuals in the market place. The main
characteristics of public goods and externalities are non-
excludability and non-rivalness in consumption.
In the case of public goods these characteristics lead to
the free-rider problem where individuals cannot be
excluded from the consumption of such goods (e.g. a
lighthouse) while non-rivalness derives from the
indivisibility character of these goods as well as the
zero opportunity cost for the marginal user which means
that the price of public goods should be nil (e.g. a non-
crowded bridge). As a result governments will provide
these goods because the market itself will fail to
allocate them efficiently as they are unattractive to
private entrepreneurs. In the case of externalities, the
market will fail to produce goods associated with external
economies (e.g. health, education, infrastructure) while
over-supplying goods which imply external diseconomies
2For example in the United State policy makers tend to
intervene through regulations, while in other countries,
such as Britain, through direct ownership.
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(e.g. pollution). The reason for "market failure" in these
cases derives from the high transaction costs of
introducing voluntary agreement between individuals and
the lack of well defined property rights which can
preclude the free-rider problem (Demsetz, 1967) (Demsetz,
1988).
The second reason for state or public ownership derives
from economies of scale or what is called the existence of
decreasing cost industries. In this case the market
solution of production through several producers would be
inefficient ( bearing in mind the size of the market)
because marginal cost pricing in such industries will not
cover the cost. As a result, producers will cut production
and increase prices leading to a departure from the first
best conditions of pareto efficiency. As a result,
governments will act directly on such industries through
direct ownership in order to employ pricing policy rules
which can achieve a more efficient allocation of
resources. However, this solution is inferior to the
direct regulation of mGnopolies (Rees, 1989, pp.29-44).
The direct provision of public utilities (e.g. water,
electricity) is an example of such an allocative role for
the state. However, in addition to economies of scale,
many natural monopolies possess economies of scope which
arise from the joint use of a central facility for the
production of different products (Brown and Jackson, 1990,
p.44). Governments invest in infrastructure facilities
because of such characteristics.
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It could be said that the theoretical justification for
state ownership rests on allocative efficiency
considerations rather than those of technical or
productive efficiency. The latter are concerned with
minimizing input requirements or costs for a given level
of output. However, allocative efficiency will be violated
in the absence of technical efficiency although the
converse does not hold. In other words technical
efficiency is a necessary condition for allocative
efficiency, but the latter is not a necessary condition
for the former.
Privatization has therefore been introduced as a means of
achieving technical efficiency based on the assumption
that SOEs do not operate in a cost-minimization manner.
Before presenting the theoretical justification for
privatization, it is important to investigate the reasons
vindicating the creation and expansion of the state sector
in developing countries and to establish whether market
failure was the main reason behind the expansion of SOEs.
Is it possible to treat the public sectors in those
countries in a similar manner or is there variance in
their age and structure?
2.3: The Origins of Public Sector Growth
The expansion of the public sector in developing countries
has been a feature of the post WW2 era and theoretically
more symmetric with the influence of the development
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theories throughout the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s. But, there
is a difference between the approach advocated by the
theory of public economics, as discussed in the previous
section, and that of development theories.
In the theory of public economics, public sector
activities are subjected to the achievement of pareto
efficiency and its aim, therefore, is to define the
minimum position that the public sector should occupy in
a market economy. Such a context, by contrast, cannot be
found in the high development theory which is concerned
with generating economic surplus, filling the gaps in
private investment, and pursuing economic and social
objectives. Nevertheless, there are activities where both
theoretical approaches allowed to be provided through the
public sector (i.e. infrastructure, public utilities).
Thus, the allocative role of the state which stems from
the theory of public economics excludes the historical
background to the formation of the public sector as well
as the dynamic play of the institutional factors which
were behind its creation in different developing
countries.
2.3.1 :Nationalization 
After political independence, many developing countries
nationalized enterprises owned by foreigners and the
wealthy upper classes. Nationalization was seen as a major
component in the drive towards economic independence and
one of its consequences was the expansion of the public
95
sector.
However, the history of nationalization differs from
country to country. In Latin America the process started
during the 1930s (e.g. Mexico and Bolivia) while in Africa
and Asia it began after the period of political
independence, that is during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s
(e.g. Tanzania, and members of OPEC). Thus, the age of the
public sector in those countries is not the same.
The economic case for nationalization was based on
increasing the saving ratio and obtaining the rents
derived from natural resources which had previously been
absorbed by foreign companies. When nationalizing local
private enterprises the aim was to reduce the consumption
of the upper class elite and redirect the resources
towards public investment. Yaf fey argued that:
"The requisite circumstances are, first, that
the elite formerly enjoyed relatively high
incomes; second, that they enjoyed a high
average propensity to consume; and third, that
the new system can make effective use of the
funds diverted into national development
budgets" [(Yaffey, 1969) as cited in (Yaffey,
1992, p.3)].
Nationalization had, therefore, played a significant role
in raising state revenue on the one hand and supporting
the expansion of the public sector on the other.
Furthermore, a recent econometric study conducted by
Andersson and Brannas (1992) on the relationship between
nationalization and foreign investment flows to 13
developing countries revealed a positive relationship
between nationalization and investment flows, particularly
during the peak period of nationalization in the 1970s.
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However, the authors also stated that the factor of heavy
indebtedness in some developing economies impeded
investment flows and thus counterbalanced the positive
effects of nationalization.
Nationalization was, therefore, an important means for the
leaders of developing countries to increase foreign
exchange revenue as well as to attract new foreign
investments.
2.3.2: The Ideological and Political Factors 
In developing countries many leaders were influenced by
socialist thinking, and particularly by the Soviet model
of industrialization.
In India, the expansion of SOEs was seen as the only way
to achieve industrialization and economic independence
(Mulji, 1990). Investment in heavy industries and
increasing state intervention in other economic sectors
also derived from the notion of building a new national
identity and self-sufficiency.
Government was seen as the representative of the people
and its owning the means of production was a notion of
anti-capitalist exploitation.
On the other hand, public sector expansion also enabled
the rulers of the newly independent states to exercise
control. The legitimacy of the ruler or the government
derived from popular support for Pan-Nationalism
(Sandbrook, 1988). In this way emphasis on socialist
planning was an essential ingredient in the public
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ideology of countries heavily embarked on statist,
integrative programmes of national development and
control.
Yet, this model of an interventionist state was inherited
from the colonial powers. Nellis commented on Sub-Saharan
Africa that "the national elites which came to power...
were thoroughly accustomed to a legally strong,
hierarchically intrusive governing system" (Nellis, 1986,
pp.12-13). In some developing countries this factor played
a major role in increasing the number of SOEs. However, it
may be inappropriate to generalize such a factor to all
developing countries because most Latin American states,
for example, did not believe in socialism. Furthermore,
during the 19th century and also the beginning of the 20th
century, the Latin American region was an integral part of
the world economy through its adoption of export-led
development (Trebat, 1983). As a result, the private
sector was an important participant in the development of
the region until the end of the 1930s.
Such arguments demonstrate that the ideology of developing
countries differed widely between the regions as well as
within countries of the same region.
2.3.3:The Commanding Heights of the Economy
One of the reasons behind the expansion of the public
sector in developing countries was the need to control the
commanding heights of the economy. These heights are the
key sectors of the economy which can stimulate
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industrialization and growth and as a result cannot be
left in the hands of the private sector (Vernon, 1988,
pp.10-11). In infrastructural activities ( such as the
generation and distribution of energy, transportation and
communication) and the heavy industries (such as oil and
petrochemicals) control of the public sector is seen as
essential for the provision of external economies and
strategic complementarities which can encourage investment
in other sectors (Powell, 1987, p.6).
Another justification for state control of the commanding
heights was that it supported the facilitation of long-
term economic planning and provided a substitute for
market forces by establishing priorities for the
development of major activities and sectors in the economy
(Rees, 1989, p.5) 3 . In Mexico, for example, the government
tried to made a distinction between strategic and priority
sectors. In the former (e.g. oil extraction, refining,
basic petrochemicals) the public sector obtained an
exclusive monopoly position for their operations while in
the priority sectors (e.g. different medium industries)
the state acted as the driving or the organizational force
and obtained the right to act alone or in co-operation
with the private or social sectors (Bouin and Michalet,
1992, p.38).
The argument of the commanding heights is an application
3This is not the case in all developing countries. In
some countries the international aid agencies, such as the
World Bank, demanded and insisted on a plan even though the
planners themselves had little confidence in economic
planning (Low, 1990, p.290)
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of the theory of "market failure" in the provision of
public goods and externalities as well as the ownership of
natural monopolies. However, it is difficult to be sure
whether the leaders of developing countries were in fact
influenced by this theoretical justification provided by
the theory of public economics.
2.3.4:  Industrialization and Modernization 
As the preceding chapter has shown, the development
theories of the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s emphasised that the
problems of development could be solved if saving and
investment were directed towards the expansion of the
industrial (modern) sector. The creation of a modern and
diversified economy was analogous to breaking the bonds of
dependence, saving and earning more foreign exchange and
enhancing employment opportunities so as to provide income
and promote the living standards of the population (Nixon,
1990, pp.312-313).
In most developing countries the state was the only
appropriate candidate for such a role. Large investment
was needed to build a modern industrial sector, for which
the private sector possessed neither the resources nor the
willingness to take risks in new technological activities.
The consequence was heavy investment in capital intensive
industries on the basis of modernization rather than the
appropriateness of such technologies to the special
features of each country. As a result SOEs in developing
countries were characterized by higher rates of capital
100
intensity ratio4 . To measure the capital intensity of
SOEs, we have used the ratio "share of gross fixed capital
formation" to the "share of GDP at factor cost". The
capital intensity ratio of SOEs varied sharply between the
developed and developing countries. While it was 1 for the
SOEs in 17 industrialized countries, it was about 3 for
the SOEs of 55 developing countries during the period
1974-19775.
Moreover, there were differences between regions as table
(2.1) shows. While in Asia and the Western Hemisphere the
capital intensity ratio was about 3.5, it was about 2 in
the African countries.
Table 2.1
The Capital Intensity Ratio of State-Owned Enterprises
(SOEs) in Developing Countries Regions During 1974-1977.
Developing countries
regions
Capital intensity
ratio for SOEs*
1.Africa 1.9
2.Asia 3.5
3.Western Hemisphere 3.4
Source: calculated by employing the data in
Short (1984, pp.116-122).
* Capital intensity ratio = Share of SOEs in
fixed capital formation /share of SOEs in GDP at
factor cost.
The sample comprised 17 African countries, 11 Asian
countries, and 22 countries from the Western
Hemisphere.
4The capital intensity ratio means the share of total
capital employed to the total value added or the total
output of an economic activity.
5Calculated by employing the data in Short (1984,
pp.116-122).
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Another dimension is the distinctive features and
circumstances under which import substitution
industrialization was adopted in different developing
countries.
In Latin American countries, for example, there was a
unique combination of early political independence and
early integration into the international capitalist
economy through the production and export of primary
products. Their economies before the end of the 1930s were
managed on the basis of "laissez-faire" and export-led
growth. However, the ISI policy was adopted because of the
negative consequences resulting from such integration,
namely the severe impact of the Great 19305 Depression on
those countries. Export revenues declined by 50-80 percent
leading to a sharp decline in the GNP (Cammack, et al.,
1993, p.75).
The depression and the negative impact of WW2 disturbed
the import channels to the region from the industrial
countries. ISI and the subsequent expansion of the public
sector were a reaction aimed at reducing a vulnerable
dependence on the international market. In other words,
industrialization was seen as a way of survival in an
unstable world.
In Africa and Asia, on the other hand, states were
dependent on foreign exchange from agricultural and/or
mineral exports. Industrialization was seen as a way of
ending their economic dependency whether on cash crops,
such as cocoa and coffee, or minerals such as copper,
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bauxite and oil. The fluctuation in the prices of such
primary products was another reason behind government
policies of economic diversification through
industrialization.
As a result the share of public enterprises in total
output and investment increased in most developing
countries but in varying proportions as, table (2.2)
depicts.
Table 2.2
Public Enterprises Share of GDP and Investment
in Developing Countries Regions During
1976-1982
Indicator
t
PEs share
(%)
Range (%)
l d
Number of
countries
GDP
Africa 15 4-48 18
Asia 3 1-7 6
Latin America 12 2-28 8
Investment (GDI or GFCF)
Africa 25 8-54 12
Asia 17 10-56 9
Latin America 19 7-47 17
Source: Swanson and Wolde-Semait (1989, p.8).
In the sample countries, it appears that African countries
PEs represented the highest share in both output and
investment.
However, the data itself does not explain the reasons
behind the expansion of the PEs in developing countries.
The reasons for the expansion of the public sector in
Latin American countries were different from those in
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Africa and Asia although both were motivated by the
necessity of reducing their dependency on western
industrialized countries.
2.3.5:Raising Revenue and the Control of Natural Resources 
In countries with a limited tax base, there are few
choices for the government regarding the collection of
revenues sufficient to meet financial obligations on the
one hand and achieve economic development on the other.
In Europe this argument led to the establishment of state
monopolies in commodities such as salt and tobacco in
order to tax consumption indirectly (Shackelton, 1986). In
developing countries, state monopolies were required in a
wider range of activities.
In addition to monopolizing industries such as tobacco,
sugar, and alcoholic beverages, SOEs were established to
control potentially profitable activities in the
industrial sector, particularly in the extractive
industries (e.g. petroleum refining, fertilizer). This is
because per capita income in such countries is low and
shrinks the revenue generated from the tax itself. On the
other hand, developing countries are characterised by weak
direct taxation systems. These require high transaction
costs as well as an efficient institutional base. The cost
of creating an efficient tax system was too high in
comparison with the expected revenues. Governments,
therefore, believed that SOEs would provide a successful
alternative source of increased income, particularly in
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the extractive sector, the main source of foreign
exchange.
2.3.6:The Lack of Local Private Entrepreneurs 
While in advanced capital countries private entrepreneurs
were in sufficient supply, they were under-represented in
developing countries. The latter lacked individuals who
possessed "economic resources such as funds, risk
absorbt ion, managerial talent and isdhumpeterian)
entrepreneurship" (Trebat, 1983, p.31). As a result,
political leadership took the initiative by converting the
state into a big entrepreneur. In the case of some African
countries, for example, the colonial experience
interrupted the emergence of an indigenous private sector
except	 for "petty traders subordinate to the big"
European firms (Tignor, 1990, p.188).
Another factor was that foreign lenders and aid agencies
were more confident and, as a result, more willing to lend
and assist governments or their SOEs than private
entrepreneurs (Herbst, 1990, p.951). This combined with
the fact that most developing countries have had no local
capital markets from which private entrepreneurs, assuming
their existence, could generate the necessary capital for
their investment (Aylen, 1988). So, in general terms,
governments and their SOEs were the appropriate
counterparts for foreign aid and the establishment of
loans.
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In Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, direct foreign loans
to private enterprises at the end of 1984 represented only
0.6 percent while foreign loans to development finance
institutions, which finance private and public investment,
accounted for only 0.8 percent of the total loans to those
countries (Marsden, 1990, p.19).
Even if the assumptions about the existence of
entrepreneurs and the availability of funds did hold good,
there was a problem in directing entrepreneurs towards
large projects with high capital requirements and a long
time span, such as petroleum refining, fertilizers, and
cement (Balassa, 1987, p.6).
In a study conducted in 1988, Abu Shair found that the
share of the private sector in Iraq had represented 56
percent of the GDP (without oil) in 1970. However, its
share in the industrial sector to the total output of the
private sector was only 12 percent. Meanwhile, in 1986, as
the private sector's share in GDP declined sharply to 22
percent, the proportion of private industrial output to
the total private sector output declined to 6 percent.
This occured because the private entrepreneur mentality is
often directed towards investment in certain activities
such as commerce and estate speculation rather than in
manufacturing activities because of the highly risk-averse
character of the private sector. Yet, even in the
manufacturing sector, the Iraqi private industrial
entrepreneurs had invested in food processing and other
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light industries where there are only minor risks and very
high short-term profits (Abu Shair, 1988, p.79).
The same argument could be used regarding entrepreneurs in
other developing countries (Shirley, 1983, p.4).
Another argument presented in the context of private
entrepreneurs is that, in some countries, such as in
Africa, they were aliens and expatriates, which created a
popular call for state control. Thus, people's attitudes
revealed a strong mistrust of the private sector and with
it the motivation of profit maximization in the market
place. This derived from the historical links between such
groups and colonialism which was associated with
exploitation of the poor (Trebat, 1983, p.34) (Nellis,
1986, p.13) (Bulter, 1986, p.22) (Tignore, 1990) (Evans,
1990, p.103).
Thus, in developing countries there was a combination of
factors regarding the lack of entrepreneurs parallel to
those existing in advanced countries which led to the
creation of the state as an entrepreneur investing in the
economy through its SOEs.
2.3.7:Employment Generation
One of the main merits of SOEs in developing countries is
that they employ a large number of educated people. Such
an objective was categorised as urgent by the leaders of
developing countries. In addition, it was supported by the
high development theory which emphasised the importance of
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generating wage labourers in order to generate demand in
the economy and thus enable the economy to escape the no-
industrialization trap (Romer, 1986).
However, it may be argued, as shown in table (2.1), that
the capital intensity character of industrialization in
developing countries does not support the argument of
employment generation. Table (2.3) shows that the African
public sector has employed more than half the workers in
the formal sector. Meanwhile in the non-financial SOEs, it
employed about 19 percent of the total. This could be
because in African countries, where the capital intensity
factor is lower than in other developing countries, the
SOEs absorbed more than they did in other regions. By
comparison, Asian SOEs absorb about 16 percent while in
Latin American countries the absorption factor lies at
about 6 percent.
Table 2.3
Public Sector Share in Non-agricultural Employment
in Comparative Perspective (%)*.
Region
levels of public
sector
OECD
countries
Africa Asia Latin
America
Central
government
8.7 30.4 13.9 20.7
State-local
government
11.6 2.1 8.0 4.2
Non-financial 4.1 18.7 15.7 5.5
SOEs
Total Public
sector employment
24.2 54.4 36.0 27.4
Source:	 Heller	 and	 Ta	 1983,	 P•7
*The period 1979-1982.
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A more recent figure for the African countries shows that
SOEs absorbed between 25-30 percent of total employment in
the formal sector during 1980-1986 (Swanson and Wolde-
Semait, 1989, p.8). Even within the same regions countries
varied sharply in their SOEs absorption of employment. In
Somalia, for example, during 1980-1986, public enterprises
absorbed only 5.3 percent of non-agricultural employment
while in Guinea the share amounted to 68 percent (ibid,
p.35).
Another indicator from the table is the employment in
central government. While it constituted about 9 percent
in OECD countries, it was more than 30 percent in Africa
and about 21 percent in Latin America. Accordingly such a
size and capacity of employment played an important role
in providing a major source of income for the work force
in developing countries.
However, the direct effect on employment is not analogous
with the SOEs' total role in generating employment because
investment in SOEs generates forward and backward
linkages. That Neans the enhancement of opportunities for
employment in other sectors of the economy.
Clements (1992) argued that
"the employment intensity of state activity must
be assessed by measuring not only the number of
jobs directly created by state firms but also by
employment created for firms possess linkages
with state firms" (emphasis added, Clements,
1992, p.51).
Direct and indirect employment generation, hence,
constituted one of the SOEs' objectives in raising the
living standard of the people by enhancing employment
Western colonization, however, the
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opportunities in the modern sector. This goal has to be
related to the incidence of poverty and low income levels
characterising the economies of many developing countries.
2.3.8: Balanced Regional Development
One of the heritages of colonialism, familiar to most
developing countries, particularly those colonized by
Western powers, was the unbalanced development of the
regions.
Japanese colonialism of Taiwan (1895- 1945) and Korea
(1910-1948) led to the development of rural regions in
those countries, particularly the development of a highly
productive agricultural sector, and sufficient investment
in the rural infrastructure (Henderson
1992, p.7).
In the case of
and Appelbaum,
expansion of urban centres was the main feature. This was
related to the economic gains generated from the
extractive industries. An estimated $6 bn of foreign
investment (at 1978 prices) in Sub-Saharan Africa up to
World War II was invested in mineral-related industries,
particularly in Southern Africa. On the other hand, the
colonial heritage contributed to agricultural under-
development after independence (Nafziger, 1990, p.143).
For example in countries such as Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire,
Nigeria and Uganda, there was a sharp contrast between the
developed Southern Regions and the underdeveloped Northern
Regions because the colonists had invested mainly in
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exports (Cammack, et al., 1993, p.62).
In addition to the sharp contrasts between the regions,
there were sharp contrasts between the very rich and the
very poor as well as among sectors. There were imbalances
in education, health and training, transportation and
communications. A more balanced development was,
therefore, one of the goals of SOEs. The establishment of
new projects in underdeveloped regions was seen as a way
of stimulating investment by the private as well as the
public sector. Although such investment projects were not
viable from the feasibility point of view, the state
invested through its enterprises in order to achieve its
goal.
2.3.9:0ther Objectives 
There were other objectives behind the creation of SOEs in
different developing countries. In some countries, it was
realised that private sector importers could exercise
little power in negotiating the prices of their imports.
The same situation prevailed in the case of exports where
government power to sustain prices was greater than that
of private exporters. The failure of the market to provide
adequate information and subsequent equal bargaining
powers led to the establishment of government trading
agencies with the main aim of representing the interests
of the private agents (Yaffey, 1992, p.13). Other goals
such as the control of inflation through underpricing of
SOEs' products, stabilization of the economy and equal
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distribution of income and opportunities can all be
included in the reasons and objectives for establishing
SOEs.
Mulji (1990) argues that in the case of Indian SOEs
"there are at least 28 national objectives of
state-owned enterprises are expected to pursue,
ranging from building up surpluses and providing
competition with the private sector to
developing backward areas, developing indigenous
technology, working as a model employer, and
promotion a socially desirable pattern of
consumption"(Mulji, 1990, p.143).
Such a wide range of objectives is quite different from
those pursued in the private sector where the main goal is
the maximization of profit.
2.3.10:Summary of Goals and Arguments 
From the above discussion it is clear that there are
differences in the origin, age and reasons behind the
creation of SOEs in different developing countries. The
objectives can be classified in various ways: micro-
economic, macro-economic, short-term, long-term,
commercial, non-commercial, strategic and secondary. Such
goals may appear desirable on an individual basis, but
when combined, they are often in conflict with one
another. For example, inflation control seldom creates
employment, underpricing policies cannot create profits,
regional balances might be inconsistent with economic
viability. From a technological dimension, a large scale
plant may be an efficient project if it is to be
established on purely economic criteria. However, when
social objectives enter the viability equation, it may
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fail to succeed economically.
On the other hand, the economic strategy itself may be
different among different countries. In Latin America, for
example, the main objective of ISI was the reduction of
vulnerability to foreign economic shocks. In Asian
countries, however, the main motive was to establish an
industrial sector similar to the one existing in advanced
countries (Banuri, 1991) although in India, the main
reason was to achieve self-sufficiency through a pattern
similar to the one adopted in the former USSR .
In other Asian and African countries the historical
struggle against colonialism and the fight against
dependency played a major part in the creation of SOEs.
However, other reasons such as the increase in oil
revenues and the prices of other minerals during the 1970s
also contributed to the growth of the public sector.
In other words the political, social, historical and
economic objectives behind the establishment of public
enterprises were complex. However, economists tend to
generalize the reasons for public or SOEs creation during
the 1960s and 1970s. Gayle and Goodrich (1990) identified
eight factors behind the creation of SOEs, namely the
encouragement of a broad sense of responsibility towards
the public interest, the creation of stable investment and
employment patterns, the improvement of industrial
relations, investment in sectors characterized by high
risk and long time horizon, the replacement of private
natural monopolies, direction and control of defence
113
related industries, stimulation of sectoral competition
and information flow in order to achieve efficiency (as in
the case of Singapore) and lastly as an instrument of
decolonization. However, such generalizations have no
validity when analyzing the case for successful
privatization, because each country, and to some extent
region, possessed different institutional factors.
The preceding analysis has attempted to make such a
context explicit because it is important to present such
a complex background for the purpose of examining the
economic rationale for privatization. Thus, the question
to be asked from the economic theory point of view is
whether a change in the type of ownership from public to
private would enhance the efficiency of the firm. Although
this question may appear inconsistent with the background
for the establishment of the public sector in developing
countries in the first place (Zank, 1991, pp.165-166)
(Prager, 1992, p.307), it denotes the major argument on
which privatization stands. However, before introducing
the theoretical arguments for public versus private
ownership, it is important to question the performance of
public enterprises.
2.4: Evidence on Public Enterprise Performance 
The proponents of privatization often argue that the
financial record of public enterprises worldwide is in
itself evidence for the necessity of privatization.
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Kikeri et al. (1992) said that, between 1989 and 1991,
public enterprises financial losses as a percentage of GDP
constituted 9 percent in Argentina, 8 percent in
Yugoslavia, and on average more than 5 percent in some
African countries. Also, 30 percent of SOEs in China
incurred losses in 1991. As a result of the heavy losses
of SOEs, government transfers (including subsidies) to
these enterprises accounted for 4 percent of GNP in Turkey
in 1990, and 9 percent of the GDP in Poland (Kikeri, et
al, 1992, p.15).
Another study by Nellis (1986) asserted that in a sample
of 12 West African countries, 62 percent of PEs showed net
losses while 36 percent had negative net worth. However,
the author argued that caution should be taken in
interpreting financial data because of the differences in
accounting and tax systems, government transfers and other
factors such as depreciation, inflation and subsidies.
Although the study refers to the constraints imposed by
the African governments on pricing decisions, investment
policies and other factors such as employment policies,
all of which led to the bad financial results, successful
cases in African public enterprises nevertheless still
existed (Nellis, 1986, pp.25).
In a more recent study of public enterprises in Sub-
Saharan Africa, Swanson and Wolde-Semait (1989) found that
the net financial results of PEs in 13 out of 19 countries
were negative while the remaining six were positive. They
argued that the positive financial results were
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attributable to the inclusion of mineral state enterprises
into the final results. Estimates of profitability as a
percentage of GDP for 22 countries range from -4.3 percent
in the Gambia to 2.5 percent in Zaire (Swanson and Wolde-
Semait, 1989, Table A.11, p.44). However, in the case of
Gambia, the main losses occurred in one state enterprise
(The Gambia Produce Marketing Board GPMB), the deficits
from which accounted for 7 percent of GDP in 1983 (ibid,
p.11). Another indicator is that the PEs' share of
external debt in 31 African countries during the period
1980-1986 was 13.7 percent ranging from the highest in
Cameroon (43%) to the lowest in Kenya (0.1 %) (calculated
from ibid, Table A.9, p.42). This demonstrates that
generalization about the financial performance of SOEs in
a country cannot produce a clear explanation for the
reasons behind bad performance.
Another study in Kenya, by Karanja (1989), found that in
a sample of 25 state corporations, an investment of $2.5
bn yielded a total surplus of $24 inn or only a 1 percent
rate of return. However the investment created employment
totalling 79.5 thousand 6 . Moreover, during 1979-1984, the
government received 6.5 percent as a dividend from their
investment in state corporations (Karanja, 1989, p.272).
Thus, what appears to be a modest financial performance
should be explained within the context of the employment
opportunities generated.
6The figures transferred to U.S. dollars using the
exchange rate in IMF (1992).
116
In the case of Ghana, a cross-debts study on 18 SOEs
(about 8 percent of all Ghana SOEs) in 1987 revealed that
the cross-debts between SOEs totalled around $58 mn in
1986 while their indebtedness to the government was around
$450 inn' (as cited in Adda, 1989, p.306).
In the Egyptian non-financial SOEs, however, a study
revealed the contrast between poor financial performance
and positive economic performance. According to Ott
(1991), the overall deficit of PEs in Egypt as a
percentage of GDP rose from 3.9 percent in 1979 to 8.4
percent in 1983/1984 while the estimated rate of return on
revalued assets was -5.7 percent (Ott, 1991, pp.204-206).
On the other hand a study of 7 public firms in the
Egyptian industrial sector showed that four of them had a
negative rate of return in 1984/1985 while the indicators
of total factor productivity (TFP) change, which could be
a reliable measure of economic efficiency against that of
financial efficiency, indicated a positive TFP change
ranging from 0.5 to 11.1 during the period 1976-
1984/1985 (calculated from ibid, Table 10.13, p.211).
Thus, it appears that the poor financial performance of
these enterprises did not reflect the positive economic
efficiency trend symbolized by the TFP change.
There is also a number of studies which indicate the mixed
stories of success and failure in some of the Western
'The figure are transferred to U.S. dollars employing
the exchange rate in the IMF (1992).
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Hemisphere countries.
In the case of Mexico, Weiss (1992) argued that, while in
1982 there were 1155 public enterprises, their total
operating losses amounted to 2.1 percent of GDP. However,
as the number of PEs was reduced to 280 public enterprises
by 1990, the financial position of the remaining
enterprises turned into surplus in 1987. However, the
largest state oil company (PEMEX) remained in deficit.
This also reflected the effect of exogenous variables such
as oil prices which cannot be controlled within the
enterprise. As a result the financial indicator is not
analogous with economic efficiency.
In the Brazilian context, Guerra (1992) argued that the
operational results of the public sector in Brazil have on
average run at around -6 percent since the beginning of
the 1980s.
In 1990, the 50 largest SOEs lost $6.4 bn or 12 percent of
their net worth and fifteen of the 20 largest deficit
companies in the country were SOEs. On the other hand,
nine of the largest profitable enterprises were SOEs. Such
mixed results indicate the importance of studying SOEs on
a case-by-case basis so as to understand the factors
impeding the profitability of some enterprises against the
success of others.
In the case of allocation efficiency, Guerra (1992, p.5)
claimed that between 1975 and 1985 investment in the
public sector (mainly SOEs) increased seven times faster
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than in the private sector while the output ratio of
public to private production did not even double. He
commented that this indicated an inefficient allocation of
resources. However, Schmitz and Hewitt (1991) argued in
their study of government investment in the computer
industry in Brazil that such a method of questioning the
opportunity cost of investment may be misleading, the
reason for this being that one of the main problems in the
Brazilian economy during the 1970s and 1980s was that
capital flowed into financial rather than manufacturing
operations because profits in the former were easier and
higher than in industry. On the other hand the Brazilian
national computer industry, for example, was employing
over 40 thousand people by 1987. Their social opportunity
cost could be measured if there had been full employment
in the economy, but that was not the case. Other benefits,
such as cumulative learning, innovation, and adaptation to
local demands and other positive externalities are not
included in the account of financial performance. Thus,
state efficiency in some enterprises might be increasing
despite short-run costs. However, it is not possible to
make generalizations applicable to all SOEs8.
A study of Jamaican SOEs revealed that 21 public
enterprises were unable to finance their operating
expenditure, taxes and debt service in 1980/1981.
8For an analysis of the case of state ownership and
privatization in Brazil and Mexico, read Schneider (1990)
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However,by 1988/1989 they had succeeded in generating
operating profits amounting to 'IS 752.6 inn and had
financed about 90 percent of their capital expenditure.
This demonstrates the possibility of transforming poorly
performing SOEs into successful ones by adopting a package
of reforms which increase accountability through efficient
monitoring and control systems on the one hand, and, on
the other hand increasing the prices of their products to
competitive levels because they had often been denied the
right to increase their prices (Schumacher and Hutchinson,
1991, pp.239-241). Nevertheless, examples of other
Jamaican SOEs which are struggling with financial losses
still exist, particularly in the utilities sector (ibid,
p.242). Despite the success stories of some public
enterprises, the authors of the above study believed that
privatization is the main tool for enhancing the
performance of SOEs. They concluded that "the Jamaican
economy must pursue an aggressive privatization strategy
if it is to be revitalized" (ibid, p.250).
Similar cases could be found in Peru. A study of the 1986
profitability of 56 SOEs revealed that 46 percent of them
obtained no profits, 37.5 percent achieved profit rates of
less than 15 percent, and 16.5 percent of the SOEs earned
more than 20 percent profits (De Zevallos M., 1989,
p.362). However, the author suggested privatization as
the overall solution.
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The above examples assert that the dangers of
privatization derive from the sweeping belief in its
merits. Privatization became a matter of belief rather
than one option among others for the reform of public
enterprises (Shackleton, 1986) (Starr, 1990). If the aim
is to increase profitability per se there are many options
for public enterprises in different developing countries
to do so. For example Jones (1991, p.16) showed that in
one case a large industrial public firm in South America
moved from large losses to a significant profit within one
year by changing the shape of the firm's accounts (i.e.
debt and interest payment) rather than increasing
efficiency.
In Asian countries, a study of Pakistan's 195 SOEs
observed that the pre-tax return on capital in 1985/1986
for 37 percent of them was negative, for 32 percent
average profits were between 0 and 15 percent, while the
remaining 31 percent achieved pre-tax profits equal to or
more than 15 percent (Bokhari, 1989, p.167). This could be
another indication of mixed financial performance.
Another study from India reveals that public sector
enterprises employed about 2.2 million people out of a
total public work force of 16.8 million workers. In 1988,
the share value of all Indian public sector enterprises
was about $22 billion while that of the private corporate
sector was $6.7 billion (Waterbury, 1990, p.295I. Such
figures reveal the domination of the public sector in the
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Indian economy. However, against expectation, the rate of
return on all investment in public enterprises in 1986 was
12.54 percent9 . Even, after exclusion of the petroleum
sector, the rate exceeded 7.5 percent. A comparison of
this rate with comparable private sector enterprises
revealed that the latter rate was 13.6 percent (Reddy,
1989, p.180). So, the difference between private and
public investment rate of return was only one percent, an
unexpected result considering the literature criticizing
the public sector in India". However, that does not mean
that all public sector enterprises are financially viable.
In the case of Malaysia, there were more than 1000 SOEs in
1990. It was found that 60 percent of the SOEs had
achieved profit during 1980-1988 while the remainder were
unprofitable. Adam and his associates (1992, p.223) ranked
Malaysian SOEs' general performance based on enterprise
profitability relative to capitalization during the period
1980-1988. However, in 1988 16.7 percent of SOEs were
"sick", 24.1 percent "weak", 14.4 percent "satisfactory"
and 44.8 percent "good"11.
9Public enterprises in this case include central,
financial and non-financial enterprises, railways, power,
irrigation, ports, telegraphs and telephones, road
transports and several departmental enterprises.
"For a critical view of the Indian Public Enterprises
see Lacey (1990).
"Sick = Companies with negative shareholders fund.
Weak = Loss-making companies with shareholders funds <200%
of paid-up capital.
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In Sri Lanka the profits of commercial SOEs (about 145 at
the end of 1989) fell from 5 percent in 1984 to -0.54
percent in 1988. Also, the return on assets declined from
2.21 percent in 1984 to -0.07 in 1988. The main problem
for the SOEs in the manufacturing sub-sector is that of
limited capacity utilization (only about 60 percent)(
ibid, pp.305-306).
From the preceding case studies it can be seen that there
are mixed stories of the success and failure of public
enterprises in developing countries. Likewise, there is a
misleading belief that inefficiency can be equated with
financial losses.
More recent figures of the estimated losses of public
enterprises in a number of countries or regions provided
by UNDP (1993) show that the arguments for the
privatization of SOEs can be divided between the belief in
private sector technical and allocative efficiency
superiority, irrespective of the institutional factor of
a country, and the argument of the social opportunity cost
of public enterprise losses (for example, in the context
of education and health spending) which is within the
dimension of allocative efficiency as well.
Leaving the argument of technical or X-efficiency to the
next section, the question is: what is the relationship
Satisfactory = Shareholders funds <100%, but currently
profitable.
Good = Shareholders funds >100% and profitable.
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between allocative efficiency and profitability?
As illustrated in the analysis of "market failure", pareto
efficiency (i.e. allocative efficiency) cannot equal
profitability on all accounts. For example in decreasing
cost industries a profit maximising producer has to
produce an output less than the pareto-efficient level and
sell at a price higher than that which the consumer is
willing to pay (that is equal to the marginal cost of
supplying the product). That is because, as the average
cost is declining, pareto-efficiency (i.e. allocative
efficient) will result in net losses on the part of
producers since they have to produce more and charge less,
which is against the rationality of profit maximization
for a private producer. In this case, as we said earlier,
the product could either be produced through the public
sector or the private sector can produce the product with
the government subsidising the losses occurred in order to
achieve a more efficient allocation of resources. Thus,
profitability is not a sufficient indicator of efficiency
since both alternatives can lead to losses in order to
achieve allocative efficiency.
The other side of the argument is that pareto-efficiency
does not indicate any bias towards favouring private
against public ownership. The important factor is
competition in the market. Thus, as many services provided
by the public sector imply a natural monopoly character,
the monopoly rent after privatization will fall to private
monopolists, which reduces consumer welfare and imposes
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losses on society. This means that competition, rather
than change in the geometry of ownership, is the critical
factor.
On the other hand, the UNDP (1993) argument presented in
table (2.4) is a rule of thumb. The assumption is that all
financial losses in public enterprises will be directed
towards education and health spending if they are to be
eliminated. But since many of the losses occurred in the
utility sectors, the question becomes: who will provide
transportation, health, education and other services? If
it is the public sector, then the losses will continue. On
the other hand, if it is left to the private sector, then
the allocation of resources toward such services will
decline if not cease (the profit maximization constraint).
Table 2.4
The Social Opportunity Cost of Public Enterprises
Losses (1988-1990).
Country or
region
Estimated
losses of PEs
as % of GNP
Public
education and
health
spending as %
of GNP
Potential
increase in
education &
health
spending if
PEs losses
are
eliminated %
, .
Argentina 9 5.5 164
Poland 9 7.6 118
Bangladesh 3 3.1 97
Turkey 4 4.6 87
Egypt 3 11.0 27
Philippines 2 8.3 24
Sub-Saharan 5 6.5 77
Africa
,
Source: UNDP(1993, Table no. 3.4, p.48).
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A study conducted by the World Bank in 1993 revealed that
cuts in spending occur "for important but politically less
visible operations and maintenance (O&M)-such as providing
drugs and supplies for health clinics and repairing roads"
was one of the outcomes of the public spending adjustment
programme imposed by the IMF and World Bank on 13
developing countries (Pradhan and Swaroop, 1993, p.29).
Also, the squeezing of spending has affected investment in
important infrastructural projects with high returns
because such investment was seen as the "softer" option
for the governments of developing countries (ibid, p.29).
Ramirez (1993) found that the austerity measures in Latin
American countries during the 1980s led to a significant
reduction in public spending on health and education. For
example, in Brazil expenditure on health and education as
a percentage of total public expenditure decreased from
12.4 percent in 1982 to 10.3 percent in 1989; in Argentina
such expenditure declined from 17.2 percent in 1982 to
11.3 percent in 1989; in Mexico they deteriorated from
22.6 percent to only 8.5 percent between 1980 and 1988
while in Chile they decreased from 21.5 percent to 16
percent between 1982 and 1989 (ibid, p.1016).
If such losses, however, are a reflection of managerial
inefficiency in public enterprises, then there is a need
to understand the option for reform and/or privatization
on a case-by-case basis rather than to implement the
option of privatization in all cases.
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This leads us to the important question of what is the
economic rationale for privatization. Does ownership
affect the productive or X-efficiency of an enterprise,
and if the answer is yes, then why? But before answering
such questions, it is important to provide an elementary
analysis of the theory of the firm.
2.5: The Theory of the Firm 
In the analysis of the neoclassical theory, there is no
direct investigation of the internal factors affecting
economic efficiency within the firm. That is because the
neoclassical theory treats the firm as an impersonal and
anonymous entity or a black box. It includes managers who
are authorized to deal on the firm's behalf. The manager
might be the owner and, if not, will be accountable to
another person who will be the owner (entrepreneur).
However, it is assumed that the owner is rational and will
thus minimize costs in order to maximize profit (the
residual). The major assumptions in this regard are that
there is no separation between ownership and control and
Zero transaction costs (costs of obtaining information
about alternatives and of negotiating, policing, and
enforcing contracts)". Thus, the economic behaviour and
performance of different organizational forms, such as
"There are other assumptions such as Zero adjustment
cost; owners fully allocate resources, which are privately
held, for purely pecuniary motivation; the firm possesses
only one plant and it produces one output; the
entrepreneur's choice between income and leisure is
independent of income (Zamagni, 1987, p.297).
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that of "public" versus "private", have no place in
neoclassical analysis. As Jensen and Meckling stated
"While the literature of economics is replete
with references to the "theory of the firm", the
material generally subsumed under that heading
is not a theory of the firm but actually a
theory of markets in which firms are important
actors" (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p.306).
In this case privatization has to be analyzed using other
theoretical tools related to the literature on the theory
of economic organization.
2.5.1: Theoretical Background for Existence of the Firm
In the traditional neoclassical analysis it was assumed
that the entrepreneur is a coordinator or auctioneer in
the market place. Thus, price mechanism will solve the
problem of market transactions" . However, the question
asked by Coase (1937) was what is the reason for the
existence of firms if market transactions can solve the
problem of coordination on the one hand and the
maximization of profit on the other. In other words, the
entrepreneur can make contracts with suppliers in the
market place rather than choose to produce within the firm
through internal contracts which include management,
labour, input suppliers and financiers.
The answer given by Coase was that there are costs of
"Hodgson argued that as the entrepreneur, in the
traditional neoclassical theory, is an auctioneer, this
will imply his gathering, processing and communicating for
a lot of information, particularly regarding the formation
of prices. Consequently, such knowledge needs to be
centralized which is "against the spirit of market system"
(Hodgson, 1992, p.753). Thus, there is a contradiction
within the neoclassical theory itself.
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transactions, particularly those arising from imperfect
information and uncertainty which can be eliminated
through the hierarchical organization of the firm. He said
"Outside the firm, price movements direct
production, which is co-ordinated through a
series of exchange transactions on the market.
Within a firm, these market transactions are
eliminated and in place of the complicated
market structure with exchange transactions is
substituted the entrepreneur- co-ordinator, who
directs production" (Coase, 1937, p.388).
Nevertheless, Coase did not realize that there are
transaction costs within firms. For Williamson (1973,
1975, 1979, 1981, 1985) the term transaction is derived
from contractual agreement in addition to the one
associated with market exchange". There are ex ante costs
which are related to the establishment of contracts and ex
post costs which are related to administering, informing,
monitoring, and enforcing the contractually agreed
performance. Williamson, although he was more concerned
with transaction costs in the contractual dimension,
identified the factors which make market transactions less
viable than hierarchies (firms). The question is what are
these factors?
Generally, these factors are based on behavioural
assumptions, but before presenting the factors, it is
important to give the reasons behind the change in the
traditional theory of the firm, particularly, those
"The notion of transaction which derived from exchange
means the transfer of property rights to resources that
involves no future responsibilities. This is mainly the
approach of property rights theory (Alchian and Demsetz,
1972) (Furubotn and Pejovich, 1972).
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related to the profit maximization assumption of the
traditional neoclassical theory.
2.5.2: The Behavioural and Managerial Theories of the Firm
As firms developed in size and scope, conventional
neoclassical theory was unable to explain the situation in
the real world. In modern firms control has been given to
managers while ownership has been spread among a large
number of shareholders (owners). This new kind of owner
has neither the power nor the interest in any single firm
because the optimum portfolio of each investor tends to be
diversified. As a result, risk bearing and management, the
two traditionally combined functions of ownership have
been separated. Berle and Means (1932) (as cited in De
Alessi, 1973) were the first to suggest that the
characteristics of the large cooperation tend to inhibit
the efficient use of productive resources". This is
because managers' objectives may differ and even conflict
with those of the owners.
This provided the ground for two theoretical attacks on
the traditional neoclassical theory. The first was the
behavioural theory which attacked the traditional
objective function of profit maximization while the second
(the managerial school) has maintained the principle of
constrained maximization but observed the existence of
other utility functions within the decision making
"That is because widely dispersed ownership is
combined with the control of managers who have a relatively
small ownership stake in the enterprise.
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process.
In the behavioural theory it is argued that the main
objective of the firm, as an organization rather than a
firm working in an ideal world of perfect information, is
"survival". Simon (1955, 1959, 1965) suggested that in the
real world modern firms face a complex body of information
as well as an uncertain environment. Therefore, it needs
to be an organization rather than an individual entity.
This organization is a complex of individuals and centers
of powers. The objective of "survival" means that the
firm's objectives will be to achieve satisfactory rather
than maximum profit because people normally satisfy rather
than maximize. Thus, he has referred to firm behaviour as
a "satisficing behaviour".
Similarly Cyert and March (1963) rejected the firm's
maximizing behaviour and argued that the firm is not a
single decision entity, but rather a multi-decisional
organization with a number of objectives. The reason for
their belief in satisficing behaviour were the factor of
imperfect information and the factor of limited managerial
ability (organizational slack).
On the other hand, through the managerial theory several
scholars have attacked the neoclassical assumption of
profit maximization and introduced several utility
functions for the managers of firms based on a separation
of ownership and control. Subject to some profit
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constraint, Baumol (1959) argued that a manager's
objective is to maximize the firm's sales revenue in order
to expand the firm. This leads to the consolidation of the
managers power and position in their contractual
arrangement. However, the profit constraint was assumed to
be a device to finance the firm on the one hand and
satisfy the owners or shareholders on the other. However,
in a second contribution Baumol (1962) argued that the
managers' utility function is to maximize the growth rate
of sales revenue rather than the sales revenue itself.
This utility function will depend not only on the
expansion of the firm's productive capacity but also on
its introduction of new policies to enhance future
consumer demands (i.e. price reduction, new products).
In Marris's contribution (1964) managers maximize their
utility function, which contains variables such as
"security" and the "growth of the firm". The first
variable (security) maintains the role and power of
managers in cases of ownership change through merger or
takeover while the second variable (growth of the firm)
promotes their prestige and increases the possibility of
obtaining higher salaries. In order to achieve such
objectives, managers have to take into account the
maintenance of higher valuation ration for the firm on the
stock market16.
However, Williamson (1963) observed that there is a
16The valuation ratio is the ratio of the stock market
value of the firm to its accounting or book value.
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discretionary behaviour by managers resting at the centre
of their utility function which is composed of salary,
status, prestige and power. This managerial utility
function derives from their "expense preferences". Yet,
this discretionary behaviour which is financed from the
firm's profit is still subject to the constraint of
minimum profit because of the continuous threat of
_
takeover.
In summary, the behavioural and managerial theories gave
new understanding to the objectives of the firm which
deviated from the neoclassical assumption of profit
maximization and a result derived from the different and
sometimes conflicting goals between managers' and owners'
utility functions which are subject to constraints.
2.5.3: Markets vs. Firms 
As the arguments build up, it is now established that
there are factors behind the establishment of firms. That
is to minimize the transaction costs of exchange in the
market place as well as the establishment of different
organizational forms in order to minimize the transaction
costs within the organization. Williamson (1973, 1975,
1979, 1981, 1985) gave several factors which are based on
a behavioural assumption regarding the existence of
transaction costs within the market as well as within the
firm. He said that
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"...the interesting problems of economic
organization are mainly to be explained by
reference to the conjunction of a set of human
attributes with a related set of (largely non-
technological) transactional factors"
(Williamson, 1973, p.316).
The main factors affecting the increase of transaction
costs are; bounded rationality; opportunism and
information impactedness.
_ Bounded rationality means that individuals have only
limited information and limited capability to process it
without error. This leads to incomplete information about
market opportunities and limited capability of prediction
derived from uncertainty regarding the reaction to future
events17.
Opportunism costs derive from bounded rationality and
self-interest behaviour. Because of information asymmetry
individuals will act in an opportunistic manner to secure
their interests when conflict arises between what they
want and what they promise to conduct. Such costs might
arise in the market when the number of bidders for a
contract is small. Within the firm opportun!stic behaviour
might take a non-pecuniary direction if pecuniary gain is
limited or cannot be obtained.
Information impactedness also derives from information
asymmetry as some parties hold information which can be
17Sah (1991) argued that bounded rationality does not
need to be defined because of limited individual capability
to observe all the possible opportunities, but it has to be
understood within the context of the other constraints. For
example the cost of the time required to observe all the
possibilities, the changes occurring in the circumstances
of delayed decisions. In general there is a human
fallibility which leads to such costs.
134
used in an opportunistic way so as to benefit them when
contracting with other parties who lack such information.
This imposes costs on the party lacking the information
and may lead to unfavourable contract terms. Scitovsky
(1990, p.137) argued that such an unequal distribution of
knowledge derives from the division of labour which leads
all individuals to possess specialized knowledge in their
area of skill.
Thus, all the above factors lead to positive transaction
costs which have to be minimized by internalizing them
within the firm". However, internalizing these costs does
not mean their elimination and their existence introduces
what is known as X-inefficiency.
2.6: The Theory of X-Efficiency
The behavioural context introduced by the preceding
theories led Leibenstein (1966) to introduce the theory of
"X-efficiency".
The degree of X-inefficiency is the degree to which actual
output is less than the maximum output for a given input
or the excess of actual over minimum costs for a given
output.
The differences between the neoclassical theory and X-
efficiency theory are summarized in table (2.5).
"In a more recent work Simon (1991) argued that the
existence of the firm is derived from the necessity of
"coordinating the activities of groups of individuals in
ways that are not always easily achieved by markets"
(Simon, 1991, p.38).
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Table 2.5
The Differences Between X-Efficiency Theory and
the Neoclassical Theory
Components X-Efficiency theory Neoclassical
theory
1.Psychology
2.Contract
3.Effort
4. Units
5.Inert areas
6.Agent-principal
Selective rationality
Incomplete
Discretionary variable
Individuals
Important variable
Differential
Maxim.or Minim.
Complete
Assumed given
Household&firms
None
Identity of
interests
Source: Lel ens ein(1978, p.129).
Leibenstein observed that the deviation of real effort
given by the individual to the firm from the optimal one
expected by the firm determines the degree of X-
inefficiency. The other important factor is the amount of
pressure operating on the effort variable. An individual
whose behaviour is influenced by the context of selective
rationality will not try to maximize profit or minimize
cost because contracts are incomplete and there are
differences of interest between the principals (owners)
and agents (nanagers and workers). There is also
discretion among firm members in their efforts to conduct
the contractual activities and there are inert areas which
are determined by the inertia costs of individual movement
from one effort position to another. These inertia costs
depend on individual personality (Leibenstein, 1978) and
it is clear that the motivation of workers and the quality
of managerial decisions are the major constraints on the
productivity of modern firms (Leibenstein, 1978). Thus, it
could be said that X-inefficiency results from the
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existence of positive transaction costs which themselves
stem from bounded rationality, opportunistic behaviour and
information impactedness.
X-efficiency theory was criticised for its failure to
emphasise the importance of different property rights
structures, particularly since any decrease in the degree
of X-inefficiency depends on monitoring and incentive
factors, both dependent on introducing different
structures of property rights". However, we found that
Leibenstein's (1989) observation on the importance of
environmental pressure factors implies an indirect
relationship with property rights structure. He argued
that there are two notions of pressure, the first from
below because of competition with other producers and the
second from above, namely from the firm's owner or
representative. Thus, "different institutional
arrangements will involve different sources of pressure"
(Leibenstein, 1989, p.1364). He suggested that the
possibility of X-inefficiency is real in typical public
enterprises because of the absence of pressure from either
direction (above and below). He, therefore, suggested a
number of options for the reform of public enterprises
such as using a franchise approach in order to reduce
costs.
However, it is still important to answer the question:
what is the economic rationale behind privatization? Is
"For a methodological criticism of the theory see
Stigler (1976) and De Alessi (1983).
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ownership per se a major factor in enhancing X-efficiency
or not?
2.7: The Economic Theory of Property Rights 
The economic rationale for privatization within the
context of ownership change is based on two fundamental
theories; the first being the economic theory of property
rights.
The main argument of this theory is that ownership
matters. It is argued that the transfer of property rights
from the public to the private sector will increase the
efficiency of the enterprise, particularly that of X-
efficiency.
This was first suggested by Adam Smith more than two
centuries ago. Smith observed that the productivity of
public land was only one quarter that of private land. The
differences in productivity, according to Smith, were
derived from the differences in the incentives available
to employees under the two types of ownership. Public
employees and managers are inefficient and negligent
because they have no direct participation in the
commercial outcome or the residual. Smith, therefore,
suggested privatization as a solution.
Since Adam Smith the argument of private ownership
superiority has moved forward. Because individual decision
makers seek to maximize their interests subject to the
constraints imposed by the organization (i.e. the
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behavioural and managerial theories), it was realized that
different structures of property rights would produce
different levels of performance. This was particularly
important because of the existence of positive transaction
costs.
The firm is viewed, according to this theory, as a set of
contracts among factors of production. In the classical
firm the firm's owners or employers are the only ones with
the right to design, negotiate and re-negotiate any input
contracts. They also are the ones who hold the residual
and have the right to sell their "central contractual
residual status" (Alchain and Demsetz, 1'972, p.7S45.w.
Thus, the owners' responsibility is to construct a
contractual arrangement with other input owners (i.e.,
workers) so as to increase the firm's efficiency by
reducing costs, particularly, those arising from shirking
in team production because shirking results in an increase
in the degree of X-inefficiency within the firm.
Thus, within the privatization debate, the comparison of
efficiency with alternative property rights structures
rests mainly on three factors, namely ownership
specialization, risk bearing, and the transferability of
ownership. The significance of these factors stems from
their effect on the incentive (cost-reward) and monitoring
20The concept of property rights in this school is
different from the one regarding the institution of
property rights within the economy. The latter is more
associated with work of Douglass North (1981) (1986) (1989)
(1991) (1993).
139
systems which result in different alignments of resources
and different input-output mixes.
2.7.1: Ownership Specialization
Under private ownership people will choose to be owners of
an organization if they possess a sufficient knowledge of
its activities (Alchain, 1965, p.821). Such specialization
will lead to a better decision making structure. It is
better for decisions such as those on new investment or
new technology or others related to the operation of the
enterprise to be taken by specialized individuals who have
an interest and stake in the enterprise as this waL aLsa
increase their capacity to monitor management behaviour
and decisions.
In the case of public ownership there is no such
specialization because each member of the public has only
a minute stake in the enterprise. Thus, even if it is
assumed that individuals from the public have a stake in
the efficiency of the enterprise, they will not possess a
comparative advantage of ownership similar to that which
exists under private ownership.
However, this argument may not constitute a decisive
difference in the effects of ownership form. In most
modern corporations shareholders are neither specialists
nor knowledgeable in the activities of the organization;
rather, the owners' objective may be to spread the risk of
their investment by building up their investment
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portfolios among different enterprises. In addition, the
complex network of knowledge and information which
characterises most modern corporations gives more
advantage to the managers over the owners of the
corporation (Fama and Jensen, 1983, p.308). However,
Demsetz (1983, p.382) argued that a specialized ownership
"creates pressure for less on-the-job consumption so long
as monitoring cost is not a barrier to guaranteeing that
what is promised by management is what is delivered".
2.7.2:Risk Bearing
One of the arguments of the property rights school is that
the possession of private property is a voluntary decision
based solely on the choice of an individual who then has
to bear the risk of the decision. This risk bearing
element derives from the status of the owner as residual
claimant on the assets of the organization. This allows
the individual as a shareholder or one of the owners of a
corporation to participate in and contribute positively to
decisions affecting the profitability and wealth of the
corporation. By contrast, public ownership is not
voluntary, thus individual members of the public have no
risk bearing function in the context of individuality.
Hence, the most significant difference is that the
incentive for the owners as risk bearers will be most
apparent in the case of private ownership; consequently,
the motivation for taking correct decisions, introducing
an efficient system of incentives, and monitoring the
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performance of the enterprise will be greater (Hanke,
1987).
In the words of Hanke and Walters (1990)
"The consequences of public ownership are
predictable. The cost of shirking to a public
bureaucrat is low. Consequently public managers
and employees tend to engage in shirking
activity and the acquisition of various
perquisites that increase production costs. From
a theoretical point of view, private and public
managers and employees can be expected to behave
in different ways. In consequence, private firms
tend to be more efficient than public firms"
(Hanke and Walters, 1990, p.98).
However, while the principle of commitment is a feature of
private ownership, flexibility and self interest
behaviour, according to the advocates of privatization,
are the characteristics of public ownership.
Nevertheless, the separation of ownership and control in
private corporations may also enhance the opportunistic
behaviour of managers and employees. Thus, Williamson
(1983, p.356) argued that "the condition of residual risk
bearing is fully determinative of organization form". In
this case the use of a U-form structure within a private
organization may result in an inferior outcome to that of
an organization using the M-form structure. This is
because the decentralizing feature of the M-form structure
offers more incentives to management and provides better
control mechanisms than the first structure. Thus, risk
bearing does not depend on the form of ownership per se,
but on the organizational structure of the corporation as
well.
An empirical study of nine British public enterprises
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revealed that there is sometimes a positive effect from
the introduction of the M-form structure (i.e. British
Steel, Post Office) (Bishop and Thompson, 1992).
2.7.3:Transferability of Ownership
By and large, the most significant difference between
public and private ownership lies in the factor of
transferability of property rights. In public ownership
the rights of the individual as shareholder of a public
enterprise do not include the right of saleability or
exchange of rights because this right is purely nominal
(Alchain, 1965) (Millward and Parker, 1983). In other
words, if members of the public are not satisfied with or
do not approve of the performance of a public enterprise,
they cannot sell their shares, which in itself denotes
less pressure on the management of a public enterprise,
which Leibenstein (1989) called pressure from the top or
from above. Its absence in public ownership because of the
vagueness of rights leads to a higher degree of X-
inefficiency.
In contrast, the contestability of ownership represents
one of the major monitoring devices for managers of a
private corporation (Vining and Weimer, 1990). Where there
is a high level of opportunism and shirking behaviour, the
value of the enterprise's shares will fall on the stock
market, on the one hand providing a signal to shareholders
to sell their shares and on the other putting pressure on
management to increase their efforts. Both outcomes will
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lead to more X-efficiency.
Another dimension of this factor is the effect on
investment. In private enterprises, investors will attempt
to maximize the enterprise's present value by taking into
account alternative future streams of benefit and costs
and selecting the one which will maximize the present
value of the enterprise (Demsetz, 1967).
On the contrary, De Alessi (1969) found that government
decision makers, by discounting the financial stream of
the proposed project, prefer to shift investment spending
from the future to the present. In addition, they tend to
modify the estimated cost-benefit data of the project
towards their own preferences for certain alternatives,
such as large and capital-intensive projects. Likewise,
Niskanen (1971) (1973) in his bureaucracy model argued
that bureaucrats prefer greater present budgets in order
to increase their non-pecuniary consumption, such as their
tenure period or prestige and powee l . As government
bureaus are the agents responsible for proposing new
projects, they tend, in the absence of ownership
contestability, to reflect their own interests. The result
is a kind of sunk investment by politicians (Lott Jr.,
1987). This explanation denotes one of the factors behind
the technological behaviour of public enterprises in
developing countries, that of high capital intensity
21The literature on bureaucratic behaviour has since
developed in a different dimension, particularly through
the public choice school and rent-seeking theory. For a
detailed analysis, review chapter 1 of this thesis.
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(James, 1989).
In contrast to the above argument, other scholars who have
studied the relationship between politicians and
voter/taxpayers, such as Crain and Zardkoohi (1978),
observed that the non-transferability of property rights
shifts the preferences of the public away from long-term
investment projects towards labour-intensive and short-
term projects which maximize their current benefits. This
happens because the public discounts the benefits of that
portion of output which occurs either after their death or
a stay in the current political jurisdiction. Also, it
maximizes the votes of politicians. The authors in a later
study (1980) found that the property right structure
provides an incentive mechanism, even within a monopoly
structure, which minimizes the X-inefficiency of a private
monopoly in comparison with a public monopoly.
However, Mayer (1987) observed that the association of
private ownership with commitment to investment cannot be
generalized in all circumstances. Imperfect competition in
the capital market may discourage private investors from
committing themselves to long-term projects while a stable
bureaucracy with a good incentive and control system may
be able to implement long-term investment in new projects.
In summary, the theory of property rights argues that a
transfer of ownership from public to private will enhance
the efficiency of the firm because of the better incentive
systems and control mechanisms associated with private
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ownership which derive from the benefits associated with
residual claimants. Public assets are not owned, there are
no clear rights for residual claimants and the exchange of
rights does not exist. This lack of ownership
contestability means that decisions formulated by public
enterprise managers do not translate into a change in
market prices and consequently there are no risk bearers
of decisions.
It is the delegation of power from the public to
politicians, and from the latter to ministers and then to
directors and finally to managers which causes high
attenuation of the property right structure. In addition,
with no signalling device available to direct owners to
influence and evaluate the decisions of the enterprise,
the X-inefficiency will increase in public enterprises in
comparison with private ones.
2.7.4:Elements of Critique 
The main criticism of the theory of property rights is
that it has established the differences between public and
private ownership on the presumption that there is an
existing and well defined system of property rights. This
is true mainly in the advanced capitalist countries but
such an assumption is not valid in either a large number
of developing countries or the former socialist countries.
De Soto (1993, p.8) argues that in the advanced countries
such as Britain, "the legal system has created property
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rights that can be exchanged in an expanded market". On
the other hand, such a system is not yet institutionalized
in many developing countries. The comparison between
public and private will, however, be meaningless without
such an important ingredient.
Similarly, the work of Douglass North since the beginning
of the 1980s has emphasised the necessity of establishing
an efficient system of property rights (North, 1993).
Likewise, Brabant (1992, p.2) observes that property
rights reform in the former socialist countries "is a
necessary, if insufficient, condition for successfully
moving toward market-based decision-making". Moreover,
even when a comparison between public and private
ownership, as in the case of property rights theory, may
seem to be compatible with any case of comparison in the
real world, such a context may vary widely between
different countries. For example, Lipton and Sachs (1992)
said that differences in the form of public ownership will
in themselves determine the simplicity or complexity of
any subsequent privatization.
In the case of British state enterprises the existence of
an independent board of directors (appointed by the
government) to run the enterprise, makes the transfer to
private ownership an easy task because the system of
corporation is well structured. Such a system is, however,
absent from public enterprises in Eastern Europe and the
existence of a workers' council, as the major controller
of the firm, makes the transition to private ownership
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more difficult, particularly in large enterprises.
Thus, there is a difference between the legalization of
private property and its institutionalization. The latter
means providing the "social legitimacy" of property rights
(Koslowski, 1992, p.684). In the former socialist
countries, the uncertainty arising from such a lack of
legitimacy, may hinder exchange and dissuade investment
even when property rights become lega122 . In the words of
Koslowski:
"For the use of property rights to become a
settled practice as in established market
economies, a newly established system of
property rights must become legitimate. If the
rules regulating the recognition of property
rights are not initially acceptable to the
polity, the permanence of those property rights
is questionable. Although exchange of such
property rights is possible, reproduction of
exchange on a routine basis is less likely"
(Koslowski, 1992, p.684).
In the final analysis, the differences between the context
in which property rights theory was developed, and the
lack of a clear and institutionalized structure for such
property rights in different developing countries may
weaken the argument for privatization presented by this
theory.
2.8: Tg_l'IJIISLOLLmWgr_AJIII/M2Z4
The most fundamental theory on which privatization has
22For a more detailed analysis of the different
dimensions of property rights in the socialist countries
review Szakadat (1993).
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been presented is the principal-agent theory". This
theory focuses on the informational and incentive
differences between private and public enterprises.
The agency problem arises from contracting with asymmetric
information when the principals (owners) delegate other
parties, the agents (managers), the right to act on their
behalf, or as their representatives, in a particular set
of decisions regarding the functioning of the
organization. If both the principal and the agent are
maximizers of their utilities, there will be a conflict of
objectives. While the principals' aim is to induce their
agents to act in their interests, achievement of this
objective (i.e. maximizing wealth), will result in
additional agency costs being imposed (Ross, 1973, p.134).
The agency costs are the costs of writing and enforcing
the contracts between the contractual parties. They
include the costs of structuring, monitoring, and bonding
a set of contracts with conflicting interests. They also
include the value of output loss where the costs exceed
the benefit yield from the full enforcement of contracts
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p.308).
In other words, the principals will face a monitoring
problem because of a lack of adequate information about
"The essence of analysis for this theory is a
mathematically oriented one. However, the intention is not
to discuss the technicality of the approach but rather the
main context on which the differences between private and
public ownership are presented. For a sophisticated
analysis of this literature within the context of
privatization read Vickers and Yarrow (1988) and Bos
(1991). For a general mathematical treatment, see Rees
(1985a) and (1985b).
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the efforts and behaviour of their agents (Strong and
Waterson, 1987, pp.18-20).
In a simple relationship between one principal and one
agent, the principal can reduce the agency costs by
observing the change in the level of output. In this case,
the optimal contract would be to compensate the agent in
relation to the output level (Diamond and Verrecchia,
1982, pp.275-276). Because of the specialized nature of
such a small firm, there would be no observability
problem, or even if there were, it could be solved with
minimum affect on the firm's efficiency (Fama and Jensen,
1983, p.307).
However, within the context of privatization, the
comparison has to be shifted to the differences in the
agency costs between large public and private
corporations.
As the separation between owners (principals) and managers
(agents) is a characteristic of such organizations, the
agency costs will rise in both type of organizations. The
ex ante costs arising from the "adverse selection" and ex
post costs arising from "moral hazard" will increase the
total agency costs derived from the problem of
asymmetrical information and observability".
"The "adverse selection" ex ante costs arise from the
inability of one party, such as the principal, to
distinguish between true and false information provided to
them by different contractual parties, which may lead to
choices that increase the costs on the principal.
The " moral hazard" ex post costs arise in agreements in
which at least one, the principal for example, relies on
the behaviour of another party and information about that
behaviour is costly.
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As the number of shareholders (principals) is large in
both public and private organizations, the difference
between them lies in their ability to provide the optimal
contractual agreement (the incentive constraint) and the
monitoring devices (the information constraint).
In contractual agreements there is no decisive difference
between public and private organizations if it is assumed
that "bounded rationality" is a problem for the principals
of both organizations. The difference between them lies in
their ability to design contracts which induce the agents
to act according to the principals' objectives. For
example the use of pecuniary and non-pecuniary reward
schemes can be found in both types of organization.
However, if the differences in the principals' objectives
are taken into account, important differences can be
assumed between the two. Shapiro and Willig (1990) argued
that under public ownership, public enterprises are run by
ministers or bureaucrats who are maximizers of their
utility functions, a weighted average of social welfare
and their personal objectives. These personal objectives
satisfy the goals of "public management", such as large
budgets, high wages and employment levels in particular
enterprises or sectors, patronage, and the redistribution
of income and wealth to favoured interest groups. It is
sometimes argued that the result of these goals will be
Both terms are mainly used within the insurance industry
(Williamson, 1985, p.47) (Holmstrom, 1979).
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the absence of efficiency-promoting incentives, because
this, even if sought by political decision makers, "is
frequently a low-ranked priority" (Prager, 1992, p.307)25.
In contrast, the private owners of an enterprise are
usually eager to pursue the goal of profit maximization,
and efficiency as a means of achieving it, which is one
component of the social welfare function. Others may be
derived from the firm's activities such as the effect on
consumer surplus and, for example, other distributional
and non-distributional effects. Thus, in both cases, there
is a divergence between the principals' objectives and
social welfare (Shapiro and Willig, 1990) (Vickers and
Yarrow, 1991).
However, what can decide the advantages of one form of
enterprise against the other is the design and functioning
of the political system versus the structure of the
market. If there is an optimal political system, where
managers cannot pursue their personal goals, then public
enterprises are at an advantage in a non-competitive
market structure. On the other hand, private enterprises
will be at an advantage in a competitive market structure
with an inefficient political system (Vickers and Yarrow,
1991). However, in reality both assumptions rarely exist,
25Similar argument suggested by Bos and Peters (1991).
In their words;
"The reward to the manager of a public firm is
more differentiated than efficient. In the case
of an unfavourable economic environment the
reward is higher than efficient. In the case of
a favourable environment the reward is higher
than efficient"(Bos and Peters, 1991, p.48).
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particularly in developing countries. Thus, the comparison
will depend on the speciality of each case to determine
the differences between the contractual arrangements in
both forms of ownership. For example Bishop and Thompson
(1992) found that the introduction of management
remuneration schemes in some of the British public
enterprises, such as the Post Office and British Steel,
during the 1980s contributed significantly to an
improvement in the performance of those enterprises
without a change in the ownership structure.
The other most important factor which affects agency costs
is the monitoring problem. This is based on the available
information for each form of organization.
It is argued, that there are several control mechanisms,
which can provide information and subsequently a
disciplinary system to private enterprise managers.
The first is the Annual General Meeting (AGM) of the
shareholders. Although shareholders delegate the power of
decision making to the managers of the enterprise, they
still retain the power to vote on important decisions.
However, in large private corporations, the influence of
internal managers is immense because of the wide range of
information they hold which affects the decisions taken
during the AGM (Demsetz, 1986). Jensen and Meckling (1976)
argued that managerial share ownership reduces agency
problems between internal managers and outside
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shareholders leading to an increase in shareholders'
wealth. The findings of Chang and Mayers (1992), however,
contradicted the above suggestion from Jensen and
Meckling. Even without such an arrangement, Millward and
Parker (1983, p.215) said that during an AGM there are no
strong tendencies for clashes between shareholders and
managers.
However, in public enterprises, there is no meeting
between the public and the managers. Ministers or
representatives of other government agencies are the
principals responsible for discussing the achievement of
enterprise goals, which are often asymmetrical. With such
features, the agency costs in such enterprises tend to be
high.
The other monitoring device is change in the value of
shares on the stock market. The difference, as mentioned
earlier, between private and public ownership is the
transferability or contestability of ownership. In private
ownership, the changes in share prices provide a less
costly mechanism for understanding the implications of
internal decisions for current and future net cash flows.
Thus, in the case of declining share prices, the owners
will either change the managers or encourage them to
correct their policies. However, where there is unresolved
conflict, the shareholders will sell their shares as a
reflection of their dissatisfaction with the managers'
performance. This will put pressure on the managers to
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increase their efforts.
A firm in continuing decline will be in danger of takeover
by an other corporation, or of bankruptcy if the firm's
assets fall below outstanding liabilities, or when, at
least in the case of fallen share prices, the firm is
unable to obtain access to additional capital (Vickers and
Yarrow, 1988).
In public enterprises none of these devices exists to
control the agents of an enterprise. This leads to an
increase in their agency costs and increased inefficiency.
Nevertheless, Stiglitz (1985) argued that none of the
above devices can succeed in disciplining private
enterprise managers and thereby reducing the agency costs.
He suggested that the three most important mechanisms are;
control of the enterprise by the banks when they are major
lenders, the concentration of equity ownership, and the
factor of managerial reputation. Likewise, Jensen (1986)
observed that enterprise debt can be beneficial in
reducing agency costs.
Similarly, Fama (1980) discussed the effect of the
managerial labour market, and two-way managerial
monitoring inside the firm as mechanisms which reduce
agency costs and ensure efficiency. However, Hirschey
(1986) argued that internal managerial monitoring may
depend on the structure of the organization itself. In
other words, the hierarchical structure of management
155
within firms may preclude such internal monitoring.
In addition, the financial markets may not be the perfect
mechanism by which shareholders can control their
agents 26 . Stiglitz (1985)(1993) argued that credit
rationing may not provide a clear signal about the
performance of managers in some enterprises. In other
words, if the banks adopt a policy of credit rationing,
they may refuse the finance of long-term projects and thus
reduce the future performance of an enterprise.
Rees (1988) asserted that the problem of asymmetric
information within public enterprises would lead to a
greater provision of capital from the principals (planners
or government) and less profit from the enterprise. This
is because the principals cannot obtain full information
about market and technology conditions and so are unable
to give instructions to the agent about first-best level
of price, output, labour and wage rates. This leads to an
inefficient allocation of resources, particularly when
there are no penalties in the public sector for
unrealistic forecasting. Likewise, agency costs will be
high in such enterprises because agents might give
information about the level of production below the actual
level, or the government may use past performance in
26In a recent contribution Greenwald, Kohn and Stiglitz
(1990) argued that financial market imperfection may
negatively affect the productivity growth in large
corporation.
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setting future goals. Hence, the achievement of such
targets will be rewarded while there is no incentive
mechanism to induce the agents to perform up to their
potential (Moore, 1981) (Sappington, 1991).
However, Vickers and Yarrow (1991) contended that loss-
making public enterprises might face tightened state
budgets which may limit managerial discretion. This would
lead to a reduction in agency costs.
Moreover, following the Vining and Weimer (1990) model,
the management of public enterprises may consider the
value of their expertise and reputation as important
factors in reducing agency costs.
External auditing may also play a role in reducing agency
costs in both public and private enterprises (Watts and
Zimmerman, 1983).
In summary, according to Shapiro and Willig (1990), what
differentiates public vs. private regulated enterprises is
the nature of private information. If private information
about the agents in both enterprises cannot be revealed,
there will be a major impact from privatizing public
enterprises; however, if there is no hidden information,
which diverges public and private interest, there will be
no major impact from privatization. Similarly, Bos (1988)
argued that it is the differences in incentive and
information which count and not ownership. However, he
believed that private ownership provides incentives for
higher efficiency, while public ownership provides
incentives for meeting social objectives.
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On the other hand, as agency costs are major components in
the total transaction costs, Sappington and Stiglitz
(1987) argued that privatization will be beneficial
through reducing the transaction costs derived from
government intervention in enterprise decision-making.
However, we could not trace any major argument in the
principal-agent literature that can stand without a
challenge to the primacy of private over public ownership.
Even the argument regarding the existence of the capital
market as a signalling device might fail to stand in
developing countries because most of them lack such
capital markets. However, the threat of takeover and
bankruptcy may put more pressure on private managers.
Nevertheless, on theoretical grounds, the differences
between the two are not analogous with ownership, but
rather information and incentives which are based on the
main objectives of each organization. Simon (1991)
summarised the above context in the following words:
"Large organizations, especially governmental
ones, are often caricatured as "bureaucracies",
but they are often highly effective systems,
despite the fact that the profit motive can
penetrate these vast structures only by indirect
means" (Simon, 1991, p.43).
2.9: Conclusion
By examining the allocative role of the state, this
chapter suggests that developing countries are not a
homogenous group. Each region, and sometimes each country,
has had different reasons for the creation and expansion
of its public sector. Such conclusions have to be taken
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into account when the proponents of privatization attempt
to enforce privatization policies on some developing
countries. That is to say, the argument of private versus
public ownership seems to be, in general terms, irrelevant
in a large number of developing countries because many of
the reasons behind the creation and expansion of the
public sector are still valid. Objectives such as the
control of the commanding heights, the creation of high-
tech industries, the control of natural resources,
employment generation, balanced regional development and
many others continue to be listed as high priorities in
many developing countries. These are a translation to the
theoretical context of public economics.
While the argument of private versus public ownership
rests on cost-benefit analysis, it is suggested that
profitability does not mean economically efficient. The
empirical evidence from the three main regions of the
developing countries revealed that public ownership is not
synonymous with loss. On the other hand, the empirical
evidence asserts that many loss-making public enterprises
were economically efficient when parameters such as total
factor productivity were employed in the analysis.
Arguments such as those based on opportunity costs were
also found to be misleading because the losses themselves
are related to the special character of the industry, or
to the kind of policies enforced by the government on its
enterprises in order to achieve specific goals (i.e.
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learning, employment, subsidies). However, the chapter
does not suggest that all public enterprises are
efficient, only that it is necessary to study each case on
its own in order to stand a better chance of reaching a
more accurate conclusion about whether to privatize or
not.
The theoretical presumption that private ownership is
superior was, when investigated, also found to be
misleading. While bounded rationality, opportunistic
behaviour and information impactedness are found both in
public and private organizations, the degree of
transaction costs seems to depend on the structure of the
organization rather than on the type of ownership per se.
Although the economic theory of property rights presents
several arguments in favour of private ownership, such a
theory depends on the existence of stock markets where the
shares can be transferred from one shareholder to another.
In the majority of developing countries, however, such
markets do not exist or, if they do, they lack the
necessary institutions and codes which protect, enforce
and legitimize property rights.
Within the context of principal-agent theory, the
arguments have shown that incentive and information
structures are the major factors which determine the level
of agency costs and consequently X-efficiency. Better
incentives and information are not characteristics of
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private ownership alone. Factors such as tight government
budgets, appropriate control mechanisms and efficient
reward-penalty systems can be employed to the benefit of
public enterprises as well. The existence of factors such
as managerial expertise and reputation can minimize agency
costs in both public and private enterprises.
However, all the above theories share the belief that
competition in the market is the single most important
factor in enhancing efficiency and reducing agency costs.
Thus, it is not ownership, but market structure which
determines the success or failure of privatization.
The question of efficiency, at the enterprise level is
whether efficiency will be improved under private
ownership. In such a context the investigation of the
competitiveness of the firm will play a more important
role in the analysis of efficiency than the simple test of
profitability. However, even if there are efficiency gains
from divestiture, these should be compared with the
transaction costs of the divestiture itself.
On the macro level the reasons for privatization in
developing countries might not be related to the question
of efficiency alone but to other factors. However, this
will be the task of the next chapter which will review the
empirical evidence regarding the different dimensions of
privatization in developing countries.
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3.1: Introduction
This thesis provides three tables on the number of SOEs
and detailed privatization experience in developing
countries.
Table 3.1
The Number of SOEs (1986) and Cases of Privatization
(1987) in the Low-income Countries.
Country No. of non-
financial SOEs
No. of
financial SOEs
Total
number of
SONS
No. of
privatisation
cases
underway
No. of planned
privatization
C11868
No. of
completed
privatization
cases
1.Nepal 37 9 46 ... 6 ....
2.8angladesh 34 16 50 ... 7 8
3.Nalawi 25 1 26 1 ... 1
4.2aire 40 5 45 1 ... 9
5.Nali vi 7 35 1 6 5
6.Uganda
.
67 7 74 ... 5 7
7.Tanzania 204 8 212 n.a. n.a. n.a.,
8.Togo 47 8 55 4	 22 16
j
,
9.Niger 23 10 33 10	
) 
9 11
10.8enin 52 7 i 59 2 13 ...
11.Somalia 51 6 57 ... ... 2
12.Cent.Afri-
can pep.
15 5 20 ... ... 1
13.Rwanda 29 B 37
... ...
1
14 .China n.a. n.a. n.a. ... 6 ...
15.Kenya 110 22 132 1 ... 2
16-Zambia 304 12 316 ... ... 6
17.Sierra
Leone
22 7 29 ... ... 2
18.Pakistan BB 25 113 10 3 1
19.Ghana 50 11 61 31 ... 7
20. Sri Lanka 110 16 126 ... 6 12
21.Nauritania 28 12 40 3 ... 5
22.Senegal 47 10 57 2 33 6
23.Guine8 184 7 191 a ... 39
Total 1595	 _ 219	 _ 1814 74 116 144
Sources: The figures are calculated by the researcher.
(1) SOEs figures are calculated employing the data in IMF
(1987) [Supplement on public sector institutions].
(2) Privatization figures are calculated by employing the
data in Candoy-Sekse (1988).
Note: Privatization cases may include privatized branches
of the same SOE.
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Table 3.2
The Number of SOEs (1986) and Cases of Privatization
(1987) in the Lower Middle-income Countries.
Country No. of non-
financial SOEs
No. of
financial SOEs
Total no. of
SOEs
No. of
privatization
cases
underway
No. of planned
privatization
cases
No. of
completed
privatization
cases
1.Liberia 16 5 21 1 10 2
2.Indonesia 155 109 264 ... 1 3
3.Philippines 41 13 54 ... ...
-
5
4.Morocco 73 11 84 ... ... 11
5.HoliVia 35 16 51 1 ... 1
6.Nigeria 83 31 114 ... 98 ...
7 .Dosinican
Rep.
a 4 12 1 2 1
8.Papua New
Guinea
16 4 20 8 5
-
1
9.Cote
d'Ivoire
57 6 63 ... ... 36
10.Honduras 11 6 17 ... 14 2
11.Egypt 468 31 499 ... ... 2
12.Thailand 497 131 628 2 5 2
13.Jasaica 117 18 135 4 3 34
14.Cassroon 58 9 67 ... 1 5
15.Turkey 31 10 41 7 ... 2
16.Tunisia 106 19 125 ... ... 8
17.Colosbia 345 67 412 ... ... 1
18.Chile 21 7 28 4 4 40
19.Costa Rica 28 16 44 5 1 1
20.Jordan 19 9 28 ... 4
Total 285 522 2707 33 148 157
Source: The figures are calculated by the researcher.
(1) SOEs figures are calculated by employing the data in
IMF (1987) [Supplement on public sector institutions].
(2) Privatization figures are calculated by employing the
data in Candoy-Sekse(1988).
Note: Privatization cases may include privatized branches
of the same SOE.
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Table 3.3
The Number of SOEs (1986) and Cases of Privatization
(1987) in the Upper Middle-income Countries.
Country No. of non-
financial SCEs
No. of
financial SOEs
Total No. of
SOBS
No. of
privatization
cases
underway
No. of planned
privatization
Cases
No. of
completed
privatization
cases
1.Brazil 561 14 575 53 a ... 28
2.Malaysia 73 10 83 3 21 10
3.Mexico 243 75 318 5 4 10
4.Portugal 244 36 280 1 12 ...
5.Panama 218 5 223 1 3 5
6.Argentina 233 42 275 14 7 3
7.Korea, Rep. 144 10 154 ... 9 7
8.Venezuela 66 27 93 1 4 ...
9.Gabon 33 9 42 ... ... 3
10.0man 21 4 25 ... ... 4
11.Trinidad
and Tobago
58 9 67 ... 4 ...
12.Israel 166 15 181 1 2 1
13.Singapore 15 8 23 3 36 15
14.Irag (b) 267 9 276 1 1 3
Total 2342 273 2615 30 103 90
Source: The figures are calculated by the researcher.
(1) SOEs figures are calculated by employing the data in
IMF (1987) [Supplement on public sector institutions].
(2) Privatization figures are calculated by employing the
data in Candoy-Sekse (1988).
Note: Privatization cases may include privatized branches
of the same SOE.
(a) This number is the sum of both privatization cases,
both underway and planned.
(b) The number of SOEs in Iraq as cited in Abu Shair
(1988).
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The main purpose of tables (3.1), (3.2), and (3.3) is to
provide a general statistical overview of the scope of
privatization.
We now turn to the empirical work conducted by different
scholars regarding privatization in developing countries.
They are rarely brought together in the literature, hence
this review.
The review is not restricted to covering the efficiency
part but will encompass a wider scope of issues related to
the analysis of privatization in developing countries.
This literature review concentrates first on empirical
studies at the microeconomic level. It compares efficiency
between public enterprises and between public and private
enterprises. The major question is; is there solid
empirical evidence which supports the belief in the
superiority of private over public ownership?
The remaining empirical studies are concerned with the
macroeconomic level, and deal with;
ii) The factors determining private investment in
developing countries and question in particular the effect
of public investment on private sector investment.
iii) Study the relationship between government
intervention (and/or government size) and economic growth.
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Is there conclusive evidence of an adverse relationship
between government size and economic growth?
v) Investigate the impact of public enterprises on
budgetary deficits in developing countries.
vi) Study the correlation between privatization and
development in its wider definition (including the human
development index). Is there a positive relation between
privatization and development?
vii) To find the reasons for privatization in developing
countries. Is privatization domestically motivated by the
desire for efficiency or is it imposed by external
factors?
viii) There are also the distributional consequences of
privatization. Who are the major winners and the losers
from such a policy?
3.2: Efficiency Comparison 
There are about 15 empirical studies into this question.
The first study is by Aylen (1988). He compared two
publicly owned steel enterprises, one (POSCO) in South
Korea and its counterpart (SAIL) in India. He found that
the labour productivity per worker in (SAIL) was only one-
tenth that in its counterpart. He concluded that it is not
ownership but rather market environment, firm organization
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and managerial incentives which determine a firm's
performance.
Millward (1987) studied the comparative performance of
public and private enterprises in less developed countries
(LDCs) in terms of productivity and cost effectiveness
over the period 1976-1986. He concluded that there was no
- statistically significant evidence that private
enterprises in LDCs which function at the same scale of
operation as their counterparts in the public sector are
technically more efficient.
Levy (1981) investigating private and public enterprises
in three industries in Iraq found that public firms are
more technically efficient while private industries were
more allocativelly efficient than their counterparts/. The
author concluded that there is a significant possibility
for economic growth if an increase of allocative
efficiency in the public sector is accompanied by an
increased of technical efficiency in private industry.
Likewise, Abu Shair (1988) found that the productivity of
labour in both private and public industrial enterprises
increased in Iraq during the period 1970-1985. However,
the annual growth for labour productivity in the private
IA firm is technically efficient when it produces a
higher level of output with the same sets of inputs while
it is allocationally efficient if it equates the value of
the marginal product of each variable input with its
opportunity cost (Levy, 1981, pp.236-237). For a further
analysis of efficiency read the preceding chapter.
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sector was 6.7 percent while in the public industrial
sector it was only 5.3 percent (Abu Shair, 1988, p.22).
Ilokwu (1991) carried out a comparative analysis of 24
enterprises in Nigeria (12 SOEs and 12 private
enterprises) across four industries over the period 1980-
1989 and reached the conclusion that public enterprises
produced a lower performance (return on investment) and
were less efficient (annual turnover ratios). Across the
four industries (airline, insurance, banking and
manufacturing), public enterprises were 1.9 percentage
points less than private enterprises in the return on
investment ratio and 12.2 percentage points lower in the
annual turnover ratios. However, public insurance
companies outperformed their counterparts in the private
sector.
Perera (1991) compared the performance of the public and
private bus transport systems in Sri Lanka. The study
revealed that the average operating cost of the private
bus sector was 2.5 times lower than in the public
transport system. Likewise, the productivity ratios for
cost efficiency asserted the superiority of the private
bus system. The same results were found when comparing
labour efficiency between the two types of ownership.
The other empirical work is by Ruangrong (1992) who
examined the efficiency parameters of the monopoly state-
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owned electric utility in Thailand (EGAT) and revealed an
efficient performance. Productivity growth rose around
1.15 percent annually during the study period. There was
also no divergence in total factor productivity (TFP)
growth between EGAT and the private industrial
manufacturing sector2 . The scholar concluded that there
was no justification for the privatization of EGAT because
it was fulfilling its objective of cost minimization.
A study by Balassa in 1987 reviewed eight previous studies
which had compared the relative efficiency of public and
private enterprises in developing countries. The author,
one of the strongest advocates of privatization, concluded
that private enterprises are more efficient than their
counterparts in the public sector and that therefore
privatization will enhance efficiency. However, Millward
(1987) who made use of a number of the same studies
reviewed by Balassa, such as Tyler (1979), Hill (1982),
Gupta (1982) [(cited in both Balassa (1987) and Millward
(1987)] reached a, different conclusion regarding the
differences between the efficiency of private and public
enterprises.
Potts (1992) in a paper presented at an international
conference on post privatization policy, held at Bradford
University, claimed that there was no conclusive empirical
2 TFP = (Weighted index of physical quantities of
output)/ (Total expenditure on inputs/Weighted index of
input prices').
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evidence to suggest that "the economic performance of the
public sector estates (agriculture) in Tanzania has been
any worse than that of the private sector in general"
(emphasis added, Potts, 1992, p.13). He observed that
during the period 1970-1985, the production performance of
estates deteriorated significantly in both the private and
public sectors while those owned by foreign companies
performed better than the national ones. The reasons
behind the deterioration lay outside the ownership effect
with factors such as institutional change, access to
foreign exchange, the exchange rate effects, taxation
policies, and the general economic environment playing a
major role in determining overall performance. Potts
concluded that privatization would not be able to solve
problems of productivity without the injection of new
external resources into the agricultural estates. In his
words
"rehabilitation is far more likely to succeed if
it has the backing of the resources of a foreign
investor. Simply privatising without injecting
new external resources does not necessarily
solve anything. There is a strong positive
relationship between the level of external
resources introduced and the production
response" (Potts, 1992, pp.14-15).
Dollar (1990), in an econometric analysis, studied the
change in TFP growth and the change in the allocative
efficiency of 20 Chinese industrial SOE53 . In comparison
with the pre-reform period (before 1978) these enterprises
experienced in 1982 a rapid growth in TFP as well as an
3For the calculation of TFP, see footnote no.2.
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improvement in allocative efficiency. Efficiency gains
also showed a positive correlation with the share of
enterprise profit distributed to workers and managers.
Thus, a reform of the incentive system rather than a
change in ownership played a significant role in enhancing
the efficiency of these enterprises. Within the same
context, a study by Park (1987) showed that changing the
system for evaluating the performance of public
enterprises in South Korea played a major role in
enhancing the performance of public managers. The revision
not only adjusted the mechanism of accountability but also
provided better guidelines for rewarding the efforts of
management and employees.
Cakmak and Zaim (1992) for their part studied the
comparative efficiency of public, private and mixed
enterprises in the Turkish cement industry. The
examination of the 41 cement plants comprising 17 SOEs, 18
private enterprises, and 6 mixed enterprises in 1990,
revealed that the ownership factor had no effect on the
economic efficiency of the different plants. Rather was
market structure or competition the driving force behind
improvements in the productive efficiency of the 41
plants. Efficiency gains from divestiture policies, the
scholars concluded, are likely to be negligible unless
accompanied by enhanced competition in the market place.
Boardman and Vining (1989) investigated the relationship
173
between type of ownership and economic performance for the
489 largest manufacturing and mining corporations outside
the United States operating in a competitive environment.
The sample consisted of 409 private companies (PCs), 23
mixed enterprises (MEs) and 57 SOEs. It was found that the
average return on equity was only positive (4.3 percent)
in the private companies. Meanwhile the rate of return in
PCs was 14.5 percent higher than that in SOEs and 18.4
percent higher than in MEs.
The efficiency indicator of average sales per asset showed
PCs to have the highest ratio; however, in terms of sales
per employee, MEs outperformed SOEs and PCs. The
conclusion of the study was that partial privatization is
worse than either complete privatization or complete state
ownership.
Weiss (1992) examined the effect of ownership on
performance for a sample comprised of around 200
industrial enterprises in Mexico. Three measures of firm
performance -sales, sales per worker, and sales per total
assets- were estimated for these enterprises for the
period 1985-1990. After constructing a cross-sectional
regression model to explain the changes in the performance
indicators brought about by variables reflecting scale,
industrial structure, general industry trends (measured by
changes in nominal protection) and ownership, the scholar
concluded that there was no relationship between economic
efficiency and ownership type. According to Weiss's
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estimates, firm's performance was strongly influenced by
industry-level trends, with some influence from market
structure, as measured by concentration and protection.
However, foreign companies, in the same industry, were
more efficient than national firms after size differences
were taken into account. The empirical study concluded
that there was no support for the view that state
ownership per se implies a poor performance. The scholar
emphasized, however, that such a finding may have been due
to the privatization of many poorly performing SOEs in
Mexico before 1985. Nevertheless, he stressed that factors
such as economies of scale, market structure and industry
trends may be more important in explaining a firm's
performance than ownership type.
A number of financial ratios taken from a large sample of
public and private enterprises in Chile during the period
1980-1987 were studied by Hachette and Luders (1992) [as
cited in Luders (1993, p.114)]. They concluded that
private enterprises as a group were slightly more
efficient than SOEs. The reasons behind this efficiency
were a minimum of political interference in SOE operations
during the period and the positive effect of a hard budget
on the opportunistic behaviour of SOE managers. The first
factor reduced transaction costs while the second reduced
agency costs.
However, by employing a different methodology to analyze
efficiency Hachette, Luders, Tagle and others claimed that
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in five out of six large privatized enterprises, internal
efficiency had increased as a result of privatization
(Luders, 1993, p.114).
It is clear, therefore, that empirical work at the
microlevel in developing countries has produced no
conclusive evidence to confirm the superior efficiency of
private enterprises over their counterparts in the public
sector. Generalizations derived from property right and
principal-agent theories about the effects of ownership on
efficiency are not evidenced in all the empirical work. On
the contrary, factors such as organizational and market
structure, enterprise size and other institutional factors
have been found to play an important role in determining
the efficiency of an enterprise whether it is in the
public or the private domain. It is also important to note
that the different methodologies regarding the calculation
of efficiency employed in the various empirical studies
can in themselves lead to different conclusions being
drawn from similar sets of data.
3.3: The Factors Determining Private Investment 
This group of studies concentrates on the factors which
determine private investment in LDCs, in particular, the
hypothesis of public investment "crowding-out" private
investment.
An econometric study by Greene and Villanueva (1991)
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analyzed the economic factors determining the average
levels of private investment in 23 developing countries
over the period 1975-1987. The econometric evidence
indicated that the rate of private investment was
positively related to the rate of public sector
investment. The study found no statistical evidence to
support the argument of crowding-out and the researchers
made reference to the importance of categorizing public
investment into two kinds, long-term investment (in
infrastructure) and short-term investment (other
activities) in order to investigate the validity of the
crowding-out hypothesis.
The International Finance Corporation (IFC) of the World
Bank undertook a study of private investment in 30
developing countries during the period 1970-1988
(Madarassy, 1990). In order to examine the "crowding-out"
hypothesis the IFC looked at 31 episodes when public
investment was increased by more than half a percent
annually over a 3-year moving average period. In nearly 55
percent of the cases private investment (as a percentage
of GDP) also grew while in the remaining cases it
declined. Thus, there is no conclusive evidence either
that in developing countries public investments support
private investment or that they compete with it.
Blejer and Khan (1984) examined the impact of government
economic policy on private investment in a sample of 24
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developing countries over the period 1971-1979 and
concluded that there was a quantitatively important role
for public investment in the process of private capital
formation. However, although the researchers advocated the
"crowding-out" hypothesis, their study was not able to
provide any powerful evidence for it.
Rodrik (1991) investigated the relationship between policy
uncertainty and private investment in developing countries
and established that the uncertainty deriving from reform
policies in developing countries may have a more harmful
effect on private investment. After developing a model to
measure the effect of uncertainty on private investment he
reviewed more than 10 empirical studies which supported
his hypothesis and concluded that economic liberalization
and "getting the price right" might have a negligible
effect on private investment in developing countries when
compared with policy stability and continuity.
A study by Pradhan, Ratha and Sarma (1990) dealt with the
relationship between public and private investment in
India under different modes of allocation and financing
public investments. The research group used an 18 sector
computable general equilibrium model and demonstrated
that, although public investment crowds-out private
investment the economy would be better off with increased
public investment in terms of its effect on total
investment, growth and distribution of income. As a result
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they took the view that the "crowding-out hypothesis, when
considered in a wider perspective, need not be
undesirable" (Pradhan, et al., 1990, p.115).
In another empirical study of Latin American countries
Cardoso (1993) investigated the issue of private
investment from different perspectives. In the
relationship between public and private investment the
scholar drew attention to the argument of the over-
extended public sector and its poor performance. However,
he stated that
"even though the performance of the public
sector has been strongly criticized, the
empirical evidence shows that there is an
important complementarity between public and
private investment" (Cardoso, 1993, p.842).
In his regression model for the relationship between
public and private investment in six countries he
estimated that a one-percentage point increase in the
share of public investment in GDP increases the share of
private investment in GDP by more than half a percentage
point.
Nevertheless, he also observed that the crowding-out
hypothesis may hold if there is an increase in budget
deficits since government borrowing from the local credit
market is likely to crowd-out private investment because
of the subsequent increase in interest rates and the
reduction in the availability of credit to the private
sector.
179
In a similar econometric study of the factors determining
private investment in 15 developing countries Serven
(1993) investigated the effect on the private
investment/GDP ratio of a one point increase in five
variables; public investment/GDP, foreign debt/GDP, real
GDP growth, inflation instability, and the real exchange
rate instability. The regression results indicated that
the largest effect on private investment corresponded to
the public investment ratio. An increase in the ratio of
public investment/GDP of one percentage point raises the
private investment ratio by 0.257 percent. More
significantly, a reduction in the public investment ratio
contributed to a deterioration in the private investment
ratio of about half a percent.
The main conclusion of the researcher is that
"even if austerity and liberalization
consolidate, the market equilibrium may not
bring renewed investment and growth. In these
cases government action is needed in ways that
revive "animal spirits" and get private
investment underway. The provision of public
infrastructure (in particular given the
compression of public investment in the eighties
in many LDCs) may play an important ro_Le here"
(Serven, 1993, p.137).
Although there is a sweeping belief that there is an over
extended public sector or investment by this sector in
developing countries, a calculation of the trends in
private investment provided by Pfeffermann and Madarassy
(1992) reveals a different conclusion. An analysis of the
data for 47 developing countries indicates that during the
period 1981-1985 private investment, as a share of total
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investment, amounted to about 56 percent while during the
period 1986-1991 it increased to about 59 percent4.
However, there is a wide gap between different developing
regions. For example, private investment in eight East
Asian countries was on average about 68 percent of total
investment during the period 1980-1991 whereas in 18 Latin
American countries it stood at about 60 percent for the
same period. In other words, despite the weight of private
investment in the Latin American countries their economic
performance was still below that achieved in the East
Asian countries. The reasons for good or bad economic
efficiency shift therefore from the traditional vision of
the effect of ownership geometry to other institutional
factors differentiating the two regions which have not
been taken into account by the advocates of privatization.
3.4: The Relationship Between Government Size and Economic
Growth
Seven empirical studies are available which have examined
the relationship between government intervention and/or
government size on the economic growth of developing
countries.
Singh (1985) (as cited in Schackelton, 1986, p.434)
carried out an econometric analysis of 73 developing
countries aiming to assess the impact of government
°All figures have been calculated by the i-esearcher
employing the data published by Pfeffermann and Madarassy
(1992).
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intervention (regulatory role of the state, its level of
nationalization on a numerical scale) on economic growth.
The study pointed out the significant negative effect of
such intervention on a country's rate of economic growth
(other factors constant).
Landau (1983) took a sample of 104 developed and LDCs
(including 8 major oil exporting countries) over the
period 1961-1976 and found that the size of government
(share of government consumption expenditure in GDP) was
negatively correlated to the rate of growth in per capita
GDP. He confirmed that the relationship was negative and
statistically significant for both lower and higher income
countries.
Another study by Nunnenkump (1986) assessed the effect of
public enterprises (their share in output and investment)
on economic performance (real growth in GDP, gross fixed
investment, industrialization level and the growth of
employment) but was unable to detect any statistically
significant cross-country relationships between the role
of public enterprises and general economic performance
with the exception of the industrialization level which
showed itself to be positive.
An econometric study by Scully (1989) covered 115 market
economies including 93 LDCs in the period 1960-1980. The
analysis indicated that the size of the state (measured by
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government expenditure as a fraction of national output)
was negatively correlated with economic growth (growth
rate of real GDP) with each one percentage increase in the
size of government in 1960 or during the 20-year period of
study reducing the growth rate by roughly 0.1 percent. The
same negative trend was found in the size of government
and economic efficiency (technical or production
efficiency).
Khan and Reinhart (1990) separated the effects of private
and public investment on economic growth in a sample of 24
LDCs over the period 1970-1979. After developing a simple
growth model that allowed private and public investment to
exercise differential effects on output, the study found
that private investment plays a more important role than
public investment in increasing long-term economic growth.
Public investment appeared to have no statistically
significant effect on growth. Nevertheless, the
researchers indicated that their conclusion was related
only to the direct effects of public investment stating
that "it is quite possible that public investment has
positive indirect effects on growth" (Khan and Reinhart,
1990, p.25). In other words government investment in
infrastructure and human capital may have a complementary
effect on long-term investment in the private sector as
well as a positive effect on the long-term growth of the
economy. The policy implications of their results were as
they claimed
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"governments should aim at creating conditions
which make private investment attractive. These
conditions can range from the most general -
establishing a stable macroeconomic environment,
provision of adequate legal and institutional
arrangements for the protection of private
property - to more specific ones, such as
adequate access to credit and to imported inputs
by private investors" (ibid, p.25).
Kirkpatrick (1986) looked at a sample of 23 LDCs and
established a negative, but statistically insignificant
relationship, between the share of public enterprise
output in GDP and the growth in income in these countries
during the 1970s. Cook and Kirkpatrick (1988) pointed out
that the argument of an "over-extended" public sector in
LDCs is empirically unproven and the evidence of a
negative relationship between the size of public sector
and macroeconomic performance is inconclusive.
Finally Ram (1986) analyzed the effect of government size
on economic growth for 115 market economies over the
period 1960-1980 and found a positive correlation between
the two variables. Productivity in the government sector,
moreover, appeared to be higher when compared with the
private sector, particularly during the 1960s.
The empirical evidence for the relationship between
government size and economic growth, provided by the
empirical studies above is insufficient to support a
rejection of government intervention and investment in the
economy. The significance of these studies, however,
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derives from their recommendation for a higher quality
government intervention, and the mobilization of public
resources for selective activities particularly where
public investment can "crowd-in" private investment.
3.5: The Relationship Between Public Enterprises and
Budgetary Deficit 
One of the main arguments for privatizing public
enterprises in developing countries is their negative
impact on the budgetary balance.
Short (1984), in his international statistical comparison,
found among different macroeconomic indicators that the
overall deficit of public enterprises in the mid-1970s in
a sample of 12 industrial countries was only 1.7 percent
of GDP as opposed to 3.9 percent of GDP in a sample of 25
LDCs. After the deduction of government transfers
(subsidies) the public enterprises overall deficit
increased to 3.5 percent and subsequently 5.5 percent. His
conclusion was that public enterprises in LDCs are a major
cause of stabilization problems (inflation and balance of
payment difficulties).
Likewise, the World Bank (1988) in its 1988 World
Development Report asserted that the net budgetary
transfers to state-owned enterprises in eight developing
countries ranged during 1983-1988 from more than one
percent of GDP in the Dominican Republic to more than 5
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percent in Sri Lanke. However, the Report claimed that
there were public enterprises which made sizable positive
contributions to the budget. According to the Report the
reason behind the negative budgetary impact of public
enterprises is that "budgetary transfers have thereby been
the unintended outcome of poor decisions in investment,
pricing, and management" (World Bank, 1988, p.169).
Waterbury (1992) studied the relationship between public
enterprises and the adjustment process in LDCs by focusing
on the problems of public enterprises in four countries;
Egypt, India, Mexico, and Turkey. Part of his work was
devoted to the effect of the public enterprises in those
countries on the budgetary deficit. He asserted that as a
percentage of GDP the public enterprise budgetary deficit
was 9.0 percent in Egypt (1986-1987), 3.2 percent in India
(1988-1989), 2.0 percent in Mexico (1987), and 2.7 percent
in Turkey (1990). The scholar noted that according to the
figures above, "Turkey and Mexico run SOE deficits that
are proportionately as large as the total public deficit
of the United States" (Waterbury, 1992, p.197). However,
in the case of Egypt the public enterprise deficit cannot
be compared with that of other countries.
His conclusion, derived from his introductory argument,
was that
5The countries were the Dominican Republic,
Philippines, Sri Lanka, Benin, Egypt, Morocco, Tanzania,
and Turkey.
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"the SOE sector in developing countries is the
major cause of the public deficit, which in turn
fuels inflation, reduces international
creditworthiness, crowds out private borrowers,
and impedes export promotion" (ibid, p.183).
In his study of public enterprise reform programmes in
developing countries Galal (1991) emphasized that there
have been many attempts to reduce the budgetary burden of
public enterprises in a number of countries 6 . In Thailand,
for example, the reform of the public enterprise sector
has remitted to the government more than it received
during the period 1983-1988. Likewise, in Mauritius,
government transfers to public enterprises declined from
Rs 290 million in 1983 to Rs 160 million in 1985. However,
in other countries such as Malawi and Senegal the net
transfers from the treasury to public enterprises
increased. Thus, the evidence of the budgetary impact
resulting from the reform of public enterprises, as the
researcher contended, is inconclusive. Failure, however,
was the result of three factors: subsidy reductions were
not accompanied by a programme of restructuring at the
enterprise level; reform efforts concentrated only on one
element of the equation, that is the transfers from the
treasury, while neglecting the second element, namely, the
outflow of funds from the public enterprises; finally, the
important elements of the budgetary impact of public
enterprises are implicit in the pattern of exemptions and
preferential treatment of all kinds.
6The countries were Thailand, Turkey, Mauritius,
Malawi, Congo, Senegal, Morroco, and Mexico.
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In summary, the studies above have accused public
enterprises in LDCs of having a negative impact on the
public budget. However, there were success cases where
reforming public enterprises proved to have a positive
budgetary impact. Thus, privatization will not be the only
solution to a country's fiscal crisis.
3.6: The Relationship Between Privatization and
Development 
In empirical work conducted by Yoder, Borkholder and
Friesen (1991) for a sample of 45 Third World countries,
the aim was to examine the following important questions;
Is there an association between privatization (measured by
private sector spending as a share of GNP) and development
(measured by per capita income, life expectancy at birth,
literacy rate, infant mortality rate, income distribution,
and GNP growth rates). The distinction between this
empirical study and all others is that it has examined the
relationship between privatization and economic
development in the wider scope rather than concentrating
on the GNP growth rates as a meaning of development. It
explained development as a mixture of growth and other
human development indicators'.
After dividing the sample into three income groups, the
researchers concluded that there was no support for the
argument of an "over-extended" public sector in LDCs. The
private sector on average contributed 74 percent of GNP
'The same argument is employed in this thesis.
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and in no case did the public sector contributes more than
29 percent to the GNP. Moreover, there was no
statistically significant correlation at the 0.05
confidence level between privatization (measured by the
size of the private sector) and any of the development
indicators. There was a negative, though not statistically
significant, relationship between privatization and the
development indicators for 21 of the countries included in
the sample. At the 0.10 confidence level, there was a
statistically significant positive relationship a) between
privatization and average GNP growth rates for the low-
income countries, and b) between privatization and the
share of income going to the lowest income groups (in the
middle-income and upper middle-income countries).
Based on the empirical findings of this study, the
research group concluded that "the claims of privatization
have been overstated and unsubstantiated" (Yoder, et al.,
1991, p.432). Nevertheless, the research group did not
fall into the same error as privatization in finding a
negative relationship between public sector size and
economic growth. The cure must be in the private sector.
The scholars instead argued that the size of the public or
the private sector will not make a significant difference.
However, the difference may be found in the investigation
of the regulatory environment, trade policies, and fiscal
and monetary policy; in other words, the institutional
factors which determine interactions in the complex
process of development.
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3.7: The Reasons Behind Privatization
In a recent study, Ramamurti (1992) tested five hypotheses
regarding the reasons for privatization using a sample of
83 developing countries. Within this sample there were 34
non-privatizers, 21 cautious privatizers, and 28 actively
privatizing countries. The hypotheses examined were that
privatization oCcurs in countries characterized by, a)
higher fiscal pressure on governments (high budgetary
deficit, large domestic public debt, and large external
debt), b) higher dependency on loans from international
organizations (World Bank and IMF), c) a large share of
SOEs in total investment, d) inferior SOE performance in
comparison with non-privatizers, and e) lower long-term
growth.
The empirical test of these hypotheses revealed that
privatization occurs in countries with higher financial
problems, such as a large budgetary deficit and external
debt, as a percentage of GDP. Also, there is a positive
correlation between privatization and dependency on loans
from international organizations. That is to say, the
greater a country's dependence on loans from the World
Bank and IMF, the greater the probability of being an
active privatizer. However, the econometric analysis does
not support the assumption that privatization is related
to poor financial performance by SOEs and poorer long-term
growth. The researcher pointed out that in Latin American
and Asian countries, the increasing trend towards
privatization is related to their past "overuse" of SOEs
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(larger weight in the economy) and their faster growing
private sector.
In Africa, on the other hand, privatization has been
imposed by external factors, particularly the pressure
exercised by the World Bank and IMF, although the
conditions for privatization were not necessarily
appropriate. In fact, the study found that in African
countries "privatizers did not have significantly larger
SOE sectors than nonprivatizers, nor did they experience
growth rates that were significantly higher than that of
nonprivatizers" (Ramamurti, 1992, p.241). On the other
hand, the researcher observed that the set of
opportunities provided through privatization to the multi-
national corporations (MNCs) has provided the latter with
new avenues to gain entry into sectors that were
previously barred.
The findings of this empirical study asserted that a
government's desire to sell enterprises and raise revenue
from asset sales to balance the government budget would
mean that no objectives , and in particular that of
economic efficiency, are effectively attained. Governments
must be clear about their objectives. Are they more
interested in receiving maximum income from privatization,
attracting foreign capital and investment into the
economy, improving the management and efficiency of the
enterprises to be privatized or rolling back the state's
role in the economy.
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3.8: The Relationship Between Privatization and the
Distribution of Gains and Losses 
In this last group of empirical works there are three
studies which investigated the effects of privatization on
the distribution of gains and losses between domestic
consumers, shareholders, employees and foreigners.
Jones and Abbas (1992) conducted a study of three
privatization cases in Malaysia; Malaysian Airlines,
Kelang Container Terminal and Sports Toto. In the first
case the domestic consumers lost around 600 million
Ringgit and the major beneficiaries were foreign consumers
(3196 million Ringit) (ibid, table no.12-31). In the
second case, the domestic consumers benefited by only 58
million Ringgit, and foreigners by 29 million Ringgit
while the major beneficiaries were the domestic
concentrated shareholders (109 million Ringit) (ibid,
table no. 13-17). In the case of the gambling company
(Sports Toto), the society gained 121 million Ringgit, the
government 147 million Ringgit and private buyers 112
million Ringgit while the main losers were the formal and
informal gambling sectors (-69 million Ringgit). Thus,
looking at the consumer gains from the three selected
cases it appears that the consumers lost in one and gained
in the other two.
In the case of Chile, Galal (1992) selected three
privatized companies as a basis for his empirical study of
the consequences of privatization. In the first case, the
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privatization of the electricity generating company
(CHILGNER), there was no effect on consumers because the
company was a price taker. However, the private domestic
shareholders benefited by Ch$3.8 billion and foreign
shareholders by Ch$2.7 billion (ibid, table no.8-27). The
second case, that of the electricity distribution company
(ENERSIS), showed that shareholders were the biggest
winners (Ch$42.9 billion) while consumers were better off
by Ch$7.7 billion (ibid, table no.9-27). According to
Galal, the sale of the telecommunication company (COMPANIA
DE TELEFONOS DE CHILE) resulted in gains to the consumers
of Ch$516 billion while private shareholders benefited by
Ch$8 billion and foreign shareholders by Ch$39 billion
(ibid, table no.10-26).
In total, the divestiture cases of two out of the three
above companies were distributional-enhancing in relation
to the impact on consumers while one was neutral in its
effect.
The third study by Tandon (1992) concerned three Mexican
privatized companies. The privatization of the
telecommunication company (TELEMEX) pointed to large
losses in consumer gains because of large price increases
during 1988-1991 (ibid, pp. 18-19). This may have been
related to the fact that more than 50 percent of the
company is owned by foreign shareholders who were the main
winners (ibid, table no.16-15). In the second case, the
privatization of AEROMEXICO led to a net loss on the side
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of consumers while the government and the buyers of the
company gained the most (ibid, p.35). The third case
demonstrating the effect of privatization on distribution
is that of Mexicana Airline. The analysis of
distributional impact reveals net losses on the side of
domestic and foreign consumers while the major winners
were the government and domestic shareholders (ibid, table
no.18-17).
Thus, in total, privatization led to net losses on the
side of consumers in all three cases although the first
two might indicate total gains after taking into account
other parties such as the shareholders and the government.
In summary, the above nine cases revealed that
shareholders are the main winners while the consumers, in
most of the cases, were the main losers. This result
contrasts with the conclusion of the three above
researchers because they argued that the welfare effect
should be taken rather than the distributional impact on
the part of consumers alone. Thus, their studies which
formed part of the 1992 World Bank Conference on the
"Welfare Consequences of Selling Public Enterprises",
concluded, as the conference did, that privatization can
enhance welfare rather than reduce it. However, as we have
indicated, such an analysis should focus mainly on the
distributional impact, particularly consumers who
represent the wider and the most important spectrum of the
affected group.
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3.9: Conclusion
This review of empirical evidence suggests that there is
no conclusive evidence on the microeconomic level to
support the argument of private ownership superiority.
According to the investigation of the efficiency records
for the two type of ownership it has not been found that
private ownership is superior to public ownership in all
cases, but rather that there are even differences between
the public enterprises themselves in different countries.
Likewise, on the macrolevel, there is no clear cut
evidence that public investment is crowding-out private
investment, but in many studies it has been found that
there is a complementarity effect between public and
private investment.
In the context of the relationship between government size
and economic growth, the empirical studies reviewed
concluded that such a relation is vague and dependent on
the methodology employed by the different scholars
although there are no empirical grounds either for a
rejection of government intervention or for an increase in
its size. The studies appeared to indicate that what is
important is the quality and the type of government
intervention.
The review of the empirical studies investigated the
budgetary impact of public enterprises in developing
countries and suggested that the burden such enterprises
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place on the public budget could be reduced by a
comprehensive programme for reforming the public sector.
Without such an approach privatization might prove to be
a more attractive cure for this problem, from the
government point of view, as has been the case in many
developing countries.
On the correlation between privatization and development,
one empirical work concluded that there was no
statistically significant correlation at the 0.05
confidence level between privatization and all other
development indicators. The conclusion of the work
directed attention to the study of the impact of the
institutional factors that may play a pivotal role in the
process of development. Development, however, is not equal
to economic growth but should include the factors of human
development.
In the investigation of the reasons behind privatization
it was found that higher fiscal diffi.;ulties and
dependency on loans from international agencies such as
the World Bank and the IMF are the main factors driving
privatization in developing countries. This means that the
conflicts in government objectives regarding privatization
has made economic efficiency subordinate to the goal of
easing the budgetary deficit.
In the last dimension, the review of nine cases of
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privatization in three developing countries revealed that
in the majority of the cases the consumers are the losers
while the government, domestic buyers and foreign owners
are the major beneficiaries from privatization. This
result may challenge the belief in the positive effect of
privatization on welfare. The latter is true if we account
the increase in the welfare of other segments of the
population apart from the consumers.
In summary, the empirical evidence shows that the effect
of privatization through change of ownership may not play
a significant role in enhancing the economic performance
on the micro and the macro levels. Thus there is need for
a more cautious approach in advising the application of
such a policy in developing countries.
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4.1: Introduction
Privatization is often described as the transfer of state
assets and /or control (partial or full) to the private
sector. The implication for development is derived from
the belief that private ownership/or control brings
greater economic efficiency, more innovation, improved
responsiveness to consumer demands, and wider choice for
individuals (i.e., shares, goods). The argument of
maximizing profits also implies increased savings and
greater investment which in their turn produce rapid
growth and higher incomes, both symbols of development.
This approach can be called an income-centred approach to
development.
From the decentralization perspective, which is the domain
of this chapter, privatization means decentralizing
decision-making away from the monopolistic centralized
bureaucracies and back to the market.
In this chapter we will consider an alternative approach
which implies the use of concepts such as "choice",
"participation",	 "voice",	 "appropriate technology",
"linkages",	 and	 "territorial	 decentralization or
devolution". Such an approach embraces a wider concept of
development and in particular looks at human development
centred on enhancing capabilities as the ultimate
objective of development rather than the growth in GNP.
The World Bank has identified its economic policy
priorities for the 1990s. Poverty alleviation and an
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increase in equity are among the first considerations. Is
privatization, as one component of the free-market
oriented strategy strongly advocated by the Bank, able to
make a positive contribution to the achievement of these
goals? What is the relationship between privatization and
the poor within consumer choice perspectives?
It is often argued that privatization is the ultimate
phase of decentralization with the latter a means to
achieve the former (World Bank, 1988, p.10) (Rondinelli
and Nellis, 1986). Is decentralization in the context of
"giving power to the people" symmetrical with the
privatization lessons experienced by LDCs?
The globalization of economic policy choices seems to be
a feature of the current economic environment,
particularly after the collapse of the former Soviet Union
and the end of the Cold War between 1989 and 1991. Can
such a globalization of the development process be of
advantage to the LDCs in adapting appropriate technology,
internal innovation, and balanced regional development?
Would the use of Western instruments such as privatization
promote development or, conversely, would a bottom-up
approach offer a genuine alternative?
In raising such questions the chapter does not pretend to
have definitive answers but rather to open the way to
deeper discussion of this subject which, although often
considered important, is generally given scant attention.
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4.2: The Meaning of Development: Growth vs. Human
Development 
One of the major problems economists have faced since the
1940s has been achieving consensus on the meaning of
development. The evolution of development economics as a
field of economics itself required a change in the meaning
of development in different periods.
During the 1950s and early 1960s, economic development was
associated with economic growth in per capita income
(i.e., 5 percent annually) but in the 1970s it was
redefined from the liberal context of "growth with
equity". As Little (1982, p.6) noted: "it is economic
growth that allowed more equitable consumption as well as
growth in consumption per se". Its new wider definition
implied the reduction or elimination of poverty (basic
needs), inequality, and unemployment within the context of
a growing economy. The emphasis during the 1980s and 1990s
has been on growth and efficiency as a way of reducing
poverty, unemployment, and inequality.
Chambers (1991) pointed out that the "growth with
redistribution" ideology which dominated the 1970s could
be seen as different from, if not actually in polarity
with, the "neoclassical counter-revolution" ideology which
dominated the 1980s and 1990s. However,
"Both ideologies, and both sets of
prescriptions, embody a planner's core, centre-
outwards, top-down view of development. They
start with economies, not people; with the macro
not the micro; with the view from the office,
not the view from the field. And in consequence
their prescriptions tend to be uniform,
standard, and for universal application"
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(Chambers, 1991, p.246).
More recently Ingham (1993) identified nine dimensions
through which the meaning of development can be examined.
Although the dimensions are correlated with each other,
they were divided into development in the context of:
historical growth; structural change; modernization;
political change; decentralization and participation;
redistribution and basic needs; human development;
sustainability; ethics and morals.
The scholar concluded from empirical studies that human
development and poverty reduction are the most valuable
objectives of development which can be achieved by
increasing political and civil liberties':
"Countries whose citizens enjoyed greater
political and civil liberties also preformed
better in people-centered measures of
development, in life expectancy at birth, in
real income per head and in infant survival
rates" (Ingham, 1993, p.1819).
This conclusion related more closely to the "capability
approach" to development developed by Sen (1983, 1988,
1989, 1990) and adopted by the UNDP (1990, 1991, 1992,
1993) in its Human Development Reports, than to that
embodied by the World Bank in its 1990 Development Report
on poverty.
This divergence between the World Bank (1990) and UNDP
(1990, 1991, 1992, 1993) views on the meaning and
objectives of development is pivotal to the analysis of
"One of the important empirical studies which
established a strong relationship between development,
democracy, and growth is that of Pourgerami (1988).
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privatization within a framework of decentralization. The
difference of view is important for two reasons; the first
is the influential role the World Bank has played,
particularly from the late 1980s, in advocating and
forcing the drive towards privatization in LDCs, which
complemented the Bank's vision of development; the second
is the Bank's income-centred and arowth dependent view of
development. This separates it from the capability
approach to human development which measures development
by the Human Development Index (HDI) taking into account
factors such as the quality of life, life expectancy,
literacy and adjusted income.
According to Mosley only 13 percent of structural
adjustment loans (SALs) provided by the Bank to 21 LDCs,
up to the beginning of 1986, were specifically attached to
conditions of privatization of public industries or
agricultural marketing facilities while 62 percent
required various forms of deregulation (Mosley, 1988,
p.134).
By the first half of 1992, however, the Bank's figures
reveal that 70 percent of all SALs and 40 percent of all
sectoral adjustment loans (SECALs) were in support of
privatization. In total 182 Bank operations, between 1981
and the first half of 1992, implied privatization in 63
countries, half of them in Sub-Saharan Africa (Kikeri, et
al., 1992, p.32). Thus, there is a significant influence
from the Bank in the restructuring of economic policies in
developing countries.
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What differentiates the capability approach to human
development from the income-centred approach favoured by
the World Bank?
The main differences lie in the means and ends of each
approach.
In the capability approach Sen (1989) criticized the use
of opulence measurements such as income, wealth or
commodity possession and other utility measurements such
as happiness, desire fulfilment, or even the simple
utility of choice. His criticism derived from the
inability of such measurements to deal with achievements,
self esteem, freedom, and capabilities, all of which
involve non-income or non-utility information.
"The evaluation of commodity-holdings or of
incomes (with which to purchase commodities) can
be at best proxy for the things that really
matter, but unfortunately it does not seem to be
a particularly good proxy in most cases" (Sen,
1990, p.47).
So capability derives from the freedom to be well, which
in simple terms is about the ability to live longer, be
literate, be healthy and well-nourished and generally
enjoy a higher quality of life. To be capable would be an
end in itself.
In contrast, the World Bank approach, which is based on
mainstream income-centred evaluation, looks exclusively at
the investment in human capital (education, health, and
nutrition) as a way of increasing productivity so as to
increase income and growth which in turn will reduce
poverty. In this case the calculation is based on the
viability of the rate of return on such an investment. The
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following quotations from the World Bank (1990) describe
the means and ends.
"The principal asset of the poor is labor time.
Education increases the productivity of this
asset. The result at the individual level, as
many studies show, is higher income. Most recent
research also points to a strong link between
education and economic growth" (World Bank,
1990, p.80).
"The effect of better health and nutrition on
productivity is less well documented than the
effect of education. An increasing number of
studies, however, show a positive effect on
agricultural productivity (World Bank, 1990,
p.81).
Such different approaches to the means and ends of
development will subsequently effect the policies employed
by the two organizations, the World Bank and the UNDP, in
describing the ends of development. While economic growth
for the World Bank is seen as an instrument for reducing
poverty, the capability approach regards the public
provision of social services as the principal medium for
human development. Moreover, even markets in the latter
are the means and human development is the end (UNDP,
1992).
Thus, it is not surprising that the World Bank regards
privatization as an instrument for reducing poverty as
stated in the opening sentence of a recent Bank study of
privatization: "The World Bank Group supports
privatization in the context of its broader goals of
economic development and the reduction of poverty"
(Kikeri, et al., 1992, p.1). In this context economic
development is a synonym for growth using the trickle-down
argument.
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By contrast UNDP (1993, p.48) is concerned about the
effects of privatization on reducing social services to
the people.
"In the face of rising unemployment and poverty,
social security systems are finding it
increasingly difficult to cope. State-owned
enterprises used to distribute most social
benefits, from child care to health care to
pensions. But over the past three years, these
widespread automatic benefits have been
dramatically curtailed and are being replaced by
"social safety nets" whose services are targeted
more narrowly - and thus risk missing millions
of people in desperate needs" (UNDP, 1993,
p.48).
In fact the "social safety nets" are those proposed by the
World Bank's 1990 Development Report in support of the
poor.
In summary the meaning of development should be understood
within the context of increasing human development. This
requires an increase in freedom through a participatory
approach in which the people's well being is the end and
empowering them through decentralization represents the
means.
4.3: Privatization, Choice, and Participation
The essence of "public ownership" is that it provides
people, as owners or as consumers, with a theoretical
right to intervene in the production process. In practice,
however, they do not.
According to the "public choice" theory, the achievement
of public interests is delegated to politicians,
bureaucrats and technocrats who take decisions in the
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public arena2 . The theory argues that there are no grounds
for believing that such delegates will behave in the
interests of the public; rather they will maximize their
interests or utility functions with a resulting
deterioration in allocative efficiency. Moreover,
according to the "public choice calculus" public ownership
brings about a reduction in social welfare. Hanke and
Walters (1990) assumed that there would be a 50 percent
reduction in total costs if public enterprises were
privatized. This would lead to a subsequent increase in
social welfare.
The advocates of privatization often argue that "choice"
is the main value of privatization because the market
place enhances the ability of individuals to choose their
own share of the goods and services they demand. In other
words public choice theory believes in "consumer
sovereignty". The market place is seen to aggregate
individual choices thus bringing about an accountable and
effective means of allocating and producing goods.
The important question is whether more choice for
shareholders and consumers provides every one with an
equal opportunity to participate in the markets of
developing countries or not.
It is well known that privatization as a phenomenon is
almost the novelty of the Western countries and that one
of its components is the concept of "people capitalism" as
2For a review of the theory read chapter 1.
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a way of broadening the ownership base, as was the case in
Britain (Marsh, 1991, p.474).
In developing countries the same slogan has been adopted
but with far less impact than has been the case in
Britain, for instance. In most developing countries as
well as in some Western countries there are two main
restrictions on the effectiveness of "people capitalism".
The first is the relatively small size of the middle
income group who can acquire shares, and the second is the
thin spread or non-existence of capital markets (Suleiman
and Waterbury, 1990, p.15).
For example a survey carried out by the World Bank on
privatization transactions in 90 countries showed that
there were 530 recorded transfers to single buyers in the
countries of Sub-Saharan, Brazil, Italy and Spain
(Nankani, 1990, p.44). More recent data which records
individual privatization transactions, over $100 million 
in value between 1988-1991, reveals that out of 28
divestiture cases in 11 developing countries only 5 were
transferred through public offerings while the remainder
were divested through private sales (Kikeri, et al., table
no.1, p.26).
Although the total value of the transactions was $41.979
billion, only $3.5 billion was transacted through public
offerings which, in proportionate terms, means only 8.3
percent (calculated by the researcher from ibid).
This indicates that ordinary people, and the poor in
particular, were excluded from the opportunity of share
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ownership and consequently from participation.
Furthermore, even if there were such a wide share-owning
base, it is likely that small shareholders would quickly
sell their shares on to larger shareholders in order to
generate short-term profits via the market. If
privatization by broadening share ownership is unlikely to
make an impact on equity ownership in Britain, as Marsh
(1991, p.475) noted, how can one expect it to have a
better impact on LDCs?
Carlsen, writing about Mexico, noted that:
"Few nationals have the money or international
contacts to buy government-owned companies. This
constrains the number of eligible bidders,
weakens bids and means that the few who are able
to purchase previously state-owned enterprises
can extend their economic reach, an unwelcome
prospect given the extreme concentration of
wealth and power in Mexican society" [Carlsen
(1992, p.19) as cited in Martin (1993, p.100)].
In Sri Lanka about 70 percent of all shares is
concentrated in the hands of about 2000 people while in
Pakistan some 6000 persons hold about 80 percent of all
shares. Likewise in India a sample of companies covered by
a study conducted by the Reserve Bank of India in 1978
revealed that less than 0.4 percent of the total number of
shareholders (in companies with capital above 50,000 Rs)
held about 70 percent of the total paid capital
(Ramandham, 1989, p.41). Another recent example is the
privatization of the Indonesian state-owned Tyer Maker
(Intirub) in 1990 where the government sold 70 percent of
the enterprise to a local conglomerate, Bimantara Citra,
controlled by Suharto's son (Montagu-Pollock, 1990, p.35).
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These examples demonstrate that unless privatization of
SOEs is well designed it neither increases choice nor
alleviates poverty. On the contrary, it concentrates power
in the hands of the market place elite. This runs contrary
to the objectives of development as a participatory
approach to human well-being.
The term "well designed" privatization may include schemes
which target specific groups such as employee
participation (e.g., employee ownership, profit sharing,
and participation in decision making) within the original
privatization plan. Employee participation fulfils many
objectives such as; increasing productivity; avoiding
enterprise bankruptcy; broadening the distribution of
ownership; and facilitating privatization proceeds (Lee,
1991, p.1).
The theoretical argument for employee participation in
decision making derives from the specific knowledge of
production which the employee possesses. mhis increases
productivity and also reduces the agency costs,
particularly when the employees possess a stake in the
enterprise. It also enables the employees to enhance their
capability of controlling their work lives. Organizing
workers into natural work teams and empowering employees
at all levels, as in the case of Quality circles (QC),
simply reduces the need for supervision and reduces the
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burden on managers3 . However, the attitude of managers
toward participation may be negative as an empirical study
of 8 medium-sized industrial plants in Bangladesh shows
(Ali, et al., 1992).
The experience of privatization with employee
participation in developing countries is in its infancy.
A programme of privatizing seven large SOEs in South Korea
in 1991 focused on increasing efficiency and the equality
of income distribution in the economy as a whole. The
People's Share Programme, as it was called by the Korean
government, allowed low-income individuals and 20 percent
of employees to purchase 75 percent of shares (Lee, 1991,
p.15). In this way the government achieved many goals. It
enhanced the distribution of income, reduced the
opposition to privatization, and increased efficiency.
Such an approach reflects what we call a "carefully
designed privatization". However, according to Lee, only
four developing countries have experienced such schemes
(Argentina, Poland, Sri Lanka, and Jamaica), and until now
the assessment of the experience has revealed mixed
results (ibid).
The second argument of choice is based on the belief that
consumers possess rational choices and will exercise their
power by choosing among competing suppliers in the market.
3A quality circle is a group of employees that meets
regularly to solve problems affecting their work area. The
members receive training in problem solving, statistical
quality control, and group processes (Lawler and Mohrman,
1985).
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Here the argument of relative prices, in which the prices
will determine the demand and consequently the supply,
might not apply in all cases, particularly as many
privatized enterprises in developing countries sustain
their monopolistic position in the market. For instance,
in 1989 a tomato processing factory was privatized in
Iraq. Before privatization one pound of concentrated
tomato puree was priced at half an Iraqi dinar while
directly after privatization the price jumped fivefold to
2.5 Iraqi dinars. As there was no alternative, demand was
relatively unaffected and the enterprise continued to
exercise its monopoly power over the consumers (Abu Shair,
1989, p.50).
In societies with different cultures and values as well as
extremely uneven income distribution, the assumption of
rational choice from the Western point of view might not
apply because of religious principles, political
constraints, social taboos and well-ingrained economic
practices (Slater, 1989, p.522). In other words the
rational choice assumption might be incompatible with the
"power of belief". However, even if it were compatible, it
would be the richer classes of the developing countries
who would enjoy the benefits, unless privatization is well
designed to enhance equal opportunity and equal access.
Another important aspect of choice according to the public
choice theory and most proponents of privatization is the
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belief in only "individual choice". It might be important
to recognize that choice in itself remains desirable as a
value for the individual although in traditional
societies, as is the case in many developing countries,
"collective choice" (i.e., malnutrition) and "instrumental
choice" are what the society is looking for in order to
improve well-being and capability rather than choice as an
end in itself as is the case in privatization (Higgins,
1988, p.203) (Marglin, 1990, p.4).
In short, as privatization leads to growth, choices would
only expand in some dimensions, as the economic history of
developing countries reveals. Thus, privatization would
reduce the concepts of "freedom of choice" and
"collective choice" to the narrower notion of "individual
choice" if it were pursued as a reaction to a financial
crisis. Consequently, while some people will be better
off, the vast majority of the poor will be worse off. As
Riddell put it, "privatization would leave development to
the vagaries of exploitative forms of primitive exchange"
(Riddell, 1985, p.215). However, another explanation of
choices could be derived from Hirschman's concepts of exit
and voice.
4.4: Privatization in the Context of Exit and Voice 
Hirschman (1970) in his theory of exit, voice, and loyalty
emphasised that economists tend to use the option of
market forces as the only option available to achieve
214
equilibrium in the market. It had long been thought that
the more elastic the demand, the better the economy was
functioning. This option, according to Hirschman, means
the exit option. In this option customers of a firm or
members of an organization choose to stop buying the
firm's product or quit from the organization as a
demonstration of their dissatisfaction with the firm's
product or the organization's policies. As a result,
revenue drops and a decline in membership would force
management to correct their inadequate performance.
Hirschman's argument against the use of the exit option on
its own came about from his questioning the role of
competition and its ability to lead firms/organizations to
"normal" efficiency, performance, and growth standards
after they have lapsed from them abid,
As a result he argued that "non-market forces" (voice) are
not necessarily less "automatic" (exit) than market
forces, particularly in the world of quasi-perfect
competition (ibid, p.25).
In this case voice would mean a mechanism for change from
within rather than escape (exit).
"Voice is here defined as any attempt at all to
change, rather than to escape from, an
objectionable state of affairs, whether through
individual or collective petition to the
management directly in charge, through appeal to
a higher authority with the intention of forcing
change in management, or through various types
of actions and protests, including those that
are meant to mobilize public opinion" (ibid,
p.30).
Hence, Hirschman is advocating a participatory approach
similar to that emphasized by the UNDP.
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The superiority of voice over exit according to Hirschman
is due to the voice option's capability of evolving in
different and new directions. No such capability is
available for the other option (exit). The UNDP noted that
participation, which is in this case a synonym for voice,
gives people access to a "much broader range of
opportunities" (UNDP, 1993, p.21).
Hence, the explanation for introducing privatization
policies on their own would be as a way of employing the
exit option rather than exit and voice together. So, while
voice denotes an opportunity for "change from within",
exit seems to offer its supporters little challenge.
The question is: which factors affect the activation of
voice?
The voice option seems to be dependent on three main
factors. The first is loyalty. This implies that loyalty
is important through its capability of neutralizing,
within certain limits, the tendency of the most thoughtful
customers or members to be the first to exit (Hirschman,
1970, p.79). However, loyalty, in order to be functional,
needs to have some social incentive to initiate a
collective action for change.
On the other hand, Hirschman argues that loyalty is at its
most functional level when it looks most irrational, or
when loyalty "means strong attachment to an organization
that does not seem to have warrant such attachment because
it is so much like another one that it is available"
(ibid, p.81).
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This could explain why voice is a functional mechanism in
Olson's distributional interest groups (Olson, 1982) 4 . In
this case, as long as the number of members in the group
is small, there seems to be a highly effective role for
loyalty to bring about effective pressure. Nevertheless,
loyalty in Olson's distributional groups does not provide
the socially useful services which Hirschman advocates.
Rather, they use their loyalty to the group as a way of
gaining benefits at high cost to the society concerned.
Thus, their collective action implies higher costs to
society.
Another factor determining the activation of voice is the
elasticity of demand. As long as this is low, the
possibility of voice being more active is high. Thus,
Hirschman argued that voice was used more often in the
former socialist countries as well as in developing
countries where the ability to exit is low. However, such
voice seems to direct efforts towards the other extreme
option, which is exit, but without any success in the
recuperation of the status of their economies. However,
there is a level where the low elasticity of demand
compounded with income constraint could bring about mass
collective action. Riots in developing countries as a
mechanism of dissatisfaction with government mismanagement
of the economy and the high costs of economic reforms are
clear evidence of this. In such cases, the elasticity and
4More discussion on the collective action theory of
Olson in chapter 1.
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income factors offer an incentive for collective action
which benefits more than it costs.
The third factor which affects the employment of the voice
option is its cost or the cost of the collective action
for recuperation. In order for reformists in developing
countries to benefit from the advantages of change from
within they have to innovate and initiate mechanisms that
reduce the cost of employing voice for constructive
purposes as well as rewards for the people who initiate
it. Productive incentives are the determinant factors in
inducing institutional change, as North (1991) noted.
Nevertheless, there is one criterion which has to be
distinguished in introducing the voice option. Hirschman
called this the case of the "lazy monopolist". Some
monopolies, particularly in the state sector, might
welcome competition or the exit option as a way of
bringing about relief from public criticism and pressure,
especially when they operate under protection of the
state. In such cases, the management of such a monopoly
would not enhance its performance after the use of the
exit option by its customers. Hirschman gave as an example
the Nigerian Railway Corporation. The quality of its
services were deteriorating and the customers for short
distances deserted the railway in favour of road
transportation systems without putting any pressure on the
management of the railway to reform their services. Thus,
the exit option can deny society an opportunity to
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increase the pressure for change.
Hirschman's theory of exit and voice provided the
reformists with a new direction of thinking replacing the
traditional method of using the financial discipline or
the market (exit) option to introduce the recuperation
initiative. The use of the two combined in different
proportions would depend on the environment and the
history of each case under investigation. The main
conclusion is that "non-market forces" are no less
automatic and efficient than "market forces" in bringing
about recuperation if there is a commitment on the side of
decision makers to enhance the possibilities for change
from within. This is because privatization means the
decision to escape rather than to challenge. For that
reason the UNDP approach and Ingham's conclusion (1993)
regarding the meaning of development lie in the use of
exit and voice together, particularly when the latter can
be enhanced through decentralization and democratization.
UNDP (1993, p.50)) listed seven sins of privatization
1.Maximization of revenue rather than creating
competition.
2.Replacing public monopolies with private monopolies.
3.Corruption and nepotism through non-transparent
procedures.
4.Using sale proceeds only to finance budget deficits.
5.Crowding the financial market with public borrowing at
a time of public disinvestment.
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6.Making false promises to the workforce.
7.Relying on executive orders rather than political
consensus
Ikenberry (1990) argued that privatization is a government
reform movement rather than a social one and that
government can build a coalition to protect its
privileges. It is a reaction to fiscal crisis, economic
inefficiency and/or international pressure. In such cases
people (and their organizations) would resist
privatization, using the voice option (i.e., protests and
riots), not because they are in favour of
bureaucratization, hut because they demand a reform that
would give them more participation in the progress and
development of their communities. The interest groups, as
the neoclassical political economists termed them, in
developing countries, especially non-governmental
organizations (NG0s) (e.g., trade unions, women movements,
farmers cooperatives, religious organizations, and the
like), are the same people who elsewhere are called "anti-
systematic" movements (referring to movements against
centralization and bureaucratization) as in the case of
Latin America, India, and Africa (Slater, 1989, p.522)
[Wallerstein (1974) cited in Banuri (1990, p.53)]. The
same people, with different nominations, demand one
important right, namely "popular participation" through
decentralization of power to them and not to the market or
representatives at the centre.
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4.5: The Concept of Decentralization
Decentralization is a concept with different definitions,
meanings and benefits. No overwhelming consensus has been
reached regarding it. However, it is believed that
decentralized development could be seen as a genuine
future alternative for development in developing
countries.
Such a belief started as a reaction to the economic
difficulties developing countries have faced during the
last three decades, in particular the "unbalanced
development" as witnessed by uneven rural development,
poverty and inequality in the distribution of income
(Griffin, 1981, p.225). Moreover, as Banuri argued (1990,
p.98) it has been seen as a vision of the future in most
developing countries.
The question is whether privatization or another meaning
of decentralization is seen as a vision of the future?
Conyers (1984, p.187) argued that there are two main
definitions of decentralization. The first is functional 
decentralizaticn, which means the decentralization of
production or/and services to parastatal or non-government
organizations. Thus, privatization policies are included
in a definition which deals with functions only. The
second definition is territorial decentralization. This
means the decentralization of government to sub-national
levels such as local governments or authorities.
The advocates of privatization and market oriented
paradigms in general are consistent in their belief in the
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first definition of decentralization. Moreover, they use
the two concepts of decentralization and privatization as
synonyms although privatization is sometimes seen as the
ultimate phase of decentralizations.
"The problems of providing and maintaining
public services and infrastructure have brought
increasing calls for decentralization and
privatization, and many governments are now
decentralizing responsibilities for service and
infrastructure provision, financing and
management"(Rondinelli, et al., 1989, p.58 from
Rondinelli, et al.,1983 and Rondinelli, 1987).
Rondinelli and his associates (1989) also believed in
decentralization defined from the public choice theorists'
perspective; that is, "a situation in which public goods
and services are provided primarily through the revealed
preferences of individuals by market mechanism"
(Rondinelli, et al., 1989, p.59).
However, in theory at least, they emphasized that concepts
such as people participation, empowerment and local
democracy were included in their vision of
decentralization. For example the US Agency for
International Development (USAID), under the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1966, adopted in its missions the
concept of grass roots participation.
5Rondinelli and Nellis (1986, p.5) argued that
decentralization has a wide scope ranging from simply
adjusting workloads within central government
organizations to diverting all government responsibilities
for performing a set of what were previously considered
public-sector functions. In that they categorized
decentralization into four types within developing
countries experience; deconcentration; delegation;
devolution; and privatization. Such a classification
reveals that the emphases are almost all on functional
decentralization.
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"maximum participation in the task of economic
development on the part of people in developing
countries through the encouragement of
democratic, private and local government
institutions" (quoted from Ingham and Kalam,
1992, p.374).
The World Bank concept of decentralization is restricted
to "fiscal decentralization " which means;
"decentralizing both spending and revenue
authority can improve the allocation of
resources in the public sector by linking the
cost and benefits of local public services more
closely" (World Bank, 1988, p.154).
However, in practice the World Bank does not advocate
empowering the poor to restore the unbalanced nature of
the decision-making processes and the powerful position of
the government elite. Its suggestion is that poverty
should be alleviated not through the devolution of power
or territorial decentralization but by designing poverty-
reduction policies that would not be resisted by the non-
poor (which is not the right word) or, in real terms, the
rich and powerful elite who guard the gates of the
decision -makers.
" The nonpoor [sic] are usually politically
powerful, and they exert a strong influence on
policy. Giving the poor a greater say in local
and national decision making would help to
restore the balance. But since political power
tends to reflect economic power, it is important
to design poverty-reducing policies that would
be supported, or at least not actively resisted
by the nonpoor" (World Bank, 1990, p.52).
The interesting point is that the same report identified
privatization among the factors that have contributed to
poverty in rural areas (ibid, p.32).
As Cardoso and Iielwege (1992, p.19) stated, "economic
poverty reflects political poverty: the poor lack the
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means for voicing their demands". In this case poverty-
reduction programmes will not empower the poor but rather
sustain the existing power structure.
It seems that there is a consistency in the argument
adopted by the international agencies and the advocates of
market-oriented policies, namely that privatization should
be the ultimate goal of decentralization. It is for this
reason that the emphasis has to be placed on territorial
rather than functional decentralization. The question to
be asked is why?
4.6: Privatization vs. Territorial Decentralization 
The proponents of privatization are concerned with
transferring state-owned enterprises to the private sector
as well as introducing competition in the market. But
there are two factors which have been neglected in the
analysis of privatization. The first is space and the
second is the structure of government.
4.6.1: The Space Factor
One of the major differences between market-oriented
strategies and those of territorial decentralization is
that the first (without solid evidence) considers shifting
the production functions from SOEs to the private sector
for purely economic reasone.
In the case of territorial decentralization, development
6Evidence in chapter 3.
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requires not only the production of goods and services but
also the production of complex political, social and
economic goods. Such a concept requires complex and
coordinated efforts by diverse people across a large area
of space. In this case, the space concept would include
not only the geographical meaning of the word but also
rules, behaviour and the institutional factors (i.e.
history, politics) within this space (Miller, 1992). Thus,
it is a territory where people can communicate as well as
struggle to achieve their objectives of prosperity within
the context of their satisfaction with the process itself.
It is introducing the place factor which, as Barnes and
Sheppard (1992) argued, can explain the rationality of
human actions because the latter "varies systematically
and unpredictably according to the context in which the
action occurs" (Barnes and Sheppard, 1992, p.18). In this
case this dimension would imply complexity, people's
capacity, control of technology, innovation,
participation, inside and outside linkages, flexibility
and development from below and within'. Territorial
decentralization refers to the territorial distribution of
power. Smith's definition is that;
7Abi more detailed analysis of these concepts will be
introduced in the following sections.
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"It is concerned with the extent to which power
and authority are dispersed though the
geographical hierarchy of the state, and the
institutions and processes through which such
dispersal occurs. Decentralization entails the
subdivision of the state's territory into
smaller areas and the creation of political and
administrative institutions in those areas"
(Smith, 1985, p.1).
Thus, devolution enhances political participation or
democracy as well as economic participation by increasing
local entrepreneurial activities. This is not what happens
to the notions of deconcentration and delegation where the
central authority retains effective control and power over
the local level, thereby neglecting the needs of local
people.
Likewise, in the case of privatization, there is no space
factor within the context of the local community, but a
market where rational individuals, consumers and producers
compete to maximize their utility functions, whatever they
are.
Also, in privatization, there are standard and
quantitative ends which draw the line between efficient
and inefficient. A universal approach to growth and
relative unity in implementation is required. Thus, it
could be described as an approach to development from
above.
4.6.2: The Structure of Government 
Another factor which is not included in the privatization
prescription is the structure of government. It is known
that privatization is not a social movement but a decision
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taken and enforced by government because of financial
pressures. Logically that would imply a powerful and
authoritarian government in order to withstand the voices
of discontent. Privatization does not discuss the
legislation and judiciary rules of the state intended to
implement it. It does not discuss the creation of
grassroots organizations (GROs) outside the bureaucratic
structure or the institution building requirement. Nor
does it look into possible reforms within the existing
structure itself. Both these are, however, important if
activation of the voice option is to be enhanced and the
hierarchical structure of the centralized state broken
down.
Such missing factors can explain why people resist
privatization in developing countries. In other words the
opposition to privatization is derived from its inability
to deliver participation and freedom, factors which
increase the capability of individuals at the local level.
Privatization transactions have been limited in developing
countries. Between 1980 and 1991 6832 SOEs were privatized
worldwide, 66 percent of them in one country (the former
GDR), 12 percent in Eastern European countries (other than
the former GDR), 2 percent in OECD, and the remaining 20
percent in developing countries (Kikeri, et.al ., 1992,
pp.22-23).
Commenting on the experience of mass privatization in the
former GDR, professor Dieter Bos said that:
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"Buyers are chosen carefully, with the wider
interests of the region in mind. The state
fiduciary body charged with carrying out
privatization (Treuhand) has sold enterprises
for as little as one German mark to avoid their
falling into the hands of West German
entrepreneurs who might want to simply buy up
potential rivals and close down their production
lines" (emphasis added) (McIntosh, 1993, p.24).
However, that is not the case in developing countries, as
our previous evidence reveals. Furthermore some
commentators believe that the privatization process in
developing countries might be reversible as has already
taken place in Chile (1983) and in Japan in the second
half of this century (Suleiman and Waterbury, 1990, p.19)
[Wilson (1988, p.27) as cited in the former reference].
Privatization as a form of functional decentralization has
led other economists to believe that the developing
countries would stay in the hands of the public sector, at
least for the foreseeable future, even though that might
not be the most efficient means of achieving sustainable
development (Ikenberry, 1990) (Todaro, 1989) (Kone, 1990)
(Low, 1990) (Ramanadham, 1989).
4.7: Paradigms of Decentralized Development
During the period 1981-1992 there emerged three major
paradigms of development all of which considered
territorial decentralization to be the main apparatus of
development. The first was "development from below"
(bottom-up and periphery-inward) from Stohr and Tylor
(1981). The second was the "strategy of reversals" from
Chambers (1991). The third one, which is an extension of
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the previous two, was "development from within" from
Taylor and Mackenzi (1992).
4.7.1: Development From Below (Bottom-Up and Periphery-
Inward) 
This strategy was introduced by Stohr and Tylor (1981) and
was influenced by the dependency school ideologies. The
latter believe that the deterioration of development in
the underdeveloped world is an outcome of the expansive
and exploitative development of the industrial market
economies and that the status of underdevelopment is not
a temporary stage leading to development, but a continuous
one resulting from the pattern of centre-periphery
exploitative relationships (Street and James, 1982,
p.681).
Moreover, Taylor (1992) argued that the concept of
"development from below" had its roots in the populist
ideas of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as
defined by Roberston:
" articulate the need to secure the cooperation
of "ordinary simple people" in reformist
endeavour, and usually do so by making the
generous assumption rest with them (the people)-
rather with other more clearly identifiable
groups and interests like businessmen"
(Roberston, 1984, p.222).
The concept of "development from below" was also
introduced by anthropologists such as Pitt (1976) before
Stohr's introduction to his paradigm.
Pitt (1976,P.4) argued that development in conventional
theory or practice comes from above, is externally imposed
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by government bureaucracy, and has minimal links with and
knowledge of the recipients (people). Thus, development
from below should be internally generated from the grass
roots as represented by rural villages away from the power
and influence of the development bureaucracies.
According to Stohr, there are five major dimensions of
policies which have to be followed and these form the
cornerstones of the Stohr paradigm: territorially
organized basic-needs services; rural and village
development; labour intensive activities; small and medium
size projects; and the application of a notion of
technology which can permit the full employment of
regional human, natural and institutional resources on a
territorially integrated basis (Stohr, 1981, p.43).
In "development from below", development has a different
meaning which depends on two factors, space and time. As
a result it should be achieved through spatial mobility
and diversity rather than unitary solutions dependent on
externally imposed functional goals such as privatization
and free-market oriented policies.
" There are many concepts of development
depending on the natural and social environment
of different communities and the development
over time of specific culture and institutional
conditions. In fact, these represent major
factors of development potential and should not
be subordinated to the short-term pressures of
any externally dominated or anonymous market
mechanism" (Stohr, 1981, p.44).
After assessing the experience of the "export-led" model
in the South-East Asian countries (the four tigers)
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Chenery and his colleagues (1986) concluded that the
export-led model cannot be the only alternative strategy
to be followed in developing countries because of the
different institutional factors characterizing them. For
example, larger countries can implement an import-
substitution strategy (ISI) while smaller countries can
specialize in exporting. This is the same pattern
advocated by Stohr (1981, p.62). However, similar to
Stohr, Chenery and his colleagues (1986) doubted the
effectiveness of pursuing a market mechanism in developing
countries because of "structural rigidities" and "limited
substitution possibilities" (Chenery, et al., 1986,
p.339).
A similar conclusion about the rigidities of market
mechanism could be found in Colclough who argued that,
"the market itself is precisely the problem to be
addressed" (Colclough, 1991, p.21).
Nevertheless, the criticism of the paradigm of development
from below arose from its lack of feasibility under the
international conditions which prevailed then.
As Stohr (1990, p.22) said there were three major doubts
about the feasibility of "development from below". The
first concerned the weak position of most local economies
(i.e, few resources and scale economies) to absorb the
international wave of economic restructuring processes.
The second was political in that local communities did not
possess enough power or momentum successfully to confront
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the powerful international and government elites. The
third reason was the lack of evidence of successful local
or regional development initiatives whether from
developing or developed countries.
Moreover, Taylor (1992, p.234) categorized the criticism
into four major groups; inadequate specification of the
theoretical frame of the paradigm; failure to specify the
necessary and sufficient conditions for such development
to emerge; the need to explain what was a theory of
policy; and finally criticism from the planners in
developing countries who saw the theory and its ideas as
just another example of theories developed in the North
and applied to the South.
However, the paradigm has recently restored its
credibility because of increasing evidence of successful
locally based development initiatives which have emerged
from developed and developing countries8.
4.7.2: The Strategy of Reversal 
During the period 1983-1991 Chambers developed what he
called " A Counter-ideology of Reversals". In his words
"It is a counter-ideology which takes as its
starting-point the conditions and priorities of
rural people, especially the poorer, and the
problems and opportunities which they face; and
it leads to a different constellation of
prescriptions" (Chambers,1991, p.265).
8The evidence of successful local initiatives in
Europe presented by Stohr (1990), in Sub-Saharan Africa by
Taylor and Mackenzi (1992) and in Latin America by Stephen
(1991).
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This strategy is complementary with rather than a
substitution for other strategies. However, it counters
the neo-Fabian school, where the state should do more, and
the neo-Liberal school, where the state should do less, in
that they are subscriptions for development from above,
centre-outwards and top-down.
While functional decentralization was the main weapon of
the two earlier schools, the counter-ideology of reversals
was based on territorial decentralization. "Near the core
of this paradigm is decentralized process and choice"
(ibid, p.276). Its main focus is the rural poor and the
realities of field administration (i.e, poorly paid
staff).
Thus, the reversals of the strategy are; location,
learning, explanation, values, control, authority, and
power. In sum, its aims are to put people on the periphery
first (ibid, p.264).
This strategy suggested functions for the state which
ultimately have to be based on the experience of the
state, and its openness to indigenous pluralism and the
mix of ideas. The state functions proposed by Chambers are
the following; firstly, maintenance of peace and the
democratic role of law; secondly, provision of a basic
infrastructure and services; and thirdly, the management
of the economy (ibid, pp.267-268).
As far as privatization is concerned, the strategy
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emphasised the importance of studying each case
independently rather than attempting to generalize from
the experience of other countries. However, it is always
important to ask the questions; who will be better off and
who will be worse off?
The Technical Centre for Agriculture and Rural Cooperation
(CTA) in its monthly bulletin (Spore) noted that
privatizing the supply of fertilizers in Senegal resulted
in a sharp decline in fertilizer use, thus jeopardizing
land fertility (Spore, 1992, p.2). Likewise, the
privatization of state monopolies in the field of vaccines
and the treatments of animals left poor livestock
producers in Chad unable to pay the high charges demanded
by the private sector. Commercial dealers have taken over
the most prosperous sections of the agro-chemical supply
business in Africa which has resulted in many isolated
sections of the rural areas being neglected. Similar
problems arose after the privatization of the African
marketing boards in Mali. The big business men deal with
capitalist farmers while small farmers are unable to get
access to the market (Spore, 1992, p.2). The uncontrolled
policy of privatizing state monopolies as well as state
lands in the agricultural sector has been shown to
represent a risk for peasant farmers who are often
vulnerable and who have to learn to adapt to the new deal
(ibid, p.4). Thus, identifying gainers and losers should
form an important part of any privatization programme.
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In summary, the aim of this strategy is to transform what
is called the "unable state" into "enable state", so that
equity and efficiency can be achieved through reversal and
diversity. A further aim is equitable development through
raising the voice of the poor and enabling them to become
more efficient in the sense of mobilizing their creative
energy. Providing incentives for long-term self-reliant
investments by the poor should make it possible for
development to become more sustainable.
Thus, as development becomes more complex and divergent,
so it becomes more stable and sustainable. There is no
simple medicine such as "getting the price right" or
"rolling back the state".
4.7.3: Development From Within 
This strategy was introduced by Taylor and Mackenzi in
1992. It is based on both previous paradigms of
development. The heart of the strategy is;
"Development from within argues for the maximum
utilization of the resources of a territory
primarily for the satisfaction of the
inhabitants of that territory. This include both
the physical and human resources of local
communities" (Taylor, 1992, p.245).
In addition, the strategy has based its framework on
actual experience drawn from eight case studies in rural
Sub-Saharan Africa. As a result they argue that the
strategy can be a "strategy for survival" in cases of
short-term survival needs as well as a "strategy of
development" when it emerges as a complete institutional
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building process which mobilizes the capacity of local
people.
The basic goal of this strategy, as with the previous two,
is "to allow local people to become the subject, not the
object, of development strategies" (ibid, 1992, p.257).
Such cases are in contrast with policies such as
privatization because the latter minimizes people's
capacity to one characterized by a rational actor without
any space and place dimensions. Privatization focuses more
on isolated individuals than on social interaction within
local communities. For this reason "development from
within" cannot be understood through systemic processes,
as is the case in privatization because the moral
considerations appearing though the case studies at the
micro-level are incompatible with rationality at the
macro-leve19.
Development from within demonstrates a local community's
understanding of communal bonds and constructive
collective identities based on time and place. Such a
relationship is difficult to quantify through a
mathematical model without simplification of the various
9Rationality is considered in the context of the free-
rider problem. Olson(1965) argued, that the strategically
rational individual will be a free rider. "Unless there is
coercion or some other special device to make individuals
act in their common interest, rational, self interested
individuals will not act to achieve their common or group
interest" (Olson, 1965, p.2).
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factors operating in reality. However, it could be well
assessed through analysis of the general results on the
ground.
The question to be asked is what are the key components of
"development from within"?
There are two key components to this strategy,
participation and territoriality.
In participation,
	 the paradigm adopts Goulet's
participation concept (1989) as both goal and means.
"It is not induced from above but is generated
from below by the populace itself; it can also
be generated by the catalytic action of some
external third agent. In terms of the timing of
the involvement, it begins with the first step
of Goulet's sequence: the initial diagnosis of
the situation" (Taylor, 1992, pp.236-237).
Goulet (1989, p.167) listed the sequential moments of
participation as follows: initial diagnosis of the problem
and conditions, selecting action possibility; organizing;
choosing the specific steps in the implementation; self
correction or evaluation during implementation and
debating the merits of further mobilization.
Goulet (1989) and Taylor (1992) agree that different kinds
of development require different forms of participation.
Thus, in the case of survival, action will not depend on
permeation by the state or a bureaucratic organization. On
the other hand, if the notion is "people centred
development", there will be a need for a form of
participation in which the elites play no active role
237
(territorial decentralization). In the case of growth-
oriented policies, such as privatization and free-market
policies which are based on a top-down approach,
participation will be imposed and monitored in order to
achieve the functional goal of growth with a major and
active role for the elite.
The second key component is the territoriality concept.
This includes "place and social relations and power
interaction which take place within the bounded space"
(Taylor, 1992, p.241). However, territory has a variety of
scales, the most efficient one being the "local scale"
where people can interact and coordinate within their
life-space bounds ( these include values and morals within
given institutional conditions).
Such a scale of local territory may appear to be small and
not to utilize the advantages of economies of scale.
However, Olowu (1989, p.205 as cited in Taylor, 1992,
p.242) has provided quantitative evidence on the average
population for existing local government units in Africa
which encourage "localness"1°.
The problem of equating participation with
decentralization, as perceived by governments through the
delegation of their powers to local level organizations,
Icln Zimbabwe, the average local unit was about 6,000
people. In countries such as Kenya (136,090), Tanzania
(166,386) and Ghana(187,692), the local unit is larger
than in countries such as France (1,320), USA (2,756) and
Italy (2,717).
238
is that it does not mean empowering people or meaningful
participation by the rural or urban masses. Instead, the
distribution of political and economic power determines
the magnitude of participation because it is based on a
top-down approach to development (Ghai, 1990, p.216)
(Ingham, 1993, p.1810). The value of participation should
be derived by empowering the people who are deprived and
excluded. This requires that local organizations are
democratic, independent and self reliant (Ghai, 1990,
p.216). In this way decentralization will be an approach
to human development, where participation denotes the
cornerstone.
Territorial decentralization will be judged on whether
participation is authentic empowerment of the poor or a
manipulation of them. This would require an examination of
the "elite domination hypothesis" (Echeverri-Gent, 1992,
p.1409). It is known that local elites also deprive the
poor of the fruits of territorial decentralization.
Griffin (1981) argued that
"it is conceivable, even likely in many
countries, that power at the local level is more
concentrated, more elitist and applied more
ruthlessly against the poor than at the
centre"(Griffin, 1981, p.225).
This hypothesis is correct if poor people remain dependent
upon the elite for employment, loans and gaining access to
the administration.
That is why privatization cannot be discussed within the
same fabric of territorial decentralization because the
first enhances the power of the elite itself, while the
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latter needs to heighten people's consciousness and
awareness in order to raise their voice.
In summary, this strategy is a combination of "development
from below" and the "strategy of reversals". All three
demonstrate the importance of the territorial dimension in
decentralization. Thus, privatization is seen as a
functional decentralization which, when imposed on people
in a conventional top-down and centre-outward approach,
may not imply participation. It is a continuation of the
policy of monocentric reliance on traditional large scale
market-driven, large-organization and central-government
initiated development processes.
4.7.4: The Differences Between Functional and Territorial 
Decentralization 
Within the context of privatization it is important to
summarise the major differences between it and territorial
decentralization according to the views of the previous
development strategies.
-One of the differences lies in the origins of the ideas
and initiatives. Privatization originated in the West and
is initiated from the capital city whereas territorial
decentralization is initiated from the villages or towns.
-Privatization may include participation while in bottom-
up territorial decentralization, participation is an
essential component. Without it decentralization loses its
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meaning.
-The implementation process of privatization is relatively
rapid once decisions have been achieved, whereas in
territorial decentralization it is gradual, local, and at
the people's capacity and pace.
-The evaluation of the process itself is external in
privatization while it is internal and continuous in
territorial decentralization.
-A further difference is the standardization of
privatization policies which in territorial
decentralization are diversified.
-The scope of privatization is narrow and limited to the
achievement of quantitative goals (i.e., technical
efficiency, profitability), but in territorial
decentralization there is more scope for institutional
growth, which can often be qualitative.
-The beneficiaries from privatization are the dominant
elite in the market while in territorial decentralization
all the people benefit, particularly the poor.
- A final difference is the level of knowledge or what
Banuri (1990) called "epistemological decentralization".
Territorial decentralization will depend on an approach to
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knowledge which depends on shared nature and experience
whereas in privatization the knowledge forms are alien and
can generate counterproductive ends (Bardhan, 1993,
p.636). Uphoff (1993, p.609) called the medium between the
public sector, which represents a centralized approach of
development, and the private sector or the market
(functional decentralization), the third sector (local
level) in which the grassroots organizations (GROs)
operate and provide the best approach to rural
development.
The characteristics of each approach are represented in
table (4.1).
What distinguishes the third approach from the other two
is that it emphasises the collective choice of individuals
based on participation in voluntary agreement which is
sanctioned through the social pressure exercised by other
members or in the case of free riding, by a single member.
Such characteristics cannot be found in the top-down
approach (state sector) nor in the market approach to
development which are based on individual choice (Nugent,
1993, p.624).
The impact of the organizations emerging from each
approach will lead to a negative-sum game in the state
sector, a zero-sum game in the market, and a positive-sum
game in the case of GROs (Uphoff, 1993, table no.2,
p.612).
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Table 4.1
Alternative Approaches to Rural Development
First approach Second approach Third approach
Principal mechanisms
Decision makers
Guides for behaviour
Criteria for decisions
Sanctions
Mode of operation
Bureaucratic organizations
Administrators and experts
Regulations
Policy-and best means to
implement it
State authority backed by
coercion
Top-down
Market processes
Individual producers,
consumers, savers and
investors
Price signals and
quantity adjustments
Efficiency-maximization
of profit and/or utility
Financial loss
Individualistic
Voluntary associations
Leaders and members
Agreements
Interests of *members
4
Social pressure
Bottom-up
Source: Uphoff(1993, table 1, p.610).
The reason for such results, as Uphoff perceived, derives
from the advantages of the "spirit of voluntarism" which
can lower operating costs and serve the community. Similar
results were recorded by Van De Kragt and his colleagues
(1988) when they noted that people who act for the benefit
of others even when costs were imposed on them are
"rational altruists" who base their decision on the size
of the external benefit as well as the costs. For example,
if there is pressure on government budgets, as is the case
currently because of the IMF stabilization programmes,
government organizations may not have the financial
capacity to serve local needs. Nor do market
organizations, because the latter through their drive
towards profit maximizing may provide inferior quality
products, as is the case in many developing countries.
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Thus, the viable alternative will be GROs which can be the
medium for people-centred development.
Cernea (1991) argued that "people-centred" projects cannot
be limited to projects only in the social sectors
(education, health, family planning, nutrition, and the
like). People must be central to all projects. Gaude and
Miller (1990, p.212) noted that such projects need to be
sustainable because sustainability is a necessary
condition for replicability. This is contrary to the
privatization experience in the majority of developing
countries which have resulted in depriving the poor of the
capacity to voice their demands.
UNDP (1993, pp.77-78) noted that the devolution of power
to the local level increases economic efficiency because
projects and services are planned, implemented, monitored,
and evaluated by local people who understand their needs
and priorities better than the central level. It also
increases political freedom and enhances democracy if it
is initiated within a package of institutional reform.
Privatization and free-market oriented advocates are in
contrast mainly concerned with increasing revenues and
using them efficiently at the local level within the
context of decentralization. Rondinelli and his colleagues
(1989, p.70) said that "user charges are likely to become
a major source of financing local services in developing
countries". Although it may be important to raise local
government revenues to finance expenditure, their
generalization to primary health care and education will
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"deter many of the poorest users and cause considerable
hardship- while raising relatively little money" (UNDP,
1993, p.73). The assessment of the user charges effect can
be derived from the empirical evidence provided by
Weissman (1990) in a visit to two public health clinics in
one of the low-income areas in Accra (Ghana). He noted
that user charges have benefited the rich and crowded-out
the poor. In his words;
"A major aspect of structural adjustment policy
has been the introduction of health fees to ease
budgetary burdens. Those now amount to 12% of
the allocated recurrent budget. But according to
available data, the use of health services
declined in many areas following the
introduction of fees in 1985. While utilization
increased for the more advantaged populations,
the level of use remained depressed among the
poorer groups" (Weissman, 1990, p.1627).
Further evidence on the negative effects of enforcing user
charges and cuts in the health budgets of developing
countries is provided by Martin (1993, pp.128-136).
The difference between the World Bank/IMF vision of
functional decentralization, or what Williamson (1990) [as
cited in Taylor (1993, p.582)] calls a "Washington
consensus", and the human development approach to
decentralization can be traced to the following quotation
from the UNDP human development report of 1992.
"The World Bank and the IMF must ... assess
projects and programmes with a vision that
extends beyond economic and financial
feasibility. They must take into account the
effect such projects and programmes will have on
the human being concerned" (UNDP, 1992, p.81).
Wiarda (1992) argued, that western ethnocentric efforts to
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promote development in developing countries have
contributed to the destruction of the only viable
institutions (i.e, family networks, clan and tribal
loyalties, religious movement and others) which are the
only agencies that might have enabled them to achieve
development. He said that;
"The destruction, in the name of modernization,
of such traditional institutions throughout the
Third World may well be one of the most
important legacies that development left behind
... For by our actions and our patronizing,
condescending, and ethnocentric efforts to
promote development among the LDCs, we may have
denied them the possibility of real development
while at the same time destroying the very
indigenous and ... viable institutions" (Wiarda,
1992, pp. 62-63).
In short, empowering people at the local level might be
the only viable alternative for human development during
the 1990s. Such development cannot be achieved by a single
decision as is the case in privatization but requires
commitment to an institutional building process beyond the
magnitude and objectives of privatization. This means also
that within the privatization programme there is a need
for the interests of the underprivileged groups to be
articulated at all stages of the divestiture process.
Through the promotion of a more open and interactive
process an environment can be created which is more
conducive to improving public confidence in the state
privatization programme and more favourable to its
implementation.
Privatization, however, is only one aspect of the solution
to the economic problems of developing countries. Others,
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such as the reform of SOEs within a context of increasing
autonomy and accountability, are further components of
such a solution. Instead of withdrawing from ownership of
state enterprises, particularly in the social services,
the government may decide to subject an increasing number
of them to reform and rehabilitation measures.
4.8: Decentralization in Practice 
The birth of decentralization ideas in developing
countries during the 1970s and 1980s was seen as a partial
cure for excessive centralization and as a response to the
weak capacity of the centralized state to plan and
implement development agenda. Thus, the concept of
decentralization was vague, and the results of its
implementation in developing countries were received with
"guarded optimism", as Rondinelli and Nellis (1986, p.4)
called it. This is because some improvement from
decentralization was traced in cases such as in
Indonesia's Provincial Development Program, Morocco's
local government reform, and other partial improvements in
Thailand, Pakistan, and Tunisia (World Bank, 1984).
However, the experience as reviewed by the World Bank
(1984), Cheema and Rondinelli (1983), Rondinelli and
Nellis (1986) put privatization at the end of the
decentralization scale, while during the late 1980s, the
privatization position has jumped into the lead
(Rondinelli et al., 1989, p.72).
Privatization in its current context will not reduce
247
centralization, increase empowerment and people
participation, or alleviate the poverty which is the
cancer of developing countries. This is because financial
crisis in developing countries following the start of the
debt crisis in 1982 provided the international aid
agencies such as the World Bank and the IMF with new
powers which allowed them to play a major role in the
international political economy. Their visions as
financial institutions are more related to factors of
financial feasibility and solvency. This is symmetric with
their organizations' objectives. Thus, it is not
surprising that their roles as financial institutions may
be in conflict with the capability approach to
development. For example, democracy and popular
participation may provide further resistance from the poor
to policies such as stabilization, structural adjustment
and privatization.
Ingham and Kalam (1992) argued that it is the agenda under
which the decentralization concept and its impact were
introduced during the 1970s and 1980s that is different.
While its assessment should be measured within the context
of participatory development, the view of its advocates
from the World Bank, and other International organizations
and their followers took,
"the form of a transfer of authority and
responsibility outwards and downwards from the
central government, it involved new functions
and duties for regional staffs outside of the
capital, for local government, public
authorities I
 non-governmental organizations
(NG0s) and voluntary organizations. The object
was enhanced administrative and economic
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efficiency, improved implementation of
development programs, and in the best
situations, a greater degree of responsiveness
to local needs" (Ingham and Kalam, 1992, p.374).
Furthermore, those aid agencies themselves are currently
behind the increasing trend towards centralization because
of their provision of aid and conditional loans to central
government linked with their policy advice and design of
the current reform policies in many developing countries,
particularly the poor which lack the administrative
ability to design reforms.
The data on decentralization measurements in developing
countries represent a major obstacle when assessing the
extent of decentralization and its impact on human
development. The UNDP Report of 1993 provided different
measurements of financial decentralization and social
expenditure decentralization ratios in developing and
industrial countries.
Table (4.2) shows that there is a wide difference between
developing and industrial countries in the expenditure and
revenue decentralization ratios. On average the
expenditure decentralization ratios are below 15 percent
in developing countries, except for South Korea, Zimbabwe
and Nigeria.
In Latin American countries, such as Chile and Brazil, the
ratios are below 10 percent while for other Sub-Saharan
African countries and Pakistan the expenditure ratios are
below 5 percent.
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Table 4.2
Financial Decentralization in Local Governments
in Selected Countries (percentage)
Country Year Total Modified Revenue Financial
Expenditure Expenditure decentra- autonomy
decentralizati- decentralizati- lization ratio
on ratio* on ratio** ratio*** ****
Developing
countries
Korea,Rep. of 1987 33 n.a. 31 99
Zimbabwe 1986 22 29 17 58
Nigeria 1988 17 n.a. n.a. n.a.
South Africa 1988 10 11 10 70
Chile 1988 8 10 6 61
Brazil 1989 7 14 1 33
Morocco 1987 6 n.a. 8 108
Paraguay 1989 4 5 3 88
Kenya 1989 4 5 7 134
Pakistan 1987/88 4 n.a. 6 100Costa Rica 1988 3 n.a. 3 123Ghana 1988 2 n.a. 2 71Cote d'Ivoire 1985 2 n.a. 2 115
Industrial
Countries
Denmark 1988 45 51 31 58
Finland 1989 41 43 29 63
Sweden 1989 37 42 30 78
United Kingdom 1989 26 31 16 55
Czechoslovakia 1990 26 27 19 61
Ireland 1989 23 28 10 33
Switzerland 1984 22 24 22 87
USA 1989 21 26 16 65
Hungary 1990 19 21 11 53
Austria 1990 16 18 17 89
Canada 1989 16 18 11 53
Australia 1990 5 6 5 83
Source: Countries been selected from the UNDP (1993, table
no.4.2, p.69)
* Local government expenditure as a percentage of
total government expenditure.
** Local government expenditure as a percentage of
total government expenditure less defence
expenditure less debt servicing.
*** Local government revenue as a percentage of total
government revenue.
**** Local government revenue as a percentage of local
government expenditure.
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Local governments in industrial countries, by contrast,
spend a larger proportion of the total expenditure. Except
for Australia (5 percent), the expenditure
decentralization ratios of other industrial countries
ranged between 15 and 45 percent. Even with the deduction
of military and debt servicing expenditure in the modified
ratios, developing country indicators of expenditure
decentralization do not improve significantly. Similar
indicators could be found in the revenue decentralization
ratios of developing countries where local governments do
not possess the power to raise revenue from local taxes.
The only decentralization ratios in which developing
countries appear to be equal to those in the industrial
ones are those regarding the financial autonomy ratios
(about 60 percent). However, in reality the difference is
immense because local government autonomy has to be
derived from its expenditure ability. This ability is
narrow in developing countries and consequently a high
financial autonomy does not mirror the size of local
spending as a proportion of total government spending, but
rather the percentage represents 60 percent of an already
small percentage of spending.
Other indicators of decentralization which relate to human
development such as social expenditure at the local level
revealed that developing country local governments spent
only about 5-6 percent from the total on social spending
while in developed countries the ratio was around 25
percent (UNDP, 1993, p.71). As has been argued earlier the
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decentralization of social spending may be more efficient
at the local level but despite that developing countries
governments still control a large proportion of
expenditure. However, the decentralization of expenditure
at the local level does not in itself secure the provision
of local needs. The experience of building prestigious
projects such as expensive colleges and hospitals, as was
the case in Pakistan in 1985, may provide counter-evidence
of the rocky road to decentralization (ibid, p.74).
There is a need to empower the poor and enhance the
democratic polity at the local level before the delegation
of power can proceed. This requires government commitment
rather than government withdrawal from the scene.
The overall assessment of decentralization practices in
developing countries undertaken by UNDP found that there
was not much evidence of full devolution; where there was
some kind of decentralization, it has generally increased
efficiency and better priority spending ratios. However,
decentralization requires state intervention to reduce the
disparities between poor and rich regions as well as some
sort of mechanism to remobilize the structure of power
towards the excluded people (UNDP, 1993, p.83).
Although there is pessimism rather than optimism about the
benefits of decentralization in developing countries, the
growing body of literature on the subject proves that
decentralization and democratization in the context of
enhancing people's capabilities is gaining ground.
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Scholars such as Slater (1989), Marglin and Marglin
(1990), Ingham and Kalam (1992), Uphoff (1993), Lipton and
Nugent (1993) are only a few examples among many.
4.9: The Effect of Privatization on Technological Choice 
and the Informal Sector 
The proponents of privatization and free-market policies
argued that market prices, through competition in internal
and international markets, would help producers to choose
the "appropriate technology" for the nation.
If we investigate the recent technological history of
developing countries, it will reveal that the economic
policies in general and industrialization policies in
particular, adopted from the 1950s until this day, have
led to a deterioration in the use of the concept of
"appropriate technology" or "orientation". Imported
technology from the West following the adoption of the ISI
has left developing countries with huge problems in
continuing the use of such technology. Most of the
projects have been a kind of "Master-Key project" where
the employees have no idea about their maintenance. This
has led to more dependence or reliance on the West, and
more financial expenditure in terms of foreign exchange,
which is rarely available in low-income countries. Thus,
the results are more debt and more unemployment because
most of this technology is capital intensive in its nature
and origin. Nevertheless, this does not mean that segments
of this technology have not contributed positively to
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development efforts in developing countries, in
particular, in the areas of communication and marketing.
The question is: why does privatization in its current
international context not provide an incentive to induce
and enhance the adoption of appropriate technology in
LDCs?
It is well known that efficient technology for a producer
means a cheaper and more technically efficient process.
So, allowing developing countries to make technological
choices within an integrated international market
(globalization) will logically induce the producers in
developing countries to purchase the form of technology
that matches the factors of cheapness and technically
efficient in order to compete internationally. According
to the argument presented by the World Bank (1991, pp.88-
90) the integration of developing countries within the
global economy means that producers in LDCs will continue
to choose Western technology. The recent experience in
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union is a positive
witness to this.
Even the arguments of the organization theories, such as
the Principal-Agent theory, X-efficiency theory, and the
transaction costs theory will induce producers to favour
technologies which reduce agency costs, opportunism and
shirking which mean less employment of the labour factor
in production. Such logic cannot help in the alleviation
of the poverty problems in LDCs.
An important impact of globalization is derived from the
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unequal competition between traditional products and
similar imported goods from cheap origins such as the
products from East Asian countries. Hirschman (1984a)
recognized such a phenomenon.
"During the first phase of export expansion in
countries of the periphery an important effect
is, not the creation of new industries to
satisfy rising consumer demand, but the
destruction of established handicraft and
artisan activities as labour is withdrawn from
them for staple production and as new imports of
consumer goods compete successfully against
them" (Hirschman, 1984a, p.66).
Where centralization as well as commercialization has led
rural people into the trap of dependency, participatory
development would produce "self-reliance" and foster self-
sufficiency in local organizations. The essential
component in this process is "learning by doing" as well
as "mobilizing" local rescurces for more efficient use.
There is no shortage of resources, but the question is how
to mobilize them? The answer is territorial
decentralization which provides economic operators in the
local rural areas with the incentives to engage in new
activities. This is what Hirschman (1984a, p.75) called
the inside linkages. One of the main factors which
determines such linkages is the degree of technological
strangeness. When this is increased, inside linkages will
meet with special difficulties. Hirschman (1984a), Cohen
and Uphoff (1980), Uphoff (1991), Banuri (1990), Stohr
(1981) and Taylor (1992) as well as others all argued that
the importance of using appropriate technology is that it
is far more efficient than using an alien technology. This
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is because the latter attenuates linkages and establishes
cultural resistance itself. Capital-intensive technologies
and modernized ones do not by themselves produce
development; people produce development. However, not all
modernized technologies are irrelevant to the development
of developing countries. Those concerned with
infrastructure and communication can help efficiently in
supporting the indigenous development effort.
The main factor is how people can control technology
because this is the condition for inside innovation.
Without it, the existing path of dependency and the loss
of the knowledge would continue. Indigenously based
knowledge could have a major contribution to sustainable
development because it is found on the local scale and is
more practical than that in advanced countries which
reflects the institutional factors of its origin.
The alternative approach to decentralization provides a
good opportunity for the use of appropriate technology.
Through popular participation in decision-making the
people would reveal their preferences and ideas subject to
deliberation. Inside the production system people who are
involved and affected by the production process would
utilize the meaning of appropriate technology. Inside
linkages would work in two dimensions; the first would be
learning from their own experiences how to adopt
appropriate technology in the context of controlling it
within their environmental, economical, social boundaries
and restrictions rather than their adaptation to more
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technically efficient, sophisticated, and progressive
forms. Innovation would come as a logical result in the
second dimension through interaction within the production
system. "Need is the mother of innovation" could well
apply in this case. The past history of developing
countries and their civilization is consistent with such
an argument. If a clear profile of accelerating benefits
emerges, for the employee in particular and the community
in general, innovation would be one of the expected
outcomes.
This is consistent with the institutional school argument
denoted by C.E. Ayres. He emphasised that the efficiency
of technology rests on two factors. The first is that it
is an autonomous, self-sustaining process and the second
is that the potential for innovation will be enhanced in
a respective environment [(Ayres, 1962) as cited in Street
and James (1982,P.684)]. This denotes a rejection of the
conventional belief that invention and discovery are best
explained in market terms. This conclusion stems from the
institutional school belief in the progressive
evolutionary character of society as well as the
technological history of Latin America and Sub-Saharan
Africa (Street and James, 1982).
If people and employees were to participate in decision-
making, there would be more incentives for them to enhance
productivity because such efficiency would promote their
well-being as employees in the production system and would
enhance the well-being and progress of their community as
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well. They share in costs and benefits. For that reason
coordination should become a value rather than a strategy
for work (Appadura, 1990, p.213). This is contrary to
individualism as the outcome of privatization.
Territorial decentralization or devolution recognizes the
importance of the informal sector in generating income and
employment for the poor. Page and Steel claimed [1984,
p.19 as cited in Dessing (1990,P.7)] that micro-
enterprises could be highly efficient even though most are
unlikely to expand and are not primarily seeking to
maximize profit but simply to generate income (self-
employment creation).
Streeten (1992, p.98) pointed out that the informal
sector, when provided with the right setting, can possess
many advantages over large-scale formal sector firms.
These are advantages of location, simplicity in the
production process, lower costs in local markets, and
adaptability and responsiveness to changing demands.
Thus, macroeconomic policies such as free-market oriented
policies and privatization would promote large-scale
private investments which do not necessarily promote
small-scale activities and may even eliminate them.
Furthermore, the contestable market features of free entry
and exit and zero sunk costs can be applied to the micro-
enterprises of the informal sector rather than to those
operating in the formal sector. According to Baumol (1982)
contestability gives consumers the benefit of competition
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while at the same time disciplining producers as it makes
them vulnerable to hit-and-run entry.
Thus privatization as a transfer of ownership and/or
control from the public to the private sector or as a
functional decentralization should be accompanied by
appropriate microeconomic policies and organizations which
are necessary to bring micro-enterprise activities into
the mainstream of the economic development process.
Streeten (1992) called it the approach to "crowd-in" the
informal sector. There is a need to look at the
development process in terms of building a pyramid which
depends on laying down a solid foundation before
proceeding to the next level; otherwise, the top-down
approach will result in a "shaky tower" (Dessing, 1990).
Stein (1992) argued that the liberalization policies
proposed by the World Bank and the IMF in Zambia destroyed
the small-scale industrial sector. He argued;
"In general the World Bank/IMF approach is
unduly exclusionary, internally inconsistent and
largely undetermined. While the measures
recommended will lead to a decline in import-
substituting manufacturing and [State]
ownership, these are unlikely to be replaced by
the ownership or industry types desired by the
World Bank/IMF (export oriented, resource
processing, etc). Overall, the policies are
likely to deindustrialize, forcing countries
into a problematic reliance on resource and
agricultural exports" (Stein, 1992, p.86).
Thus, privatization and liberalization policies might lead
to an intensification of the disparities between the rich
and the poor unless accompanied by a package of reform
that brings the informal sector into the heart of the
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development process. It is argued that liberalization and
privatization would encourage foreign direct investment to
increase its inflows to developing countries. The data on
global investment reveals that out of $181.7 billion
invested worldwide in 1989, 89.7 percent was invested in
OECD and only 10.3 percent in developing countries, of
which the most needy Sub-Saharan African countries
received only 1.4 percent ($2.6 billion) [IMF (1990) as
cited in Steidlmeier (1993, pp.216-217). This demonstrates
that international investment responds to profits in
international markets rather than to the needs of a
country.
The problem, however, is not limited to the factor of
investment. Another important one is the loss of
knowledge. Even with poverty spreading in developing
countries, the traditional activities in the informal
sector were not enhanced because of the loss of knowledge
and experience in the informal sector. Banuri (1990) noted
that "epistemological decentralization" can solve the
problem. This means encouraging a new approach to
knowledge which emphasizes its shared nature. Alien
technologies and alien notions of knowledge have
contributed to a distortion of people's capacity to
control the technology from one side and to innovate from
the other.
Even if we assume that technological progress will
accompany privatization, as the latter's advocates have
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argued, privatization is by no means the only path to
technological progress. At the national level, public
enterprises and publicly subsidized private firms can be
employed as effective motors for technological change and
for the indigenizing of technology as was the case in
Brazil and South Korea respectively (Taylor, 1993, p.586).
Likewise, at the local level, the importance of specific
learning will contribute to the overall effort of
development which will enhance people's capacity to
control their destiny.
4.10: The Necessity of Coordinating the Efforts For
Development
Development requires a coordination of effort at the
national, regional, and local levels. The government and
its agencies could supply the local community with what
Hirschman called the "outside linkages". The supply of
public goods is necessary to complement the effort at the
local level to achieve sustainable human development. In
this case the state is invited to provide an
infrastructure such as power, transportation, irrigation
systems, and services such as disease and pest control,
education and health. This invitation to the state is a
requirement because local people cannot supply such goods
individually or collectively.
An empirical study of this issue conducted by Anand and
Ravallion (1993) examined the comparative effects on the
infant mortality rate in Sri Lanka of providing direct
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health services through the government and that of
increasing income through growth.
The study revealed that an increase of one rupee in Sri
Lanka government health expenditure per capita would
reduce infant mortality by 1.1 deaths per thousand which
is 22 times more than the impact from a similar increase
in average income (Anand and Ravllion, 1993, p.146).
The state still possesses an effective role in
decentralization. This is contrary to the role assumed and
assigned to the state by the advocates of privatization
and free-market oriented policies.
There exists a crucial role for the state in providing a
suitable social, economic and political environment in
which local initiatives and local self development could
flourish [UNCRD (1989, p.21) as cited in Taylor (1992,
p.255)].
Another important role is to maintain peace and the
democratic rule of law which can be achieved through
providing equality and justice. Legal decentralization and
devolution of power are the major factors that can
contribute effectively to the delivery of such
responsibility.
Providing equal access for the poor through their supply
of basic goods and food at affordable prices is another
responsibility for the government.
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The state also has the important role of providing
training programs to produce an educational outcome
suitable for the economy's needs. That would require a
shift in educational policies so as to provide the
respective knowledge to the rural poor.
However, to reduce the impact of bureaucracy public goods
can be provided at a level lower than the central
government (e.g. regional government). Nevertheless, there
would still be the need to create a connection between the
different agencies at different levels. Communication as
a means of understanding and the feed-back of information
would be important as well.
It is difficult to argue that territorial decentralization
by itself would guarantee an equal distribution of
political power or real empowerment. Neither could
empowerment guarantee voice. This is what is called the
"political patronage hypothesis" (Echeverri-Gent, 1992,
p.1412). In this hypothesis, public participation would
require a process of interest representation mediated by
agents such as political parties, NGOs or other
organizations. In such a case there might be a
contradiction between the interests of the two. According
to Echeverri-Gent (1992, p.1414), political competition is
an essential mechanism for the effective operation of
participation.
It is essential to understand, as Ingham and Kalam (1992,
p.384) state, that the traditional decision-making
structure can be different from place to place and from
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time to time. Thus, greater decentralization does not
necessarily mean "power to the people". But, the evolution
of democratic and independent organizations at the local
level may support the evolution of a healthy institutional
setting for popular participation.
Riddell argued that decentralization constitutes three
major changes in direction; "power, knowledge and
information handling to be decentralized away from the
central government and recentralized outward from local
government" (Riddell, 1985, p.225). Thus, coordination and
cooperation would be the most important elements
contributing to such a required change.
The task of reforming SOEs in the literature of
privatization often assumes that privatization is the goal
of reform, and often the concept of reform has been used
as a synonym for privatization (Galal, 1991) (Shiny,
1990) (Shiny and Nellis, 1991). The danger in the
proposed privatization policies stems from the fact that
it has become a matter of belief rather than one of a
number of alternatives. It must be recognized that
privatization, if pursued "within the wrong framework and
without a human development purpose in mind", will fail to
achieve the objective of development defined as increasing
human well-being (UNDP, 1993, p.51). Furthermore it would
mean no accountability to the people while the poor would
be worse off and the rich better-off.
Participation through privatization has to consider two
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facts, firstly the constraint imposed by government design
and implementation policies for privatization (e.g.,
budgetary deficit) and secondly the need to make
enterprises accountable to the people through the
government as a competent third unbiased agent or through
the people's representatives (e.g., democratic
institutions). If the voice option can be used
effectively, there would be a prospect to reform SOEs and
to make them more accountable and people-oriented.
4.11: Conclusion 
Throughout the preceding sections, people in communities
have been presented as the cornerstone of development.
Their diversity can be used as a source of well-being.
Advocates of privatization are eager to use market forces
and private ownership as the only source of growth.
Impersonalization of human relations and choices, through
the demand and supply forces, could be ensured. There is
no territory for the rational actor; instead there is only
the market.
As the market is restricted in developing countries and
the institutional factors are different from those
prevailing in the West, there is a need to introduce the
place factor in any development strategy. That is because
functional alternatives such as privatization will not
change the coercive power of the interest groups whether
they are operating through market tools or through state
power. Both would lead to a concentration of income and
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wealth, both deny the poor their entitlement and choice to
improve their capability. Also, both eliminated
institutional factors from their calculations because the
considerations are limited to efficiency and growth
through the "trickle-down" principle.
The question addressed by the chapter is how can
privatization empower people when the present bargaining
power is in the hands of the elite?
The chapter suggested that privatization might enhance the
participation of the poor and the underprivileged if it
was designed and implemented within a framework that can
enhance workers' participation in decision-making and
ownership as well as other people who are excluded from
participation in the market place (such as the low income
groups). However, the experience of developing countries,
as shown by the chapter, gives little evidence of such
intention.
The alternative then is devolution or territorial
decentralization. There are two key principles on which
this alternative can work, participation and linkages.
Participation is defined as
"the organized efforts to increase control over
resources and regulative institutions in given
social situations, on the part of groups and
movements hitherto excluded from such
control"[Wolf (1983, p.2) as quoted by Goulet
(1989, p.165)].
Thus, participatory development would imply a dependency
on local initiatives through grass root organizations
rather than a bureaucratic structure. As a result,
accountability would be enhanced because local people have
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a special interest in sustainable development.
Privatization is a "crisis driven policy" while
participatory development is a strategic setting based on
community rules and values and their collective capacity
rather than an individual one.
The proponents of privatization equate economic freedom
with privatization or private ownership. In participatory
development, economic freedom should be defined as a
decision-making input to the degree that one is affected
by the outcome of an economic choice. In the case of
privatization, unequal ownership of property is
inconsistent with "equality of opportunity". It is the
notion of property rights rather than participation
because the scale of the first determines the size and
activation of the latter.
Thus, the dominance of the private property concept will
reduce, if not diminish, any interest in community
projects and as a result low participation in decision
making on which the choice concept stands. It is a case of
ignorance and isolation.
The problem of privatization in developing countries is
that it promotes the culture of silence and people will
not participate in their humanization. Poor people will be
marginalized in the name of growth and denied the
opportunity to choose in the name of "equal opportunity".
This is because the privatization experience in developing
countries treats people as objects of development while
participation and democracy through decentralization would
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have an educational impact. It transforms the poor from
objects of development to knowledgeable subjects of
progress. Within this context participation would be seen
as a goal and as a means for achieving sustainable
development. It increases the internal cohesion and
solidarity of local communities in order to reduce their
dependence and increase their self-reliance. This is
consistent with Uphoff i s conclusion that
"government and technical agencies seem to
prefer delivering benefits at a time and place
of their own choosing in order to keep control.
In the process, however, there is no assurance
that they will be delivering the most needed
benefits, or even correct ones" (Uphoff, 1991,
p.491).
Finally the chapter suggests that development may mean
decentralization which certainly means participation.
However, privatization will not necessarily assure that.
It will depend closely on the design and the
implementation which cannot be severed from the objectives
of introducing it in the first place. If privatization
within the context of developing countries is to be
sustainable and people-centered it has to be a gradual
process, relatively crisis-free, untroubled and unforced,
marked by the fusion of collective participation from
below (e.g., grassroots) and individual participation in
the market place. Such an approach will depend exclusively
on the commitment of the decision makers and their vision
of empowering the people.
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5.1: Introduction
Jordan is a small country which emerged as a political
entity in 1921 when the Arab Emirate of Trans-Jordan was
established on the East Bank of the Jordan River. In 1946
it became a sovereign monarchy. In 1950, after the 1948
War which resulted in the partition of Palestine and the
creation of Israel, that part of Palestine which had been
retained in the hands of the Arabs was incorporated into
the renamed Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. After the 1967
War,Israel occupied the West Bank which has remained under
occupation until this day.
The selection of Jordan as a case study is based on its
distinctive economic experience. Since its foundation,
Jordan has followed a free-market ideology combined with
an export-promotion strategy after 1985 (as advocated by
the neo-classical theorists) but it has suffered from
deficient development outcome.
This introduction suggests reasons for the negative
results of the continuous development efforts in this
country. The analysis in this chapter will focus on the
characteristics of the Jordanian economy during the last
four decades (1952-1992). The questions to be asked are
whether there are any specific variables which influence
the performance of the economy. Are there any constraints?
What is the relationship between the productive capacity
of the economy and the country's consumption pattern. Does
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unemployment denote a problem for the economy; if yes,
what are the reasons? Is there a case of disparity between
the regions inside Jordan, and between the income strata.
As alleviation of poverty is the objective of economic
development as well as the slogan for development
economists and institutions in the 1990s, is there real
poverty in this country?
All these aspects will be evaluated in this chapter, in
order to facilitate the later case study of privatization
and development in the country which follows in the next
chapter. The methodology employed in this chapter is a
holistic one based on investigation into the economic as
well as the non-economic factors (history, institutions,
politics, etc.) which have played a major role in the
different development phases of Jordan.
Jordan Map
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5.2: Jordan Prior to 1952 
More than 450 years ago, Jordan was one of the Turkish
Ottoman Empire colonies. Between 1516 and up to the First
World War the area which became Jordan constituted the
Syrian province of the Ottoman Empire.
During this period of colonialism the country suffered in
the same way as most of the other Ottoman colonies from
poverty, illness and illiteracy.
The economy was predominantly agricultural as more than
three quarter of the GDP was produced by this sector
(Patai, 1958,P.119).
Although agriculture was the main domain of employment
farmers were under continuous oppression from three main
interest groups.
The first group was the Ottoman authority with its heavy
taxation of the farmers on the one side and its army
policy of compulsory military service on the other. Both
these policies deprived farmers of an important proportion
of their money and labour.
The second group was the nomads. The nomads often raided
the farmers and either stole whatever they could, and\or
demanded from them (farmers) a share in the crops at the
time of harvest. Such behaviour was a normal feature of
nomadic life, especially as there was no central
authority, no police force and no law and order in general
terms, to protect the rural people.
The third group consisted of merchants and money lenders.
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Those were the main reason for the farmers' permanent
state of indebtedness. They often imposed a very high rate
of interest (up to 70 percent) on farmers, leaving them
unable to escape the states of poverty (Al-Tememi and
Bahgat, 1965, p.105).
However, despite such oppression farmers were not able to
give up farming during this period because there were no
other employment opportunities. Moreover, there existed no
infrastructure or public services in the country that
could encourage industrial investment to promote the
absorption of new manpower. Thus, working in the
agricultural sector was more preferable to unemployment.
During the First World War, the Bedouin tribes rallied to
the call of the British sponsored Arab revolt against
their Ottoman Turkish rulers. From 1918, when the Ottoman
Empire collapsed, Great Britain assumed responsibility for
the region. In 1921, the British installed Amir "Abdullah
bin Al-Husayn" as ruler of the British controlled
territories east of the Jordan river. The West Bank,
however, was retained under the direct administration of
Great Britain.
In 1946, the British mandate ended and as a result, the
Hashemite Kingdom of Trans-Jordan was officially
established.
During the three decades of British colonialism, the
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Jordanian economy was dependent on external aid and
subsidies from Britain. This was not a temporary feature
of the country then, but it was the starting point in a
permanent trend towards dependency on external resources
capable of financing government expenditure and
investment.
In 1921, British subsidies amounted £60,000 paid annually
to the Amir of Jordan. These had increased to £100,000 by
the mid-1920s and to around £2 million by the mid-1940s.
In a country with a population at the time of around
375,000 people, such subsidies denoted a sizable amount of
cash. This led Jordan into a path of development
characterised by centralization of power on the one side 
and vulnerability to external factors on the other.
The 1948 Arab-Israeli War 
In 1948, the Arab-Israeli War started. It resulted in the
partition of Palestine and the creation of Israel. The
territories retained in Arab hands were incorporated into
the country in 1950, forming the renamed Hashmite Kingdom
of Jordan.
The incorporation of the West Bank added a sizable
population (around 350 thousand) and cultivable land area
(around 25 percent). Thus, the population of Jordan became
more than triple the population of Trans-Jordan, but the
total arable land was increased by about only one quarter.
In addition to this effect of the 1948 war, there were
277
other effects on Jordan.
The first effect was the disruption of the transport and
marketing links between Trans-Jordan and the rest of the
world because almost all of Transjordanian imports before
1948 passed through Haifa Port on the Mediterranean sea.
On the other hand, Trans-Jordan sold its major surplus
production of wheat and barley in the coastal region of
Palestine, or exported it through Haifa port. As a result
of the war and its aftermath, transportation costs became
a heavy burden on the economy. Imports and exports had to
travel north to Damascus and then over the mountains to
Beirut, or south to Jordan's only outlay of Aqaba. But,
the infrastructure was deficient, lacking roads and
transport facilities, particularly to the south (at
Aqaba).
The second effect of the war and the heavy transportation
costs in particular, was that the economy was forced to
establish an industrial base that could serve local needs,
which before 1948 had often been met through imports.
Thus, the selection of import substitution
idustrialization as a strategy for development was not a
choice but a necessary condition for the survival of the
country.
Before 1948 manufacturing industry was practically non-
existent. Small scale industries were concentrated in food
processing, especially flour milling. Thus, the country
was dependent on imported consumer goods to meet local
demand.
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Another effect of the 1948 War was that the Palestinians,
who were more urbanized than the east Jordanians
(Transjordanian) helped Jordan to facilitate new
businesses and activities which had never been experienced
in the country before. The contributions of Palestinian
businessmen and their labour force were supported by a
protection afforded by heavy transportation costs which
ensure sufficient profits for their investment in the
industrial sector. New industries were expanded, although
power supply was expensive, water was in short supply and
there was a scarcity of good quality raw materials.
Most of the industries were concentrated in foodstuffs,
building materials and simple household goods (Smadi,
1982).
In the agricultural sector, which was the dominant sector,
most of the land areas in east Jordan were small holdings
(more than 52 percent consisted of less than 20 ha.). As
a result, the proportion of subsistence farming as opposed
to commercial farming was greater in east Jordan than in
Palestine (IBRD,1957). The country during the 1940s and
1950s was almost self sufficient in food, particularly,
field crops and fruits such as grapes, olives and tobacco.
Moreover, both kinds of crops, particularly field crops
were the major exports of the country .
On the natural resources side, Jordan possessed only large
deposits of phosphate rock and salt. Their main source of
energy, particularly in rural Jordan, was wood fuels.
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To sum up, Jordan had faced two kinds of colonialism as
well as further political instability due to the 1948 War.
This led to a new set of socio-economic conditions which
characterised the country with special features, difficult
to be found in the experience of other countries. In
particular, the one which led to the change in the main
fabric of the society (Transjordanian and Palestinian),
and the other related to the importance of the traditional
interest groups (merchants, money lenders, capitalist
farmers, tribal leaders, etc.).
Thus, in order to evaluate economic development in Jordan,
it would be more appropriate if the 40- year period (1952-
1992) covered by this part of the thesis is divided into
two main periods of study, the first (1952-1972) and the
second (1973-1992). However, it is important to stress
that the study will employ statistically available data
from both primary and secondary resources.
5.3: The First Phase of Development (1952-1972)/
5.3.1: The Structural Change of the Economy
The population of Jordan in 1952 was about 1.3 million of
which more than 50 percent lived in rural areas. Such a
distribution could be explained on the one hand by the
dominant agricultural base of the economy and on the other
'.It is to be noted that most of the available and
reliable data of the Jordanian economy started to be
published in the 1960s rather than the 1950s. Thus, the
statistics in this chapter often start from the 1960s.
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hand by the slim industrial base during this period. In
addition, with minimum infrastructure, housing problems,
unreliable public services and few employment
opportunities, there were no major attractions to
encourage large scale migration to the capital, Amman.
Despite that, the capital city of Amman was the major
business centre in the country. Merchants and government
bureaucrats in Jordan, particularly after the 1948 War,
were mainly Palestinians because they were more educated
and urbanized than the inhabitants of Trans-Jordan.
Moreover, after the incorporation of the West Bank,
Jordan's revenues from tourism had increased. As a result
the services sector after the 1948 War became more
important for its contribution to the GDP than the
agricultural sector.
5.3.1.1: The Agricultural Sector
5.3.1.1.1: The Share of the Agricultural Sector
As figure (5.1) shows, there was a declining trend in the
contribution of the agricultural sector to the GDP during
this period. However, this decline in agriculture during
the process of structural transformation was not unique to
Jordan but rather
"a tendency obviously driven by powerful forces
inherent in the development process, whether in
socialist or capitalist countries, Asian, Latin
American, or African, currently developed or
still poor" (Timmer, 1988, p.276).
This natural fall in agricultural contribution should not
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be treated as a "black box". Instead we need to focus on
the context of decline historically and through the
relationship between government policies and the role of
agriculture in structural change.
While its share was about 35 percent in 1952, agricultural
sector contribution to GDP in Jordan declined to less than
10 percent in 1972.
The country's agricultural production fluctuated sharply
because of changes in rain levels and weather conditions
in general.
Nevertheless, the major deterioration during this period
was caused by the 1967 War between the Arabs and Israel
which resulted in the Israeli occupation of the West Bank.
This event deprived Jordan of more than a quarter of its
agricultural output.
Although the agricultural share was about 23 percent on
average during 1952-1967, it declined to less than 15
percent after the occupation. During that period
vegetables and field crops were the main products of the
agricultural sector. Figure (5.2) shows that field crops
production during 1964 was more than 430 thousand tons,
while it declined after the occupation to less than 150
thousand tons.
The occupation of the West Bank in 1967 had a greater
effect on the production of vegetables and fruits in the
country than on field crops production. However, in
Jordan, as mentioned earlier, good harvests are often
dependent on the weather and on the rain factor in
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Figure (5.1) : The Sectoral Contribution to GDP in Jordan
(1952-1972).
Source: Calculated by the researcher employing the data in
-United Nations and Department of Statistics (1977)
-Central Bank of Jordan (1989, table no.47, p.58)
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Figure (5.2): The Changes in the Production of Main
Agricultural Crops Groups in Jordan (1964-1972).
Fruits (Olives,Grapes, Citrus Fruits, Bananas and Figs)
Field crops (Wheat, Barley, Tobacco, Lentils and Vetch)
Vegetables (Tomatos, Eggplant, Cucumbers and Melons)
Source: Calculated by the researcher employing the data in
Central Bank of Jordan (1989, table no. 45, p.56).
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particular.
Another reason for the agricultural problem was government
policies towards this sector. Such policies were not
effective, even before the occupation of the West Bank in
1967, because more emphasis was placed on
industrialization. The provision of public services and
infrastructure to the major urbanized cities coincided
with a general neglect of the agricultural sector and
small farmers' needs in particular. Moreover, although
irrigation is the main problem, government provision of
irrigation water was only concerned with the supply of
water to the existing irrigated areas (i.e. East Ghor
Canal project 1959-1961 and the other projects in the
Jordan valley) (Smadi, 1982, p.16).
Consequently, while the areas cultivated with field crops
were about 85 percent in 1956, this percentage reduced to
about 73 percent in 1965. On the other hand, land
dedicated to the cultivation of vegetables and fruit trees
increased from around 5 percent and 10 percent in 1956 to
11 percent and 16 percent respectively in 1965 (FAO, 1967,
p.50).
Another important phenomenon is the structural change of
the working force in Jordan. As Figure (5.3) asserts, the
dependency rate in Jordan is relatively high, about 5:1 .
This means that the participation rate which determines
the size of the work force was on average about 20 percent
of the population. Another unique phenomenon in Jordan was
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the decline in the size of population in 1968 due to the
occupation of the West Bank. In other words, the
occupation left the country with 1.4 million people in
1968, a decrease from 2.1 million before the invasion in
1967.
Despite that, during 1952-1972, the participation rate
pattern did not change due to two factors. The first is
the population structure; half the population was under
the age of 15. The second factor was the increasing rate
of schooling; 17.8 percent [Primary (P) + Secondary (S)]
during 1961. This increased to about one quarter of the
population by 1972.
On the sectoral level, while more than 50 percent of the
work force were farmers or workers in the agricultural
sector during the 1930s, the agricultural work force in
1968 declined to about 22 percent, and to 17.3 percent by
1972 (Ibrahem, et al., 1989, p.74). This major shift in
the distribution of the work force was attributable to
different factors (such as education policies, credit
distribution, powerful interest groups, government pricing
policies,. .etc).
5.3.1.1.2: Land Tenure and Land Reform
One of the major factors determining the degree of
efficiency of the agriculture sector in Jordan is land
tenure. Prior to 1956, the tenure of much but not all
state land which constituted 31 percent of the total land
(called miri land) was on the musha'a system. In other
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Figure (5.3) : The Size of Population, Schooling and
Employment in Jordan (1961-1972).
Population
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Sources:-
-
The population data from; Department of Statistics (1991,
table no.2, p.19) and Ibrahem et al. (1989, table no. 2.1,
p.28).
-
The number of students data from; Ministry of education,
The Statistical Education Yearbook, several issues.
-The size of work force from; Ministry of Labour, Annual
reports, several issues.
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words, the lands were held in common and individual rights
were based on shares of the total not in specific parcels.
The land was redistributed every two to nine years.
Thus,there was security in tenure but no continuity on the
same piece of land.
In 1957, the government embarked on a program called "Land
Settlement" in order to determine and register the
traditional rights (IBRD, 1957, p.126). However, such a
programme was not introduced to establish communities on
the land or to achieve land reform. Rather, because
ownership rights are important for traditional social
values, the purpose was to reduce conflicts between the
tribes as well as to attract the settlement of the nomads
in the south for security reasons. Thus, there was no
economic significance or purpose behind the programme. On
the contrary, most of the land users were not their
traditional owners. This privatization of state land has
led to a rapid transference of the land to speculators on
the one hand and to unequal distribution of lands on the
other.
This institutional change could be regarded as a solution
in Jordan to the problem of the "tragedy of commons" 2 . The
tragedy of commons can be overcome by the substitution of
a system of property rights instead of communal rights.
However, the establishment of an effective system of
2 The tragedy of commons is the deterioration in the
quality of common resource that resulted from unregulated
behaviour of self-interested utility maximizing
individual. For further discussion see; Brown,C.V. and
Jackson,P.M. (1992).
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property rights requires substantial transaction costs in
designing and implementation which the government could
not bear. It relied on traditional rights as a way of
decreasing the transaction costs of the government.
However, this led to unequal distribution of wealth and
income among different individuals and groups.
The question is why this solution was more preferable? The
answer is, because the alternative solution was an
external intervention by the government which brings
excessive costs of monitoring and enforcing rules and
regulations on land tenure. This solution was more costly
than the first. Also it did not provide
the nomad problem. However, the failure
implementation of the first solution
significantly to the deterioration of
sector in Jordan.
any settlement to
in the design and
has contributed
the agricultural
5.3.1.2: The Industrial Sector
In the industrial sector, the country followed an import
substitution industrialization (ISI) strategy as well as
resource based industrialization (RBI). However, the ISI
path was at that time a necessity rather than a choice of
strategy. In other words it was a reaction to the high
transportation costs of imported goods from abroad as well
as the dramatic increase in the size of the market due to
the high number of refugees. Both factors contributed to
the expansion of this sector. Another factor was the
availability, following shortages before 1950, of skilled
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manpower (mainly Palestinian).
According to the World Bank mission to Jordan in 1957, the
number of industrial establishment employing more than
five workers was 421 establishment in 1954. They employed
a total of 8200 workers with an average of 19 workers per
establishment. The total capital invested in was 4.3 MJDs
and its gross output was 7.2 MJDs, so the capital/output
ratio was 0.6 which is low. Such a ratio is consistent
with the kind of industries which prevailed at that time
(food industries, wearing apparel, wooden products, non-
metallic minerals product, detergents, weaving & knitting,
beverages, tobacco, bus & trucks bodies and blacksmiths).
However, there were no statistics available on the size of
the informal sector which constituted the bulk of this
sector and was mainly dependent on a handicrafts (IBRD,
1957).
In addition, government protectionist policies encouraged
the building of an infant industrial base. The industrial
sector in Jordan during this phase of development was
limited but growing. Its share of GDP,which had been about
8 percent in 1952, rose to about 15 percent in 1972. The
industries were concentrated mainly in foodstuffs,
clothing, non-metallic mineral products and wooden
furniture.
As Jordan possesses limited mineral resources, phosphates
and potash were the only major natural resources to
receive heavy investment. The government undertook direct
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investment in those minerals in order to increase its
revenue in terms of foreign currencies. However, the
private sector participated in financing and implementing
large scale projects, including cement, the oil refinery
and expansion of phosphate production facilities. During
this period, "big is beautiful" was the prevailing
ideology in development thought, particularly for this
kind of industrial project. Economies of scale, forward
and backward linkages were patterns to be followed through
big projects, in order to provide a big push towards the
industrialization of the economy.
What were the other main economics concern of the
government at the time?
The government's main concern was the weak infrastructural
base of the economy, and the need for construction of
public utilities. Roads and housing services were a real
problem due to the influx of a large number of refugees
(360,000 ) into the country (due to the 1967 War) which
resulted in a huge burden on the Jordanian economy.
5.3.1.3: The Services Sector 
As figure (5.2) reveals, Jordan's services sector is the
most important sector of the economy. Jordan has always
been a country of trade and transit, as is evident from
the ruins of Petra. So, the era of modern transport came
with the opening of the Hijaz railway in 1904-1907. In
other words, in the services sector, the country
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mercantile base (traders and businessmen) particularly
after 1950 served the expansion of this sector. In
addition, government investment in transportation,
telecommunications and public utilities, mainly in the
urban areas, had helped significantly in the domination of
this sector during 1952-1972. Also, the expansion of the
banking system and the establishment of new development
banks as well as commercial banks had contributed to give
the large share for this sector in the country's GDP.
In 1952, the contribution to the GDP of the services
sector was 56 percent. This increased to more than 70
percent by the end of this period of study. Moreover, the
real annual growth rate of the income of the services
sector was more than double the rate of growth in the
agricultural sector during the fourteen-year period (1952-
1966). However, such service sector growth declined after
the 1967 War due to the decline in tourism, workers'
remittances and other services.
5.3.2: The Openness of the Economy
The Jordanian economy during 1952-1972 had the features of
a modestly open economy. As table (5.1) illustrates, the
degree of the economy openness [ratio of (exports +
imports) /GNP] during the period 1964-1972 was between 39
percent and 50 percent.
Jordanian imports during the period 1952-1966 had grown at
an annual rate of 10.3 percent from 17.2 Million Jordanian
Dinars (MJDs)in 1952 to 68.2 MJDs in 1966. The trend
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continued during 1967-1972 when the annual growth rate
increased to about 11 percent from 55 MJDs in 1967 to
about 95 MJDs in 1972 .
Table 5.1
The Economy Openness Ratios and the Size of
Trade Deficit in Jordan During 1964-1972.
Year Exports
UN
[ 1 ]
bports
UN
[2]
OP
UN
[3]
Openness
ratio Ufl +
PYPD
(1)
Trade deficit
([1]12])
UN
1964 8.7 53.6 160.6 38.8 -44.9
1965 9.9 56.1 180.5 36.6 -46.2
1966 10.4 68.2 185.7 42.3 -57.8
1967 11.3 55.0 142.5 46.5 -43.7
1968 14.3 57.5 166.4 43.2 -43.2
1969 14.7 67.8 197.4 41.8 -53.1
1970 12.2 65.9 187.0 41.8 -53.7
1971 11.4 76.6 199.4 44.1 -65.2
1972 17.0 95.3 221.0 50.8 -78.3
Sources:
-Exports and imports data from; Department of Statistics
(1991, table 19/1/1, p.434).
- GNP data from; Central Bank of Jordan (1989, Table no.
47, p.58).
- Economy openness ratios and trade deficit data are
calculated by the researcher.
The imported goods were mainly consumer goods (67%) while
the intermediate goods and imported raw materials share
was 23 percent and imported capital goods share was only
10 percent (Ministry of Planning, 1986, p.5).
On the export side, the value of exports increased from
1.3 MJDs in 1952 to 10.4 MJDs in 1966 mainly due to the
increase in the exports of phosphates and other industrial
products. During the years 1967-1971 exports did not
increase, but they rose significantly in 1972 to 17 MJDs
after standing at 11.3 MJDs in 1967 and 11.4 MJDs in 1971.
This significant increase was due to rises in the prices
293
of exports and phosphates in particular (Jordanian Central
Bank, 1989, table no.30).
As a result of the rises in imports and the slackening in
trade balance deficit was a feature of Jordan's economy
throughout.
The deficit rose as table (5.1) depicts, from 44.9 MJDs in
1964 to 78.3 MJDs in 1972. As a percentage of GNP, its
size increased from about 28 percent in 1964 to 35.4
percent of commodity exports.
However, the Jordanian governments have always relied on
external aid and transfers from abroad to overcome the
deficit.
5.3.3: The Importance of External Transfers 
Jordanian governments' public finance policies in general
were aimed at reducing the reliance of their budgets on
external support. Whether this was achieved or not, is the
important question.
Figure (5.4) shows that from 1954 up to 1972, the external
revenues and assistance to Jordan constituted not less
than 50 percent of total central government revenue,
except for the years 1957, 1964, 1965 and 1966.
The decline in external support in 1957, mainly from
Britain, was due to the 1956 War on the Suez Canal between
the allies (Britain, France and Israel) and Egypt which
led Britain to stop aiding Jordan. Consequently, Egypt,
Syria and Saudi Arabia signed a ten-year treaty with
Jordan to supply it with money and arms to compensate for
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Figure (5.4): The Sources of Jordanian Central Government
Revenue (1954-1972)
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the deficit caused by the withdrawal of the British
subsidy. Later, for political reasons, Egypt and Syria
discontinued such grants.
The other exceptional period was between 1964 and 1966
when British aid virtually ceased, leading to Jordan's
exit from the sterling area. As a result the Jordanian
Central Bank was established in 1964 to replace the
"Jordan Monetary Board". After the 1967 War and until
1972, central government external revenue was not less
than 55 percent of total government revenue.
The question is, what are the major sources of external
transfers to Jordan?
There are two main sources, the first is external grants
and the second is workers' remittances.
5.3.3.1: The External Grants 
As mentioned earlier, the State of Jordan since its
existence has been dependent on grants and financial
assistance from abroad. In the 1950s, the country received
its main cash grants from Britain and U.S.A (IBRD, 1957).
The assistance during 1949-1952 was called "the Marshall
Plan period". During the period 1952-1972, the amount of
grants received from abroad rose from 11.8 MJDs in 1952 to
about 44.5 MJDs in 1972. As a percentage of GNP, foreign
grants constituted on average about 20 percent of GNP.
The turning point was in 1967 when Arab countries'
assistance to Jordan increased because of the War and the
occupation of the West Bank of Jordan. Thus, the Arab
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countries after their summit in Khartoum ( the capital of
Sudan) decided to assist Jordan as a frontier state
against Israel. Annual grants totalling 40 MJDs were
pledged by the three oil-rich countries, Kuwait, Saudi
Arabia and Libya (Sayigh, 1978, p.191).
As figure (5.5) reveals, the amount of grants received
declined during 1964-1966 because of the stoppage of
British aid. But, the financial assistance rose
substantially during the remaining years of this phase of
development, although it was disrupted by the Jordanian
internal disturbances with the PLO during the second half
of 1970 . As a result, Arab countries, in particular
Kuwait and Libya, reduced their assistance to Jordan,
while the United States assistance was resumed after being
reduced due to the 1967 war.
However, table (5.2) shows the fluctuated trends of
official aid received by Jordan (grants and other
development assistance) from the different sources during
1959-1972. It is apparent that Jordan during this period
was dependent on unstable external assistance in which
political factors played the major role.
5.3.3.2: Workers' Remittances 
The second important external source of hard currencies to
Jordan is workers' remittances. During the period 1959-
1972, the number of Jordanians working abroad rose from
60,000 to 145,000. Most of them left the country because
of increased demand for their services in the newly
grAg
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Figure (5.5): Grants and Workers' Remittances Trends in
Jordan (1964-1972)
Sources:
- Central Bank of Jordan (1989, tables no. 21&38, p.26 &
p.46).
- United Nations and Department of Statistics (1977, pp.
129-131).
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Table 5.2
Official Aid* to Jordan by Source (1959-1972)
(Million Jordanian Dinars MJDs)
Item total
official aid
kb
aid
U.S.A.
aid
Other
maces
Year [1] [2] [31 [4]
1959 25.14 ... 17.32 7.82
1960 25.49 ... 18.20 7.29
1961 25.33 ... 17.05 8.28
1962 23.47 ... 15.48 7.99
1963 22.52 ... 15.51 7.01
1964 26.57 4.54 15.03 7.00
1965 26.78 7.34 11.98 7.46
1966 31.44 9.49 13.37 8.58
1967 51.58 37.57 7.62 6.39
1968 53.07 46.25 1.19 5.63
1969 45.79 41.15 1.25 3.41
1970 39.08 33.07 1.38 4.63
1971 35.94 19.11 12.82 3.56
1972 65.96 23.19 35.95 6.82
Sources:-
1- Hammad (1987, table no. 2.7, p.25).
(*) Grants and other development assistance.
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emerged Gulf states, in particular Kuwait which absorbed
50 percent of total Jordanian workers abroad in 1961
(Share, 1987, p.32).
Thus, Jordan during 1952-1972 was a labour-exporting
country. Remittances amounted to 107 percent of the value
of the country's total merchandise exports in 1964. But,
such relative importance declined during the last years of
this period. The relative importance of workers'
remittances relative to the country's export earning
declined to 45%, 44% and 43.5% for the years 1970, 1971
and 1972 respectively. The reason was not simply a
decline in the number of workers abroad. Since the
majority of them were Palestinian in origin, they had
stopped transferring money back to Jordan because of the
1970-1971 disputes between Jordan and the PLO. This
illustrates the extent to which the Jordanian economy is
dependent upon regional politics.
Both grants and workers' remittances during this period
were the main factors which contributed to the rise of
reserves and as a result enhanced Jordan's import
capacity. Figure (5.6) illustrates that their proportion
(grants + workers' remittances) to the country's total
imports was on average about 58 percent during the period
1964-1972, though their relative importance was of less
significance before 1967. Other indicators of their
importance are as a proportion of the country's total
consumption and of GDP. They constituted about 20 percent
of the country's total consumption and 22.5 percent of
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Figure (5.6): The Relative Importance of Grants and
Workers' Remittances in Jordan (1964-1972).
Sources:
All data are calculated by the researcher employing the
following:
1- Grants and workers' remittances data from; Central Bank
of Jordan (1989, tables no. 21&38, p.26 & p.46).
2- Total''consumption data from; Central bank of -Jordan
(1989, table no.59, p.59).
3- GDP data from; Central Bank of Jordan (1989, table no.
47, p.58).
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country's GDP during 1964-1972.
As a result of this dependency on external resources, the
country was more vulnerable to external shocks (i.e.: 1956
war and 1967 war) as well as internal ones because of the
complexity of the Palestinian equation and its different
effects on Jordan (i.e.: the civil strife in 1970-1971).
5.3.4: Economic Planning
This period in the history of Jordan saw the adoption of
planning policies, leading to the first Five-Year Plan for
economic development (1963-1967), later altered to the
(1964-1970) Seven-Year Plan.
During this period of economic development, the Jordanian
government adopted economic planning not as a model to be
pursued as was the case in the centrally planned
economies, but rather as a symbol of the Jordanian
government's commitment to economic and social
development. Moreover, the planning document itself was a
necessary condition for the receipt of grants and
technical assistance from abroad, in particular from
institutions such as the World Bank.
This reflects the domination of the idea of planning in
the development field during this period. So, Jordan
followed the same pattern of development as was advocated
by the prevailed theories at the time.
However, as the necessary aggregate data were not
available for planners, the planning document consisted of
project proposals with no clear strategy. Its assumption
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of continuous external budgetary support led the plan to
predict an 8 percent annual GNP rate of growth (Jordan
Development Board, 1961). As the main assumption proved to
be invalid, the plan was replaced by the 1964-1970 Seven-
Year Plan.
The goals of the latter plan were mainly a reduction in
the trade deficit and a reduction in the dependency on
foreign assistance for budget support, a 7 percent annual
increase in GDP and a reduction in the level of
unemployment (Ministry of Planning, 1986, p.2). These
goals were a reflection of the main bottlenecks in the
Jordanian economy at that time. However, as the 1967 War
disrupted the plan's implementation, and new socio-
economic conditions arose, the plan was out of touch with
the new conditions. Nevertheless, GDP at current market
prices rose during 1952-1966 from 50.5 MJDs to 170.5 MJDs
with an average annual increase of 9.1 percent as table
(5.3) shows.
During the second period 1967-1972 the GDP decline in the
first year affected the performance of the economy to the
end of the period, although it rose to 207.2 MJDs at the
end of 1972 with an annual growth rate of 7.9 percent
during the period.
Another important indicator of real GDP growth was the
relative price stability in Jordan during 1952-1966
(Ministry of Planning, 1986, p.2). During the period 1967-
1972, however, there was an abnormal increase in the
inflationary trend at the end of the period, which had a
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Table 5.3
The Changes in the Size of GDP and GNP
in Jordan Between 1952 and 1972.
(MJDs)
Year GDP GNP
1952 50.5 51.3
1954 57.0 58.1
1956 74.3 76.2
1958 85.6 87.2
1960 98.3 105.7
1962 118.9 130.8
1964 149.0 160.6
1966 170.5 185.7
1968 156.1 166.4
1970 174.4 187.0
1972 207.2 221.0
Sources:
-United Nations and Department of Statistics (1977).
-Central Bank of Jordan (1989, table no.47, p.58).
negative affect on the real GDP annual growth rate. The
consumer price index (1985=100) increased from 23.6
percent in 1967 to 33.2 percent in 1972. However, during
the period 1967-1972, planning in Jordan was carried out
on an ad hoc basis, because of the uncertainties of the
time as well as the political and military situation of
no-peace no-war (Smadi, 1982, p.29).
5.3.5: Consumption vs. Productive Capacity
Expenditure on public and private consumption in Jordan
increased during the period 1952-1966-1972 from 53.1 MJDs
to 188.8 MJDs to 245.7 MJDs respectively. Figure (5.7)
shows that private consumption in Jordan constituted more
than 75 percent of the country's total consumption during
the period 1959-1972. But, the important phenomenon in
Jordanian consumption was the fact that it was increasing
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Figure (5.7): The Sectoral Distribution of Consumption in
Jordan (1959-1972)
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Sources:
- United Nations and Department of Statistics (1977,
pp.110-111).
-Central Bank of Jordan (1989, table no.59, p.59).
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more quickly than the country's own productive capacity.
It was on average about 107 percent of GDP during the
period 1954-1972.
This can be explained by the effect of external
transactions. As figure (5.8) illustrates, Jordan
consumption during the period 1966-1972 was more than the
country's gross domestic product. Another indicator, the
relative importance of imports to the GDP, shows that
imports constituted more than 38 percent of GDP while
exports constituted about 7 percent of GDP on average.
Such measurements can mirror the extent to which the
Jordanian economy was a subsidized economy, living far
above its means. While per capita GNP was only 40 JDs in
1952, it rose to about 137 JDs in 1972. Such growth in per
capita GNP cannot be attributed to the country's
productive capacity, but to external cash transfers from
outside the economy.
5.3.6: The Social Development Indicators 
In order to complete the economic analysis of this period
a number of social development indicators need to be
considered. This will provide an appropriate basis for an
evaluation of the economy's development in a latter stage.
5.3.6.1: The Distribution of Income 
During this phase of development there was only one study
conducted in 1973 which could be regarded as an assessment
of this period of development. The study concluded that
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Figure (5.8): Total Consumption, Imports and Exports As
Percentage of GDP in Jordan (1964-1972).
Sources:.
-All data are calculated by the researcher employing the
data in table no. (5.1) and consumption data in the
Central Bank of Jordan (1989, table no.59, p.59).
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the distribution of individual income was more unequal in
the urban areas than in rural areas. About 70 percent of
the urban population received only 39 percent of the total
urban income, while in the rural areas they received about
43 percent of the total rural income (Al-Assaf, 1979).
However, alone, the top 20 percent of urban households in
Jordan received more than 50 percent of the total income.
A comparison of these results with other developing
countries at the time (Jain, 1975) revealed that in Jordan
the distribution of income between the different income
brackets was better than in India (1967-1968) and Malaysia
(1970). However, the distribution of income was worse than
in countries such as South Korea (1971), Pakistan (1970-
1971) and Sri Lanka (1969-1970).
5.3.6.2: Unemployment Rates 
As a result of the limited capacity of the economy, the
1948 War and its aftermath resulted in a rise in the
country's rate of unemployment, particularly, where the
vast majority of refugees were mostly small farmers who
had lost their lands. Another shock to the trends of
unemployment during this phase of development was the 1967
War. It caused unemployment rates to reach 9.9%, 11.8%,
13.7% and 14% for the years 1968 to 1972 respectively
(Ministry of Labour, 1988).
Thus, at the end of this development phase, the
unemployment rate was the highest in the country during
the 20 years period (1952-1972).
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5.3.6.3: Other Social Development Indicators 
Health, educational as well as poverty indicators are
essential for providing a complementary view to the
progress in the quality of life of the Jordanian people.
However, national statistics might not provide a true
picture to the uneven distribution of public services and
human development in general, particularly between the
rural and urban regions.
On the health dimension, the infant mortality rate (per
1000 live birth) dropped sharply during the period 1961-
1972 from 151 to about 82 respectively. This could be
attributed to the rising standards in the health care due
to government spending.
The total fertility rate measurement indicates that in
1965, the rate was about 8 births per women decreased to
about 7.8 in 1972. However, this rate varies significantly
between the rural and urban areas due to the traditional
Islamic values effect which increase in the rural areas.
Life expectancy indicator refer to an estimated age of
45.8 for males and 46.5 years for females in 1961 have
increased to about 57 on average by 1972. This increase
could be attributed to the government successful efforts
in controlling infectious diseases which played a major
factor in shortening the average life expectancy rate
before the 1960s.
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The physician/population ratio increased from 1.8
physician per 10000 population to about 5 between 1961 and
1972. This increase could be attributed to the increasing
number of doctors who were graduating from the educational
system.
On the educational dimension, Jordan by 1964 had
introduced the "Law of Education" no.1 for compulsory
education. This law implies nine years of compulsory
education for elementary and preparatory cycles in all the
regions of the country. As a result the primary school 
enrolment rate increased to about 87 percent by the end of
1972. Meanwhile, the rate of enrolment in the Secondary
schools has reached 38 percent by 1972.
Also, by 1972 the illiteracy rate as a percentage of the
population aged (15+) was 67.6 percent.
On the poverty problem, there are no statistics that refer
to the case of poverty during the period (1952-1972).
However, the only reference to the case of poverty found
in the IBRD report on the economic development of Jordan
in 1957 stated;
...without aid from overseas, there can be no
doubt that after 1948 the standard of living of
one-third to one-half of the population of
Jordan would have fallen below the subsistence
level"(IBRD, 1957, p.50).
However, the indicators of high inflation rates and
unemployment combined with unequal distribution of income
can provide a good indicators for the case of poverty in
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the country.
To sum up, it could be said that during this period (1952-
1972), Jordan followed the same pattern of development
adopted by other developing countries at the time, except
that of high level of state intervention in the production
process. That is to say, planning was adopted although it
was indicative. The establishment of central, commercial
and sectoral development banks (agricultural bank and
industrial bank) was seen to be one of the criteria to
measure government commitment. The most important trend
was the decline in agriculture's share in GDP and
employment. This was consistent with the belief of
development economists during this period that (IS) and
(RS) industrialization as well as more physical capital
accumulation are the main driving forces toward
development.
As a result, government policies favoured the industrial
sector as well as urban consumers in general against small
farmers in the agricultural sector (i.e.; cheap price
policy of field crops and subsistence crops in general).
Also, the chosen institutional solution to the
distribution of land has led to unequal distribution of
land and wealth.
What could distinguish the Jordanian case from other
developing countries during this period was the political
tension and wars which left the country deprived of major
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resources on the one hand, and subject to massive changes
in the social fabric on the other.
In addition, government investments in infrastructure,
health and education was a necessary step toward
development. But it was completely dependent on assistance
from abroad. Thus, the question is whether the development
pattern of high dependency on external resources changed
during the next period (1973-1992) or not?
5.4: The Second Phase of Development (1973-19921
5.4.1: The Characteristics of the Economic Sectors 
As already mentioned, the Jordanian economy during the
first phase of its development (1952-72) experienced a
shift in its structural formulation towards a greater
contribution from the services sector. This pattern of
structural change continued throughout this phase of
development. The question, however, is why such a
transformation took place in an economy which had been
dominated by an agricultural base only three decades
earlier?
5.4.1.1: The Agricultural Sector 
In contrast to the contribution of industry and services
in the economy, the agricultural sector experienced a
continuous decline in its relative importance. While its
share had been about 9.3 percent and about 13 percent in
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1973 and 1974 respectively, the relative importance of the
agricultural sector dropped to around 7.5 percent in 1991
as figure (5.9) shows.
This decline, however, was accompanied by a sub-sectoral
change in the production of the main crop groups as figure
(5.10) asserts. While vegetables and field crops had been
the main products of this sector during 1952-1972, this
period experienced a major shift towards vegetables and
fruit production. This caused the Kingdom to be highly
dependent on food imports to meet the consumption demands
of its population. In other words, the economy lost its
"food security".
This shift from subsistence crops to cash crops
manifested itself in a sharp decline in per capita field
crops production during the period (1964-1991) as figure
(5.11) illustrates. This can be postulated as the major
reason behind the dependency conclusion which
characterised the country's agriculture.
In 1956, the planted areas for wheat, barley, and chick-
peas were (in thousand dunums) 2720, 1033 and 80
respectively (IBRD,1957). By 1991, however, they had
declined to only 564.7, 655.2 and 14.8 thousand dunums
(Department of Statistics, 1992), representing reductions
of 80 percent, 37 percent and 82 percent respectively.
Such a sub-sectoral deviation cannot be justified purely
by market demand but should be seen on the one hand within
the context of the domination of commercial farming and on
the other within the increasing degree of monetization of
----
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Figure (5.9): The Sectoral Contribution to GDP in Jordan
(1973-1991)
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Data are calculated by the researcher employing the data
in the following sources;
-Central Bank of Jordan (1989, table no. 47, p.58)
-Department of Statistics (1992)
-Central Bank of Jordan (1992, table no. 46, p.80)
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Figure (5.10): The Changes in the Production of Main
Agricultural Crops Groups in Jordan (1973-1991)
Years
Fruits (Olives,Grapes, Citrus Fruits, Bananas and Figs)
Field crops (Wheat, Barley, Tobacco, Lentils and Vetch)
Vegetables (Tomatos, Eggplant, Cucumbers and Melons)
Sources:
Data are calculated by the researcher by employing the
data in the following sources;
-Central Bank of Jordan (1989, table no.45, p.56)
-Department of Statistics (1992, table no 5/1/3, p.99)
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Figure (5.11): The Changes in Per Capita Field Crops
Production in Jordan (1964-1991)
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the economy .
Nevertheless, it has to be asked why the decline in the
overall agricultural contribution to the GDP was so rapid.
Although it might be argued that such a decline reflects
the structural change in the Jordanian economy, the size
of the decline in the Jordanian agricultural sector is
more than the average for developing countries. For
example Kirkpatrick et al. (1984, p.13) showed that the
agricultural contribution to GDP in the lower-middle
income countries declined between 1960 and 1981 (by 38
percent) from an agricultural share of 36 to 22 percent.
In the case of Jordan, however, the decline for the same
period was by 50 percent, from about 16 to 8 percent.
Thus, other factors might lie behind the rapid decline in
Jordan.
The first reason could be explained by employing the
institutional approach of Olson (1982). With the exception
of a few capitalist farmers it has been merchants and
middlemen who have generally dominated this sector. They
supplied seasonal credit at high interest rates in order
to reinforce the farmers state of indebtedness. In order
to secure the repayment of their debt, merchants and
middlemen operated as monopsonists in the field of
marketing (Robins, 1986, p.84). That left the farmers in
a weak position when negotiating the prices of their
crops.
Thus, the collective action of merchants and middlemen
against the unorganized and absent group of peasants led
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to a devaluation of farming as a way of life in Jordan. As
a result, between 1973 and 1990 the share of the labour
force in the agricultural sector declined from 16 to 8
percent (Ministry of Labour, 1991). In comparison with
lower middle-income economies distribution of labour force
in the agricultural sector (55 percent in 1981), Jordan
share seems to be very low (Kirkpatrick, et al., 1984,
p.13).
One of the main indicators for measuring the power of
distributional interest groups in the economy is the
sectoral distribution of commercial bank credits, all of
which were in private ownership, between the three main
economic sectors (agriculture, industry and services).
Figure (5.12) shows that the agricultural sector share of
total credits was on average only about 3 percent during
the period 1973-1991 3
 and never exceeded 5 percent.
It might be argued that there are other specialist
financial institutions, such as the Agricultural Credit
Corporation (ACC), which could lend to this sector. In
practical terms, however, the ACC neither advances credit
to cover the total cost of an agricultural project nor
does it usually concern itself with the demands of small
farmers. Its credits, as well as those from other
commercial banks, are almost always channelled to
capitalist farmers who can provide the required
collateral.
3Calculated by employing the data available in Central
Bank of Jordan (1989,1992).
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Figure (5.12): The Sectoral Distribution of Private Sector
Credits in Jordan (1973-1991).
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Years
Sources:
All data are calculated by the researcher employing the
data in the following resources;
-Central Bank of Jordan (1989, table no.12, p.17).
-Department of Statistics (1992, table 17/10, p.406).
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The effect of merchants and capitalist farmers as special
interest groups has been contributing to the decline of
agricultural production on the one hand and to crowd-out
small farmers on the other.
Another interpretation of the sub-sectoral shift in
production could stem from Ahmed and Ruttan's (1988)
concept of "institutional biases"
They argue that there are institutional biases which lead
to the decline of agricultural production in LDCs.
In the case of Jordan, research and extension programmes
(i.e.,Jordan Valley) are biased in favour of traded (in
particular, export crops such as vegetables and fruits) as
opposed to subsistence crops. The latter which are
produced by the resource-poor peasantry are neglected
because the growers are unable to voice their demands for
appropriate infrastructure (i.e., irrigation schemes) and
appropriate technology (i.e.,seeds and water pumps for
underground irrigation).
As only 7.6 percent of the cultivatable land areas, which
total about 528,300 ha, is irrigated land located in the
Jordan Valley, farmers and particularly the poor are
heavily dependent on rain which fluctuates in volume from
one year to the next.
Another institutional bias is that the priorities in
national planning programmes are influenced by the
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strengths of different interest groups; on a macro-level
urban bias can be cited as clear evidence of this. Ahmed
and Ruttan (ibid, p.12) claim that there is a negative
correlation between urbanization and the level of
agricultural research and extension expenditure. In the
case of Jordan, urban bias has lead to a sizeable demand
for wheat aid from the United States instead of a search
for other policies which could increase wheat production
in Jordan. Consequently, prices of wheat have declined and
become unprofitable crops for small farmers to produce.
One of the main attributes in Jordan is government
interventionist policies which have been characterised by
poor management and poor coordination among its different
agencies.
Another factor is the uncontrolled urban expansion at the
expense of agricultural land caused by extensive migration
from rural areas to the cities. This resulted from the
uneven distribution of services and the large numbers of
educated people seeking employment opportunities in the
cities (Abu-Zant, 1988).
On the demand side, the reason for decline in the
agricultural contribution is the loss of some traditional
markets due on the one hand to the reduction in quality
and high production costs and on the other the new
agricultural policies in neighbouring countries which
constitute the traditional regional markets for Jordan.
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However, regional political spillover also has a major
role to play in the demand for Jordanian agricultural
production. For example, during the Gulf War of 1990/1991,
the markets of the Gulf States were closed to the
Jordanian crops. This led to heavy losses for Jordanian
farmers. The exports of the agricultural products
constituted 11 percent of all exports of goods in Jordan
during 1990 and 1991 while the percentage of imported
agricultural products to that of exports was more than 400
percent and more than 100 percent of the value added of
this sector in 1990 and 1991 (Ministry of Planning, 1994,
p.45).
In order to assess the contribution differences of the
agricultural sector to the GDP growth in Jordan with those
of East Asian countries, a comparison with South Korea
reveals the following;
While both countries have experienced a decline in the
agricultural sector contribution (table 5.4 and 5.5), the
difference between the two is that South Korea witnessed
an industrial revolution and a structural change in the
economy through the adoption of dynamic export policies
based on an effective land reform programme in 1948-1950
(Wade, 1990) (Koo and Kim, 1992). Land was redistributed
to establish a basis for individual peasant agriculture,
which was not the case with the land settlement program in
Jordan during 1957. This left lands to speculators in the
market rather than to farmers. Thus, although the
322
Table 5.4
The Relative Structural Importance and Contribution
of the Economic Sectors to the GDP in Jordan
(1973-1990).
Detail
----
Years
Agriculture
(%)
[ 1 ]
Contribution
to growth
RN
[2]
Industry
(%)
[3]
Contribution
to
growth
PM
[4]
Services
(%)
[5]
Contribution
0
growth
RN
[5]
1973 9.3 -3.1 20.8 6.7 69.9 32.3
1975 8.6 -1.2 25.8 16.2 65.6 20.3
1980 7.8 4.6 31.5 12.3 60.7 17.1
1985 5.1 0.7 25.8 -3.2 69.1 5.5
1986 5.7 0.2 24.0 1.3 70.3 10.8
1987 6.9 1.6 24.0 0.3 69.1 1.9
1988 6.5 1.6 23.6 -1.7 69.9 0.1
1989 6.9 -1.3 28.1 2.9 65.0 -9.3
1990 7.5 1.2 25.9 -0.4 66.6 0.4
Sources:
1. Data for 1973-1980 ; World Bank (1987).
2. Data for 1985-1989 ; World Bank (1992).
-(PP) Percentage Points are calculated by the World Bank
(1985-1990) and by the researcher (1973, 1975 & 1980).
Note: 
The industrial sectors implies; mining and quarrying,
manufacturing, electricity&water supply, and construction.
The services,etc sectors implies; trade,restaurants &
hotels, transport & communications, finance & other
services, and government services.
323
Table 5.5
The Relative Structural Importance and Contribution
of the Economic Sectors to the GDP in South Korea
(1966-1990)
Detail
Year
Agriculture
(%)
[11
Contribution
to growth
PM
[21
Industry
(%)
[3]
Contribution
to growth
PM
[4]
Services
(t)
[51
Contribution
to	 growth
PM
[51
1966 34.9 n.a. 25.6 n.a. 39.5 n.a.
1970 26.0 n.a. 29.2 n.a. 44.8 n.a.
1980 14.6 n.a. 41.3 n.a. 44.1 n.a.
1985 13.4 0.5 41.0 2.8 45.6 3.6
1986 12.3 0.6 42.4 6.5 45.3 5.2
1988 10.3 0.9 43.6 5.1 46.1 5.2
1989 9.5* -0.2 43•7* 2.9 46.8* 3.7
1990 n.a. -0.1 n.a. 5.2 n.a. 4.2
Sources:-
1.Data for 1966-1985 ; World Bank (1987).
2.Data for 1986-1990 ; World Bank (1991).
Note* The sectoral contribution to GDP growth combines
information about growth rates and percentage shares of
GDP components. It is measured by "percentage point of
GDP" (PP). This form shows, by how much GDP would have
changed if other GDP components were unchanged.
(*) estimated.
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structural change in the agricultural sector of South
Korea seems to be similar to Jordan, but the shift in
Jordan led the economy to be more services rather than
industrial oriented. This can be shown by the wide
differences between the two in the industrial sector
contribution to growth. In South Korea was on average
about 4.4 percentage point during 1988-1990 while in
Jordan was -0.7 percentage point for the same period.
5.4.1.2: The Industrial Sector
In the industrial sector (mining and quarrying;
manufacturing; construction; electricity, gas and water)
there was an increasing share of contribution to the GDP,
from 20.8 percent in 1973 to 25.9 percent in 1991 (figure
5.9 and table 5.4).
This trend was an analogue of Jordanian government
industrialization policies started in the early 1970s,
particularly during the period 1976-1980. During this
period a sizeable amount of foreign transfers was received
from the Arab countries and Gulf oil states in particular,
after the 1970s' boom in the price of oil.
Government industrialization policies were a continuation
of those followed in the first phase. The emphasis was
mainly on RBI. The intention was to promote the export of
mineral resources (phosphate and potash). In other words,
industrialization policies were a mixture of RBI and
export-promotion. However, the investment in projects such
as cement works, an oil refinery, chemicals, batteries and
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glass factories were a demonstration of ISI.
In the manufacturing sub-sector, small scale factories
have dominated industry with its mixed goals of import-
substitution and export-promotion. Particularly after 1980
this latter was motivated by a sudden increase in the
demand for Jordanian products from Iraq following the
start of the Iranian -Iraqi War in 1980. On average this
sub-sector contribution to the total industrial output was
about 43 percent during the period 1986-1992 (Ministry of
Planning, 1994, table no.4, p.8). Despite that, the
relative importance of manufacturing imported products to
that of exports was more than 400 percent during 1987-1991
(ibid, p.46).
The question is: what are the main protiems of the
industrial sector in general and that of the manufacturing
sub-sector in particular?
The first problem is the narrowness of the domestic
market. Jordan is a small country with a limited market,
thus the policy of import-substitution industrialization
pursued throughout the 1970s was not an appropriate
alternative to industrialization and growth. Such an
assessment is supported by Chenery, Robinson and Syrquin
(1986). Nevertheless, when started in the 1950s and 1960s,
ISI was a necessity rather than an option. Since 1970,
however, ISI has become an option chosen by the decision
makers in order to build a modern industrial base for the
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economy. This consequently initiated what Page (1990)
called an extensive growth in the industrial sector. This
extensive growth was based on factor accumulation rather
than on productivity. What is needed is more intensive
growth which relies on a balance between factor
accumulation and factor productivity.
The second problem is related to the size of the firms. In
countries such as Jordan where small firms or the informal
sector denote the bulk of the industrial sector (80.2
percent of the total number of industrial firms employed
fewer than five employees) (Department of Statistics,
Industrial Census, 1984), industrial policies have to
differ from those adopted in developed countries.
Although Jordan has always been a country with a liberal
economic policy, free-market policies are not equal in
their effects on different countries.
How could the effect have been equal when total Jordanian
industrial output, for example in 1986, amounted to only
one percent of that of G-M in the United States (i.e.,
$1.21 bn in Jordan while $102.8 bn for G-M) and only 2
percent of IBM output.
According to the Jordanian Industrial Census of 1984, the
number of industrial establishments employing more than
five employees was 1686. These employed a total of 41.8
thousand workers (25 workers per establishment). Their
capital/value added ratio was 4.1 which is high and
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reflects the capital intensity characteristic of these new
enterprises. This is because such enterprises were mainly
in mining and quarrying, petroleum refining, non-metallic
mineral products and chemical products which required more
capital intensity than the one dominated the informal
sector.
On the other hand, the number of establishments with fewer
than 5 workers was 6847 with an average of 2 workers each.
Their capital/value added ratio is only 0.5 which reflects
their simple technological base as well as their
contestability as they do not require huge sunk costs
(costs of entry and exit).
Thus, the differences in internalizing many of the
mechanisms and externalities, such as the flow of
information and the coordination of investment decisions
as Stiglitz (1989) contended should be recognized when
free market advocates defend the success of the market
ideology in the West.
Such an explanation is supported by Krugman (1993) when he
argues that
"the counterrevolution went too far, by
neglecting the central idea of the high-
development theory which are external economies
and strategic complementarity" (Krugman, 1993,
p.16).
Western corporations such as G-M, IBM or those in East
Asia such as Nissan, Hyundai surpass the largest
enterprises in the Jordanian economy. Firms such as Jordan
Phosphate Mines (4197 workers), Jordan Petroleum Refinery
328
(2787 workers) and the Arab Potash Co. (1320 workers),
cannot be compared with enterprises employing hundreds of
thousands of workers as is the case in the developed World
and the NICs.
Market structure and competitiveness are a constraint on
the Jordanian industrial sector.
For example Lee (1992) argues that one of the factors
which contributed to the development and success of South
Korea was the government-business relationship. This
constituted an internal organization or quasi-internal
organization which internalized many of the externalities
found in the market place. However, such relationship is
not the case in Jordan. Rather, because informal
industries are constituting the bulk of the manufacturing
sector, they tend to operate on the fringe of the law and
have no channels to voice their demands' for the
government.
Another important problem is the lack of linkages or
complementarities within the economy.
Hirschman claims that forward and backward linkages are a
necessity in order for an economy to perform effectively.
ISI has had a negative effect on the interconnection
between the different sectors comprising the Jordanian
economy, particularly within the industrial sector.
Most of the firms have relied on imported raw materials as
inputs for their products. Thus, the complementarities
between the industrial sector in general (especially the
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manufacturing sub-sector) and the agricultural sector have
been weak. For example the private industrial sector
(constituting more than 85 percent of the sector) is
mainly concentrated in textiles, clothing, pharmaceutical
products, food stuffs, soaps and detergents, almost all of
which are dependent on imported inputs.
Thus, although the share of the industrial sector
increased between 1970 and 1991, its contribution to the
growth of the Jordanian GDP in comparison with that of
South Korea was limited, particularly after 1985.
The question is, therefore, why was industrialization a
story of success in South Korea or in East Asian countries
in general and a failure in Jordan?
Sachs explained the causes of success and failure of
industrialization, growth and development when he compared
the successful economic experience of South East Asian
countries (i.e.dynamic export-oriented industrialization)
with its opposite side of Latin America (i.e. ISI). He
found that the crucial variable which explained the
differences between tre two regions lies in the
differences between the breadth of ownership and land
distribution in the two regions [Sachs (1989) as cited in
JR.James (1992,P.247)].
For example in South Korea and Taiwan, there was a broad
land distribution which created a large interest group of
rural exporters who opposed an overvalued exchange rate.
In contrast with the uneven distribution of rural land in
Latin America, devaluation was resisted by the majority of
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the population because it would have worsened the
distribution of income by channelling it from the mass
population towards a small class of landlords and
exporters. Thus, South Korea and Taiwan followed the path
of export-oriented policies without resistance, while
Latin American states implemented an ISI due to the
resistance of the majority of the population. The result
was failure in the latter and success in the countries of
East Asia.
Within the Jordanian context this could provide a valid
explanation for the story of failure. As mentioned earlier
in the chapter, the land settlement programme in Jordan
introduced in 1957 was not a land reform programme with
economic objectives as was the case in East Asia but a
registration of the existing traditional rights. As a
result the distribution of land in Jordan worsened, and
with it income and wealth because land in the rural areas
was left to the speculators in the urban areas to trade
in.
Another contributor to the industrial sector expansion in
Jordan is the augmentation of the construction sub-sector.
On average it contributed about 40 percent to the total
output of the industrial sector during 1973-1985. (Central
Bank of Jordan, 1989, table no.27, p.58) Government
investments in infrastructural activities contributed
significantly to the flourishing of this sub-sector.
However, both government investments in infrastructure and
331
private construction activities, mainly housing, were
linked to external sources of finance (grants and workers'
remittances), which led to a reduction in the contribution
of this sector (total industrial sector) to GDP growth
after 1985. On average during 1986-1992 the contribution
of this sub-sector to the total industrial output declined
to only 30 percent (Ministry of Planning, 1994, table no.
4, p.8). As we shall see in the subsequent sections of
this chapter this was due to the decline in the volume of
external finance.
5.4.1.3: The Services Sector
On average, more than 60 percent of the country's GDP was
generated from this sector during the period 1973-1991 as
shown by figure (5.9).
Such a relatively large share for this sector, which is
comprised of government services, the wholesale and retail
trade, transportation and business services, has often
been a feature of the changing economic structure in
developing countries. In the case of Jordan, the private
services sector illustrates the traditional strength of
the merchant business culture.
According to Mancur Olson (1965, 1982), growth is
hindered in countries monopolized by special interest
groups. In countries where such groups have been nullified
in the course of war or revolution, prosperity and growth
tend to be quite rapid once a free and stable legal
framework is established. Olson's examples were Germany
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and Japan after 1945. In the case of Jordan, the
traditional special interest group is that of the
merchants (importers and traders in general as well as
bankers). This interest group has often influenced
government policies and decision making through
maintaining overvalued exchange rates, affecting the
allocation of credit, as figure (5.12) shows, as well as
other tariff rates and protectionist policies. Thus, and
as table (5.4) stresses, the contribution of the services
sector to GDP growth was significant in comparison with
the other two sectors. But, this factor does not explain
all the reasons behind the increasing domination of this
sector.
During this period there were other factors which affected
the expansion of this sector in addition to the powerful
private business class. The first was the Lebanese civil
war which started in 1976. Before this time it had been
believed that Amman would be an appropriate alternative to
Beirut as the main business centre in the Middle Eastern
region. For this reason the government established a
financial market [Amman Financial Market (A.F.M)] and
started to encourage Jordanian as well as Arab companies
to participate in its activities although Amman was not
expected to become an international financial centre like
the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.). Many foreign banks
found Amman a useful location for the remaining businesses
in Lebanon as well as for trade finance for Iraq, which
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does not permit foreign banks to operate within its
borders. The number of commercial banks and branches rose,
during this period (1976-1991), from 88 to 330 (Central
Bank of Jordan, 1992, pp. 4-5). This is a reflection of an
increasing trend towards monetization of the economy and
a resulting increase in the contribution of the services
sector to the country's GDP.
The second reason was the Iran-Iraq War which started in
the last quarter of 1980. Jordan through its port of Aqaba
was the main gateway for Iraqi imports (transit trade), a
factor which encouraged Jordan to mobilize sufficient
resources to establish new service institutions and
transportation services to fulfil the new demands. The
government undertook major investment in telecommunication
and transportation projects in order to induce more
foreign companies to locate in Jordan.
Both of these factors as well as the decline in the share
of the agricultural sector have contributed to the
characterization of the Jordanian economy as a services
oriented economy.
Furthermore, the relatively stable regional politics and
relations between Jordan and the other states in the
region during 1973-1988 resulted in increasing regional
tourism. The latter became an additional source of revenue
for this sector and investment in tourism became
profitable for the private as well as the state sector.
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After 1988, however, two non-economic factors have led to
a decline in tourist revenue. The first was the decision
by Jordan to cut links with the West Bank and the second
and [the] most important was the Gulf war (1990/1991).
While income from tourism increased from 186 MJDs in 1986
to 339 MJDs in 1990, it declined to 216 MJDs in 1991
(Ministry of Planning, 1994, p.48).
In general, however, services continued to dominate the
orientation of economic activities in the Kingdom with the
sector absorbing on average 68 percent of the total work
force.
5.4.2: The Demographic Constraint 
The population of Jordan is characterised by a high annual
growth rate. During the years 1973-1989 the population
increased by 4 percent annually as figure (5.13) shows.
About 3.5 percent was due to natural increase while 0.5
percent was the result of net migration in particular by
foreign workers.
However, the participation rate did not change during this
period in comparison with 1952-1972; on average it was
about 20 percent. It did not decline until 1990-1991 with
the sudden increase in population caused by the flow of
some 300 thousand returnees from Kuwait and other Gulf
states after the Gulf crisis.
In comparison with the East Asian countries Jordan's
participation rate seems to be too low. For example, in
South Korea and Hong Kong the rates were 43.4 percent and
P+S levels •tudenti
Size of work force
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Figure (5.13): The Size of Population, Schooling and
Employment in Jordan (1973-1991).
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1974 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Years
Sources:
-
Population data from Department of Statistics (1992,
table no. 2/1, p.19)
-
Workforce data from Ministry of Labour (several issues)
-Number of students data from Ministry of Education
(several issues) and Department of Statistics (1992, table
no. 3/1/10, p.244) and ibid (table no. 10/2/16, p.260).
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49.5 percent respectively in 1990; in Malaysia, the
participation rate was 43.8 percent in 1987; and in
Singapore, about 48.6 percent of the population
participated in the economic activity in 1989 (ILO, 1991).
Thus, Jordan's low participation rate implies a high
number of dependants per labourer. Such low participation
rate is the result of four major factors; The first and
the most important is that more than half of the Jordanian
population is under the age of fifteen, while in South
Korea the figure is only 28.3 percent, in Hong Kong 21.5
percent and in Singapore 23 percent (ILO, 1991). Secondly
the Jordanian female participation rate is rather low
(although increasing) being only 10.1 percent in 1989
(Ministry of Labour, 1990). The assessment that this rate
is further justified when compared with that of South
Korea (33.9 percent) in 1989 and Singapore (12.4 percent)
in 1988 (World Bank, 1991).
Another reason for the low participation rate in the
labour force is that large number of workers migrate to
the Gulf states, and their numbers were si rinificant till
the mid-1980s when Jordan experienced a shortage in its
domestic labour force and simultaneously became an •
exporter and importer of labour.
The last factor is, the high rate of participation in
schooling. Jordanians normally enter the workforce on
completion of compulsory education about the age of
fifteen. However ,there is still a high number who attend
high school and post-high schools. In 1990, approximately
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one-half of the population attended such schools (Dwairi,
1991, p.220). Meanwhile,the rate in the primary and
secondary school was about 35 percent in 1991 as figure
(5.13) illustrates.
In comparison, the rate of primary and high school
attendance in South Korea was 20.8 percent in 1988 and
that of Singapore was 17.4 percent for the same year
(Unesco, 1990).
Moreover,the structure of the workforce in Jordan
experienced a shift from the agricultural sector towards
the industrial and services sector. While in 1973 the
agricultural workforce constituted 16.3 percent, it
declined to only 7.8 percent in 1990. Within the same
period there was an increase in the industrial sector from
19.5 to 23.4 percent and in the services sector from 65.1
to 68.8 percent (Ibrahim, et al., 1990, p.60) (Ministry of
Labour, 1991).
The change in the structure of the workforce mirrored the
parallel change which had occurred in the sectoral
contribution to the GDP.
5.4.3: High Degree of Economic Openness
The period 1973-1991 experienced a higher degree of
economic openness than the period 1952-1972. The ratio of
economic openness was 52.7 percent in 1973 rose to about
96 percent in 1991 as table (5.6) shows. This high ratio
reflects a high dependency on imports rather than
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successful achievements on the side of exports.
As the volume of external transfers (grants and workers'
remittances) increased, the country's propensity for
imports increased as well. The increase in imports was
important as a way of meeting the growing demand for
capital and intermediate goods and raw materials,
particularly during the 1970s and early 1980s.
Table 5.6
Economic Openness Ratios and the Size of
Trade Deficit in Jordan (1973-1991)
Years Imports
MJDs
Exports
MJDs
GNP
MJDs
Openness
ratios
(%)
Trade
deficit
MJDs
GDP
MJDs
Outward
orientation
(I)
[1] [2] [3] [4) [5] [6) [7]
1973 108.2 19.0 241.5 52.7 -89.2 218.3 8.7
1975 234.0 48.9 376.0 75.2 -185.1 312.1 15.6
1977 454.5 82.1 660.1 81.3 -372.4 514.2 15.9
1979 585.6 120.9 972.9 72.6 -464.7 976.6 12.4
1981 1047.5 242.6 1484.2 86.9 -804.9 1426.7 17.0
1983 1103. 210.6 1815.0 72.4 -892.7 1765.8 11.9
1985 31074.4 310.9 1935.8 71.6 -763.5 1940.6 16.0
1987 915.5 315.7 2086.1 59.1 -599.8 2136.2 14.8
1989 1230.1 633.0 2280.2 81.7 -597.1 2043.2 31.0
1991 1710.5 770.4 2586.3 95.9 -940.1 2805.5 27.5
Sou
-Imports and exports data from Department of Statistics
(1992, table no. 19/1/1, p.434).
-GNP and GDP data from Central Bank of Jordan (1989, table
no. 47, p.58) and Central Bank of Jordan (1992, table
no.46, p.80).
-Openness ratios [(Imports+Exports)/GNP], trade deficit,
and outward orientation ratios (Exports/GDP) are
calculated by the researcher.
This was accompanied by a demand for imported food stuffs
and consumer goods as per capita income increased.
Jordanian imports during the period 1973-1980 grew at an
annual rate of 26.6 percent, from 108.2 MJDs in 1973 to
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716 MJDs in 1980, and in 1981 alone the rate increased by
as much as 46 percent. There were two main reasons. The
first was the mounting cost of imported oil because of its
price rise. The second reason was the increasing demand
for Jordanian manufactured products from Iraq after the
start of the war with Iran in 1980. As the manufacturing
base in Jordan is linked (inputs requirement) with the
outside world ( weak linkages effect), an increase in the
imports requirement was to be expected. Both factors were
supported by an overvalued exchange rate which encouraged
the increasing trend towards imports'.
Nevertheless, this upwards trend continued during 1982-
1989, but much more slowly (only 4.1 percent annually).
This was mainly due to the decline in oil prices, the
sharp drop in Iraqi imports from Jordan after 1982, the
overall recession since 1983 and the devaluations of the
Jordanian dinar in October 1988 and August 1989. However,
the Gulf crisis in 1990/1991 played a major role in
increasing the imports burden on Jordan. The volume of
imports increased by 40.3 percent in 1990 (IMF, 1993) when
Saudi Arabia decided to cut its oil exports to Jordan
through the Tapline (Independent, 1990,P.10), and Iraq was
lost as a major supplier of oil to the Kingdom. Both these
factors meant that Jordan had to pay more for its imported
oil from countries such as Syria and Yemen.
This shows that economic and non-economic factors were
'Until 1988, the exchange rate of Jordanian dinar was
1JD = $3.0.
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behind the Kingdom's fluctuating bill of imports. This
high dependency on regional factors has increased the
pressure on the Jordanian government to formulate crisis
driven policies rather than a clear strategy for
controlling imports.
Exports on the other hand increased from 19 MJDs in 1973
to 49.8 MJDs in 1974. This increase was mainly attributed
to a rise in the unit price of exports and a relative
increase in unit volume, mainly in food and live animals,
raw materials (phosphates and potash), and manufactured
goods (Central Bank of Jordan, 1989, table 30).
During 1974-1979 Jordanian exports grew at an annual rate
of 19.4 percent, from 49.8 MJDs in 1974 to 120.9 MJDs in
1979. This significant increase was due to rises in the
production and export of phosphates and potash as well as
increases in demand for Jordanian products from the
regional markets.
The regional effect played a significant role during 1980-
1982. Iraq started to supply its domestic market with
Jordanian products as its requirements increased after the
Iran-Iraq war in September 1980.
In addition, rises in the prices of phosphates
contributed significantly to total export earnings.
During the three years (1980-1982), Jordanian exports had
more than doubled, from 120.9 MJDs in 1979 to 264 MJDs in
1982 but, as Iraq decided to reduce its imports in 1983
and the prices of phosphates dropped on the World markets
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(by 17 percent of the price index of 1980) (IMF,1992), the
total value of Jordanian exports declined by 25 percent in
1984.
As the production capacity of phosphate and potash
increased during 1984-1991, Jordanian exports started to
increase from 290.7 MJDs in 1984 to 770.7 MJDs in 1991.
This remarkable increase was mainly due to two factors.
The first reason was the increases in the price of
phosphate by 200 percent in 1990 and 1991, in comparison
with 1985 (IMF,1993). The second reason was the
devaluations of the dinar in 1988 and 1989 which increased
total domestic currency earnings. However, the efforts of
Jordanian governments to promote exports must not be
underestimated. Since 1985, export promotion policies in
the field of mineral production have born fruit. The
export/GDP ratio or the degree of outward orientation
increased from 15 percent during the second half of the
1970s to about 27 percent in 1991.
However, the dependency on regional markets is the main
weakness for Jordanian exports. The impact of the Gulf
crisis has reduced the country's manufactured exports. The
international embargo on Iraq as well as unstable
political relations with the Gulf states have deprived
Jordan of its traditional markets in those countries.
This can explain why export-promotion policies in Jordan
are dependent not on domestic policies per se, but also on
regional politics and the prices of its most valuable
minerals on the world markets.
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This unbalanced exports-imports trends increased the
economy's trade deficit tenfold during the period 1973-
1991. It rose from little -89.2 MJDs in 1973 to -940.1
MJDs in 1991. In 1992, however, the trade deficit figure
exceeds the one billion JDs mark as it stood at 1158 MJDs
(Ministry of Planning, 1994, p.24).
5.4.4: Semi-Rentier Economy
The Jordanian economy had always had the features of a
semi-rentier economy. During this second phase of its
current history, there was more than one factor to
justified its assessment as a semi-rentier economy.
However, before presenting the different factors, it is
wise to clarify the concept and meaning of a rentier
economy in this instance.
There are three main characteristics of a rentier
economy5 ; firstly, foreign revenue play a dominant role,
particularly in the composition of government revenue;
secondly, the size and the flow of such foreign revenue
are not related to the productive capacity of the economy;
thirdly, the foreign revenue depends on decisions and
factors over which the recipient has either little or no
control.
Such characteristics of rentier states are apparent in the
majority of OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries) countries, particularly those in the Middle
East, often dependent on crude oil exports as the main
or an over review of the concept see Beblawi (1990).
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source of foreign revenue. During the oil boom of the
1970s and early 1980s, crude oil exports constituted more
than 90 percent of total export earnings in the oil rich
Gulf states.
Consequently, government budgets in those countries relied
on financial resources generated from oil exports. These
resources are not in the main derived from components of
the oil industry, but rather from external economic rents 
which derive from the wide gap between the low cost of
producing crude oil and its relatively high price on the
world's markets.
The size and flow of these rents are almost wholly
dependent on the international market price of oil, that
individual oil producer countries can not control and
collectively (through OPEC) have practically wwak
contro16.
The question is, what is the relationship between the oil
rentier economies, particularly in the Arab Gulf states
and the Jordanian economy?
There are two important connections between Jordan and
those economies, firstly grants and secondly remittances
transferred by Jordanians working in the Gulf states.
5.4.4.1: Arab Grants
Although Jordan is not an oil-producing country, its
6 For full discussion to the role of OPEC in
determining oil prices, see Spero (1993, pp.261-301).
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economic take off was linked to the oil economies of the
region. When oil revenues rose dramatically between 1973
and 1980, grants from Arab oil countries ensured a flow of
windfall revenues, producing the boom years of the
Jordanian economy (the 1970s and early 1980s).
As figure (5.14) shows, the amount of grants received
increased from about 46 MJDs in 1973 to 122 MJDs in 1977.
However, 1978 denotes the turning point in the volume of
grants transferred to Jordan. After the unilateral
Egyptian peace negotiations with Israel, the Arab Summit
in Baghdad decided to make annual transfers of $1.25 bn to
Jordan for a period of 10 years on the ground that it was
a front line state. The size of the transfers actually
never achieved the above figure but, was backed [during
the 1970s] by a flood of petrodollars from the oil
economies of the region.
In 1979 alone, Jordan received about $700.3 inn in the form
of cash grants, mainly from the oil rich Arab states.
Another important feature of these grants is that they
were cash grants which differentiate them from other kinds
of aid sent to Jordan (i.e. development assistance aid).
While the former are left to be utilized (freely) by the
Jordanian government, the use of the latter is conditional
on the implementation of certain development projects.
Thus, the allocation decisions relating to cash grants
were left to the Jordanian decision makers.
During 1978-1983, the annual average of grants received by
Worker. remittance.
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Figure (5.14): Grants and Workers' Remittances Trends in
Jordan (1973-1991).
Years
Sources:
-Central Bank of Jordan (1989, table no.38, p.46)
-(ibid, table no.21, pp.26-29)
-Central Bank of Jordan (1992, table no.1, pp.6-7)
-IMF (1992, p.318).
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Jordan was about $600 inn.
It appears that Jordan was linked to the oil circulation
of the rentier economies of the region. Thus, while rises
in oil prices contributed positively, declines had a
negative effect.
The sharp drop in oil prices after 1983 resulted in a
substantial decline in these grants. Their volume dropped
in 1984 by half compared with 1983. In addition, since
1985, the share of Arab grants as a percentage of the
total grants received by Jordan declined from 90 percent
in 1985 to only about 60 percent in 1990 (EIU, 1993,
p.34). This was due a mixture factors of economic
recession in the oil rentier states, the end of the
transfers period, and geopolitical factors'.
This explains why Jordan was not in control of such
revenue. One manifestation of the uncertainty
characteristic of grants is the decision at the last
Baghdad Summit (May 1990) to transfer $200 inn to Jordan in
the second half of 1990. This failed to materialise after
the start of the Gulf crisis in August 1990 (Ibid).
In summary, while grants were important as a source of
foreign transfers, they led to dependency surrounded by
uncertainty. The links with the rentier economies of the
region on the one hand, and the "no control" character on
the other left Jordan vulnerable to exogenous economic and
non-economic variables in a region the main character of
'The Jordanian decision of cutting the links with the
West Bank in July 1988 and the start of the Gulf crisis in
August 1990.
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which has been instability.
5.4.4.2: Workers' Remittances 
The second main source of Jordan's links with the rentier
economies of the region is workers' remittances as figure
(5.14) depicts.
The growth in remittances was due to two factors. The
first, an increase in the number of Jordanians working
abroad, from 150 thousand workers in 1973 to about double
this number in 1979 and to 329 thousand workers in 1987
(Ibrahem, et al., 1989). Meanwhile this factor was
accompanied by a rise in the wages and salaries of workers
in the Gulf states arising from oil windfall revenues
(1970s and early 1980s). As a result of both these
factors, remittances rose from 14.7 MJDs in 1973, to 236.7
MJDs and 475 MJDs in 1980 and 1984 respectively.
However, both these previous factors, in the same way as
grants, are determined by the economic conditions of the
rentier economies of the Gulf states.
Another group of variablrs are non-economic. The political
relationship between Jordanian governments and the PLO is
very important, because the majority of Jordanians working
abroad are of Palestinian origin (about 90 percent).
[Until July 1988] the relationship could be described as
relatively stable. On the other hand, the political
relationship between Jordan and the Gulf states is also a
significant factor in determining the size of remittances
flow.
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On the economic side, as recession hit the oil rentier
economies of the region after the mid-1980s, the size of
remittances declined from its peak in 1984 (475 MJDs) to
317.7 MJDs in 1987. Wages and salaries had been reduced.
In addition the demand in the Gulf states for skilled
Jordanian labourers swung towards the cheaper, unskilled
workers of East and South East Asia.
On the political side was the Jordanian government
decision on the 31st of July 1988 to disengage from its
administrative role in the West Bank. Since the majority
of Jordanians working abroad are Palestinian in origin
they stopped transferring money back to Jordan and the
Palestinians inside Jordan started to transfer their funds
out of the countrya (Guardian, 1989, p.10) (The Times,
1988, p.13). This reveals another impact of an important
interest group in the country. The collective action of
this Palestinian interest groups is more complex than that
of the merchants because a large number of Palestinians
(inside Jordan) are merchants and industrialists while
others are workers abroad. The complexity of their actions
is analogous with both economic and political criteria.
Thus, as a result of the previous economic and non-
economic factors as well as the devaluation of the
Jordanian currency in 1988 and 1989, remittances declined
from $892 mn in 1988 to $623.4 inn in 1989.
Further political spillover from the Gulf War of 1990/1991
a This was one of the major factors that led to the
devaluation of the Jordanian dinar in october 1988.
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produced a decline in the number of workers abroad. An
estimated number of 300 thousand returners came to Jordan
from the Gulf states and particularly from Kuwait.
However, those who came back brought with them all their
funds. Thus, the figure for remittances increased from
406.3 MJDs ($613.5 mn) in 1990 to an estimated figure of
795 MJDs ($1168.6 mn) in 1991 (Central Bank of Jordan,
1992).
This vulnerability to external factors demonstrates the
features of a semi-rentier economy without control of its
major foreign revenue.
In comparison with other major labour exporting countries
such as Bangladesh, India, South Korea, Pakistan and the
Philippines, Jordan represents an extreme case of close
dependency on the remittance transfers, as table (5.7)
shows.
While Pakistan represents the most dependent on
remittances among the other countries stated in the table,
a comparison between Pakistan and Jordan reveals the
extent to which Jordan is vulnerable to such transfers.
As table (5.7) depicts, both countries received
approximately similar volumes of workers' remittances in
1977, but remittances as a percentage of GNP constituted
only 4.3 percent in Pakistan contrasted with 31.8 percent
in Jordan. In addition, as a percentage of total exports
(goods plus services) they constituted only 46.6 percent
in Pakistan compared with 256.2 percent in Jordan.
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Table 5.7
The Relative Importance of Remittances in Major
Labour Exporting Countries in Comparison With
Jordan.
Details
Remittances
$101
Remittances/GNP
(%)
Remittances/
Exports
(t)
Bangladesh
1977 61 0.8 16.1
1986 582 3.8 51.6
India
1977 888 0.9 11.4
1986 3065 1.6 22.9
S.Korea
1977 584 1.6 4.5
1986 1077 1.1 2.3
Pakistan
1977 604 4.3 46.6
1986 3093 10.6 90.0
Philippines
1977 213 1.0 5.0
1986 681 2.3 7.9
Jordan
1977 609 31.8 256.2
1986 1029 18.5 56.1
Sources:-
1. For the countries except Jordan; Athukorala (1992)
1. For Jordan, the figures are calculated by the
researcher employing the data in; Central Bank of Jordan
(1989, table no. 47 and table no.21). Department of
Statistics (1992, table no. 10/1/1)
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Even nine years later (1986) when remittances had
increased fourfold in Pakistan and by less than 70 percent
in Jordan, the share of remittances as a percentage of GNP
was 18.5 percent in Jordan compared with only 10.6 percent
in Pakistan. However, as a percentage of total exports,
the relative importance of remittances reduced in Jordan
to 56 percent while increasing in Pakistan to about 90
percent.
In making this comparison it is important to mention the
difference in population size between the two countries
(99 million in Pakistan against 2.8 million in Jordan in
1986). Another factor is the difference between the two in
the quality of workers (the level of skills).
In Pakistan, most of the remittances were transferred by
unskilled, cheap labour, while in the Jordanian case it is
dependent on highly paid skilled labourers. Such
differences in the features of migrant workers led
Pakistan to be in a more favourable position than Jordan.
That is to say, recession in the host countries,
particularly in the Gulf rentier states, reduced the
demand for workers with high quality and/or high wages
towards those with lower skills and/or lower wages.
To sum up the importance of those two sources of external
transfers (grants plus workers remittances) figure (5.15)
provides a clear guide to their relative importance in the
semi-rentier economy of Jordan.
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Figure (5.15): The Relative Importance of Grants and
Workers' Remittances to the Jordanian Economy (1973-1991)
Years
Sources:
All data are calculated by the researcher employing the
data;
- For imports from Department of Statistics (1992, table
no. 19/1/1, p.434)
-For total consumption from Central Bank of Jordan (1989,
table no.59, p.59) and Central Bank of Jordan (1992, table
no.48, p.82).
-For GDP from Central Bank of Jordan (1989, table no.47,
p.58) and Central Bank of Jordan (1992, table no.46,
p.80).
-For grants and worker' remittances from sources of figure
(5.14).
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As a percentage of total imports both sources accounted to
an average of about 55 percent during the period 1973-
1991. Their importance as an indicator of total
consumption reveals that they constituted 32 percent of
the total consumption (private plus state) during 1973-
1991.
In comparison with GDP, grants and workers' remittances
constituted on average about 33.8 percent of the GDP
during the same period.
Such measurements are analogous in their significance for
the country's overall economic performance on the one
hand, and the country's uncertain development derived from
the dependency on them on the other.
5.4.4.3: Sources of Government Budget 
Another feature of a semi-rentier economy is reflected in
figure (5.16) which shows the heavy dependency of
government budgets on external sources of finance.
Throughout the period 1973-1991, external revenues made up
an important proportion of Jordanian governments' total
revenue. During 1973-1980, the share was about 54 percent,
while during the remaining years of the period (1981-
1991), external revenue constituted on average about 38
percent. The main reason for this decrease was the decline
in revenue received from abroad.
Because of this Jordanian governments were often more
concerned with external events over which they had no
power of control than internal one. This led to a greater
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centralization of the decision-making process. The role of
government9 was distributive rather than productive. A
patron-client relationship prevailed between the decision
makers and the people instead of one based on popular
participation. That means the distributional interest
groups in the country were trying to increase their share
of the income rather than increasing the size of the
income itself. Such a constitution is characteristic of a
semi-rentier economy and a rentier state.
5.4.5: Indicative Planning
As mentioned earlier economic planning in Jordan was
adopted not as a model of development but rather as a
symbol and a fashion of development at the time,
reflecting government commitment to economic and social
development.
The major features of almost all of Jordanian development
plans were the employment of a top-down approach of design
and implementation, and high uncertainty in the
achievement of their objectives. Different external and
internal events led Jordanian plans to be unreliable and
out of touch with the real capacity of the economy.
5.4.5.1: The Three-Years Plan (1973-1975) 
This plan was formulated to tackle the problems arising
9More discussion on the role of government within the
context of the rentier state follows in the next chapter.
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Figure (5.16): The Sources of Jordanian Central Government
Revenue (1973-1991)
Sources: All data are calculated by the researcher
employing the data in;
-Central Bank of Jordan (1989, tables no. 37&38, pp.45-
46).
-Central Bank of Jordan (1992, table no.1, pp.4-5).
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from the occupation of the West Bank or what might be
called a "corrective adjustment" plan (Khader, 1990, p.87)
Its main concerns was unemployment with the creation of 70
thousand employment opportunities (Ministry of Planning,
1986, p.11). The objective of an 8 percent annual growth
rate of GDP was also set but never achieved. As figure
(5.17) shows, GDP at market prices rose from 218.3 MJDs in
1973 to 312.1 MJDs in 1975 (Central Bank of Jordan, 1989).
In real terms, GDP achieved an annual growth rate of only
5.9 percent. Inflation, [see figure (5.18)], reveals a
substantial rise in the cost of living which was further
exacerbated by land speculation. The latter was the result
of two main factors; firstly, the Lebanese war which
resulted in 100 thousand people been driven into Jordan
leading to sudden increases in the money supply in an
economy characterised by limited productive capacity as
well as a mercantilism tradition (Khader, 1990, p.88).
The second reason was the increase in workers' remittances
transferred mainly to the families of those workers in
Jordan. Both factors lnd mainly to investments in the
construction sub-sector (infrastructure and housing) of
which land speculation was traditionally an important
component.
5.4.5.2: The Five-Years Plan (1976-1980) 
The objectives of this plan were drawn in the light of two
major factors of dependency. These were the increases in
Arab grants and workers' remittances. The target of a real
GDP
GNP
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Figure (5.17): Nominal GDP and GNP Trends in Jordan (1973-
1991)
Years
Sources:
-Central Bank of Jordan (1989, table no.47, p.58)
-Central Bank of Jordan (1992, table no.46, p.80)
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Figure (5.18): The Inflationary Trends in Jordan (1973-
1991)
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annual growth rate in the GDP of 12 percent had
demonstrated the case of dependency. However, other
targets such as increasing the proportion of domestic
revenue to the revenue (to 68 percent), a reduction in the
trade deficit and a balanced regional development were
never achieved because they were more related to the
institutional characteristics of the economy rather than
the availability of external resources.
Heavy infrastructural investment by the government was
mainly concentrated in the urban areas, which led to even
further urbanization and polarization. The problem in the
economy never realised by either planners or decision
makers was not the growth rate in GDP, but a solution for
both the structural problem of inequality in the
distribution of income and wealth and the uneven
development between the regions.
5.4.5.3: The Five-Years Plan (1980-1985) 
Planners in Jordan were too optimistic when setting their
goals during this period. The reason for this was the
presumption of continuing favourable conditions in the
rentier economies of the region. But as oil prices
declined, the projections of high external revenues were
undermined. As a result, only half the targeted annual GDP
growth rate of 11 percent was achieved. Additional factors
were a decline in the world prices of phosphate and potash
and increases in the prices of manufacturing inputs which
led to higher costs on the economy (terms of trade
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effect).
In addition to the above factors, Iraq, the traditional
market for Jordanian manufacturing exports, decided, in
1983, on a major reduction in its imports because of the
heavy burden of its war with Iran. This brought about the
collapse of Jordanian exports to Iraq.
5.4.5.4: The Five-Years Plan (1986-1990)1° 
This plan could be described as regional (Ministry of
Planning, 1986) but in reality it followed the traditional
top-down approach which had prevailed in the previous
plans. Promoting growth, reducing the trade deficit, and
privatization were the main objectives. In reality, the
GDP growth rates started to decline as the recession hit
the rentier economies of the region hard and
simultaneously the semi-rentier economy of Jordan. Real
GDP growth rates declined from 9 percent in 1986 to only
2.8 percent in 1987. However, after 1987, GDP growth
started to become negative with figures of -1% , -10.3%
and -0.4% for 1988, 1989 and 1990 respectively as figure
(5.19) shows.
The targets of growth, a reduction in the trade deficit,
balanced regional development and popular participation
all remains unachieved. However, the return of large
number of Jordanian workers from the Gulf states as a
uTurther discussion to this plan will follow in
chapter 7.
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Figure (5.19): The Changes in GDP Real Growth Rates in
Jordan (1981-1991).
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Sources: All data are calculated by the researcher by
employing the GDP deflator data in IMF (1991, p.346) and
IMF (1992, p.318).
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result of the 1990/1991 Gulf war led to a mini-boom in the
economy during 1991 and 1992. While the real growth rate
of GDP in 1991 was 0.5 percent it increased to high 11.6
percent in 1992. The reasons were; first, the increase
demand in the economy due to the large money inflow which
led to growth in construction, insurance services, housing
and government services sectors which affect positively
the overall growth in GDP despite the negative growth in
other activities such as mining, manufacturing,
agriculture and transportation. The second reason for the
high growth of GDP was the increase in government indirect
taxation revenue (Ministry of Planning, 1994, p.4).
5.4.5.5: The Five-Years Plan (1993-1997)
Jordan did not introduce new development plans during
1990/1993 because of economically uncertain environment on
the one hand and the unstable geo-political factors on the
other.
However, in 1994 the Ministry of Planning published its
new five-year development plan for the period (1993-1997).
The objectives of the current plan are designed in the
light of two major factors, namely the negative
consequences of the Gulf war on the economy, and the
change of emphasis in managing the economy following the
structural adjustment programme agreed with the IMF in
1989 and 1991.
The target of a moderate 6 percent annual real GDP growth
rate is set to increase per capita GDP during 1993-1997 by
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2.7 percent annually. Other objectives, such as cutting
the budgetary deficit to 5 percent of GDP, balancing the
current account in the balance of payments, cutting down
the percentage of debt to GDP to not more than 100
percent, reducing the debt service ratio to 22 percent,
and decreasing the proportion of total consumption to real
GDP to 85 percent, are all goals included by planners in
order to achieve the targets of the structural adjustment
programme and enable access to new funds from
international donor agencies. The planned emphasis on a
greater role for the private sector in investment and the
running of the economy are also evidence of such a
context. Thus, the design and the goals of the plan are a
continuation of the top-down development approach employed
in the previous plans. The plan, however, seems to be
asymmetric in its goals because during the past three
years, tte real. problems of economy became poverty and
Imamployment which cannot be reduced through policies
directed to achieve the above targets.
To sum up: during this period economic planning in Jordan
was responding to events rather than creating development.
5.4.6: High Consumption vs. Small Productive Capacity
Total consumption (capital+private) in Jordan increased
sharply during the period 1973-1991. As figure (5.20)
shows, the country's total consumption increased threefold
during the first ten years (1973-1983), with private
consumption constituting three quarters of the total,
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Figure (5.20): The sectoral Distribution of Consumption in
Jordan (1973-1991)
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Sources: All data are calculated by the researcher
employing the data in;
- Central Bank of Jordan (1989, table no.59, p.59).
- Central Bank of Jordan (1992, table no.48, p.82).
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similar to the share in the first period (1959-1972). This
expansion in consumption was supported by a sizable sum of
external transfers from abroad (grants and workers'
remittances) and favourable economic conditions within the
economy. However, remittances alone constituted about 38
percent of total consumption in 1983.
When recession deepened after the mid-1980s, the
productive capacity of the economy declined while
consumption continued its rate of increase. This is
because consumption in a subsidized economy such as
Jordan's is often not related to the productive capacity
of the economy. As a semi-rentier economy, external
sources of finance have played a major role in shaping the
pattern of economic behaviour towards consumption rather
than production.
In 1971, consumption represented more than 120 percent of
the country's GDP. The only time, it had a share of less
than that of the GDP (95 percent) was during the most
prosperous period of the Jordanian economy namely (1978-
1984). But after 1985, consumption, as a percentage of
GDP, rose dramatically as GDP started to decline [see
figure (5.21)]. In the final year of the period (1991) it
amounted to about 117 percent of the country's GDP (The
Gulf crisis effect). This means that one of the main
characteristics of this economy is that, "it has long
lived above it means".
Other measurements of this propensity for could be derived
by comparing import levels with GDP. On average, imports
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Figure (5.21): Total Consumption, Imports and Exports as
a Percentage of GDP in Jordan (1973-1991)
Sources: All data are calculated by the researcher
employing the sources in figures (5.17) (5.19) and table
(5.6).
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represented about 61 percent of GDP during 1973-1991
compared with only 38 percent during 1966-1972. The share
of exports to the GDP for this period, however, was on
average only about 16 percent, an increase of barely 11
percent when compared with the average during 1966-1972.
The explanation for this was a structural problem within
the economy far beyond the capability of high GDP growth
to solve.
5.4.7: The Debt Burden 
The logical outcome of such high levels of consumption and
imports was an accumulating burden of external debt.
What then is the size of the Jordanian's debt?
In 1970 Jordanian debt was estimated to be around $134 mn
(World Bank, 1987) but it grew to unprecedented levels
during the 1980s. As table (5.8) shows, Jordan's total
external debt rose to $3.5 bn in 1984, constituting about
three quarters of the country's GNP. As mentioned earlier,
as long as the policies of high consumption and imports
continued after the mid-1980s, the debt figures
accumulated and became double tose of 1984. In 1989 and
1990 and 1991 the economy's external debt had risen to
$7.4 bn, $7.1 bn and 7.6 bn respectively. That is to say
the size of the external debt was more than twice the
country's GNP. At the same time servicing the debt
consumed one-fifth of export earnings in 1990 and 1991.
It was the policies of continuing dependency on the one
side and living beyond the country's real means on the
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other which left Jordan in such a difficult position.
Table 5.8
Jordan External Debt for the period 1984-1991.
(Million U.S. dollars)
Item
Year
Total
external
debt
[ I ]
Nak
disbursed
debt
[2]
Total
debt
service
[3]
RwaT
(%)
[4]
PY
Exports
[t]
[5]
1984 3508 2832 452 73.5 13.8
1985 4153 3398 558 87.5 18,0
1986 5142 4307 641 87.2 20.8
1987 6605	 f 5201 802 107.0 24.9
1988 6720 5500 1054 116.3 31.3
1989 7395 6365 565 181.5 18.8
1990 8328 7143 606 237.6 19.7
1991 8641 7570 638 225.3 20.9
Sources:-
1- Data for 1984 and 1985 from EIU (1992a, p.33)
2- Data for 1986-1991 from EIU (1993, p.37). Both are
adopted from the World Bank, World Debt Tables.
As a result of this structural problem Jordan concluded a
five-years structural adjustment package with the IMF in
April 1989. Because of the Gulf crisis, however, a second
agreement between the two sides was concluded in October
1991. The latter package was for seven years to last until
the end of 1998.
The main objectives of the agreement were to reduce both
deficits [current and budget (excluding grants)], reduce
public expenditure, increase domestic revenues and reduce
consumption. That is . similar to the objectives of the
current 1993-1997 development plan.
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The social costs of the IMF package are too high,
especially for the poor. Thus, in 1989 riots broke out in
Jordan, particularly among the poorer regions of the
south.
It is the Jordanian policy makers failure to choose the
appropriate strategy for development which often led them
to be crisis-driven agents rather than strategic planners
and decision makers. These are the main reasons for the
country's development failure.
5.4.8: The Social Development Indicators
In order to complete the assessment of Jordanian
development efforts, a number of social development
indicators need to be presented in this section.
5.4.8.1: The Distribution of Income 
Although there was growth in the country's GDP and GNP
during the first fifteen years (1973-1987) of this period,
the measurement of income distribution can provide, at
]east, an indicative indicator of who benefited and who
lost from the economy's growth.
The most recent study on the distribution of income in
Jordan was conducted by Shamaielh (1990). It is based on
data derived from the more recent household survey in
Jordan (1987).
The study found that the distribution of individual income
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was more unequal in urban areas than in rural areas".
While the Gini coefficient was 0.37 in rural areas, it was
0.45 in urban areas. However, there is a large difference
in per capita mean income between urban and rural areas.
While it was about 626 JDs in the urban cities, it was 38
percent less in the rural areas. When comparing this
divergence with the figures in 1973 [Saket and Asfour as
stated in Khader (1990, p.91)], it is found that income in
urban areas increased by 9.4 percent (from 572 JDs) while
the average income in rural areas increased by 7.6 percent
(from 362 JDs) 12 . Thus on a regional level, the income
increases seem to be providing greater benefits to urban
areas in comparison with the rural ones'.
At the national level, the distribution of household
incomes reveals that the top 10 percent received about 48
percent of the total income while the lowest 40 percent
received only 19 percent of the total income. This
demonstrates a severe inequality in the distribution of
household income.
At the per capita income level, the top 20 percent
obtained 54 percent of the total income, while the lowest
40 percent only 14 percent (Shamaileh, 1990, p.74).
So at the per capita income level, the distribution of
"This is similar to the Al-Assaf (1979) conclusion in
his study to the distribution of income in Jordan in 1973.
12 . This comparison has to be taken with caution due
to the differences in the two studies samples.
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income is worse than the distribution of household income.
A comparison" of the distribution of household income
ratio" of Jordan (0.51) with other developing countries
(World Bank, 1990) revealed the following. The
distribution of income in Jordan was better than in Sri
Lanka (1985-1986) and Malaysia (1987). However, it was
worse than the distribution of income in countries such as
Bangladesh (1981-1982), Indonesia (1987), India (1983) and
Pakistan (1984-1985).
So, in Jordan the fruits of economic growth were
redistributed in favour of the rich, and to a lesser
extent the middle class, but the main losers were the
poor.
The focus on growth in the economy during the last four
decades, therefore, did not take into account the
consequences resulting from unequal distribution of
income. It seems that the rich became better off and the
poor worse off since only 20 percent of the population
received more than half the country's income. This
emphasis on growth continue to be the cornerstone of the
government's economic policy during the 1990s (Susser,
1992, p.463).
Such distributional status should be linked with the
" The ratios are calculated by the researcher
employing the figures presents in the World Development
Report; Poverty (1990).
"The ratio of the lowest 40 percent to the top 10
percent.
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initial phase of the "Land Settlement" programme (1957).
As mentioned earlier in the chapter, the consequences of
the implementation of this programme led to a more unequal
distribution of income and wealth since most landlords are
urban in origin and livelihood. This widened the income
distribution between rural and urban on the one hand and
within the urban areas on the other. This compares
unfavourably with countries such as South Korea and Taiwan
where initial land reform was the corner stone in the
drive towards a more equitable distribution of the
development gains.
5.4.8.2: Unemployment Rates 
The state of unemployment in the country can be viewed as
a reflection of the inappropriate economic policies of
reliance on exogenous factors as constants in the equation
of development and growth of the country.
Unemployment varied significantly within two different
periods during 1973-1991 as table (5.9) shows.
The first period was from 1973 to 1982 when the
unemployment rate started to decline. Oil prices had gone
up and the demand for the skilled and educated Jordanian
workers by the rentier economies of the region increased.
The rate of unemployment declined from 11.1 percent in
1973 to 1.6 percent in 1976 and then rose to 4.3 percent
in 1982. During this period the country experienced for
the first time a role as importer of cheap labourers from
neighbouring countries, such as Egypt, and from Asian
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countries, such as Bangladesh, to fill the unskilled
vacancies within the economy (Abu Zant, 1988). The number
of foreign employees increased from 9.7 thousand in 1977
to 120 thousand in 1982 (Ministry of Labour, 1988).
Table 5.9
The Unemployment Rates in Jordan (1970-1991).
Year mialgope-
d
rate (%)
Year
.	 .
umploym-
d
nth(%)
1970 13.7 1981 3.9
1971 13.8 1982 4.3
1972 14.0 1983 4.5
1973 11.1 1984 4.8
1974 8.0 1985 6.0
1975 4.9 1986 8.0
1976 1.6 1987 8.3
1977 2.2 1988 8.9
1978 2.9 1989 n.a
1979 3.5 1990 20.0
1980 3.5 1991 32.5*
Sources:-
1- Data for 1970-1988 from Ministry of Labour (Annual
Reports, several Issues)
2- Data for 1990 and 1991 is estimated from EIU (1992a,
p.9.)
(*) This figure is an average between 30%-35% which was
estimated by the EIU (1992a)
The second period has been from 1983 until this day and is
characterised by a decline in the demand for *Jordanian
workers from the oil rich Gulf states. However, the Gulf
crisis in 1990/1991 resulted in the unemployment figures
rising dramatically. While the official jobless rate
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before the crisis was 20 percent, it is estimated to have
stood at between 30 and 35 percent in 1991 (EIU, 1992a,
p.15). On the other hand the official unemployment figure
according to the Ministry of Planning stood at only 17.1
percent in 1991 (Ministry of Planning, 1994, p.75).
The problem of foreign workers has compounded the case of
unemployment. Despite efforts to tighten up on foreign
workers a straight substitution of local labourers for
foreigners is problematic. Firstly because of the low
wages often accepted by the latter and secondly because of
the social barriers to manual and domestic work by the
local labourers (Susser,1992).
However, before the Gulf crisis, Smadi and his colleagues
(1987, p.96), in their study of the unemployment problem
in Jordan concluded that unemployment in Jordan has
resulted from different causes; they summarized the
internal ones as follows;
"1.At the top of the list of internal factors has been the
slow down in economic activities as a consequence of the
sluggishness of domestic demand. And, in turn, the retreat
of gross capital formation.Three major factors have
affected adversely domestic demand, namely the decline in
unrequired transfers, export proceeds, and growth rate of
remittances of Jordanian workers abroad.
2.The significant growth in college and university.
graduates of unrequired specialization, leading to a
notable excess in the labour supply of the domestic labour
market.
3.The continuous inflow of guest workers into the country.
4.The rigidity of wages in the country.
5.The lack of suitable information system about job
vacancies.
6.Behaviourial unemployment."
Nevertheless, they realized that the exogenous factors
were the most weighted factors in the unemployment
position of the country.
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So, for the last seven years, the unemployment problem
seems to have caused social problems on the one hand and
pressure on government as the major employer15 of the work
force on the other.
Thus, a mixture of economic and non-economic factors has
led to a serious problem of unemployment in the country.
According to the current five year plan, the target of
unemployment was set to be reduced to only 9.2 percent at
the end of 1997 (Ministry of Planning, 1994, p.92).
5.4.8.3: Other Social Development Indicators 
A number of indicators are used in this section in order
to assess the Jordanian achievements in the field of human
development.
On the health side, the growth in health services and
rising levels of health education resulted in a sharp
decrease in the infant mortality rate from 78 in 1973 to
about 41 in 1989 (World Bank, 1991, pp.346-347) and 39 in
1991 (Ministry of Planning, 1994, p.74). Although such an
achievement could be described as remarkable, it still
stands about three times higher than the rate in the
developed countries.
However, there were two main reasons for the drop in this
rate; Firstly, government provision of health services,
particularly due to the large sum of revenues from abroad,
and secondly the increasing degree of mothers' education.
15More discussion to the role of government in Jordan
will follow in the next chapter.
376
Thus, as government services were more in urban areas
along with the number of educated mothers, it is to be
expected that the infant mortality rate would be higher in
rural areas (Ministry of Planning, 1986, p.198). In
general terms, government health policies have contributed
significantly to the sharp drop in this indicator during
the last four decades.
The total fertility rate indicator shows a decline between
1973 and 1989, from about 8 births per woman to about 6.
The factors of education and a greater participation of
women in the work force had contributed to this decline.
Again the figures show a variance between the urban and
rural areas where more traditional values live on and
fertility rate is higher because of lower education and
lower participation rate levels.
The life expectancy estimates in Jordan indicate that in
1973, the expected age was about 57.5 years increasing to
about 66.6 years in 1989 (World Bank, 1991, p.346-347).
This increase reflects rising levels of income and
government health spending programs. But despite large
expenditure on health, a sizable segment of the population
has no insurance cover to protect them against the high
costs of medical treatment (Ministry of Planning, 1986,
p.213). Thus, national statistics might not give a real
assessment of the disparities between the rich and the
poor, urban and rural., or workers in state institutions
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and others outside, such as wage labourers in urban areas
and small farmers in rural areas.
The physician/population ratio estimates refer to an
increase from 5 physicians per 10 000 population during a
15-20 year period to about 11.6 in 1989 (World Bank,
1991). The reason for this was a great demand for medical
education because of the demand deriving from the rentier
economies of the region (during the 1970s and early
1980s). However, there has since become an unacceptable
surplus of graduates in the Kingdom this field who can no
longer be absorbed by the regional demand as was
previously the case. A high number of unemployed doctors
has been the result. By contrast, there is a lack of
interest in paramedical and ancillary studies which has
produced shortages threatening the capacity of the health
sector.
On the other hand the lack of services in rural areas as
well as a lack of motivation has discouraged doctors from
working outside the cities and particularly the capital
Amman. Thus, most of the medical services in rural areas
are based on medical units rather than hospitals.
On the educational level, Jordan has been a country of
educated people with half the population enroled in the
different stages of education. As a result the primary
school enrolment rate increased from about 89 percent in
1973 to 100 percent in 1989, as a direct benefit of
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compulsory education Law enforced since 1961.
Simultaneously, the rate of enrolment in secondary school 
rose to 79 percent (ibid, p.161).
In addition, the illiteracy rate as a percentage of the
population aged (15+) decreased sharply from about 67
percent in 1973 to only about 25 percent in the late
1980s, according to World Bank estimates. This is a
reflection of two main factors; Firstly, the high
percentage of the population under the age of fifteen
(about 50%), and secondly the number of students (about
half the population). Thus, it was to be expected that the
illiteracy rate would fall during the period. This
demonstrates government effort in increasing the number of
educated people, but as mentioned earlier, the policies
were shaped by regional requirements did not reflect the
economy demand. For that reason many shortages arose at
the semi-skilled level, while there was a surplus in
others of academic speciality.
5.4.8.4: Rising Poverty
One of the important dimensions in studying poverty is to
identify if there is any evidence for polarization in the
country. It is important to realize the relationship
between the population, labour force and land.
Jordan comprises eight governorates and Amman is the
capital city. Table 5.10 identifies the distribution of
population and labour force among the governorates.
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Table 5.10
The Distribution of the Population (1991) and Labour
Force (1987) Between Jordan's Governorates.
Governorate Share (%)
1991pop1atim
narOof19V
labour force
Amman 40.4 41.1
Zarga 15.4 14.3
Irbid 24.4 23.6
Mafraq 4.1 3.4
Balqa 6.9 6.3
Karak 4.2 5.4
Tafila 1.6 1.8
Ma'an 3.7 4.1
Total 100.0 100.0
Sources:-
1. Population data from Department of Statistics( 1992,
p.20)
2. The shares of labour force are calculated by the
researcher, employing the data from Ibrahem, et al. (1989,
p.29).
It is apparent from the table, that Amman, Irbid, and
Zarqa comprise 80.2 percent of the population and 79
percent of the labour force with half of these in the
capital city Amman. Such polarization in the three cities
in general and Amman in particular, was due to two main
reasons.
The first stem from the internal migration from rural to
urban areas because of the attractiveness of the city and
the greater availability of services. This is particularly
true in the case of the capital.
During the period 1969-1989, the urban population
percentage increased from about 50 to 67.4 percent (World
Bank, 1991).
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The second reason has its origins in nature. As 80 percent
of the country is desert, the sedentary population is
concentrated in the northern and central highlands. There
the major towns are located near the River Jordan and the
rain fall is sufficient to support cultivation.
Nevertheless, the effect of internal migration has been
the stronger and was identified by the economic
specialists (Planners) in the Fifth Year Plan (1986-1990).
The economic policies of the 1970s and 1980s were the
major cause of this unbalanced demographic distribution.
Thus, it was the uneven distribution of services and job
opportunities caused by the concentration of investment in
the capital city which brought about the polarization
problem.
Another aspect of poverty can be observed by reading the
changes in the average real per capita income although
this is not a precise indicator. Table (5.11) shows that
there was a declining trend in the real per capita income
in the country (in 1985 prices). Between 1986 and 1991,
real per capita income fell by 39 percent, from 62.5 JDs
monthly to about 38 JDs monthly in 1991.
Another indicator of people's hardship in the country is
the inflation rate or the retail price index. The annual
increase in consumer prices (1985=100) was 33.8%, 55.4%,
68.1%, and 174.9% in the years 1989, 1990, 1991 and 1992
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subsequently (Ministry of Planning, 1994, p.15)).
Table 5.11
Real Annual Per Capita Income in Jordan
for the Period (1980-1991)
(JDs)
Year
Real per
capita
income
(1985=100)
1980 675.0
1981 756.0
1982 775.6
1983 743.8
1984 716.9
1985 718.S
1986 750.3
1987 733.5
1988 689.1
1989 588.7
1990 499.1
1991 457.8
Source:- Calculated by the researcher, employing the data
of GNP and GDP deflator of 1985 from the IMF (1991)
(1992).
Such rises in prices often affect the poor rather than the
rich in a country characterized by an uneven distribution
of income and wealth.
The above assessment is based on the supposition that
people living in the southern regions constitute a large
proportion of the poverty ratio. When price increases
followed the country's agreements with the IMF in 1989,
riots broke out in the poorer regions of the south, in
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Ma l an, Karak and Tafila (Guardian, 21st April 1989). Thus
it seems that the poor are more concentrated in the south
and in the north eastern city of Mafraq.
Cardoso and Helewege (1992) argued that
"Economic poverty reflects political poverty:
the poor lack the means for voicing their
demands, as they possess neither capital nor
trade union power"( p.19).
Thus, in Jordan the peasantry, organized and unorganized
workers are weak both because they are poor and because
the other interest groups who denote the government elite
are more powerful.
Another dimension is the people living below the poverty
line. According to some commentators (EIU, 1992a, p.9),
the percentage of people living below the poverty line
during the mid-1980s until 1988 was estimated at between
25 to 30 percent of the population. Another international
organization Unicef, estimated in a report published in
1991, after the Gulf crisis, that the crisis had wiped out
50,000 jobs in Jordan. It stated that the number of people
living below the poverty line (less than $135 monthly
income per household) has risen sharply, to almost one in
three, which is more than one million people. It also
suggested that 150 thousand people may fall within the
class of "absolute poverty" with almost no income (The
Independent, 28 February 1991, p.4).
Thus, the available statistics reveal that there is strong
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evidence of poverty in the country, before and after the
Gulf crisis. However, the current conditions of poverty
seem to be the major challenge for the government because
the number of poor is increasing rather than decreasing16.
The number of poor was estimated to be 1.3 million people
in 1992 (Al-Qudus, 1993, p.4).
Such phenomenon marked the failure of development despite
major achievement in other human development indicators.
That is because poverty means less capability on the side
of individuals to choose their destiny and well-being.
5.5: Conclusion 
The focus of this chapter has been the evaluation of the
Jordanian economy. As a small country, with a traditional
merchant business culture, the Jordanian economy has been
a hostage to powerful interest groups which play an
important role in shaping the sectoral structure of the
economy. Because traders, bankers and middlemen are the
powerful interest groups, the economy has been dominated
by the service sector. The other major effect of these
interest groups has been a negative one on the
agricultural sector.
The "land settlement" program in 1957 was a major factor
which contributed to the widening of income and wealth
16 In an interview with one of Jordanian's member of
Parliament, Mr. Altaema, and the Jordanian Minister of
social development, Mr.Mashakba, They both have admitted
that poverty is increasing in the country and the
government should employ a solution wider than the one
depend on giving money to support the poor (Al-Qudas,
1993, p.4).
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distribution in the country. It had also led to increased
resistance to reform and change (i.e. overvalued exchange
rates and ISI policies).
As a small market, there are many constraints on the
existing industrial sector. ISI was forced on the country
during the 1950s and 1960s, due to the high transportation
costs caused by the 1948 war. Nevertheless, ISI during the
1970s and early 1980s became a choice that had negative
effects on the economy. The first effect was the
dependency on external markets to provide inputs, the
second was the weak linkage between the productive sectors
of the economy.
This case study has shown that there are internal
constraints on the economy (structural, demographical and
geopolitical). Other forces of constraint are the
exogenous variables (Arab aid, worker remittances, oil
prices and regional politics spill-over).
Because of the factors above the Jordanian economy is a
semi-rentier economy. Its heavy dependency on unstable and
uncontrolled foreign transfers have made the country and
its development vulnerable to exogenous economic and non-
economic factors.
The dilemma in development is how to conduct economic
policies which suit the country's features and capacities.
This is the responsibility of government in a centralized
and rentier state such as Jordan.
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The conclusion drawn has been that the country's economic
policies were basically depend on exogenous variables
rather than internal ones. Decision-makers thought that
favourable external factors will continue to provide them
with external resources that cover up the mismanagement of
the economy. For example, the education policies were a
reflection of a demand from the neighbouring countries
during the boom years of their economies (oil Gulf
states).
The consumption and import policies were beyond the
country's productive capacity. The unequal distribution of
services and employment opportunities led to the problem
of polarization in the country.
Dependency is a feature of development in the country.
This has led to the path of debt. Meanwhile, because of
this dependency the country is suffering from a high
unemployment rate as well as a real crisis of poverty.
Although health and educational indicators refer to
success in the field of human development, this success
should be assessed within the context of dependency on
external sources of finance on the one hand and the
government's distributional role on the other.
In summary, there is a failure in development. This
assessment is based on the statistics of negative growth
rates, declining real per capita income, unequal
distribution of income, increases in the cost of living,
rising poverty and the polarization of the economy.
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That means, the current attempts to provide a universal
solution to the problems of developing economies and
Jordan as a case study based on neoclassical prescriptions
of privatization, liberalization and openness are
seriously misguided in that they neglect the major role of
institutions and history on which opportunities and
constraints can be presented. This contextuality to the
Jordanian case was the task of this chapter.
Thus, the alternative approach for development in Zorda
has to be one from within the country rather than a
development from above. Within this context, does
privatization provide an answer to the illness of the
economy. That will be the question addressed by the
chapter follows.
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6.1: Introduction
In the preceding chapter the evaluation of the Jordanian
economy suggested reasons for the negative outcome of the
continuous development efforts in that country. In this
chapter, therefore, it is important to identify the role
of the state sector in the economy in order to assess its
significance at the macro level (spending and tax ratios),
its regulatory role and its share in the means of
production. Such an approach makes it necessary to examine
why the introduction of privatization was proposed.
The following questions will therefore be raised: Why has
privatization been included within the agenda of economic
reform? It will be asked whether this implies a change in
ideology or is the result of other factors related to the
worsening state of the economy.
Privatization through change of ownership has not yet been
implemented in Jordan, but the country seems to be nearing
a moment of truth. Three industries in principle have been
selected for privatization since 1986; Royal Jordanian
Airlines (RJ), the Public Transport Corporation (PTC), and
the Telecommunication Corporation (TCC), but despite their
selection no steps of actual privatization have taken
place.
This chapter will record for the first time the
announcement of government officials about the
privatization programme from its first initiative to the
end of 1993. Many of these refer to the difficult tasks of
design and implementation.
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Another aim of the chapter is to examine the economic and
financial performance of SOEs in Jordan. This part of the
analysis will be divided into two sections, one for the
performance of SOEs in general and the other devoted to an
examination of one particular state enterprise in the
electricity sector. Jordan Electricity Authority (JEA)
will provide further empirical evidence on whether there
is a relationship between ownership form and performance.
Another goal is to differentiate between the economic
efficiency of the enterprise and its financial
performance.
Further enquiry will be conducted into the reasons behind
the poor performance of many public enterprises. Are they
exclusively related to the geometry of ownership?
Given the long time since privatization proposals were
introduced and the poor financial performance of many
enterprises, there should be specific factors which are
hindering the implementation of a divestiture programme in
Jordan. The following part of the chapter makes a
tentative attempt to deal with this subject.
A number of conclusions have to be drawn from the
Jordanian experience of suspended privatization. One of
these requires emphasis, namely that the merits of
privatization should not be judged by its success in
developed countries but rather through a study of the
economic and non-economic factors affecting the design,
implementation and results within a particular context.
This can provide a more solid basis for an appropriate
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understanding of the problems and the right methods of
solving them.
6.2 :The Role of the State 
In order to study the role of the state in the Jordanian
economy this section divides such a role into three
different parts, the first related to government spending,
the second to regulation and the third to government
ownership.
6.2.1: Government Spending
It is often argued that the government spending ratio (or
public expenditure ratio) can give an impression about the
level of the allocative role of the government, in
particular when the expenditure is divided between current
and capital.
Table (6.1) provides statistics on the composition of
government spending in Jordan (current and capital) as
well as its share of GDP . The first impression which can
be gained from the table is that the ratio of public
expenditure during the period 1980-1992 was high, on
average it constituted about 38.6 percent of GDP during
the period 1980-1991. It is known that government spending
affects the demand side in the economy as well as the
balance of payments. As the recession became apparent
after the decline in oil prices in 1986 with its
subsequent effects on the economy, the government spending
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ratio increased to counter the slowing down of the
economy. However, the high percentage of government
expenditure in Jordan must be linked with the external
grants and revenues collected by the government from the
boom years of the 1970s to the beginning of the 1980s.
Table 6.1
Jordanian Government Spending and Its Share of the GDP
for the Years 1980-1992
Detail Governed
ttrafithre
Namt
Expenditure
capital
Expenditure
111/0
(%)
Year POl M[2] R1131 pil
1980 487.94 62.6 37.4 40.8
1981 546.17 65.2 34.8 38.6
1982 631.99 71.4 28.6 39.4
1983 656.28 69.8 30.2 37.3
1984 640.64 78.2 21.8 34.3
1985 713.44 73.9 26.1 37.6	 J
1986 770.13 80.5 19.5 37.7
1987 825.71 71.2 28.8 39.5
1988 910.87 79.6 20.4 41.4
1989 947.92 79.7 20.3 37.3
1990 1033.7 81.8 18.2 40.2
1991* 1112.0 81.5 18.5 38.8
1992* 1348.4 74.0 26.0
_
n.a.
Sources:-
1- Data of column [1] from IMF (December 1986) and (May
1992b).
2- Columns [2] [3]: Calculated by the researcher employing
the data in the IMF (1991a).
3- Column [4]: Calculated by the researcher employing the
GDP data in the preceding chapter.
4- The data for 1990, 1991 and 1992 from EIU (1993, p.28).
(*) Preliminary.
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In comparison with the South-East Asian countries, for
example South Korea, the average annual government
spending ratio during the period 1981-1991 was 38.4
percent in Jordan and 16.6 in South Korea respectively.
The ratio was also relatively higher than that in Malaysia
(31.2 percent on average during 1981-1990) 1 . Such a high
level of expenditure was based on a combination of
expansion in expenditure during the boom years of high
revenues and an inability to control or reduce this during
the period of economic decline.
Thus, the problem for Jordan was not the level of
government expenditure but the limited capacity of the
economy to finance it. As a result, the country was left
with a large external debt accounting for more than 200
percent of the country's GNP in 1990 and 1991 and the
consequence was a very unstable economy2.
The other important question is whether this expenditure
was spent efficiently or not. A precise answer to this
question may not be possible; however, the failure of the
development effort might provide a large part of the
answer as the next section will illustrate.
Another important indicator for the presence or absence of
a sound economic policy is the share of current and
capital expenditure to total governmental spending. Where
1 The figures for South Korea and Malaysia are
calculated by the researcher employing the data in IMF
(1992a, pp.92-93), while for Jordan from table 6.1.
2See chapter 5, Jordanian external debt.
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current expenditure has a large share, there is less of a
commitment to development and vice versa. The
classification itself may not be the same in different
countries but in the case of Jordan there is further
evidence about the status of the developmental or capital
expenditure. Table (6.1) depicts the share of current and
capital expenditure in the total governmental or public
expenditure. The proportion of current expenditure
constituted on average about 3/4 of the total spent during
the period 1980-1992. This reflects two important facts;
the first is that government current spending has been
excessive because of the high level of military
expenditure [(25 percent on average as illustrated by
table 6.2)] and the enormous government wage bill. The
latter is so large not because per capita wages are high
but because the government employs over 48 per cent of the
Jordanian work force in its service sector (EIU, 1992a,
p.15). This is an example of deficient centralization as
more central units of government need more government
spending although the economy itself is market oriented.
Another conclusion is that the private sector itself does
not possess enough capacity to be able to participate
significantly in absorbing the labour force into the
economy.
The second fact is derived from the lower -share of
spending on the capital category itself, which is vital in
classifying the merits of government economic policies.
Since income uncertainty has been an important
395
institutional factor in the Jordanian economy, because of
its dependency on exogenous sources of finance, capital
expenditure has been used as a sinking account with much
of the spending made in the last quarter of the year
(Ministry of Planning, 1986).
Table 6.2
Jordanian Government Spending By Function
During the Period 1981-1990 (%)
Detail
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Year
1981 25.3 17.7 7.6 3.7 13.7 28.3 3.7
1982 24.8 12.4 10.4 3.7 16.4 28.6 3.7
1983 25.6 11.2 11.5 3.6 12.5 n.a n.a
1984 27.7 11.1 11.3 4.2 13.7 24.8 7.2
1985 26.7 12.2 12.2 3.8 7.7 22.4 15.0
1986 30.3 11.4 13.7 4.2 9.0 18.1 13.3
1987 26.5 8.6 13.0 5.4 8.4 15.7 22.4
1988 25.9 6.9 15.3 4.1 8.8 14.6 24.4
1989 23.1 6.4 14.2 5.8 9.7 12.9 27.9
1990 21.3 4.7 14.7 5.0 15.7 10.3 28.3
Sources:
All the figures are calculated by the researcher employing
the data in IMF (1991)(1992).
[1] Defence; [2] General public services; [3] Education;
[4] Health; [5] Social security & welfare; [6] Economic
affairs & services; [7] Others (include public order &
safety, housing, Amenities, recreation & culture and
religious affairs).
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This might explain the reduced commitment of policy makers
to cut current spending while devoting the necessary
resources to development.
Westphal (1990) argued that the relevance of the Korean
development success to other less developed countries is
limited
It 
...mainly because following them requires an
overriding commitment to meaningful economic
development, a commitment that few political
leaders of less developed countries appear
capable of making" (1990, p.58).
In other words, to treat development resources as a
sinking account is like giving second priority to the
commitment to development in the country.
One of the challenges for policy makers in 3ordan must be
to choose policies which suit the needs of the people,
particularly the poor who constituted one third of the
population in 1990.
While neo-liberal economic theory would suggest that
distributional objectives should, as Lal argues (1992,
p.30), be pursued through the use of the fiscal system
such as taxes, direct cash transfers and subsidies. It
seems that such policies have been lacking in Jordan.
Shamaileh (1990) in his study of the impact of government
egalitarian policies in Jordan found that four taxes
(income, property, gasoline and customs) had an
insignificant impact on the relative distribution of
households among the income brackets (p.171) as well as on
the poverty gap (p.176). This is because government high
dependency on indirect taxation (in particular customs
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taxes) to maximize revenues, taxes which do not
discriminate between the different income brackets.
Table (6.3) asserts that during the period 1980-1990 the
share of indirect taxes within total tax revenue was on
average about 76 percent. Another important indicator is
the share of taxes on international trade and transactions
within total revenue collected from indirect taxes. This
was on average about 65 percent of total indirect taxes
collected by central government.
An explanation for such a phenomenon is that in a country
like Jordan revenue maximization is the overriding concern
of the government subject to the constraint that the
burden of taxation must not fall on the government elite.
There is a desire for taxes which minimize collection and
other transaction costs, particularly where the collection
of such taxes is facilitated through certain trade
channels of the country (i.e. ports). Johnson (1975, p.57)
denominated such taxes as a "corruption tax" which do not
reflect the relative profitability of the different
economic activities within the economy. It is, therefore,
socially inefficient because it does not reflect changes
in the social opportunity costs.
The table, however, reveals a marked change in the
revenues collected from direct taxation, the result of a
government decision to tax the mineral fertilizer
industries whose products are priced in dollars and export
oriented. As a result corporate taxes increased from 29.8
MJDs in 1989 to 88.7 MJDs in 1990 (IMF, 1992, p.318).
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Table 6.3
The Origins of Tax Revenues to the Jordanian Central
Government and their Relative Importance (1980-1990)
Detail
Year
Total tax
revenues
(IIJps)
Direct
taxes*
000
Percentage
of total
tun (%)
indirect
taxes **
()00
Percentage
of total
taxes (%)
Internati.
trade
taxes (as %
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] d4)[6]
1980 164.8 43.1 26.1 121.7 73.8 83.1
1981 214.2 59.8 27.9 154.4 72.1 80.0
1982 250.2 66.1 26.4 184.1 73.6 76.4
1983 274.1 69.8 25.5 204.3 74.5 68.6
1984 285.8 71.0 24.8 214.8 75.2 64.3
1985 304.7 74.9 26.4 229.8 75.4 59.2
1986 291.6 64.9 22.2 226.7 77.8 57.5
1987 292.0 54.7 18.7 237.3 81.3 60.5
1988 322.0 58.7 18.2 263.3 81.8 63.2
1989 364.6 72.3 19.8 292.3 80.2 52.4
1990 508.4 135.6 26.7 372.8 73.3 50.2
Source:
-Data of 1980 in columns [1] [2] and [4] from IMF (1991a)
and for 1981-1990 from IMF (1992a) (Government Finance
Statistics Yearbook).
-Data in columns [3] [5] [6] calculated by the researcher
employing the data in the sources above.
(*) Direct taxes include tax on income, profit and capital
gains plus property taxes.
(**) Indirect taxes include domestic taxes on goods &
services, taxes on intetnational trade, transactions and
others.
In contrast, there was a reduction in the indirect taxes
collected from international trade and transactions. The
reason for such a trend in 1989 and 1990 was the effect of
the structural adjustment plan on the choices of the
government. Under this plan, which was signed in 1989, the
Jordanian government turned to local indirect taxes as a
means of reducing demand on the one hand, and to prove to
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the IMF its intention of reducing trade barriers on the
other. Such policies were not a choice but a condition
imposed on Jordan by the IMF. This analysis is consistent
with the argument of Levi (1988) who believed that rulers
are revenue maximizers subject to changing constraints.
The constraint in the case of Jordan was the IMF
structural adjustment programmeme. This forced the leaders
to adjust their ways of revenue maximization because the
programmeme in itself provided a new way of maximizing
revenue through the loans given to Jordan3.
Another revelation from Table (6.2) is that the share of
government spending on social security and welfare was
limited, less than 10 percent of total governmental
spending during 1985-1989. Such figures reflect the
absence of welfare state schemes to provide the poor with
effective help parallel to those existing in the welfare
states of western countries or those suggested by the
World Bank in its report on the problem of poverty in
developing countries (World Bank, 1990) 4 . Thus, public
enterprises are the major means for the state to provide
people with income for equity reasons and this fact needs
to be taken into account when discussing privatization in
Jordan.
3 Further analysis of the predatory rule of the state
is provided by the first chapter under the transaction cost
theory and institutional change.
4For more details regarding the effect of social
security schemes on income distribution in Jordan, see
Musallam (1990).
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Nevertheless, the Jordanian state spent a good proportion
of its total expenditure on education and health. For
example in education it spent on average 12.4 percent
during 1981-1990 which constituted 4.8 percent of the
total GNP during the same period. Although no one can
argue against such human investment, government policies
in education until 1990 never addressed the real need of
the Jordanian economy, middle level practical skills, but
concentrated more on professional academic skills. As a
result the highly educated people in the country suffer
from unemployment.
If modernization is based on imitating the trends in
advanced countries, as is the case in education, any
country, not only Jordan, will fall into the trap of
cultivating the unemployment of a highly educated
workforce.
In health, the proportion of expenditure was about 4.3
percent of total government expenditure during the period
1981-1990 and only 1.7 percent of the total GNP for the
same period.
Thus, the social allocation ratio, which is the relative
importance of health and education expenditure to the GNP,
seems to be low (UNDP, 1991, pp.44-45) 5 . The problem in
health, however, is not the spending but the quality of
the spending. The health system is hospital oriented.
5Calculated by the researcher by employing the
expenditure data in table 6.1 and table 6.2 and by
employing the GNP data for Jordan from the Central Bank of
Jordan (1989, table no.47, p.58) and the Central Bank of
Jordan (1992, table 46, p.80).
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Expenditure on hospitals accounted for 75-80 percent of
total expenditure in the Ministry of Health's budget
during 1984-1988 while expenditure on primary health care
constituted only 12.5 percent. About 90 percent of total
health expenditure in Jordan (including that by the
military medical services, University hospitals and the
private sector) was directed towards the non-primary
health services (Kharabsheh, 1990, p.141). Another problem
is the uneven distribution of such services among the
rural and urban areas. The rural regions, particularly in
the south, suffer from shortages in hospitals as well as
technicians (EIU, 1993, p.12). More than 63 percent of the
physicians are based in Amman while most of the remaining
are based in four urban centres (Zarqa, Irbid, Salt and
Karak) (Kharabsheh, 1990, p.142).
Such evidence demonstrates the inability of a centralized
policy to match the needs of people desperate to enhance
their range of choices and entitlements according to the
Sen (1992, p.15) concept of development. This implies that
health services should be directed towards primary
services and to a more even distribution among the
regions.
Although capital expenditure is not the same as government
fixed capital formation (or government investment), it is
closely related to it. Table (6.4) provides the statistics
for government as well as private investment and its share
of GDP. The table reveals the following:
In the first place private investment constituted an
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important share of total investment, particularly before
1986. On average its share was 62 percent during 1980-
1990. However, as short-term profit is a feature of
private activity, or the economy in general, investment
was mainly in the construction sector (buildings) and
transport rather than capital equipment for industry
(Central Bank of Jordan, 1989).
Secondly, government investment was limited, on average to
about 9 percent of GDP. What then are the areas of
government investment? According to the Jordanian Ministry
of Planning most government investment is concentrated on
two sectors, namely infrastructure (construction,
transportation, telecommunication, energy and irrigation)
and the social and services sectors (health, education,
housing and government buildings) (Ministry of Planning,
1986, p.97).
Thus, according to the normative theory of public sector
intervention, such intervention through public spending
seems to be consistent with the policies advocated by the
market proponents. The question is whether there is
another role for the government which affects private
activities more than is apparent from public spending
measurements.
6.2.2: Government Regulations 
The UNDP (1993, p.52) has argued that private
entrepreneurs in developing countries are less concerned
about government spending than with government control.
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Table 6.4
Jordanian Gross Fixed Capital Formation (Governmental
and Private) and Its Relative Importance to the GDP
During the Period 1980-1990.
Detail
Year
Total OF
MO
[ 1 ]
Governnent
due of
au m
[2]
Private
due of
OF (%)
[3]
Governnent
a'um
(%)
[4]
Private
OFXDP
(%)
[5]
Total au
as (%) of
GDP [05]
[6]
1980 397.8 33.2 66.8 11.1 22.2 33.3
1981 564.8 33.2 66.8 13.3 26.6 39.3
1982 597.0 30.5 69.5 11.3 25.8 37.1
1983 502.8 33.2 66.8 9.4 19.1 28.5
1984 530.4 25.1 74.9 7.1 21.3 28.4
1985 455.6 30.6 69.4 7.3 16.6 23.9
1986 417.1 35.0 65.0 7.0 13.0 20.0
1987 411.3 43.1 56.9 8.3 10.9 19.2
1988 465.8 38.5 61.5 8.0 12.8 20.8
1989 507.9 36.1 63.9 7.6 13.5 21.1
1990 678.3 19.6 80.4 5.1 20.8 25.9
Sources:-
1- Data for column [1]. For the years (1980-1985) from IMF
(1986) and (1991a) (International Financial Statistics).
For the years (1986-1990) from IMF (1993) (International
Financial Statistics).
2- Column [2]. Calculated by the researcher employing the
data of Government GFCF in the IMF (1991a) (Government
Statistics Yearbook) for the years (1980-1985), and IMF
(1992) (Government Statistics Yearbook) for the years
(1986-1990).
3- Column [3]= 100%- figures in column [2].
4- Columns [4] [5] and [6] are calculated by the
researcher employing the GDP data in Central Bank of
Jordan (1989) and (1992).
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Thus, the role of the government in regulating the economy
has a more vital impact because the institutional context
of the state is reflected in its regulatory role6.
Although the government in Jordan pursues free market
policies, decisions are made on imports (who? what? how
much?) through centralized units. The government also
determines the domestic prices at which goods can be
imported or exported. In other words, it uses licensing as
an effective means of favouring and rewarding special
interest groups. Moreover, the government indirectly
decides who obtains bank credits because most financing is
based on collateral rather than on risk assessment
(Ghezawi, et al., 1989, p.19). In other words, the rich
can get access to loans, especially in the specialist
financial institutions.
Other protectionist policies, such as the competition with
imported goods and the use of overvalued exchange rates
(until 1988) are also decided by central government.
The concept of rent-seeking applied well to the government
regulatory structure. The spending of resources to
establish, acquire or maintain a government-granted
monopoly or secure an otherwise privileged position is
widespread.
In this context, the effect of government regulation is
more excessive than the figures shown by the government
6For more detailed analysis, see the discussion of the
New Institutional Economics (NIE) literature in the first
chapter.
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spending ratio. The problem with this role however, is
that it cannot be quantified or measured, although its
effect could well be assessed by employing the
institutional approach .
The Jordanian state is a mercantile state. In a mercantile
state, consumers are not allowed to decide what should be
produced, in the sense of demand and supply, instead the
state reserves to itself the right to single out and
promote certain economic activities. In Jordan the
Ministry of Industry and Trade, and the Ministry of
Supply, were the major players in deciding who and what
was to be supplied and consumed in the market (Sullivan,
1987, pp.136-137).
De Soto (1989) contended that there are major differences
between a market economy and a mercantile economy.
Competition prevails in the first while privileges and the
employment of the law to one's own advantage is a feature
of the latter as regulation is the determinant factor of
the economy.
Under the standard perfect competition model, selfish
behaviour by small independent economic players, such as
utility maximization by consumers and profit and wealth
maximization by producers, results in a situation . which is
also desirable in the sense that the value of output, at
prevailing market prices, cannot be increased and which
is, moreover, pareto optimal. However as Buchanan (1980,
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p.4) argued, once the institutional framework moves away
from that associated with perfect competition,
"institutions have moved away from ordered markets toward
the near chaos of direct political allocation ", DUP
activities will arise.
The second difference is that market economies tend to
serve consumers efficiently, while in mercantilism,
bureaucrats serve at the cost of society.
The third difference is that entrepreneurs in market
economies tend to satisfy customer requirements of
quality, price and sustainable supply while in a
mercantile society entrepreneurs seek to satisfy the state
so as to win privileges through its policies. Thus
corruption is often a feature of a mercantile state and
this is the case in Jordan (Financial Times, 29th June
1989, p.4). Furthermore, corruption throughout different
Jordanian administrations is precisely Jordan's major
illness as parliamentary debates reveal (Susser, 1992,
p.462).
Another difference is that in a mercantile economy,
entrepreneurs and workers spend an increasing amount of
time complaining, flattering and negotiating. In this case
competition for the profits connected with political
influence become the concern of entrepreneurs. The aim is
to obtain economic monopoly positions as the political
sphere becomes subordinated to economic self interest. The
consequences are that resources are spent obtaining a
larger share of a given stake rather than one increasing
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the size of the stake itself.
Moreover, government, as in the case of Jordan, has to
employ more bureaucrats in order to meet the demands of
the special interest groups. In Jordan 48 percent of the
work force is employed by the government, mainly in its
services sector. Such bureaucrats are not the same as
genuine workers. They increase neither production nor
investments by their efforts. However, they do increase
the complexity of state regulation by their datly
intervention in the economic life of small producers and
the general population.
The most decisive difference, which can be used to
criticize those who believe in enhancing individual choice
and freedom through privatizing public ownership, is that
in Jordan access to the market is restricted. This means
that the problem lies with the complexity of regulation.
Special licences are required for almost everything
(Sullivan, 1987). This creates a constant need for
assistance from privileged private groups or authorities
who control or guard the administrative gates. Thus rent
seeking becomes the norm, while large numbers of working
papers are needed to gain access to markets.
In summary the attributes of the state regulatory role in
Jordan are: centralization of economic decision making
within a small elite; special interest legislation; the
non-existence of or only very weak public accountability,
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and the non- involvement of basic local institutions or
smaller business groups (as the small producers) in the
economic process. Its features also include favouritism
rather than efficiency and the promotion of monopoly
powers.
Thus, it can be concluded that the regulatory role of the
state in Jordan is more important in its effect than
government spending because it restricts the market and
the initiatives of ordinary private entrepreneurs who lack
access to the decision making body.
Thus, laws encouraging private investment have not
succeeded in attracting domestic entrepreneurs to invest
in the manufacturing sector; rather entrepreneurs have
directed their investment towards construction,
particularly of housing, and to the services sector where
there are lower risks and a shorter time span for
investment.
6.2.3: Government Ownership 
In the case of Jordan, there was no nationalization or a
centralized planned economy, as was the case in the
majority of developing countries, particularly after their
independence. This is because of the ideological belief of
the state in the market-oriented policies and the
effectiveness of the free-enterprise model as a path for
development. However, .according to the Jordanian Ministry
of Planning's five year plan for 1986-1990, the state,
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although it has carried out indicative planning, pursues
a laissez-faire approach based on individual initiative
and adjustment to market demand and supply.
Historically, government ownership in Jordan passed
through three different phases.
The first was between 1921 and 1951 when there was neither
the place for government ownership nor the funds to build
the economy. The state's main priority was to establish
its authority and legitimacy while responding to private
sector demands by means of regulation; an example was the
relinquishing of income tax declarations.
The second phase was between 1952 and 1972 when the
private sector was the leader, initiator and main engine
of investment. The only exception was the establishment of
a state cement industry in 1951 because the size of the
investment was beyond the financial capabilities of the
private sector. Thus, a joint venture, in which the state
owned 51 percent of the cement industry, was the first
form of government ownership. In other cases the
government participated with fewer than the majority
shares and in order to overcome the shortages of funds in
private projects. Given the relatively limited external
and internal sources for financing the government budget
at the time and the limited demand in the economy, the
allocative role of the state was simply restricted to
"helping" the private sector (Sha'sha, 1991).
In 1973 the role of the state started its third phase as
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an owner of major projects. Two factors were mainly
responsible for this phase, which is the more relevant for
the privatization discourse. The first was the increase in
government revenues which created a new and immense
capacity for the government to intervene through the means
of production. The second was the need to build services,
an infrastructure and a modern industrial base in a
country lacking many of the natural resources owned by its
neighbours. As a result, the Jordanian state participates
directly in the production sector for three reasons. The
first is the substantial capital required for capital-
intensive projects, particularly in mineral projects which
the private sector cannot afford. The second is the high
risk surrounding investment in some projects and the final
reason is related to the two above, namely control of the
commanding height industries, which the state is keen to
be involved in, in order to generate revenue and foreign
exchange (i.e., mineral based industry) (Kanovsky, 1990,
p.338). The small size of the Jordanian market will
naturally lead one to the conclusion that most government
participation in ownership implies a high probability of
a monopolistic position and indeed this is often the case.
The share of value added generated by the central
government (pure state sector) during the period 1970-1992
averaged 21.5 percent'. This includes all government
services such as defence, public administration,
'Calculated by the researcher employing the data in
Central Bank of Jordan (1989, Table no.47) and Central Bank
of Jordan, 1992, Table no.46) and EIU (1993, p.15).
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education, health, etc. Thus, it is obvious that the state
sectoral contribution is highly limited. On the public
sector level it was estimated that in mid-1986 it produced
about 40 percent of the country's GNP, possessed nearly 50
percent of capital formation and employed nearly half the
country's work force [(Fank (1986) as cited in Brand
(1992, p.170)].
6.2.3.1: Notions of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) 
According to IMF statistics, there were 19 non financial
SOEs in Jordan in 1987 (as table 6.5 depicts). This is the
same as in 1993. However, there are three kinds of SOEs.
Table 6.5
Non-financial State-Owned Enterprises in
Jordan in 1987
Non-financial SOEs Non-financial SOEs
1 Aqaba Railway Corp 11 Water Authority
2 Civil Aviation
Authority
12 Jordan Electricity
Authority
3 Civil employees
Consumption Corp.
13 Jordan Hijaz
Railway
4 Free Zones Corp. 14 Jordan Hotels and
Tourism Co.
5 General Transportation
Corp.
15 Ports Corp.
6 Himmeh Hot springs Co. 16 Jordan Phosphate Mines
Co. and Subsidiary:
Jordan Fertilizer Co.
7 Holy Lands Hotel Corp. 17 Royal Jordanian Airlines
8 Hotels Corp. 18 Posts and
Telecommunication
9 Housing Corp. 19 Jordan Cement Co.
10 Jordan Broadcasting &
Television
20
Source:IMF(1987, p.67).
412
a.Pure state sector departments: Some such departments are
involved in commercial activities and are fully owned by
the central government. Their funding is derived from the
government budget and they are staffed by civil servants.
Examples are the Civil Employees Consumption Corp. and the
Free Zones Corp. Their relative importance derives from
the spending power of the central government. In the five-
year development plan (1981-1985) 27 percent of the
resources allocated for development expenditure were to be
used by the pure state sector departments or what are
called central government departments.
b.Autonomous State Institutions: These institutions arise
through a gradual transformation of government departments
or similar administrative structures. They are owned by
government but are at the same time legally, financially
and administratively independent. In spite of this
apparent autonomy the board is generally appointed by the
cabinet and central government continues to exercise
administrative and financial control. Examples are the
Public Transportation Corp, the Water Authority, Jordan
Electricity Authority and Royal Jordanian Airlines. Their
share of development expenditure was estimated to be 34
percent of the total allocated in the 1981-1985
development plan'.
'The figures for the share of development expenditure
in both pure and autonomous SOEs are adopted from Brand
(1992, p.170).
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c.Mixed Enterprises: These are share holding companies in
which the central government or autonomous state
institutions have equity participation. Government
representation on the board of directors in such
enterprises is linked to its share in the company's paid
up capital. Their total number in 1985 was about 90.
Examples are the Arab Potash Company (the largest in
Jordan with a government share of 53 per cent) and the
Jordan Phosphate Mines Company (government share 69 per
cent) (Khalaf, 1989, pp.236-237)
6.2.3.2: The Role of SOEs on the Sectoral Level
The domination of SOEs can be divided among the economic
sectors into three levels.
6.2.3.2.1: Pure Domination
There are three activities where the government operates
as a monopolist; the water sector, which is the domain of
an autonomous public institution (The Water Authority);
telecommunication activity is represented by the
Telecommunication Corporation, which operates as an
integral part of the central government; and finally
electricity generation through Jordan Electricity
Authority accounted for 92 percent of the total
electricity output in 1992. The remainder of electricity
is generated by the industrial companies [e.g., The Jordan
Cement factories, the Jordan Phosphates Mines Company
(JPMC), and the fertilizer companies] for their own use
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only (calculated by the researcher employing the data in
Jordan Electricity Authority, 1993, Table no.5, p.21).
6.2.3.2.2: Equity Sharing
There are two important economic sectors where the
government possess an equity sharing.
a.Mininq: In this sector, the state holds its largest
share. The country is the world's fifth biggest producer
of phosphates rock and the third biggest exporter after
Morocco and the U.S.A. The government possesses 38.4
percent of the equity of the Phosphates Mines Company, and
in potash it holds 53 percent of The Arab Potash Company.
Total state investment amounts to about 50 percent of the
capital of mining companies and represents almost 1/2 of
the total state shareholding in all Jordanian corporations
(Anani and Khalaf, 1989, p.216).
b.Manufacturing; The total equity share of government in
this sector amounts to about 23.2 percent of the whole
capital of the manufacturing shareholding companies in
Jordan.
The state's participation ranges from 0.02 percent in the
Arab Aluminium Industry to 49.7 percent in the Jordan
Glass Industries. In actual terms, 87 percent of state
equity sharing in this sector is held in the four largest
companies: the Jordan Cement Factories, the Jordanian
Petroleum Refinery, the Glass Industries and the
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Engineering Industries. The share of capital in these four
companies represents 56 per cent of all the capital of the
48 manufacturing companies in Jordan (ibid).
6.2.3.2.3: Mixed Sectors 
There are two mixed activities where the state operates to
some extent with the private sector.
The first is transportation where the state contributed
about 2/3 of the value added during 1970-1988. However,
the only competition between the private sector and the
state is in land transportation. Air transportation is a
monopoly, and rail transportation (Aqaba Railway and the
Hijaz Railway) is an oligopoly. The ports are run by an
autonomous state institution (The ports Authority)
(Khalaf, 1989, pp. 240-241)
The second is electricity distribution. In this activity
there are two share holding companies (the Jordan
Electricity Company and Irbid Electricity Company) which
distributed 58 percent of the electricity power generated
by Jordan electricity authority in 1992 (47 percent and
11 percent respectively) (calculated by the researcher
employing the data in Jordan Electricity Authority, 1993,
table no.12, p.27). However, the state possesses shares in
both of them (13.6 percent and 55 percent respectively)
and they are regulated by the government.
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In summary, it can be said that the absolute private
sector can be found operating in agriculture and quarrying
while the Jordanian state possesses a limited allocative
effectiveness through direct ownership and production. In
that, it does appear to be on the same side as the
advocates of the market approach.
However, the idea of privatization in Jordan started to
appear on the government agenda during the mid-1980s.
6.3: Objectives and Reasons for Privatization of SOEs 
The thinking of privatization as a new economic policy in
Jordan was initiated in 1985 after a new government took
office in April. The new P.M. (Al-Rafai) was himself one
of the major advocates of reform policies in Jordan.
Privatization was part of a larger reform package for the
economy9 . However, the idea of privatization was announced
in a paper entitled n The role of the private sector in
development"
	 which was presented to the Jordan
Development Conference from 8 to 10 November 1986. The
main goal of the conference was a review of the 1986-1990
five-year plan. The government established a special
permanent privatization committee at ministerial level to
study the most suitable techniques for implementing the
proposed privatization policies.
The objectives set out in the paper provide a clear view
of the government's objectives and privatization measures.
9For a review of Jordan's reforms record (1985-1989)
see Brand (1992, pp.173-179).
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The policies stated in the paper were:
"First, promoting the private sector in its traditional
domain through the following measures:
1.Minimizing market distortions by allowing market forces
to determine the prices of factors of production as well
as the price of final output of industries.
2. Providing support for research to enhance the
efficiency of private sector operations and to have pre-
feasibility studies made available to private investors
at a minimal cost.
3.Devising policies and incentives to encourage private
investors.
4.Pledging consistent and uniform application of
government policies to reduce disparities in the
treatment of foreign and domestic firms.
5. Providing a supportive legal environment to the
property rights and contractual obligations and having a
commercial law for the settlement of disputes.
Second, transferring public control of PEs to the private
sector. This strategy envisages the following measures;
1. Sale of state-owned shares in mixed enterprises to the
private sector.
2. Transferring ownership of autonomous PEs to the
private sector.
3. Authorizing the establishment of private universities.
4. Leasing state-owned agriculture land to the private
sector." (quoted from Al-Quaryoty, 1989, p.170).
From this, it seems that privatization in Jordan does not
reflect any shift in economic or political ideologies and
one must therefore ask why privatization was initiated at
this time.
a. Economic Recession
When the institutional factors were introduced in the last
chapter, it was shown that the recession in the economies
of the rich oil Gulf states after the decline in oil
prices had an immense effect on Jordan. Thus, when the
price of oil declined sharply in 1986, government external
revenues declined from 350.2 MJDs in 1985 to 303 MJDs and
190 MJDs in 1986 and 1987 respectively (Central Bank of
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Jordan, 1989, pp.45-46). This was combined with a sharp
decline in workers' remittances from 414 MJDs in 1986 to
317.7 MJDs in 1987 (ibid, pp. 26-29). GDP real growth
rates started a decline from 9 percent in 1986 to only 2.8
percent in 1987 and entered negative growth during 1988-
1990 (calculated from IMF, 1991, p.346 and 1992, p.318).
There were many ideas for reducing the role of the state
and giving the private sector the first initiative on the
basis, though without solid evidence, that the Jordanian
private sector would be far more efficient than the state
sector.
b. Growing Budgetary Deficit 
Another major reason for considering privatization was the
Jordanian central government's growing budgetary deficit.
Table (6.6) shows that the deficit rose more than twofold
from 109.9 MJDs in 1980 to 247.8 MJDs in 1987. In other
words, the government thought that the sale of SOEs would
enhance its financial position and reduce the budgetary
deficit. According to UNDP this is one of the seven sins
of privatization because "selling assets to meet current
liabilities is mortgaging the options of future
generations" (UNDP, 1993, p.50).
c. The Debt Crisis 
The debt crisis has had an immense impact upon Jordan's
economy. During the period 1984-1987 external debt rose
sharply from $3508 million to $8641 million .
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Table 6.6
Overall Deficit in the Jordanian Central
Government Budget (1980-1990)
Year Deficit
(MJDs)
1980 109.9
1981 115.9
1982 128.2
1983 108.5
1984 139.7
1985 153.1
1986 130.0
1987 247.8
1988 208.3
1989 137.5
1990 92.1
1991* 12.4
1992* 144.2
Sources:-
1-Data
2-Data
for
for
1980-1989 from the IMF (1991a,
1990 from IMF (1992a, p.318).
p.345).
3-Data for 1991 and 1992 from (EIU, 1993, p.29).
*Preliminary.
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Consequently, Jordan started approaching the eurodollar
financial markets and other international aid agencies to
acquire more financial support in the second half of the
1980s.
A privatization plan was essential for the government in
approaching the IMF, and the World Bank in particular,
because it dressed the government in a reformist outfit
and matched the demands of the international agencies
(Dessouki and Aboul Kheir, 1991, p.221). As a result the
government secured credits worth $262 million from the IMF
during the period 1985-1988, and $107 million worth of
loans from the World Bank in 1987/1988 1°. Part of the
World Bank's loans was allocated to cover the consultancy
service costs required to study the feasibility of
privatizing the Telecommunication Corporation (TCC).
D. Attracting Foreign Investment 
Another reason for seeing privatization as a viable
solution to the economic problems in Jordan was the need
to increase the flow of foreign investment to the country.
As table (6.4) shows, there was a real need to substitute
the shortages of investment in the country. While in 1981
the investment ratio (total investment to the GDP) was
about 39 percent, it declined to only around 20 percent in
1986. Although historically Jordan was not an attractive
destination for private investment, as table (6.7)
1°The figure of $262 million was distributed between
$63 mn, $70 inn, $81 inn, and $48 inn during 1985, 1986, 1987
and 1988 respectively (EIU, 1992c, p.35).
Years Net private
foreign
investment
$	 million
Years Net private
foreign
investment
$ million
1979 26 1986 21
1981 143 1987 33
1983 30 1988 0
1984 71 1989 0
1985 23
Source: World Bank Reports (various years)
cited in Joffe (1993. table no.7.1.,
as
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depicts, the declining share of investment in the GDP
forced the Jordanian decision makers to rethink their
policies, particularly as there was little prospect of
increasing Arab aid.
Table 6.7
Net Private Foreign Investment in Jordan,
1979-1989 (Selected Years)
p.134).
Privatization in the conteN,. of deregulation and new
incentives for foreign ownership were ways of increasing
investment in the country as well as the efficiency of
that investment because foreign investors will not invest
their capital in unviable projects.
For example, the idea of privatizing Royal Jordanian
Airlines (RJ) originated from the need for new investment
to replace its aging fleet of aircraft and expand its
services to new destinations. In the case of the
telecommunication corporation (TCC) about 70 percent of
the investment projects with estimated costs of 91 MJDs
during 1986-1990 had to be financed by hard currency
particularly as the bulk of the technical equipment for
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the projects needed to be imported. In addition, reliance
on foreign consultants as technical staff imposed further
constraints on the financial capacity of the corporation.
Similar arguments can be found in the purchase of new
buses for the Public Transport Corp. (PTC) in Amman
(Ministry of Planning, 1986, pp.421-465). It was believed
that higher foreign investment and greater efficiency of
the economy would be essential ingredients for the
achievement of respectable GDP growth.
Given the marginal role of foreign investment in Jordan,
the other benefit from the liberalization policies, of
which privatization constitutes but one cornerstone, is
"to show some concurrence with the perceptions of the IMF
and the World Bank" on the openness for such investment
(Joffe, 1993, p.139).
E. The Imitation Factor
Another reason is the imitation of the Western idea of
privatization, particularly that of the new-conservatives
in the U.S.A. and Britain. Since most of the government is
composed of professionals educated in those two countries,
any new academic or western image has been emulated to
give the country a modern face. The preference for foreign
experts, foreign models, and foreign standards is a
consequence of Jordan's imitative modernism. However, this
over-academic image is even found in the reactions of the
country's top decision makers (Guardian, 28th April 1989,
p.15).
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From the preceding analysis there is little doubt that
there was no deep-seated commitment on the part of
Jordan's decision makers to follow the path of
privatization, but there were several factors which
limited the government's freedom to continue the
management of the economy as they had done before the
economic crisis in the mid-1980s. The recession and the
pressure from international financial institutions to cut
public expenditure, the lack of investment funds as well
as the modernity image of the country in an integrated
international environment all played a significant role in
the consideration of privatization proposals.
6.4: Performance of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) 
6.4.1: The Economic Performance 
6.4.1.1: The General Economic Performance 
In the case of Jordan there are no comparative studies of
the economic performance of public versus private sector
enterprises. This is because of the difficulty of finding
like-with-like efficiency comparisons between different
enterprises. This stems from the advantages of economies
of scale in a small market. These provide most public
enterprises in Jordan with the basis for a monopolistic
position. However, three commentators have referred to the
comparative efficiency between public and private
ownership in Jordan.
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In general terms Robins (1986, p.52) argued that the rate
of return on public investment is roughly half the rate
achieved by the private sector. However, this conclusion
was not based on any conclusive evidence or methodological
empirical studies.
A second study by two senior Jordanian economists, Anani
and Khalaf (1989) stated that;
"Although there is a complaint that government-
owned enterprises are not as efficiently run as
those in the private sector, there is no clear-
cut empirical evidence to support such a
statement in the case of Jordan. While there are
clear indications that testify to better
management in privately owned and managed
organizations, evidence to the contrary is
also available" (p.212).
However, the study also pointed out that an inadequate
rate of return could be found in government shares in the
share holding companies. It was found that where the
opportunity cost of maintaining such shares exceeded 7
percent the rate of return, on average, was less than 3
percent (ibid, p.212).
Al-Quaryoty (1989, p.177) argued that the efficiency of
the Jordan Electric Company, which is a private franchise,
is not much better than that of the Jordan Electricity
Authority which is a state enterprise. The researcher thus
dismisses the option of franchising SOEs in Jordan because
of the limited number of potential contractors willing and
able to provide such services.
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6.4.1.2: Case Study: Jordan Electricity Authority (JEA) 
In order to investigate the economic performance of SOEs
in Jordan Table (6.8) depicts the performance indicators
of one Jordanian state enterprise, that is Jordan
Electricity Authority (JEA) during the period 1987-1992.
This enterprise produced more than 91 percent of the total
electricity generated in the Kingdom during the period
1987-1992.
Table (6.8) indicates that there was an increasing trend
in employee productivity during the period 1990-1992.
Nevertheless, the figure for 1992 (1973 M.W.H/employee)
reflects the increase in production for export (to Syria)
which constituted 1.7 percent of the total electricity
generated by JEA in 1992. This in itself represented a new
way of utilizing the JEA's capacity. The increase in
employee productivity in 1992 was 20.2 percent in
comparison with 1991.
In terms of technical efficiency, the indicator for the
thermal efficiency of generation stations revealed a
slight decline in 1992 when compared with 1991.
Nevertheless, in comparison with the total sector in the
Kingdom, the efficiency of JEA was 0.3 percent higher
(calculated by the researcher employing JEA, 1993, p.16).
Another important measure of quality for the services
provided by the JEA is the average time without
electricity by consumers in the Kingdom. Apart from 1992,
in which snow storms affected the provision of services,
there was an increasing trend in the quality of services
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Table 6.8
Performance Indicators of Jordan Electricity
Authority During the Period (1987-1992)
Years
indicators
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Workforce indicators
1-Annual productivity 1730a 1530 1627 1623 1641 1973a
(M.W.H/employee)
2-Generating capacity 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.46 0.46 0.46
(M.W/employee)
3-Number of customers
(customer/employee)
103 107 107 109 112 112
Technical indicators
1-Thermal efficiency for
generation stations(%)
33.5 33.8 34.6 34.3 33.8 33.3
2-Average cut in power
for consumers(hour/year)
8.4 6.8 7.0 6.0 5.5 17.0
3.Total Percentage of
electricity loss(%)
10.1 10.2 10.1 10.3 10.2 9.9
Rate of return on fixed 4.4 3.2 -1.8 6.4 4.04 5.99
assets
Source: Jordan Electricity Authority (1993, table no.1,
p.17.
a. In 1987 and 1992 the figure includes electricity
exports.
M.W.H: Mega Watt per Hour.
M.W: Mega Watt.
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provided by the corporation. The average time without
electricity supply declined from 7.9 hours/year in 1987 to
only 5.5 hours/year in 1991.
The percentage loss in electricity, which is one of the
technical features in the electricity industry, was much
less than for that in the whole sector. While it was 15.4
percent for the latter, it was only 9.9 percent in the JEA
(JEA, 1993, p.16).
The indicator of the rate of return on fixed assets shows
a positive trend. The nearly two percent increase in the
rate of return, from 4 to 6 percent, between 1991 and
1992, according to JEA reports, was the result of hard
budget policy and strict monitoring of corporation
expenditures, particularly of investment in new projects.
This reduced the opportunistic behaviour of the
corporation's employees which reduced the agency costs.
This is consistent with Vickers and Yarrow's (1991)
argument regarding the positive effect of tightened state
budgets on limiting managerial discretion and increasing
efficiency.
The above figures suggest that the economic efficiency of
the JEA was better in comparison with the indicators of
the total electricity sector. Furthermore, there is
evidence that the quality of the services reached higher
standards during the period 1987-1991. In addition, there
was a positive rate of return on the JEA's fixed assets.
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From the studies above as well as the case study of the
JEA, there is no clear-cut evidence of superior economic
performance within the private sector in Jordan as opposed
to the state owned sector, or that SOEs are necessarily
linked with economic inefficiency. This is consistent with
the empirical evidence provided in chapter 3 on the
comparative efficiency of public versus private ownership
in developing countries.
6.4.2: The Financial Performance 
One of the problems facing Jordanian SOEs is the low
profitability if not the large losses incurred by them.
The reasons for such poor financial performance vary from
one enterprise to another and in any case, economically
efficient does not necessarily mean financially
profitable, especially in decreasing cost industries".
However, other factors such as equity considerations also
play a major role in determining the profitability of a
state enterprise.
6.4.2.1: Case Study: Jordan Electricity Authority (JEA) 
Despite a trend of increasing productivity and a positive
rate of return on fixed assets JEA suffered large losses
between 1987 and 1991, particularly during 1989 and 1990
(19.1 MJDs and 14.5 MJDs respectively). As table (6.9)
depicts, the problem of profitability lies mainly with
"For further analysis of this subject review chapter
2.
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Table 6.9
The Financial Performance of Jordan Electricity
Authority for the Years (1987-1992)
(Thousand JDs)
Years
Indicators
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
1.Electricity sale
net profits.
(88) (3637) (19161) (14514) (7525) 2415
2.Unit cost (F.
per K.W.H)*.
20.74 22.98 27.76 27.23 27.38 24.38
3.Unit revenue (F. 20.7 22.02 21.02 22.28 24.87 25.85
Per K.W.H).
4. Net profit per
unit sold (F. per
(0.07) (0.96) (6.74) (4.97) (2.51) 0.67
K.W.H).
5.Annual capital
investnent
11760 27452 12658 2454 8826 4820
6.External
contents of (5)(%)
100 68 55 14.3 9.5 10.0
7.Net working
capital
3974 (18894) (26697) (33527) (35830) (37640)
8.Debt paynent and
service as 1 of
total revenue
41 54.4 57.4 89.7 70.2 43.1
9.Self finance (%) 15 (-) (-) (-) (-) (-)
Sources:—
1— Indicators no. 2,3,5 and 9 adopted from JEA (1993,
p.52)
2 —Indicators 1,4,6,7, and 8 calculated by the researcher
employing the data in (JEA, 1993, p.52).
*Unit cost measurement in Fils per Kilo Watt Hour.
Each 1 JD equals to 1000 Files.
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three factors. The first is the government pricing policy
towards public electricity supplies. This imposed a tariff
rate on the corporation which did not reflect the marginal
costs of the electricity unit supplied to the customer and
resulted in losses from the sale of each unit of
electricity at the rate of -0.04, -0.96, -6.74, -4.97 and
-2.51 fils during 1987-1991.
The second factor relates to investment. Many of the
proposed projects required a high proportion of external
finance. The policy of external borrowing to finance some
questionable projects, such as the unification of
electricity grids with neighbouring Arab states, led to a
long-term debt burden which affected the profitability of
the JEA. The debt payment and its services constituted
about 60 percent of the total revenue generated from
electricity sales during the 6 year-period of study. Also,
the outturn costs of foreign borrowing crucially depended
upon movement in relative exchange rates shaped by factors
completely outside the control of JEA. For example a major
conflict between the Finance Ministry and the JEA arose
over the rouble exchange rate required for the repayment
of a Russian loan to the JEA. While the Ministry insisted •
upon an exchange rate of $1.65 for the rouble, the JEA
said that the rate should be equal to the one at the date
of borrowing.
Following the same argument, the devaluation of the
Jordanian dinar in 1988 and 1989 imposed heavy losses on
the Authority during 1989 and 1990. As a result, the net
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working capital of the JEA has been negative since 1988,
which reflects the inability of the enterprise to finance
any proportion of its projects.
The last factor, which is related to the previous two, is
the management of the enterprise. The policy of increasing
accountability and responsibility in 1992 bore fruit by
converting 7.5 MJDs losses from 1991 into 2.4 MJDs profits
in 1992. Imposing restrictions on current expenditure and
the proportion of foreign currency required for investment
were among the major factors behind the success. For
example, management lowered the amount of external finance
from 18.8 MJDs in 1988 to less than 0.5 MJDs in 1992.
In summary, the financial performance of JEA during the
period 1987-1991 was poor because of a number of factors
which were not found to be exclusive to its ownership. The
debt and investment problems are part of the structural
problems mainly due to the poor management of the economy
as a whole rather than a result of the geometry of
ownership.
As Satloff (1992) argued, Jordanian decision makers after
feeling the crisis in the economy during the mid-1980s,
chose not to respond with a tight fiscal policy but
instead with one of three options:
"to ignore the glaring structural weakness in
the economy, to hide them under the rug of
further borrowing at commercial rates, or to
exacerbate them with expansionary policies that
only shrank the Kingdom's finite foreign
currency reserves" (1992, p.132).
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Such options can go someway towards explaining the
deterioration in the financial performance of JEA during
the period 1987-1990.
6.4.2.2 :The General Financial Performance of SOEs 
According to the available data the financial performance
of many SOEs seems to be poor. Table (6.10) depicts the
external debt of the non-financial SOEs in Jordan at
around $1517.2 million (about 871.8 MJDs) in 1989. This
debt constituted 34.3 percent of the country's GDP. In
1990, however, there was an estimated decline in the
external debt for these enterprises of $194.5 million,
which is a much healthier sign in comparison with previous
years. The external debt began its increase in 1970. After
being $5.0 million in 1970, it reached $430.0 million in
1980.
This reflects the poor overall management of the economy,
particularly in depending on external sources of finance,
and the poor financial performance of Jordanian SOEs. As
long as loans, foreign aid and grants are able to maximize
government revenues and minimize its transaction costs,
particularly monitoring costs, the government relied on
them rather than on reforming its monitoring system.
Another remarkable phenomenon of SOEs is the poor
financial performance of the public shareholding companies
in which government participates through its paid capital.
In 1985, about 22 percent of the 90 shareholding companies
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Table 6.10
Jordanian Non-financial SOEs External Debt
(1970-1990) ($ million)
Year Meng
debt
Year Mune
debt
1970 5.0 1981 705.8
1971 21.2 1982 906.3
1972 21.2 1983 891.7
1973 21.4 1984 976.4
1974 43.8 1985 1060.1
1975 61.1 1986 1220.5
1976 61.8 1987 1423.1
1977 167.9 1988 1345.2
1978 227.0 1989 1517.2
1979 299.2 1990 1322.7
1980 430.0 1991 n.a
Sources:World Bank (1991) and (1992).
suffered losses, more than 60 percent of them in the
industrial or mining activities [calculated from Brand
(1992, p.171)].
More recent figures for the financial return on government
investment in shareholding companies are presented in
table (6.11).
State investment is mainly directed through the Jordan
Investment Corporation (JIC) which was established in 1988
as a substitute for the Pension Fund. From the table it is
clear that the rate of return fluctuated sharply between
1989 and 1990 because of the Gulf War. However, even in
1991, only 16 out of 36 companies in the Industrial and
Mining sectors produced profits while the remaining 20 did
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not distribute any profits to their shareholders (Ministry
of Finance, 1992, pp.129-130).
Table 6.11
The Financial Returns for the Jordan Investment
Corporation (JIC) from Investment in Shareholding
Companies During the Period 1989-1991
Year Number of
companies
Value of
investment
Os
Total
profits
Mas
Rate of
return
(t)
1989 70 150.3 15.89 10.5
1990 70 149.9 3.1 2.1
1991 67 116.1 10.3 8.8
Source: Calculated by the researcher employing the data in
Ministry of Finance (1992, pp.127-139).
This is a very serious problem because these companies
were set up to operate in an essentially commercial
environment. No one could argue that the companies were
established with non-commercial objectives, the argument
always employed by the state to defend its position in the
case of poor performance of its enterprises.
However, there are many reasons for the poor financial
performance of both shareholding companies and purely
state-owned enterprises. One is that companies whose
products are mainly for export, such as the Arab Potash
Company (APC) and the Jordan Phosphate Mines Company
(JPMC), suffered from unfavourable terms of trade; for
example, the declining prices of their products on world
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markets during the 1980s. The Arab Potash Company which
recorded its first profit of 39.6 MJDs began commercial
operations in 1983 (Fisher, 1993, p.568).
Declining prices for phosphates during 1986, 1987 and 1988
brought the unit value of their export prices (1985=100)
to 87.4, 76.8 and 92.0 during 1986, 1987 and 1988
respectively (IMF, 1992b, p.316). After the boost in the
world phosphate prices in 1989 and the devaluation of the
dinar in 1988 and 1989, the Phosphate Mines Company
enjoyed profits totalling 107 MJDs and 41.4 MJDs in 1989
and 1990 respectively (Fisher, 1993, p.568). The decline
or losses in such companies depend upon international
demand and their competitiveness on the world market.
Although both are shareholding companies, they are
primarily financed through state funding and backed by
state sector institutions because they represent an
important part of the commanding heights industries in
Jordan.
The second reason is the inadequency of feasibility
studies. One example is the South Cement Company which was
established on the basis of an inadequate feasibility
study conducted in the 1970s. This company faced
difficulties in marketing even in its initial levels of
output and the result was a merger with the Jordan Cement
Factories company in September 1985 (Al-Quaryoty, 1989).
Another example is Jordan's Fertilizer Industries Company
(JFIC). It was estimated that the cost of the project
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would be about $300 million but actual costs reached $410
million. In addition, as a result of a slump in world
fertilizer prices, JFIC lost about 13 MJDs in 1984, its
first year of trading, and in 1986, the JPMC bought the
corporation, which by the end of 1985 had accumulated
losses of $40 million, for only 60 MJDs (Fisher, 1986,
p.516).
Poor financial performance can also be the result of
uncompetitive prices when compared with imported products.
The Jordan Glass Industry Company (JGIC) faced a problem
in marketing its inefficiently produced glass. Continuous
government injection of capital into the company failed to
transfer its losses into profits. Government protectionist
policies, completely banning the import of white glass, as
well as other cost control measures undertaken by the
company, only succeeded in cutting losses by a third in
1986 (Brand, 1992, p.171). These two companies (fertilizer
and glass) are clear examples of inappropriate government
policies of import-substitution industrialization.
Another reason for poor financial performance is the lack
of an appropriate incentive and monitoring system. This
can be found in the majority of public enterprises in
Jordan. The Public Transport Corporation, for. example,
which carries about 20 percent of public transport
passengers in and around greater Amman, faces strong
competition from buses and taxicabs in the private sector.
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Since its establishment in 1975 it has made an annual loss
of 0.5 MJDs (Khalaf, 1989, p.246). Weak institutional
management and an ill-functioning incentive and monitoring
structure are the main reasons.
In SOEs such as the Electricity Authority, or institutions
such as the Water Authority, government pricing at a level
below the marginal unit cost of production, has led to
planned losses (e.g., table 6.9, indicator 4). This is
because of social criteria implicit in government
decisions to subsidise such basic goods for the
population. Other companies, however, produced poor
financial performances because of inefficiency in their
operations. It is questionable whether they should ever
have been established in the first place.
Corruption in some public enterprises also contributed
significantly to their poor financial results. The
Department of Public Security spent $350 million on a
communication system which could have been purchased at
much lower cost on the world market (Guardian, 28th April
1989, P.15). Another scandal concerned Royal Jordanian
Airlines. In 1989, the company was found to have debts
amounting to about $192 million although all of this debt
was believed to have been repaid the same year from the
sale of its fleet of aircraft. Other cases of corruption
can be found throughout the different institutions
(Guardian, 25th April 1989, p.14) (Guardian, 21st April
1989, p.10).
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Another factor which seems to affect the economy as well
as public enterprises is regional political spillover. For
example, the Gulf War caused Royal Jordanian Airlines
losses estimated to be around $100 million (Fisher, 1991,
p.586). Another example is the effects of U.N. sanctions
on Iraq on business in Jordan's Ports Corporation. The
cost of U.N. inspections was estimated at $30 million in
1992 and was expected to go up by 10 percent by the end of
1993 (Arab News, 17th November 1993). Such factors reflect
the extent to which regional politics affect the financial
performance of some SOEs.
Anani and Khalaf (1989) in their study of privatization in
Jordan listed six reasons for the inefficiency of SOEs. In
summary the reasons were 1) overstaffing and recruitment
policies, particularly in the autonomous state
enterprises; 2) government pricing regulations; 3) weak
systems of control where they existed; 4) weak incentive
systems with some enterprises giving a bonus equal to two
months salary every year to every employee; 5) inadequate
accounting systems leading to further misallocation of
future investments; and 6) the absence of systematic
monitoring since government representatives on the board
of directors in many shareholding companies are appointed
for political rather than technical reasons (ibid, 1989,
pp.217-218).
From the previous analyses it appears that the problem in
the state owned sector was not exclusively a result of
439
government ownership per se. That is because most of the
companies with government participation, which were formed
to operate according to commercial criteria, were
performing inefficiently while at the same time there were
some SOEs performing as efficiently as the private
operators.
Despite poor financial performance and frequent recorded
announcements on privatization by different government
officials, there is no case of divestiture recorded in the
country. The following section provides a record of
privatization plans and actions by different public
corporations.
6.5: Privatization Progress to Date 
Only two of the objectives listed in the development
conference paper about privatization presented previously
had been implemented by the end of 1993.
The first was the establishment of five private
universities and as Whittington (1992, p.10) reported;
"Students are presently accepted on the basis of
being able to afford the fees rather than
academic ability ,..., therefore the private
universities are for those students with wealthy
parents".
The second was the leasing of unused State-Owned land at
a rent of one Jordanian dinar per dunum in November 1990.
This decision should be understood in the context of
agricultural output deterioration explained in previous
chapter. In the oft quoted words of Fisher (1991); it was
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" a crisis-induced move to increase domestic
agricultural production , ... [particularly] to
increase cereal output, on the basis of
guaranteed prices for farmers" (emphasis added
Fisher, 1991, p.584).
According to the World Bank there were three enterprises,
all in the transport and communication sector, which were
initially included in the government's privatization plan
(Candoy-Sekse, 1988, p.35). However, no real transfer or
divestiture within the context of ownership change from
Public to private has yet taken place. The main candidates
for the initial privatization plan were Royal Jordanian
Airlines (RJ), the Public Transport Corporation (PTC), and
the Telecommunication Corporation (TCC). However, the
purpose of this section is to provide for the first time
a record of announcements and comments on privatization by
government officials and others until the end of 199312.
March 1986: Jordan's Minister of Communication, Muhyi
Eddeen Huseini, who is also the chairman of the Wire and
Wireless Communication Establishment (WWCE) announced that
it had been decided to convert WWCE from a state-owned
enterprise into a public shareholding company (Al-Rai,
20th March 1986, p.1).
November 1986: In an interview with Al-Tadamun weekly in
London, the PM Zaid Al-Rafai confirmed his government
policy of backing the private sector role in the economy
12This record has been collected entirely by the
researcher from secondary resources.
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and the need to deter public sector firms from doing what
the private sector could do. On the privatization of
public firms, he explained that the government would
continue to hold part of the equities; the balance,
however, was to be offered for private sector subscription
(Al-Rai, 1st November 1986, p.1).
February 1987: the Jordanian Cabinet decided to convert
the State-Owned Jordanian Co. for Marketing and Processing
of Agricultural Products to a private shareholding where
the government would acquire 7 MJDs of the capital (70
percent), the Pension Fund and the Social Security Fund
would subscribe 12.5 percent each, while the remaining 5
percent would be acquired by the Agricultural Credit Corp
(Al-Rai, 20th February 1987, p.1).
July 1987: The government announced its decision to
privatize the Public Transport Corporation (PTC). An
inter-departmental committee was also formed to evaluate
the market value of the corporation (Khalaf, 1989, p.247).
December 1987: All Ghandour the chairman of Royal
Jordanian Airlines (RJ) said that RJ had signed a $165
million deal with a consortium of Arab and foreign banks
to sell and lease-back five of its eight Lockhead Tristar
jets. Negotiations were in progress for the sale of two
other Tristars. Earlier in the year RJ had sold a Boeing
747 to British Caledonian Airways for $ 64 million. These
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moves were made in order to repay debts worth $305
million. RJ chairman said that in January 1988 the
corporation would submit a final report on privatization
including the legal aspects. He estimated the preliminary
value of RJ to be around 85-87 MJDs ($259 million- $269
million). However, he confirmed that under the plan agreed
with the government RJ would become a shareholding company
with the government holding all the shares (Al-Khaleej,
18th December 1987, p.1).
December 1988: The chairman of RJ said that the state-
owned airline was set for partial privatization next year.
The airline's 5,000 employees would take 10 percent of the
equity and foreign ownership would be limited to 35
percent. The government would not necessarily retain a
controlling share. It was also suggested that the company
would offer shares to Jordanian frequent fliers and travel
agents who sold tickets worth more than 100 thousand JDs
($200 thousand) in 1988. Ghandour said aircraft sales and
leaseback deals had enabled the company to pay off all its
debts on aircraft, including $276 million repaid in 1988
(Al-Rai, 21st December 1988, p.8).
April 1989: Jawad Anani, a former Jordanian Minister of
Labour, Trade and Industry said in a lecture, part of a
week of Jordanian activities in Abu Dhabi in U.A.E., that
the financial crisis in Jordan would push the government
to cut public sector jobs, raise tax revenues and
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privatize firms. Privatization according to him was a
viable solution despite the rising figure of unemployment
in the Kingdom (Khaleej Times, 4th April 1989, p.11).
August 1989: King Hussain of Jordan removed the chairman
of RJ, Ali Ghandour, due to the discovery of fraud and
embezzlement in the company after a financial scandal in
Jordan's second largest commercial bank, Petra Bank, which
affected more than 37 companies in Jordan. The new
management under the chairman Abu Ghazaleh started to sell
most of RJ's fleet of aircraft, cut some of its
unprofitable routes, and imposed a recruitment freeze to
repay a debt of $192 million (EIU, 1992b, p.26)(Fisher,
1991, pp. 579-580).
September 1991: In an interview with Interavia, an air
transport Journal, Abu Ghazaleh, chairman of RJ, said that
as a result of the Gulf War the corporation had started a
"slimming down strategy" in which it had reduced its staff
by 400 people, or 6 percent, which allowed it to save from
13-15 percent on salaries particularly through " the
0
reduction in higher-salaried overseas staff". RJ is still
committed to privatization and the process is well on the
way according to Ghassam Ali, executive vice-president of
corporate planning. There is also a plan to sell up to 49
percent of shares to interests outside Jordan (Endres,
1991, p.29).
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September 1991: The Jordan Telecommunication Corporation
(TCC) started to revive its plans for expansion after
their cancellation in 1989 as part of government measures
to cut public expenditure by encouraging local and foreign
private sector involvement on a build-operate basis. This
move was seen by observers as the first concrete form of
the government's privatization plan. The new scheme
encouraged potential investors to plan, finance, build,
operate and maintain projects on a shared revenue basis.
The TCC identified the governorates of Mafraq and Ma'an as
the most suitable for the implementation because their
existing networks and facilities required almost total
replacement (MEED, 20th September 1991, p.15).
September 1991: The Jordan Investment Corporation (JIC),
the government-owned establishment responsible for
supporting investment in new projects, announced its
intention to sell its shares in hotels, newspapers (15
percent in Al-Rai and 15 percent in Al-Dustour dailies)
and a number of hotel projects. Its total equity holdings
in hotels was valued at between 8 MJDs and 8.5 MJDs ($11.8
million-$12.6 million). The move was described by the
JIC's Acting General Manager as a way to concentrate
efforts to help new projects rather than hold the shares
of well established ones (MEED, 20th September 1991,
p.16).
August 1992: On August 3rd, a government official in Amman
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said that the Council of Ministers had endorsed the
principle of transforming the Royal Jordanian corporation
into a public corporation whose shares were fully owned by
the government and to run it on a commercial basis as a
first step towards its privatization. In the last two
weeks of July a government committee evaluating RJ's
assets and liabilities met twice. The committee was also
responsible for preparing the new company's founding
charter bylaws and defining its capital before its
registration as a public company. The external British
auditor (Arthur Anderson) advised the Jordanian government
to increase RJ's capital from $20 million to $100 million
in order to attract foreign interest in the corporation
(Arab Times, 4/8/1992, p.17)(MEED, 14th August 1992,
p.19).
March 1993: The committee set to supervise the structural
overhaul of RJ opted for full privatization rather than a
limited form of commercialization for the corporation. The
Deputy Prime Minister and Transport Minister, who is the
committee chairman, revealed that eight British
consultancy firms had been invited to bid to pilot the
privatization process. The task of the winner will be to
evaluate RJ and to provide technical assistance for the
privatization programme. The debt service for the company
is now estimated to be around $40 million a year (MEED,
2nd April 1993, p.29).
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July 1993: The Jordanian Telecommunication Corporation
(TCC) announced a planned investment of $300 million
during its five-year plan 1993-1997. The finance has World
Bank approval. The TCC director-general said that the
basic policy would be for TCC to be responsible for the
provision of the basic telephone network throughout the
country; all other services would be the task of the
private sector. Local companies contended that the main
problem with this approach to privatization was the
regulation of services and the price mechanism employed
and regulated by the TCC. They (local companies) expressed
their doubts about the TCC's ability to succeed in such a
big task (MEED, 23rd July 1993, p.15).
November 1993: On November 16th, the Director General of
Jordan Ports corporation revealed a preliminary plan to
privatize the state-owned corporation. In this plan the
private sector would be given investment opportunities in
Aqaba in 1994 because the government does not want to keep
full control over port activities in the future. He
pointed out that an export port would be constructed and
managed by the private sector and as a first step the
private sector could share the port management with the
government (Arab News, 17th November 1993).
December 1993: It was announced in Amman that the Royal
Jordanian airlines were likely to start a privatization
programme in April 1994. The RJ signed a contract with a
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British company (Peat Management Consultants) to conduct
a detailed study of the financial and managerial position
of the corporation and to evaluate its assets and
liabilities as a first step toward privatization. It was
also revealed that RJ had a heavy external and internal
debt of $270 million at the end of 1992. About 40 percent
of the debt ($108 million) was held by local companies
(i.e., Jordan Petroleum Refinery and Social Security
Corporation), while 60 percent ($162 million) was with
foreign institutions and corporations (Arab News, 9th
December 1993).
The above record reveals that the implementation stage of
privatization, although a required commitment from the
government, should not be rushed into until every aspect
of the divestiture mechanism has been looked at.
6.6: Obstacles to Privatization 
Two sets of factors delayed the implementation of the
privatization programme in Jordan; the first are economic
factors and the second non-economic and influenced by the
notion of state-society relationship.
6.6.1: The Economic Factors 
Many economic factors contributed to the delay of the
Jordanian privatization programme.
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6.6.1.1: The Valuation of the Enterprise
One of the key problems for the privatization of Jordanian
enterprises is the time and resources needed for the
valuation of enterprise assets, liabilities, and market
value. Taking the Jordanian national airline (RJ) as an
example we can observe that from 1986 more than three
committees were formed in order to set an accurate
valuation of the airline assets and liabilities. As the
corporation records reveal, many foreign, as well as
local, consultancy companies were invited to conduct this
very important task as it represented the first and most
vital stage in privatization. The cost of the latest study
which was carried out by a British company in 1993
totalled $170 thousand. These extra transaction costs have
to be added to the total costs of the corporation which
ultimately increases the doubts about its already doubtful
solvency.
Moreover, with the lack of appropriate accounting records,
particularly in the case of foreign debt and debt service,
the delay in reaching a decision about privatization means
another round of valuation is required. This vicious
circle delayed the privatization of many establishments
planned for divesture in Jordan.
6.6.1.2: The Need for Restructuring the Enterprise 
Many of the firms targeted in the privatization programme
are characterised by financial difficulties which make
them unattractive to private buyers (local and foreign).
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In the case of TCC, for example, the corporation has to
change much of the existing telephone network in a number
of Jordan's governorates before being able to proceed with
privatization. Because of this the TCC has contracted
different foreign companies to modernize the old
equipment. It is planned to install a 17,000-line exchange
in Ma'an, a 13,000-line extension in Amman, and more than
120,000 other lines by the end of 1994. The restructuring
itself will cost more than $300 million during the period
1993-1997 as the TCC's plan shows. Such an investment
means that the total market value of the corporation must
go up, thus making it more difficult for it to be sold to
a local buyer.
Restructuring may be physical and lead to the
fragmentation of the enterprise, as is the case with TCC,
or it may be financial as in the case of the national
airline (RJ). RJ has to capitalize its $270 million debt
which means that foreign ownership will exceed 49 percent
and thereby contradict the Jordanian companies' rules and
regulations. To solve this problem the consultant company
studying the case for privatization proposed an increase
in the airline's capital from the current $22 million to
about $100 million so that the new capital would be
consistent with the size of the company's operations. Such
financial restructuring is a necessary step for
privatizing the corporation in order to encourage foreign
investors to buy into its equity.
Thus, the physical and financial conditions of the
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targeted enterprises are serious factors behind the delay
in the implementation of privatization.
However, in the case of the Public Transport Corp. (PTC),
the privatization proposal was intended to include the
restructuring of the whole transport sector rather than
the corporation alone (Candoy-Sekse, 1988, p.35). Thus,
the task of enterprise restructuring and rehabilitation
may go beyond the boundary of the enterprise because of
problems in the sector concerned.
6.6.1.3: The Lack of Regulatory Capacity 
Jordan, as is the case in many developing countries, lacks
the capacity to regulate a privatized utility such as one
in the transport or the telecommunication sectors. Most of
the corporations targeted for privatization in Jordan
possess a heavy economic and political weight which may
shift the parameters of regulation towards their benefits
rather than those of the consumer.
Despite the advanced regulatory institutions available in
developed countries regulating privatized utilities has
proved to be a difficult task. In the United Kingdom, for
example, regulatory bodies such as OFTEL and OFGAS are
often in conflict with the privatized utilities when
trying to regulate their monopolistic behaviour.
The question is whether the bureaucratic establishment in
Jordan posseses similar capacity and competence to that
which exists in the developed countries?
One of the reasons for delaying privatization is the need
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to set a regulatory framework which suits the economic
sector's concerns. In the case of TCC, the Jordanian
private local companies doubted the ability of TCC's
bureaucrats to provide a suitable mechanism for regulation
(MEED, 23rd July 1993).
It may be argued that the need for an appropriate
regulatory design may be solved by copying or amending
regulatory models based on the experience of developed
countries such as U.K., but the main problem lies at the
implementation stage where the difference in bureaucratic
efficiency, competence, and energy are of vital importance
to the ultimate results. Even the design cannot be
imitated in the majority of cases because it was
established on a particular policy design derived from the
specific sectoral features of the country.
The interest attached to regulation could stem from our
analysis of the principal-agent theory in chapter 2.
In the absence of an effective regulatory mechanism, the
asymmetry of information between the regulator and the
enterprise will reintroduce the information asymmetry
problem which dominated the relationship between the
principal (government) and agent (manager) in the case of
state ownership. The difference would lie only in the
distribution of benefits from the state to the private
monopoly and ultimately the shareholders.
In the absence of real competition or contestability the
privatization of a monopolized industry may create more
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problems than privatization intended to solve.
Thus, designing the appropriate regulatory framework for
a telecommunications or airline corporation may take a
long time before the mature stage of implementation is
reached.
The reason why the Jordanian government does not have the
opportunity to correct policy errors regarding inefficient
regulation is because the size of their corporations and
their numbers are not similar to those in Europe, for
example, where the experience gained from every
privatization case can be transferred to many more cases.
Where foreign ownership is introduced, the bureaucratic
capacity and efficiency to rectify policy errors may prove
more costly for the Jordanian government than for a
developed country's government. Part of the difference
derives from their different bargaining positions in the
privatization process and part from the abilities of their
bureaucrats. All these factors have proved to be obstacles
to smooth privatization in Jordan.
Another dimension of regulation derives from property
rights literature.
As a developing country Jordan has the problem of defining
property rights and all its subsequent entitlements. In
western industrial countries, on the other hand,
privatization does not require an entirely new legal
framework to deal with such a situation because their
societies as well as their economies have had two
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centuries of gradual adjustments and now function
according to a relatively well defined and advanced legal
framework of property rights.
The objective of a) providing a supportive legal
environment for property rights and contractual
obligations and b) forming a commercial law for the
settlement of disputes was never formulated in Jordan
although it was one of the main requirements for
privatization. This reflects the weak capacity of the
country's regulatory body where, as North (1991)
contended, an efficient system of property rights might
offend the interests of the rulers.
Both dimensions regulation of enterprise operations and
the introduction of an efficient system of property rights
required an institutional building process rather than a
privatization decree. Their absence in Jordan presented an
obstacle to the implementation of privatization.
6.6.1.4: Inefficient Capital Market 
In Jordan there is a capital market which was established
before the idea of privatization emerged in the country.
The Amman Financial Market (A.F.M.) is an independent
public institution established in 1976 under special law
no.31.
The establishment of the market was seen as a device to
attract investors and traders who had been conducting
their businesses in Beirut and left it after the start of
the civil war in Lebanon in 1975.
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Market capitalization as a percentage of GNP in the A.M.F.
in 1990 was 22.8 percent (calculated by the researcher
from A.M.F.,1990), which lies somewhere near the average
for all emerging capital markets (25%-30%) (IFC, 1991).
Moreover, turnover as a percentage of GNP, which had been
15.2 percent in 1989, dropped to 11.9 percent in 1990
because of the effects of the Gulf crisis (calculated by
the researcher from A.M.F., 1991).
Another indicator, the depth of trade on this market
(measured by market turnover as a percentage of market
capitalization), was relatively high, standing at about 71
percent in 1990.
However, all these positive statistical indicators for the
Jordanian financial market do not necessarily mean that it
provides efficient and helpful support for privatization.
There are questions which have to be asked in relation to
privatization. Is there sufficient capital available to
buy the enterprises, particularly those in the
transportation and telecommunication sector planned for
privatization? Is this market able to reflect the
performance of management and increase their X-efficiency
as happens in the industrial nations?
In any developing country the major question is the
availability of capital to buy the public enterprises
targeted for privatization.
There are three possible sources in the case of Jordan;
local capital, Arab investment, or foreign capital.
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The first possibility, the raising of local capital, does
not seem to be promising since the banking and financial
institutions in Jordan, although the most expanding in the
economy, still suffer from many deficiencies: the
narrowness of the money markets and the narrowness of the
secondary market for money instruments as well as the
inadequacy of the short term instruments in use (Ministry
of Planning, 1986, p.74). Moreover, the Jordanian public
is sceptical and aware of management practices within
financial institutions as many financial scandals have
occurred in the country. For example, the Petra Bank
scandal in 1989/1990 put the bank into liquidation.
Another factor is the lack of long-term interest in
productive activities shown by the holders of local
capital. The search for fast-earning activities,
particularly during the economic recession, impeded the
government from privatizing its enterprises.
Moreover, local capital is relatively concentrated in
Palestinian hands who give more weight to political
factors than to economic criteria per se.
In summary, the shortage of domestic capital during 1986-
1990 represented a major obstacle for the Jordanian plans
of privatizing public enterprises.
After the increase in economic growth during 1991-1993,
there is now more prospect for mobilizing local capital to
buy the targeted enterprises.
Without any doubt, the Arab alternative depends strongly
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on regional political spillover. Historically Arab
countries and Arab investors have little interest in
investing in other Arab countries. Thus, it is unlikely
that Arab investors would be allowed by their governments,
particularly in the rich Gulf states, to buy shares in
such enterprises. This reflects the strong effects of the
institutional factor on the running of the Jordanian
economy.
The third and the last scenario is foreign ownership of
the targeted enterprises. The difficulty of such a method
of privatization comes from two dimensions. The first is
the instability of the country's socio-political
environment, particularly between 1989 and 1991, which
causes foreign buyers to shy away from any major
investment in Jordan. Also, the regulations regarding
foreign investors still restrict majority foreign
ownership in the country.
It is also the case that the concentration of the proposed
enterprises in the transportation and telecommunication
sectors does not allow the government to sell such
important segments of the economy to foreign companies for
complex socio-political as well as economic reasons. Young
argued that the widespread foreign ownership of
enterprises greatly contributed to the initial wave of
nationalization in developing countries; thus
privatization will inevitably invite charges of
recolonization [(Young (1986) as cited in Hanke and
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Walters (1990,P.105)]. This should be understood with the
new wave of Islamicization in the country.
Thus, capital restrictions as well as the risk of crowding
out private investment in the case of privatizing big
enterprises played a major part in delaying the
privatization programme.
The second dimension for the capital market is related to
its ability to transform the information necessary to
increase the pressure on managers which subsequently
increases the efficiency of the firms. This is the most
strongly declared objective of privatization.
The Amman capital market, as is the case in most other
developing countries, is not similar in its efficiency to
those existing in developed countries.
Civelek (1991) conducted an empirical study to examine the
efficiency of the Amman stock exchange and asked the most
important question regarding the success or failure of
privatization, namely whether capital market prices can be
relied upon to provide accurate signals about the optimal
allocation of capital in the economy.
By examining the information effect on market prices for
fifteen industrial companies listed on the market the
scholar found the following; the market was thin and
discontinuity in trading constituted one of its major
features. Regulations governing the market prohibited any
major movements in share prices. Consequently, the study
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pointed out that the "stock prices established in the
Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) do not appear to have any
significance policy relevance" (Civelek, 1991, p.30).
The conclusion of this study is consistent with our
perception of the market. As the market is small, there
are two problems which seem to characterize it. The first
is volatility. This means that the small size of the
capital market makes share prices and transactions in
general subject to immense fluctuations and this could be
a result of manipulation by certain parties in the market.
For example, while the government currently holds 48
percent of the shares, their sale will lead to the
manipulation of specific interests which might affect the
stability of the economy. Another reason for volatility is
the effect of regional politics. For example, in the third
week of January 1994 transactions in the Amman stock
market shrank by 55 percent because of the Security
Council's decision to extend sanctions against Iraq.
Another influence was related to obstacles in the peace
negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis about the
control of trading routes between the West Bank and Jordan
(MBC News, 24th January 1994).
The second problem emerging from the small size of the
Amman capital market is that of short-termism.
In its study of Jordan the EIU said that;
n ... the Amman Financial Market, although
resistance to anything but more tangible investments,
such as those in bricks and mortar, still exists
among the bulk of the population. Even among business
people and financiers, the attractions of trade
outweigh the uncertain promise of only long-term
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profits on industrial investment" (EIU, 1992a, p.25).
The problem facing the Jordanian government is precisely
a result of this factor. It was short-termism and the
merchant tradition of activities which led the government
to undertake big projects and enhance its activities by
owning the means of production. About 54 percent of the
turnover of the A.M.F. in 1990 was in the financial,
insurance and service sectors (calculated by the
researcher from A.M.F., 1991).
All the above factors clearly demonstrate the limited room
for manoeuvre available to the Jordanian government in its
privatization programme.
6.6.2: The Non-economic Factors 
Although it may seem that the Jordanian government lacks
the will to implement the privatization programme, this is
in reality not the case. The explanation may lie within
the package of choices the government possesses in order
to implement its policies. Apart from the economic reasons
there are other socio-political or so called systemic
factors which have also impeded the implementation of
reform policies, including privatization, in Jordan.
Bery (1990) pointed out that
"what is seen from the outside as "lack of will"
or commitment may in fact be the wisest course
of action given such systemic factors. Outsiders
are obliged to appreciate these systemic factors
before exerting undue pressure and provoking
failure" (Bery, 1990, p.1125).
What are these factors?
The crisis of unemployment and the increasing number of
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people living below the poverty line impeded the
government from proceeding with the privatization of its
public enterprises during the period before the Gulf war,
and brought privatization completely to a halt in the
period from the end of the war until 1993.
Since public sector employment represents about one-half
of total employment in Jordan, the implementation of
privatization will be seen as a state retreat from its
historical responsibility and a breach by the state of the
social contract agreed between its leaders and the people,
particularly in the absence of any unemployment benefits
or effective social security system.
Although the government has attempted to balance
differential social advantages and disadvantages, severe
inequalities inevitably accompany privatization. An
increase in the number of job seekers is linked with an
unavoidable increase in the concentration of wealth and
income.
In a socio-political environment similar to that in Jordan
decision makers have historically been characterised by a
vulnerability to internal and external events. The patron-
client relationship and the distributive responsibility of
the state stemming from its heavy dependency on external
resources led the state to be the employer of last resort.
This means that large numbers of people became totally
dependent on the state for their income.
Such people, particularly the East Jordanians, are
politically significant for the country's stability
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because of their loyalty and support for the leaders which
is based on their economic dependence on the state. In
other words, there is a contract of shared benefits. So,
privatization means a great gamble for politicians unless
there is a careful policy design and a gradual mechanism
for implementation.
The state in Jordan, although supportive of private
initiatives, plays and will continue to play a key role in
the process of economic and social development. Limited
and carefully designed privatization is a rational
political strategy for successive Jordanian governments
and bureaucrats. The case in Jordan suggests that systemic
factors based on state-society relationships may prove to
be constraints on the choices of policy and policy
implementation available to decision makers.
6.7: Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter has been to assess the process
of privatization in Jordan. To achieve this objective, the
opening section of the chapter investigated the role of
the state in Jordan. Three dimensions were considered. The
first measured the size of the state by its spending. From
1981 to 1990 government spending constituted 38.6 percent
of the country's GDP, a high percentage compared with that
of East Asian countries, for example. The study of state
spending revealed that 75 percent was directed towards
current expenditure and reflected a high level of military
spending (25 percent) and a large number of government
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employees. The Jordanian government plays the role of
employer of last resort. With the absence of unemployment
benefits and other social security schemes similar to
those in western countries employment in the public
sector is the only means of survival in a country
characterised by a low capacity for employment generation
in the private sector.
Through regulation the state distributes rents to its
elite by licensing every aspect of the market in Jordan.
The characteristics of the Jordanian state are similar to
those which existed in Europe from the 16th to the 19th
century and which still exist in contemporary Latin
America. Legislation and restrictions on market forces
form an integral part of the daily management of the
economy. Thus, although the state believes in free
enterprise and private initiative, markets are not free in
Jordan. In the absence of free access to resources a
transfer in the status of ownership will not necessarily
mean more freedom of choice for consumers and producers.
The state will still retain its power to influence private
activities in the same way as in the public sector.
The state's role as owner of production evolved in Jordan
through three phases. In the first (1921-1951) and the
second (1952-1972) the main goal was not to own but to
help and protect. However in the current phase, which
started in 1973, the government took the initiative from
the private sector because of the latter's inability to
build a modern economy. Thus, the public sector is large,
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mainly because of the great numbers of central government
departments. At the sectoral level the government
possesses a monopoly position in water, electricity
generation, and telecommunications. It also participates
through equity sharing in mining and the manufacturing
industries. In real terms, although owned through
shareholding, the government appoints, administers and
finances most of those industries as part of its control
of the commanding heights. However, it is still correct to
argue that the allocative role of the state through direct
ownership is limited in the country.
Privatization in Jordan was proposed in 1986 as part of
the reform programme initiated by the government of P.M.
Al-Rafai after it took office in 1985.
The study identified five factors which have played a
major role in the consideration of privatization as a
viable alternative; the economic recession in the country
during the last half of the 1980s, the growing deficit in
the central government budget, the huge burden of external
debt, the need to attract foreign investment and finally
the effect of western oriented bureaucrats on the decision
makers.
In order to support our findings regarding the empirical
evidence for privatization in chapter 3, an empirical
study was conducted on one of Jordan's SOEs (Jordan
Electricity Authority JEA) covering the period 1987-1992.
This corporation is completely owned by the government and
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represents a state monopoly in the electricity sector. The
study found that there is an increasing trend of
employment productivity and technical efficiency in the
generation stations as well as a positive rate of return
on the JEA's fixed assets. In spite of this there were
huge losses during 1987-1991 attributed to heavy borrowing
from external sources, and government pricing below
marginal cost, as well as the effect of currency
devaluations in 1988 and 1989 on JEA's in foreign currency
liabilities.
Our study of the JEA as well as the review of other
studies in Jordan leads to the conclusion that there is no
clear-cut evidence that private ownership is superior to
public ownership. Nor can it be claimed that a loss-making
corporation is necessarily economically inefficient.
Empirical studies themselves are rare because of the
monopoly position of most SOEs in a small-size market.
Thus it is difficult to find like-with-like comparative
studies.
An analysis of the financial performance of SOEs in Jordan
revealed that losses are not restricted to pure state
ownership but also occur in public shareholding companies
which were established to maximize profits. Many reasons
can be identified as the main causes of financial
difficulties within public enterprises whether in the pure
state sector or in public shareholding companies.
A complete record of government officials announcements on
privatization is documented for the period from 1986 to
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the end of 1993. The record shows that no single case of
privatization took place in the country despite many
government announcements at different times during this
period. The latest announcement stated that 1994 will be
the year of the first privatization experience in which
the national airline will be transferred to private
ownership.
In order to study the factors impeding privatization in
Jordan the chapter grouped them into two categories. The
first category was composed of economic reasons, which
include factors related to enterprise valuation problems,
physical and financial restructuring, the lack of an
efficient regulatory capacity and the weakness of the
capital market.
In the second category the delay in implementing
privatization can be viewed as a rational decision given
the kind of state-society relationship dominating in
Jordan. This is particularly so since the private sector,
which is characterised by short-termism and the search for
quick and secute returns on investment, cannot in Jordan
take over the role of the state at least in providing
employment opportunities for the large army of unemployed.
The expectation of the chapter is that privatization will
take a gradual approach in Jordan and the state will
continue to play a significant role in the management of
the economy.
The new five-year Plan for 1993-1997, emphasised that the
government
	 should	 carry	 out	 the	 following
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responsibilities; provide investment information, cut red
tape and simplify the complexity of regulation, enhance
competition in the market place, increase the investment
in infrastructure, particularly for the agricultural
sector and more investment in health and education or
human development.
Privatization in Jordan, however, will be more related to
the opening of new opportunities for private entrepreneurs
through government support and incentives. The plan
envisaged that the total gross fixed capital formation in
the country will be 5.132 billion JDs during 1993-1997,
63.5 percent to be supplied by the private sector and 36.5
percent by the public sector (Ministry of Planning, 1994,
p.156). The private sector will be allowed to participate
in the implementation and the management of
infrastructure. The plan envisaged a role for the private
sector in the field of water distribution, the collection
of water fees, cooperation between the private sector and
the Telecommunication corporation (TCC) to give the former
more participation in the construction of the
corporation's projects and the provision of some selected
services (ibid, p.141).
In such an environment privatization itself will be more
related to creating the institutions necessary for better
government through careful privatization design.
The current development plan (1993-1997), which was
published in 1994, referred to the need to conduct a
careful and detailed study about privatization in Jordan.
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The main objective of the study will be to draw a clear
conception of those public sector activities which are
suitable for privatization; the strategic activities in
which the state would continue its current role, but with
additional emphasis on their costs and benefits; and the
need to run current public activities on commercial
grounds as a first step toward their full privatization
(ibid, p.129). In order to achieve that there is a need
for privatization in Jordan to be looked at in a wider
context of participation and decentralization, which is
the task of the following chapter.
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7.1: Introduction
Chapter four in the first part of this thesis concluded
with the statement that development may mean
decentralization and the latter certainly does mean
participation, but that privatization will not necessarily
secure participation. It depends on how it is designed and
implemented.
This chapter will study this argument within the context
of decentralization and participation in Jordan.
The question is whether privatization in Jordan would lead
to decentralization and participation, and hence
development. However, as there is no actual experience of
privatization, the answer to the question will be
hypothetical rather than based on concrete evidence,
except for that of leasing state lands.
The chapter will outline government objectives on
decentralization and participation, the policies pursued
to achieve this, and whether they were successful or not.
The chapter will also measure the degree of financial
decentralization in Jordan and the changes in the
decentralization indicators between the period 1980-1984
and 1988. The main reason for this exercise is to
investigate whether the decentralization objectives of the
government in the 1986-1990 development plan were achieved
or not and why. Part of the investigation will focus also
on the process of project allocation on the local level
and its relevance to participation and development.
Democracy and free market policies are two important
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components of participation. However, the chapter will
argue that in the case of Jordan the introduction of
democracy or political liberalization since 1989 has been
forced by pressure from below but in practice been used
not as an instrument to increase popular participation but
as a new means of increasing the centralization of
decision making on the one hand and of speeding up the
delayed	 process	 of	 economic	 reform,	 including
privatization, on the other.
This issue will be investigated further by examining the
objectives of decentralization, if there are any, in the
more recent five-year development plan 1993-1997.
More attention will be given before concluding the chapter
to the factors missing in the analysis of the relationship
between privatization, decentralization, participation,
and development:- reforming SOEs, bureaucratic reforms,
and the importance of "crowding-in" the informal sector in
the development of Jordan'.
7.2: Government Objectives on Decentralization and
Participation 
It was argued in the previous two chapters that Jordan's
approach to development has been top-down. The main
reasons for this are;
1) The effect of colonial rule on the administrative
structure as well as the historical and religious power of
"Crowding-in" the informal sector means increasing and
supporting the establishment and the operation of
microenterprises legally, financially and institutionally.
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the leaders which has led to extensive centralization. The
King appoints the cabinet and may also relieve it of its
duties. He also makes appointments to the important posts
within the country (e.g. government officials and judges)
and can acquire further powers outside the constitution by
declaring a state of emergency (York, 1988). Such power
rests on the patron-client relationship vis-a-vis the
country's traditional tribal leaders and other notables
who constitute the ruling elite (Owen, 1992). It is this
which makes Jordan similar to the European mercantile
states of the 15th to 19th century where regulations were
designed solely to maximize the benefits of the ruling
elite.
2) The effect of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the complex
effect of the Palestinian question on the state-society
relationship in Jordan increased the tendency to
centralize the decision making process.
3)One of the major reasons for centralization is the
sources financing the government budget which will either
lead to dependency on aomestic sources (pressure for
participation) or on external sources (state insulation)
(Dessouki and Aboul Kheir, 1991). Dependency on exogenous
sources of finance in Jordan led to less pressure on the
government for participation in decision making because in
many countries, particularly in the developed world,
increased taxation means an increase in pressure from
below for participation. In the case of Jordan the state,
instead of taxing to raise revenue, became a patron which
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distributed benefits on society, in particular by being
the employer of half the workforce in Jordan. Furthermore,
the drive to build the nation and its industrial base
contributed to a more top-down approach towards
development. Nevertheless, this factor represents the most
powerful one because in the face of economic crisis
pressure on government for participation through
decentralization starts to mount and the voice option,
according to Hirshman (1970), starts to activate and this
is what happened after the decline in government revenue
after 1982.
By the mid-1980s the revenue of the Jordanian state had
declined because of the fall in oil prices and the
negative effects of this denoted by the decline in
external revenue. Inflation, unemployment and poverty
increased as recession hit the economy. As a result, there
was a tendency in the government to bring about more
participation in the decision-making process. It was at
this time that the idea of privatization was born.
Decentralization was viewed as a way to combine regional
planning with sectoral planning and the preparation of the
1986-1990 development plan was conducted within such a
context.
It is interesting that the Jordanian Ministry of Planning
was working with the United States Agency for
International Development and adopted USAID's Rural
Development Strategy framed by Rondinelli (1984) and
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entitled, "Urban Functions in Rural Development Strategy2"
(Honey and Abu Kharmeh, 1989, p.80).
This provided positive evidence for the simultaneous
imitation of both policies, privatization and
decentralization, by Jordanian decision-makers and
planners. This is fully consistent with the frame set by
the World Bank, USAID, and the advocates of their line of
thought.
While planning prior to 1986 was sectoral in base and
goals, the fifth development plan (1986-1990) was regional
and denoted the first phase of establishing a system for
regional planning in Jordan. Thus, it was regarded as a
departure from the old system of sectoral planning which
had characterised previous national plans.
There were two main principles in this plan which revealed
the decision-makers' and planners' vision of
decentralization and participation.
The first is the principle of social justice which
perceived that territorial decentralization contributes to
the achievement of a more balanced distribution of the
fruits of development, particularly in circumstances where
the landowners, the trading and the business communities
have benefited substantially more than rural people. So,
planners viewed territorial decentralization by increasing
the base for people participation in the initiation,
2• The strategy calls for injecting investments in
smaller towns of the rural regions as well as improving the
communication, transportation and trade linkages (Honey and
Abu Kharmeh,1989).
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formulation, implementation and monitoring of the
projects. That will lead to more efficiency in the
distribution of services and to more social equality. In
the words of the plan document
"Realizing social justice in all regions of the
Kingdom and ensuring a balanced geographical
distribution of social and economic services
through regional development, promotion of
popular participation in the formulation,
implementation and follow-up of overall
development programs and adoption of regional
planning methods to direct future development at
the national, regional and local levels"
(Ministry of Planning, 1986, p.78).
The second principle was based on people as the means and
objects of development. Thus it called for popular
participation as a way to increase human capabilities and
choices. The plan stated popular participation to be the;
"Enhancement and expansion of popular
participation in the various phases of the
planning process as well as in decision-making,
determining of priorities and monitoring the
implementation of development projects and
programs. The emphasis on popular participation
stems from the concept that man is the mean and
object of development. He is the means by
participating in the planning process,
contributing as much effort as he could, and he
is the object because he reaps the achievements
of development in the form of employment
opportunities and appropriate income" (ibid,
p.114).
Another vision of decentralization and participation is
available from an interview with Crown Prince Hassan of
Jordan.
In reply to a question in August 1988 about his opinion on
decentralization in Jordan he stated that;
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"There has to be an effort made to move people
out of high population areas-hence the
importance of regional planning. I still feel
that greater participation is essential on the
part of the local elected bodies. (the problem)
is what available in terms of finance... One of
my major disappointments ...is the inability to
monitor the (planning) process in the regions"
(Interview with Crown Prince Hassan, 1988, p.7).
Concerning the future of the decentralization process he
said;
"I hope the government will take the necessary
decision on this all-important subject to
allocate a decentralised budget more effectively
to regional councils and provided the necessary
staffing to assist those councils"(Interview
with Crown Prince Hassan, 1988, p.7).
Both answers revealed that there was no true commitment on
the side of the state to empower people at the local
level, firstly because financial constraints do not mean
that priorities at the local level cannot be selected by
the local people despite the funding shortages (Cernea,
1991, pp.9-10). Secondly, in nis first answer the Crown
Prince expressed the wish to continue monitoring the
planning process even at the local level. This ultimately
leads to central intervention in all aspects of planning
as we shall see in the implementation or practical part.
It is the decision-makers' vision of decentralization and
development in general which leads to more centralization.
This is because it is development from above. What is
needed is empowerment, not a programme conducted from
above and evaluated from above. There is a need for a real
spatial reversal to the "local scale" in village councils.
The question, therefore, is whether there was a failure in
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the design or the implementation.
7.3: The Design of Decentralization and Participation 
There were four levels in the hierarchical system
established to coordinate the plan (Honey and Abu Kharmeh,
1988) (Honey and Abu Kharmeh, 1989).
At the national level there was the Ministry of Planning
with officials and experts who held the upper hand in the
ultimate decision-making processes. The Ministry developed
a geographical information system (including a locational
network with all settlements) which depended on field
level surveys as well as information provided by other
ministries.
The second level in the top-down hierarchy was the
governorate level. There are eight governorates considered
to be regional planning agencies. Their main task was to
update data for the Ministry of Planning files. The
governorate structure possessed only a modest planning
staff, but they were still important as a territorial
division to provide.state services for the regions.
The third tier in the planning system was the subdivision
of the governorates, nominated as development subregions.
Each one had a "development council" consisting of public
and private leaders. These were new territorial units. The
selection of these territorial units was based on two
principles, the first was physiography (valley, highlands
or desert) and the second spatial linkages. There were
according to those two principles 37 subregions, as
478
illustrated in table (7.1). However, in theory, the
councils were expected to identify development plans for
their respective territories mainly to enhance employment
opportunities and increase income. At the same time, they
had to work with the governorates and the Ministry of
Planning to find financial support (domestic and foreign)
for the implementation of the plans.
The last level in the hierarchy of regional planning was
the development cluster of villages, known as
"development units". Each unit had a representative on the
respective development council. This level was seen
chiefly as an information line rather than a level of any
executive power.
From the design point of view it could be said that the
plan had the potential to provide the appropriate
structure as well as a solid base for territorial
decentralized development. That would have been so if the
assumption had matched the intentions of the decision
makers. However, this was not the rase as the
implementation process revealed.
7.4: Decentralization in Practice 
It is known that the inclusion of a proposed activity in
any development plan is not a guarantee of its
implementation. The Jordanian 1986-1990 development plan
although sound in its design, could be assessed as a
successful failure from the implementation aspects.
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Table 7.1
Regional Planning Units in Jordan Development Plan
(1986-1990)
Governorate Sub-regions No. of
development
units
No. of
vill-
ages
Amman Amman 1 52
Ma'adaba 8 143
Na'our 4 38
Sahab-Muwaqqar 2 25
Sub-total 4 15 258
Zarga Zarqa 5 36
Dulail 1 7
Azraq 1 6
Sub-total 3 7 49
Irbid Irbid First 5 28
Irbid Second 6 42
Ramtha 2 6
Bani Kananah 3 21
North Ghors 4 4
Koura 4 31
Ajloun 6 53
Jerash 8 55
Sub-total 8 38 283
Mafraq Mafraq 6 76
North desert 8 73
Sub-total 2 14 149
Balqa Balqa Ghor 7 25
Balqa Middle 7 40
Balqa'a Basin 4 17
Sub-total 3 18 82
Karak Karak 1 38
Qasr 3 22
South Mazar 3 41
Ay 1 6
Safi 2 10
Desert 1 5
Sub-total 6 11 122
Tafila Tafila 3 23
Bsairah 2 10
Hassa 1 3
Sub-total 3 6 36
Ma'an Ma'an 3 17
AL-Husseinial 1 6
AL-Shoubak 1 21
Wadi Mousa 2 18
Desert 13
Aqaba 1 14
Quwairah 1 6
Wadi Araba 3 9
Sub-total 8 15 104
Grand Total 37 124 1083
ource: Honey and Abu Kharmeh(1988, p.279).
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Jreisat (1989) argued;
"Once more, the proposed projects and measures
in the plan are devoid of empirical content,
reasoned justification, or assessment of
expected outcomes at any level of tentiveness.
The general approach is basically of the
traditional, legal genre of prescriptions that
lack an action oriented, conceptual
sophistication, or substantive relevance; hence,
they are old remedies of proven inadequacy"
[(Jreisat, 1989, p.97) from (Jreisat, 1988)]
(emphasis added).
The failure to achieve decentralization and participation
could stem from the field studies conducted in Jordan
during the period 1989-1991. These emphasized the lack of
power at the local level to alleviate the problems facing
people in villages such as the lack of social services and
other important infrastructural requirements such as roads
(AL-Edwan, et al., 1990) (Sadik and AL-Kasawna, 1990) (AL-
Ahmed, et al., 1989) (AL-Ahmed, et al., 1991a) (AL-Ahmed,
et al., 1991b).
All the studies pointed out the powerless status of local
authorities and institutions from their establishment to
their budget and plans.
1.The Establishment of the Village Council: This requires
a request from at least 2500 people in the area to the
municipalities' minister through the governor of the
village. The minister establishes a committee which
advises him on the case for establishment. Later the
minister makes a recommendation to the cabinet which then
decides whether to establish the council or not. After the
establishment decision the municipality minister sets up
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a two-year administration for the village; an election is
then held to choose the administration. However, the
minister still possesses the right to approve or reject
the elected council. In addition, there are two members on
the village council who are appointed by the minister
himself but are subject to the national regulations
governing the civil service.
2. The Relation with the Municipalities Ministry: This
ministry controls all the municipalities in Jordan. The
staff of the municipalities are appointed by the ministry.
3. The Relation with the Ministry of Interior: The
relation of this ministry with rural Jordan is through the
administration governors. In addition to maintaining the
rule of law, the governors control the civil servants in
the municipality. The most important point is that the
head of the municipality cannot initiate any project
costing more than five thousand Jordanian Dinars (JDs)
without the approval of the governor. The governor is also
responsible for the relationship with the Municipalities
Ministry on project funding. The role of the governors in
the southern regions, as revealed by the study by Sadik
and AL-Kasawna, is more important than in the northern
regions (Sadik and AL-Kaswana, 1990, p.53). That explains,
at least partially, the relationship between greater
poverty in the south and excessive centralization.
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4. The Budget of the Municipality Councils: Although the
municipalities proposed the projects and explained their
advantages to the rural people in the area, the
Municipalities Ministry often altered the proposed
projects in order to be more consistent with the national
plan. The Ministry issued their final plan for
implementation. However, even with such excessive
centralization 94 percent of the heads of the
municipalities believed that this method was a
decentralized approach while the 6 percent who did refer
to excessive centralization were in the municipalities of
Amman, Irbid and Mafraq (ibid, 1990, p.57). This explains
the consistency in the objectives of the ruling elite
whether at the central or local level.
In summary, government below the national level is not
local government as is the case in western countries. In
Jordan it is much more of a local administration composed
of bureaucrats executing government policies from the
centre. Thus, the goals of the plan in initiating,
planning, implementing and monitoring did not find any
place in practice.
7.5: Measuring Decentralization and Participation 
The UNDP (1993) in its Human Development Report listed a
number of indicators to measure financial decentralization
in local government. However, the report referred to the
scarcity of information regarding local government in
developing countries as is the case in Jordan. In this
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section we will first measure financial decentralization
in local government for the period 1980-1984, then we will
construct more detailed local data for 1988. We will
calculate the data for the national level by using the
data provided by Sadik and AL-Kasawna (1990) in their
study of 50 Jordanian Municipalities 3 . We will also
examine whether or not funds granted to local governments
are directed towards the provision of basic needs such as
health, education, sanitation and clean water. The
emphasis on basic needs derives from their link with
participation and our concept of bottom-up development.
7.5.1: Decentralizations indicators 
In the case of Jordan we will employ five indicators to
measure the degree of financial decentralization.
1.The expenditure decentralization ratio (EDR) = Local
government expenditure(LGE)/Total government expenditure
(TGE)
2.The modified expenditure decentralization ratio (MEDR)=
Local government expenditure (LGE)/Modified total
3It is important to mention that there are no data
available on the expenditure and revenue of municipality
councils after 1984. Furthermore, even the new five-year
development plan (1993-1997) ,published in February 1994,
does not contain any information regarding municipality
expenditure and revenue. Thus, the construction of the data
for 1988 becomes important for two reasons, the first is
for comparative purposes as many of the decentralization
ratios asserted in UNDP (1993, table 4.2, P.69) were for
1988. The second reason is to assess whether the objectives
of the 1986-1990 development plan regarding
decentralization were implemented, at least in financial
matters, as it was a failure from the territorial side.
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government expenditure (TGE _ defence and debt servicing
expenditure).
3.The revenue decentralization ratio (RDR)= Local
government revenue (LGR)/Total government revenue (TGR).
4.Financial autonomy ratio (FAR)= Local government revenue
(LGR)/local government expenditure (LGE).
5. Proportion of total expenditure controlled by local
government (PTECLG)= (FAR) multiplied by (EDR).
7.5.2: Decentralization Ratios (1980-1984) 
As many aspects of the relationship between the centre and
the local level in Jordan cannot be quantified, table
(7.2) sets out the expenditure decentralization ratio
which measures the proportion of expenditure spent by
local government to that spent by central government.
However, there are two kinds of expenditure
decentralization ratio. The first is the expenditure
decentralization ratio (EDR), and the second is the
modified expenditure decentralization ratio (MEDR). The
first, EDR, does not discriminate between central
government expenditure that cannot be decentralized such
as military expenditure and debt servicing payments, or
that could be decentralized, such as health, education,
and development projects. Thus, EDR has to be modified in
order to take the military and debt servicing expenditure
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out of the central government total spending. Thus, MEDR
(Modified expenditure decentralization ratio) is more
appropriate for assessing the real proportion of finance
that the centre can allow the local level to assume
responsibility for spending.
In the case of Jordan, table (7.2) shows that EDR in
Jordan is very low although the central government
spending figures did not include the debt servicing
expenditure. This means the EDR will become lower if the
debt servicing payment is included. During 1980-1984 the
EDR did not reach 7 percent. Even when military
expenditure is deducted, the MEDR figures show that
spending in Jordan is highly centralized. The average MEDR
for 1980-1984 was only 8.3 percent. Thus, the
decentralization of public expenditure in Jordan is
extremely limited. A summary of the main reasons for this
was set out in the first section of this chapter, but it
is important to mention that the increase in transaction
costs, when spending is decentralized, has to be taken
into account. In other words, decentralization policies go
against the rulers' rule of the game (maximize revenue and
minimize transaction costs)4.
Likewise, in the case of the revenue decentralization
ratio (RDR), which measures the importance of local
government revenue to that of central government. The RDR
figures in Table (7.3) provide further evidence for the
`This argument is mainly derived from North (1989,
1991) and explained in detail by chapter 1 of this thesis.
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Table 7.2
Expenditure Decentralization Ratios in Jordan
(1980-1984)
(MJDs)
Years
Details
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Amman 15.7 21.1 20.6 22.8 24.1
Zarqa 1.7 2.1 3.4 3.1 3.3
Irbid 4.0 5.9 8.3 10.1 10.1
Mafraq 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.2
Balqa 1.6 1.1 1.5 2.0 1.5
Karak 0.9 0.9 1.2 1.7 1.5
Tafila 0.3 0.4 0.8 0.4 0.7
Ma l an 0.6 1.0 1.5 0.9 1.8
[1] LGE 25.5 33.4 38.3 42.2 44.2
(MJDs)
[2] TGE 487.9 546.2 632.0 656.2 640.6
(MJDs)
[3] MTGE 352.7 408.0 470.2 488.2 463.1
(MJDs)
[4] EDR 5.2 6.1 6.1 6.4 6.9
(%)
[5] MEDR 7.2 8.2 8.1 8.6 9.5
(%)
Sources:
[1] Local government expenditure (LGE) figures from
Ministry of Planning (1986, Table no.6, p.398).
[2] Total government expenditure (TGE) figures from IMF
(1991, p.346).
[3] Modified total government expenditure (MTGE) figure
calculated by the researcher after deducting defence
expenditure from (TGE) as the latter figures do not
include debt servicing in the first place (IMF, 1991,
pp.345-347).
[4] & [5] Expenditure decentralization ratios (EDR) and
modified expenditure decentralization ratio (MEDR) are
calculated by the researcher.
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Table 7.3
Revenue Decentralization Ratios in Jordan
(1980-1984)
(MJDs)
Years
Details
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Amman 13.6 15.5 21.2 21.9 29.2
Zarqa 1.7 2.3 3.0 3.1 3.1
Irbid 3.6 5.8 6.9 9.5 9.0
Mafraq 0.6 1.3 1.0 1.1 1.2
Balqa 0.8 0.9 1.5 1.5 1.3
Karak 0.7 0.8 1.0 2.0 1.4
Tafila 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.6
Ma l an 0.6 1.3 1.4 1.7 1.8
[1] LGR 21.9 28.4 36.7 41.2 47.6
(MJDs)
[2] TGR 507.0 591.2 627.1 674.4 643.3
(MJDs)
[3] RDR 4.3 4.8 5.9 6.1 7.4
(%)
[4] FAR 85.9 85.0 94.6 120.5 107.7
(%)
Sources:
[1] Local government revenue (LGR) figures adopted from
Ministry of Planning (1986, Table, no.4, p.396).
[2] Total government revenue (TGR) figures adopted from
Central Bank of Jordan (1989, Tables 37 & 38, pp.45-46).
[3] & [4] Revenue decentralization ratios (RDR) and
financial autonomy ratios (FAR) are calculated by the
researcher.
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argument presented throughout the second part of this
thesis, namely that Jordan's high dependency on external
sources of finance increased the tendency towards
centralization. The RDR average was only 5.7 percent
during 1980-1984.
Another indicator shown in table (7.3) is the financial
autonomy ratio (FAR) which measures the degree of local
government control on local spending. It appears that
Jordanian municipalities are highly autonomous in their
spending as the FAR was 98.7 percent during the period
1980-1984.
Two important factors have to be pointed out: the first is
that this ratio (FAR) is high because local government
spending was very low when compared with central
government spending, and the second is that the figures
for local government revenue imply, in the case of the
data for Jordan, revenue transferred by central government
to the local level. This is why more detailed data is
needed to show the percentage of local government revenue
(collected by the local government itself) against total
revenue which includes transfers from other sources.
Another indicator which shows the proportion of total
expenditure controlled by local governments is (PTECLG).
This reveals that the ratios were 4.5%, 5.2%, 5.8%, 7.7%
and 7.4% during the period 1980-1984.
All the above indicators of decentralization depict very
limited financial powers for local governments in public
spending and revenue collection during the period 1980-
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1984.
7.5.3: Estimated Decentralization Ratios for 1988 
Since 1984 there have been no figures available regarding
the expenditure and revenue of local governments in
Jordan. We have therefore estimated the data by relying on
the information collected by Sadik and AL-Kasawna (1990)
from a sample of 50 municipalities constituting 29.1
percent of the total municipality councils in Jordan and
about 10 percent of the total municipality and village
councils which totalled 516 in 1988.
7.5.3.1: The Methodology of Estimation
In the original study the authors calculated their figures
directly from the local authority budgets. They
distributed the councils in the sample between the eight
Jordanian governorates. We calculated the per capita
expenditure and revenue for each municipal and village
council included in the sample. We then multiplied the
figures for per capita expenditure and revenue by their
counterparts at the governorate level. We calculated all
the expenditure and revenue ratios as well as the shares
for each kind of expenditure and revenue source and then
related them to the governorate in the sample. By
totalling the data for the eight governorates we produced
the figures to be used in measuring the different
decentralization ratios at the national level for 1988.
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7.5.3.2: Expenditure Decentralization Ratios 
One of the important indicators derived from the
expenditure figure and the number of councils in table
(7.4) is that per capita council spending varied widely
between the eight governorates. In Amman governorate,
average council spending was the highest in Jordan (98.7
thousand JDs), while in Zarqa, an industrial governorate,
the spending was only 26.9 thousand JDs. Another important
indicator from the table is that related to the notion of
expenditure.
On average, the current expenditure share of the local
authorities total expenditure amounted to about 47 percent
while that spent on development projects was only about 22
percent.
If we assume that all development expenditure was
allocated to the social priority projects such as health
and education, which is not true in practice, then
Jordan's local government social allocation ratio (social
expenditure/ total expenditure) would be similar to those
in Kenya and Malawi in 1989 and 1984 but less than those
in Chile in 1988 (31%) and Zimbabwe in 1986 (34%) (UNDP,
1993, table no. 4.4, p.71). In comparison with the
industrial countries, the social allocation ratio in
Jordan was about half the ratios in Germany (47% in 1988)
and the United Kingdom (43% in 1989) (ibid).
Measurement of the EDR revealed that the percentage of
local government spending to that of total government was
small at 3.5%, which is about half that for 1984.
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Table 7.4
Estimated Municipal Councils Expenditure
According to Jordan's Governorates for 1988.
(Thousand JDs)
Governorate
Details
Annan Karp Irbid Mafraq Balqa Karak Tafila Ma'an
No. of Councils 85 19 161 73 54 66 16 42
Total Local
expenditure (Os)
8389.5 511.1 8082.2 4547.9 4438.8 3471.2 1004.8 1625.4
Average Council
expenditure
98.7 26.9 50.2 62.3 82.2 52.6 62.8 38.7
Expenditure Share
ill
Current 42.9% 54.1% 45.0% 39.4% 44.61 38.6% 34.11 46.9%
Capital 5.4% 26.8% 3.5% 2.5% 5.7% 7.4% 1.5% 0.7%
Developlent 19.4% 2.0% 24.21 18.6% 20.0% 28.7% 16.7% 28.3%
Others 32.31 17.1% 27.31 39.5% 29.7% 25.3% 47.7% 24.1%
Total 100.01 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Source: All figures are calculated by the researcher
employing the sample data in Sadik and AL-Kasawna (1990).
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In comparison with other developing countries the EDR in
Jordan was lower than in the majority of developing
countries (14 out of 17) listed by the UNDP (1993, Table
no. 4.2, p.69). Even after deducting military expenditure
from total government spending in 1988, the MEDR for
Jordan was only 4.8% which is the lowest among the seven
developing countries listed in the Human Development
Report of 1993. The explanation for such a low ratio in
Jordan is that the reduction in local government
expenditure was enforced by central government because of
the recession which developed in the country after the
mid-1980s.
7.5.3.3: Revenue Decentralization Ratios 
A number of interesting observations can be derived from
table (7.5). The first is that total local authority
revenue in Jordan was 33.3 MJos in 1988. This means the
RDR was only 4.1 percent, which is also less than it was
in 1984. In comparison with other developing countries
Jordan's RDR was less than that of South Korea (31%),
Zimbabwe (17%), Algeria (16%), Bangladesh (8%), while more
than that of Brazil (1%), Ghana (2%) and Costa Rica (3%).
However, the most important observation is that related to
the structure of revenue sources for local councils.
All local councils in Jordan were highly dependent on
central government to provide them with revenue because
they had no powers to collect taxes. About 59 percent of
local Council revenue came from government while only 15
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Table 7.5
Estimated Municipal Councils Revenue in Jordan
According to Source of Revenue in Each governorate
for 1988
(Thousand JDs)
Governorate
Revenue source
Aman Zarqa Irbid Mafraq Balqa Karak Tafila Ma'an
Total revenue 8381 484.5 10061.9 4555.2 3681.2 3367.8 1190.4 1579.6
OF which
Goverment 4097 383.8 5957 2963.8 2516.4 2516.4 680.0 1142.4
% of total 49% 79.21 59.21 65.0% 68.3% 68.3% 57.11 72.33
Municipality 2023 66.5 1360.5 562.1 804.6 402.6 92.8 193.2
1 of total 24.1% 13.7% 13.5% 12.3% 21.4% 12.01 7.8% 12.33%
Extraordinary * 2261 34.2 2744.4 1029.3 360.2 448.8 417.6 244
1 of total 26.9% 7.1% 27.3% 22.7% 10.3% 19.7% 35.1% 15.34%
Total share, 100.0% 100.0 100.0% 100.01 100.01 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Source: All figures are calculated by the researcher
employing the sample data in Sadik and AL-Kasawna (1990)
* Extraordinary revenue includes; projects revenue;
interests, grants and aid; and loans.
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percent was collected by the local authorities. In the
extraordinary revenue category, revenue from capital
projects did not account for even one percent of total
local revenue while the other main source of revenue
was the loans which constituted about 19 percent of total
municipality and village council revenue. Thus, the
financial autonomy ratio (FAR) calculated for Jordan
during the period 1980-1984 is highly misleading because
local council revenue does not equal local council revenue
raised by local taxation. The first produces an FAR equal
to 104 percent while the second gives an FAR of only 15.5
percent5.
7.5.4: The Allocation of Projects at the Local Level and
the Issue of Participation and Development
In the "Human Development Report" of 1993 the UNDP stated
that investment at the local level, particularly through
borrowing, may lead central government to lose "control
over the national creation of credit-and macroeconomic
management" (UNDP, 1993, p.74).
The report suggested that special funds for investment
such as the one in Jordan called "Cities and Villages
Development Bank" might provide an alternative means of
financing investment at the local level. The report went
on to assess the results of this development bank in the
5In the first method: FAR= 33.3 MJDs (Local government
revenues) / 32.1 MJDs (local government consumption= 104%.
In the second method: FAR= 33.3 . 0.15/ 32.1 = 15.5%.
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following oft quoted words;
"This has helped finance improvements throughout
the country, bringing roads, schools, clinics
and water supplies to even the smallest and most
remote communities" (UNDP. 1993, p.74).
In order to examine the extent of the success referred to
by the UNDP in the Cities and Villages Development Bank of
Jordan table (7.6) provides detailed data on the kind of
projects invested in by the Bank. The argument of this
chapter as well as the entire thesis is that providing
basic needs, such as medical centres, schools, clean
water, electricity and sanitation as well as roads and
other infrastructures, is the most important step towards
enhancing the capabilities, capacities and choices of the
people. From the table, it is clear that loans allocated
for investment in roads constituted about 40 percent of
the total. Such investment is essential for local people
in rural areas. However, loans allocated for investment in
basic needs were 1.5 percent in electricity, 0.5 percent
in schools. There was no investment in water, sanitation
or the construction of medical centres. It seems,
therefore, that investment in human development at the
local level is weak in Jordan. Instead the central
government provides such investment directly. As a result
of this top-down approach, many field studies in Jordan's
rural areas pointed out that shortages in the provision of
basic needs at the local level led to internal migration
to the urban centres (AL-Lawzi, et al., 1989) (AL-Tayeb,
et al., 1990).
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Table 7.6
Allocation Notion of the Loans Given By Cities
and Villages Development Bank to Jordan's
Municipalities
(Thousand JDs)
Municipalities of
----------------
Project notion
Amen Karp Irbid Mafraq Balqa Karak Tafila Mean
Roads 269 135 960 848 477 103 35 20
Electricity 67 16 0 a 24 a 0 a
Water o 0 0 0 0 o 0 0
General Buildings 0 0 42 50 0 12 0 a
Sanitation 0 o a a 0 a a 0
Schools a 0 12 a 7 14 0 a
Medical Centres 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	 1
Productive
Others
550 0 589 247 50
68
0 100 o
229
1115
100
251
1506
3109
159
1304 626
303
432
a
135	
1 75
95Total
Source: Cities and Villages Development Bank (1987, table
no.9, p.26).
497
Thus, the success of Jordan's approach for allocating
projects to the rural areas have been overestimated by
UNDP (1993). The problem for this bank as for other
specialist development banks in Jordan is that the centre
determines the projects to be implemented with the
priorities set by planners and other decision makers at
the national level.
For example, investment in productive projects, which
constituted about 21.7 percent of the total loans
allocated by the bank in 1987, is usually based on an
allocation suggested by the development plan. Thus, there
is no participation for people at the local level either
in the initiation, implementation, and monitoring or in
the evaluation of success and failure. All the phases of
the project are discussed and agreed on by bureaucrats at
both levels, central and local. That is because local
councils and municipalities are not local government but
local bureaucrats. They form part of the Jordanian
government's apparatus for centralization rather than for
decentralization. Thus, he UNDP assessment regarding the
role of the bank in providing basic needs was not
completely true.
Another criticism of the Cities and Villages Development
Bank in Jordan stems from the highly distorted and unequal
distribution of loans among the governorates. In the
southern governorates, Karak, Tafila and Ma'an together
received less than 9.5 percent of the total loans
allocated by the bank.
498
Given the status of poverty and the low level of
development in the southern region there is no reason why
a greater proportion of investment should not take place
in the southern region. The only reason we can give is the
effect of powerful interest groups in the centre on loan
allocation decisions. Such a conclusion is consistent
with the history of centralization and the features of
administration in Jordan.
7.6: The Effect of Privatization Policies on Participation 
in Agriculture By Small Farmers 
The consistency between privatization or market-oriented
policies and functicnal decentralization as proposed by
the World Bank and its advocates has had a negative effect
on small farmers in rural Jordan6.
Leasing government lands to capitalist farmers in the
irrigated areas led to a more unequal distribution of
landholding and thereafter of wealth and income in the
country. The UNDP (1993, table no. 2.2, p.29) placed
Jordan among the countries with high inequality in the
distribution of landholding, 0.57 on the Gini Coefficient
measurement'. A policy of privatization through the
leasing of unused state land is not an alternative to a
land reform programme. However, Lipton (1993, p.644)
6For more discussion on the differences between
functional and territorial decentralization see chapter 4.
' Gini Coefficient measures the inequality in
distribution. Its value ranges from 1 (highly unequal) to
zero (very equal).
499
argued that land privatization (i.e., leasing) can be
classified as land reform "only if it is invoked at the
option of small farmers" (emphasis added). This was not
the case in Jordan, but land privatization led to a
greater deterioration of the incentives to small farmers
in Jordan.
Two important negative consequences were the result:
The first is that, while many Jordanian small farmers have
abandoned farming because they cannot afford the debt
forced on them by the middlemen and merchants in the rural
areas, there were 150 thousand foreign workers in Jordan
mainly working as wage farmers. Crown Prince Hassan in a
1988 interview admitted the negative impact of the
problem.
"With 150,000 workers from abroad largely in
agriculture. I feel that something is tragically
wrong. The incentives are obviously not viable
for Jordanian farmers. This is something that
has to be looked at" (Interview with Crown
Prince Hassan, 1988, p.8).
The second negative consequence is that commercialization
has led to an emphasis on more efficient, profitable,
modern (technically), high-yield crops. As a result
government loans have been directed toward the capitalist
farmer elite. This trend has led farmers to move from
self-sufficiency and semi-subsistence farming to a
dependency on commercial farming. The latter includes all
the risks arising from the new crops as well as the need
to engage in marketing.
North (1989, p.1321) argued that such developments lead to
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the break down of personal exchange and its most important
effect is the "break down of communities of common
ideologies and of a common set of rules in which all
believe".
Both spelled disaster for the small farmers. In the case
of marketing, dependency on the State Marketing Board led
to groups lobbying so as to gain first access to the
market with high prices. Even after the dismantling of the
State Marketing Board in 1989, capitalist farmers remained
powerful groups in the agricultural sector. It should be
explained that it is not ownership per se, but government
centralized policies, which favour capitalist farmers.
The latter lobby to secure access to government loans as
well as to secure the marketing of their products (in
particular at the beginning of the cultivation season) at
home and abroad. This has left small farmers in an unequal
position and is consistent with what North (1989, p.1321)
said, "the rise of impersonal rules and contracts means
the rise of the state, and with it unequal distribution of
coercive power".
Participation in the context of privatizing or leasing
state land (the free choice principle of participation)
failed because the policy was not complemented by
territorial decentralization through which local
organizations of small farmers can be active enough to
achieve free choices for their members. This problem might
be overcome if leasing were to be based on decisions by
local bodies governed by an efficient system of checks and
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balances (Nugent, 1993).
Another problem unsolved by privatization is the
government food pricing policy which contributed to the
shift from subsistence to commercial farming. Cheap food
for the urban sector led the country to increase its share
of food imports. Moreover, the policy of food aid from
countries such as USA to Jordan contributed to the
transfer from subsistence to commercial farming. Wheat
production has declined to the extent that the country
could only provide 14 percent of its actual consumption
during the period 1981-1985 while for barley the ratio of
self-sufficiency was only 18 percent. For other field
crops (including corn and Soyabean) the ratio of self-
sufficiency for the same period was only 6 percent
(Ministry of Planning, 1986, p.536).
Supporters of the commercialization of agriculture such as
the experts in the Ministry of Agriculture in Jordan, have
come to believe that farms with an area of less than 4
(ha.) are inefficient and unprofitable (Honey and Abu
Kharmeh, 1988, p.76). In reality more than half the farms
in Jordan fall below this level and this is an obvious
contradiction between what the experts believe, using
their modern knowledge, and what the poor need. The latter
basically need to enhance their capacity to use their
traditional experience and knowledge. However, this
problem has also been identified by the Crown Prince of
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Jordan.
"More work is needed to develop a policy which
is relevant to the bulk of small producers-
mainly subsistence farmers who can not afford
the outlays necessary for modern production"
(Interview with Crown Prince Hassan, 1988, p.9).
It is the Jordanian decision-makers, planners and experts
who have proved unable to work out an approach which is
committed in reality to a spatial reversal. Jordan's
decision-makers have always regarded modernization as the
subject and people as the object. There is need for a
shift in real policies to put people first rather than
modernization, a manipulative technology, and a deficient
centralization. As Uphoff (1993, p.619) has stated, the
goal should be to achieve a positive-sum outcome which
government programmes and the working of market forces
alone cannot.
The use of market forces as a way of increasing
participation does not work because the existence of
product surpluses and deficits within centralized policies
for the benefit of the rich in itself distorts the market
forces.
As long as there is a lack of healthy local organizations
and institutions, and territorial decentralization is weak
or does not exist, the universal solution of "getting the
price right" will fail to achieve a sustainable level of
development particularly in rural areas. Small Jordanian
farmers are the main losers from the privatization of
land.
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7.7: Dissatisfaction and the Institutional Role
The enforcement of Western models of development in Jordan
has eroded traditional Islamic values and undermined the
Jordanian people's confidence in themselves and their
cultural heritage. They have had their values and norms
denied to them by Western attitudes of cultural
superiority reinforced through an alien system of
institutions and material welfare.
Particularly in rural areas, there is a "power of belief"
in Islamic values. These values do not operate in a
similar way to those modelled by rational choice theory or
the context of individualism inherent in public choice
theory.
Institutionalists emphasise the importance of studying the
characteristics of social institutions in order to
understand the evolution of society and its institutional
change.
Nabli and Nugent (1989, p.1335) argued that there are
three characteristics which could be considered basic to
the concept of a social institution. The first is the rule
and constraint nature of institutions; the second is the
ability of institutions to govern relations among
individuals and groups as well as being applicable in
social relations and the third is their predictability
where the rules and constraints have to be understood, at
least in principle, to be applicable in repeated and
future situations.
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In the rural Jordanian communities there exists social
responsibility and accountability. Individuals must
voluntarily curtail their own freedom in order to maximize
collective freedom. Participation in this sense will not
be valued individually but collectively. Until today the
head of the family is respected and is able to enforce his
decisions on family members because denying recognition to
the father of the family means denying recognition to the
other members of the family. There is a feeling of
security in belonging to a family and community. In Jordan
these needs cannot be enhanced and worked to their full
capacity when alien values and models of development are
introduced.
In these communities there are rules and norms which from
a western point of view work irrationally.
For example, in a field study about the socio-economic
conditions in Tafila governorate in the south conducted in
1989 AL-Ahmed and his colleagues found that only 33.5
percent of the total households in the sample covered by
the study (1147 households) took loans and most of these
were working in military service. This was because most of
the families did not believe in paying interest on loans 
for religious reasons as Islam prohibits transactions
based on financial interest ( AL-Ahmed, et al., 1989,
p.76). Other field studies of rural areas in Jordan
reached the same conclusion (AL-Ahmed, et al., 1991a) (AL-
Ahmed, et al., 1991b) and (Sadik and AL-Kaswana, 1990).
Such a power of belief does not mean that the Islamic
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religion is an obstacle to development but that it is a
way of life which has to be taken into account.
Sutcliffe (1975) found no ground or evidence for the
assumptions made by Weber that Islam with its
"thoroughly traditionalistic ethic.., directed
the conduct of life into paths whose effect was
mainly opposite to the methodical control of
life found among Puritans" [Weber (1963, p.265)
as cited in Sutcliffe, (1975, p.77)].
And McClellland's conclusion in 1961 that "Arabs as
Moslems are probably generally low in achievements"(Mc-
Celland, 1961, p.340 as cited in Sutcliffe,1975, p.77).
Although the concept of development itself was simple
under the previous two assumptions, the researcher found
that "religious commitment (in the Jordanian Valley) has
no statistically significant effect on adoption of modern
farm methods or productivity" (Sutcliffe, 1975, p.80).
However, development is not the adoption of modern methods
of farming but it is rather the enhancing of entitlements
and choices for people to determine their destiny.
These views are shared by a growing number of scholars who
believe that traditional values are not inefficient
values, particularly in the Islamic context (Reilly and
Zangeneh,1990)
	 (Banuri,1990)	 (Slater,1989)
(Choudhury,1990) (Said,1989). This cannot be recognized
without combining the space factor in any analysis of a
development strategy. It is introducing the place factor,
as Barnes and Sheppard (1992) argued, which can explain
the rationality of human actions because the latter
506
"varies systematically and unpredictably according to the
context in which the action occurs"( p.18). So, the
question is whether or not international organizations
such as the World Bank and the IMF take such factors into
account when they put forward their policy proposals.
The Jordanian government started its economic reform
programme in 1988 by freezing expenditure and subsidies
while increasing revenue through new taxes and duties.
However, the measures of 1988 failed to bring about a
significant reduction in the budgetary deficit. In 1989,
the Jordanian government concluded a structur a I adjustment
package with the IMF. The agreement itself represented the
first admission by the government that it had mismanaged
the economy.
A first condition of the agreement was a cut in government
subsidies on fuels and foods in order to reduce the budget
deficit (excluding grants) from 23.7 percent of GDP in
1988 to 19.6 percent in 1989. This meant that the
measures, although economically sound, were also directed
against the interests of the poor. On 16 April the
government implemented price increases on a wide variety
of goods such as petroleum products (11-33 percent),
alcoholic beverages (40-50 percent), and detergents (25
percent). Water charges in the Jordan Valley were also
doubled. Moreover, the government on the IMF advice agreed
to reduce its subsidies on essential goods such as
powdered milk, barley, bran and olive oil by increasing
507
their retail prices (Satloff, 1992).
As the price burden fell too heavily on low-wage Jordanian
workers and small farmers, who had benefited least from
the country's boom years in the late 1970s and early
1980s, riots spread from the southern region of the
country, which is also the poorest, within hours of the
price increases being announced (Guardian, 21st April
1989, p.10).
This shows that neither the authorities nor the IMF had
given thought to the effects of such measures on the poor.
The demands of the people during their collective action
(riots) provided a clear voice against P.M. AL-Rafai's
economic reform policies on the one hand and the
centralization of decision-making on the other. In
relation to Hirschman's (1970) concepts of exit and voice
the riots represented the activation of voice when the
exit option had achieved its limit.
The first demand of the rioters was for the dismantling of
the measures towards cuts in price subsides; the second
was support for small farmers; the third, while pledging
loyalty to the King, was a demand for the end of economic
inequalities and corruption and greater political freedom
and participation (Brynen, 1992, p.90).
Although it is not possible to find a direct causal
linkage between privatization and the riots, because no
privatization took place, the people's dissatisfaction
with the economic reform policies can be understood as a
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no vote against privatization as well. This is because the
state is the major employer, and a severe cut in its
expenditure meant cuts in jobs and a resulting increase in
uncertainty, unemployment and poverty.
In such an environment privatization and policies of
"getting the price right" and that of functional
decentralization cannot secure choices and participation
for the people within the context of decentralization as
a strategy for development. It simply makes the rich
richer and the poor poorer.
Crown Prince Hassan, when asked for his view on the IMF
measures after the riots, said "these measures will be
more than we can bear unless we can secure Arab aid"
(Interview with Crown Prince Hassan, April 23rd, 1989).
However, Satloff (1992) contended that the riots were a
result of the lack of consideration given to the effect of
such measures by Jordan's decision makers on the poor,
especially since the Jordanian team postponed discussions
with the IMF on specific policies in order to protect the
poor from the above measures. However, a failure to
anticipate the outcome of government policies is a culture
in Jordan's economic management.
The resulting riots were an opportunity for the people to
show the authorities their degree of dissatisfaction with
the country's political and economic management,
particularly that of Prime Minister AL-Rafai, the
organizer and designer of the economic reforms.
In the words of Ian Black, the Guardian's correspondent in
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Amman
"He (AL-Rafai) was widely blamed for the effects
of the recent agreement on debt rescheduling
with the International Monetary Fund, and, more
generally, for an arrogant and autocratic style
of government that alienated ordinary people
struggling with the country's severe economic
crisis" (Guardian, 25th April 1989, p.14).
This however indicates another important explanation for
AL-Rafai's motive for economic reforms in Jordan,
including privatization, namely securing gains for the
special distributional interest groups (Guardian, 28th
April 1989, p.15)(The Times, 24th April 1989, p.12).
The reaction of the monarch was to dismiss AL-Rafai and
appoint a new P.M. critical of AL-Rafai's policies. In
addition, the riots represented for some commentators the
turning point in the drive towards political
liberalization and participation in Jordan. The question,
however, is what kind of relationship developed between
democracy, participation and privatization (functional
decentralization).
7.8: Democracy, Participation, and Privatization 
The riots resulting from the country's economic crisis and
the government economic reform policies led the monarch to
appreciate that political reform was important in order to
temper the repercussions of the IMF adjustment Plan
(Robins, 1990). Thus, from the preceding discourse, the
two main factors which determined the introduction, form
and the nature of the democratic process were the short
and long-term objectives of political stability and the
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economic reform programme which includes privatization.
Both have led to greater political freedoms and new
political controls.
Our argument is that participation through democracy and
pluralism cannot in Jordan be equal to that of popular
participation through territorial decentralization because
the spatial reversal factor is absent from the first
mechanism of participation.
Democracy has been introduced to enable the same economic
reform programme to be implemented with parliamentary
approval. Even if opposition to economic reform is
mounted, parliament will have no alternative but to accept
the reforms because that is the only way to ensure that
Jordan's debt can be rescheduled and the economy receive
additional funds from international aid agencies and
western countries which demand reforms as a condition.
The democratization process started in November 1989 with
the election of the Chamber of Deputies, but since then
the process has been controlled by the authorities in a
way consistent with their general aim of political
stability and the approval of economic reforms.
The aim of starting the democratic process early could be
seen as a way of pre-empting any further violence or
rioting in the country.
In April 1990 King Hussein appointed a Royal Commission
(R.C.) to draw up a national charter governing the
democratization process in the country (Susser, 1993,
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p.498).
Rather than relying on the National Assembly to draft the
charter the leader through his assignment to the (R.C.) of
this very important task determining the future and the
form of popular participation in Jordan proved that the
process of political liberalization or democratization
would be subject to direction from above.
This is consistent with the objective of "keep in control"
because the authority saw that the national charter was
essential to Jordan's democratic experiment (i.e., define
the legal and ideological framework). It also ensured that
"the process of liberalization would not get out of hand
and endanger the regime" (Susser, 1992, p.468). It could
be said that it was also a way to escape the danger of the
Islamic movement having an influence on the shaping of the
charter.
Likewise the P.M., Badran, in 1990, declared that
political liberalization in Jordan "was the "real safety
valve" for a country in prolonged economic crisis" (ibid).
Similarly, the King's adviser, Adnan Abu Awda, noted that
the National Assembly should "serve to complement [i.e.,
not oppose] the state in carrying out its duties" (ibid).
The three above quotations show that the authorities
believed they were best placed to define the rules of the
game. One result was that ratification of the national
charter on 9 June 1991 was carried out by a specially
summoned national conference (Susser, 1993, p.501).
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The charter was composed of eight sections dealing with
different dimensions (e.g., the rational and aims, the
law-abiding state and political pluralism, the economy,
society). However, three of them provide an important
linkage between democracy, participation and
privatization.
The first principle of the charter reserved the right of
forming and designing policy ;
"The system of government in the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan is parliamentary, monarchic
and hereditary. Adherence by all to legitimacy
and to respect of the letter and spirit of the
Constitution shall enhance the union between the
people and their leadership" (Ministry of
Information, 1991, p.14).
In the section dealing with the principles and limitations
governing the political parties the charter withdrew the
right to use demonstration and violence thus
depoliticizing the issue of economic reforms.
"Jordanians enjoy the right to establish and
belong to political parties and grouping
provided that their objectives are legitimate,
their methods are peaceful and their statutes do
not violate the provisions of the Constitution"
(ibid, p.21).
Also, in chapter one, the right of the citizens
"to change their circumstances and improve their
lot by legal means, express their views, and
report to whatever they deem necessary for the
benefits of the whole by legitimate methods, and
participate in the decision-making process"
(ibid, p.13)
Control of the democratization process was necessary but
not in itself sufficient to absorb the dissatisfaction
with economic management and economic reforms. Therefore,
cooptation was another goal for democracy. In other words,
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it was an avenue for the political leaders to bring key
opposition figures under control (Pool, 1993, p.51). The
opposition's acceptance of the rules of the game in itself
denoted a major victory for the leaders because it secured
the goal of political stability on the one hand and on the
other put them on line to share the responsibility for
managing the economic crisis and the economic reform
programme. Any criticism from the people of the
government's economic management implies criticism of
Parliament. However, that does not mean Parliament will in
practice have the upper hand in managing economic policy.
In summary, a measure of popular participation in
difficult decisions about resource allocation was
necessary since the authorities had no intention of
lifting either the economic reform programme or the
austerity measures it implied. In fact, between 1991 and
1992, state subsidies were reduced from 120 MJDs to only
40 MJDs (The Middle East, 1992, p.8).
Regarding privatization and the role of the state chapter
5 of the national charter noted that the future
relationship between the state and the private sector
should be based on encouraging private ownership. However,
the state would retain control over strategic industries
as well as regulating the economy.
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" The Jordanian economy must be based on respect
for private ownership and encouragement of
private enterprise. On the other hand, natural
resources and strategic projects must be the
property of the state, with a full right to
their management and supervision in the public
interest. The state must also retain the
prerogative of regulating the economy and
allocating resources in accordance with national
priorities" (ibid, pp.26-27).
Thus, the relationship between democracy, participation
and economic reforms including privatization was formed in
order to serve political stability rather than popular
participation.
As Amawi (1992, p.29) argued, democracy in Jordan is
limited to the parliament, parties and the press, but it
has to include socio-economic rights, such as the right to
form grass root organizations (GROs). UNDP (1993, p.21)
contended that individuals participate more effectively
through group action which comes through membership in
community organizations.
Political participation may be secured through democracy,
but the latter cannot secure social and cultural
participation. Likewise, economic participation through
economic reforms and privatization cannot assured social
and cultural participation unless privatization design and
implementation techniques are well designed.
The question of economic reforms, on the other hand, goes
beyond the issue of privatization or public versus private
since it belongs to the centralization/decentralization
sphere	 of	 policy	 formation.
	 Both	 processes,
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democratization and economic reform including
privatization, are state-induced and relatively the state
retains a considerable degree of management over them in
spite of the fact that "democracy has to be valued and
sought for itself, not for its economic rewards" (Hank,
1992, p.22). Although UNDP (1992, p.27) contended that
"political freedom is an essential element of human
development", it is important that it is understood within
its particular applications, objectives and limits.
7.9: The Current Thinking of Decentralization and
Development
In Jordan the authority does not want to expand the
spectrum of democratization because it can act as a
constraint rather than an advantage for proceeding with
economic reforms.
A measure of the authority's achievement in
democratization is its success in passing the budget and
economic reform programme for 1992 through Parliament with
a comfortable majority (EIU, 1992b, p.16). The new
Parliament elected in November 1993 is expected not only
to give decision makers no problems but also to provide
good support in implementing the IMF and other long
delayed privatization programmes (The Middle East, 1994).
Further important evidence of increased centralization is
the shift in planners' and decision-makers' orientation
and thought from participation and empowerment within the
516
context of decentralization and development (i.e.,
devolution), similar to that in the 1986-1990 development
plan, to a more functional decentralization (i.e.,
deconcentration, delegation and privatization) in the
latest five-year development plan (1993-1997).
The word decentralization appeared only three times in the
new 196-pages development plan document, published in
February 1994. The first objective of decentralization is
to increase the efficiency of government administration by
reducing intervention and duplication of responsibility
between different government departments (Ministry of
Planning, 1994, p.86).
The second occasion where the word decentralization
appears is in the context of conducting studies of
government agencies and departments outside the capital in
order that some of the centre's responsibilities can be
delegated (ibid, p.129)
The third and last occasion in which decentralization
emerges is in the context of increasing the financial and
economic efficiency of SOEs. In this episode the
decentralization of power to branches of SOEs in the
governorates will increase their flexibility and autonomy
so that they can increase their degree of responsiveness
according to location (ibid, p.128).
In more than one case, the emphasis on privatization as a
way of decentralizing decision making to the market place
was based on the argument of inefficient and highly
centralized SOEs (ibid, pp. 41-42). However, the plan
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revealed that the state will continue to control strategic
activities within the economy.
In summary, the 1993-1997 development plan represents a
clear shift from participation and empowerment (i.e., to
territorial units) towards sectoral planning in which the
emphasis is mainly concentrated on the limited delegation
of power and responsibility within government departments.
In this plan there is not even one occasion in which
municipality and village councils are mentioned.
That is to say, the relationship between decentralization
and development in Jordan is based on development from
above in which the central authority determines to what
extent participation and empowerment shall be allowed. For
that reason we argue that unless privatization can
increase	 participation	 (i.e,
	 increase	 employee
participation in decision making, increase the number of
lower-income shareholders) it cannot achieve a higher
level of human development.
The danger comes when IMF policies and privatization
programmes deliver no significant outcomes in terms of
growth and efficiency, and lead to a deterioration in
living standards because of increasing unemployment and
poverty.
If privatization is in future to include health, education
and other basic needs sectors of the economy, then the
human development achievements of Jordan during the last
four decades will be thrown away. As table (7.7) asserts,
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Jordan's success in human development is visible. The
human development index rose from 0.428 in 1970 to 0.586
in 1990 which put the country among the leading nations in
terms of human development.
Table 7.7
Comparison Between Trends of Human Development
in Jordan with those of Developing Countries
Trends in human development Jordan Developing Countries
-Life expectancy at birth
(years) 1960-90
-Under five mortality rate
(per 1000 live births)1960-90
-Daily calorie supply
(as 1 of requirements)1965-88
-Adult literacy rate
(%) 1970-90
-Real GDP per capita
(PPP$) 1960-89
-Human development index
1970-1990
-The difference between GNP
rank and HDI rank (1989-90)
46.9 to 66.9 years
217 to 52 child
93 to 118 % of
requirement
47 to 80 1
1120 to 2415 PPP$
0.428 to 0.586
-13*
46.2 to 62.8 years
233 to 112 child
90 to 109 1 of
requirement
46 to 64 %
784 to 2296 PPP$
N.A.
N.A.
Source: UNDP (1992, table no.1, pp.128-129 and table no.4,
pp. 134-135).
*Shows that the GNP rank is higher than the HDI rank.
The country's position according to the 1992 Human
Development Report is 14 out of 110 developing and
developed countries listed (UNDP, 1992, table no. 1.3,
p.94). However, the high investment in basic needs,
particularly health and education, during the 1970s and
the beginning of the 1980s was related to increasing
external revenues as was the increase in per capita
income. Thus, the achievements should be understood within
the context of a semi-rentier economy in which dependency
on external factors determines the policy direction. If
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the Jordanian government is forced to cut expenditure in
the future as a result of IMF and World Bank conditions,
the targets will be the softest items such as health and
education. This represents a risk particularly if the
decision makers continue to exercise a top-down approach
towards development.
7.10: Important Factors in the Relationship Between
Privatization, Decentralization, Participation and
Development 
The preceding discussion on the relationship between the
four issues did not take into account some important
factors.
7.10.1: Reforming SOEs 
One of the important factors which has to be taken into
account is the reform of Jordan's SOEs because, according
to the 1993-1997 plan and the 1991 National charter, many
of them will continue to operate under state ownership.
1.The first step is to decentralize the authority of such
SOEs from the government to their managers so that they
can operate with some autonomy. Government intervention in
the running of such enterprises has been one of the main
factors affecting their performance in Jordan. Multiple
objectives and political appointments to the boards of
directors have allowed the state to divert the operation
of these enterprises to non-economic objectives.
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2. Employing a system of performance evaluation which has
to be linked with another system of incentives for
managers and employees. This contrasts with the present
system of routine bonuses for all managers and employees
irrespective of their performance. Setting planned targets
for the performance of every line and department over a
certain period of time are important elements in
distinguishing between "efficient" and "inefficient". Such
target achievement systems with efficient incentive
schemes will allow better prospects for efficiency.
One of the major problems in Jordanian SOEs is the weak
system of control which raises the principle-agent
problem. As Jones (1991) said, "the [SOE] manager plays a
game without a score" (p.6). Introducing an efficient
system of performance evaluation with another of
incentives will contribute to solving such problems. This
is a difficult task to implement. Moreover, such systems
require continuous development of the performance
indicators themselves.
3. Establishing a new and competent system of
accountability which should be linked with an efficient
accounting system. Shiny (1990) gave five problems in
holding managers accountable;
"1.The available information does not give a clear and
accurate picture of performance.
2.There are no standards by which to judge results.
3.There is no organization assigned and competent to
evaluate performance.
4.There are no procedures to follow up on the evaluation.
5.The managers face many constraints in how much they can
affect performance"(Shirly, 1990, p.28).
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The need for monitoring enterprise accounts by an unbiased
and competent third party is very important. Thus, if the
decentralization procedures are implemented, the
government could play the role of the third unbiased
agent; otherwise, it is incapable of assuming such a role
when it is the suspect and the judiciary at the same time.
However, this needs a specification of the enterprise's
objectives, commercial and non-commercial, which are
quantifiable. In cases where the objectives cannot be
quantified, qualitative measurements can be used through
weighting their effects on a scale.
Managers should be held accountable for factors within
their control, and they should know that their reward or
punishment will be according to the behaviour of those
variables. In the oft quoted words of Jones;
"If autonomy is to be efficiently and
permanently delegated to the enterprises, then
accountability must be insured by a signalling
system which specifies and rewards socially
desirable behaviour" (Jones, 1991, p.9).
4.The dissemination of information through a performance
information system. It is the people who should know the
details of the enterprise's performance. In any private
company, such information is provided to the public or the
shareholders in order that they may assess the performance
of the company. The same principle could be applied in
SOEs. The corruption in many SOEs in Jordan would not have
occurred if there had been a regular check on the
information provided. This system with the accountability
system can provide safeguards for the people.
522
5.Government representation on the board of directors
should be for technical reasons only unless obvious
objectives need to be considered and clear reasons can be
given to justify breaking such a condition.
6. Any subsidy for the enterprises should be accompanied
by an evaluation of the reasons for the subsidy. Such
subsidies need to be planned for over a period of time and
the public kept informed about them. In Jordan, some
subsidies have been necessary as the direct result of
deficient government investments. A review of such
enterprises and their prospects should be undertaken in
order that, through analyzing the different objectives,
ways of improving performance can be agreed. In cases
where the future prospects of such enterprises, from the
social welfare point of view as well as the micro and
macro economic and financial dimensions, are severely
restricted decision should be taken to liquidate them or
to merge them with other enterprises that can benefit from
their output.
Any subsidies which occur because of deficiency in
performance and as a direct result of management
performance, rather than specified exogenous factors
outside management control, should be accounted for by its
management team.
7.Elected members of outside organizations (private
individuals,
	 NG0s, Public organizations, customer
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organizations and so forth) should participate in
monitoring the quality of performance and report their
findings and recommendations through the different
channels of information both to the enterprise and to the
public. Employing the "double check" principle can help
overcome the difficulties of such enterprises. The
ordinary people or what is called the "non-expert
populace" as Goulet (1989, p.166) described them, can
often contribute positively to their evaluation because
they are the customers affected by management performance.
Employing a system of evaluation from below as well as
from above (experts) can coordinate the efforts to improve
the enterprise's performance. Open lines for customer
complaints and recommendations should allow room for
voices to be listened to rather than to be suppressed or
avoided as has been the case in Jordanian SOEs.
8.Evaluating the provision of Public enterprise services
on a spatial scale, that is to consider the balance in
services provision for the poorer local areas against the
urban areas and setting time-place targets. This could be
achieved through discussion and the coordination of local
people particularly in rural areas where participation is
minimal.
9. Another problem facing SOEs in Jordan is overstaffing.
In this case the government has to take the responsibility
of introducing training programmes, which are in short
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supply, and redeploying the workers towards the economic
sectors with a shortage of employees, in particular the
semi-technically skilled.
10. Increasing employee participation in the initiation,
planning, implementation and evaluation of the different
projects would give them an incentive to reduce shirking
and opportunism because participation will set new
standards in the work place where every employee will be
considered an important member of the enterprise.
Currently, the shop floor workers in Jordanian SOEs play
no part in decisions regarding the operation of or the
investment in their enterprises. That is because of the
socio-economic culture which divides the work force into
managerial and manual workers where the latter have no
say.
7.10.2: Bureaucratic Reforms 
Another factor which privatization does not take into
account is bureaucratic reform. As a centralized state in
which bureaucrats constitute 48 percent of the total work
force, there is a need for Jordan to reform its
administration. The fifth and the sixth development plans
(1986-1990) (1993-1997) respectively describe the
overcentralization of authority and its relevant problems
by a weakness of commitment towards administrative
development leading to a lack of confidence in efforts
exerted in this direction.
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- Too much centralization in certain agencies, where the
agency head becomes the sole decision-maker on most
issues, coupled with a responsibility span which is too
broad for effective management.
- An indifferent attitude to public relations which takes
the principle of reciprocity into account.
- Weakness of the administrative staff in local government
organization, procedures, manpower and financial aspects,
together with insufficient concern for their development.
(Ministry of Planning, 1986) (Ministry of Planning, 1994).
Although bureaucratic reforms have been conducted since
the 1960s, this has been a slogan of every government
rather than a genuine commitment.
Ellayan (1987) conducted a survey by questioning the heads
and permanent secretaries of 76 administration departments
who in reality represented the bureaucratic elite. He
found that 56 percent of the respondents admitted that
their services did not meet people's expectations, and 52
percent said that their departments lacked adequate
information systems.
There is, therefore, a need to reform the bureaucratic
structure by decentralizing the authority of the central
agencies on the one hand and decentralizing their
authority to the sub-regional and local levels on the
other.
However, this should be accompanied by the introduction of
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an efficient accountability system (performance tables) to
ensure that the people's views of the services provided by
these departments are registered.
Decentralization by itself will not be enough without a
change in the rules and legal structures which govern the
bureaucratic environment. Training and accountability are
important steps in changing the structure of bureaucratic
practices. The promotion and stimulation as well as the
vitalization of local initiatives will contribute
significantly in that direction. This is not a simple task
because it requires concrete commitment and changing the
rules of the game. However, a journey of 1000 miles has to
be started with a first step.
7.10.3: The Informal Sector 
While the concern of privatization is the transfer of
ownership and/or control from the state to the private
arena, its focus has been limited to one sector of the
Jordanian economy, namely the formal sector, where SOEs
are operating.
The informal manufacturing sector in Jordan denotes 80.8
percent of the total number of manufacturing
establishments in Jordan. Thus, competition or
contestability is the environment under which such micro-
enterprises are operating. While sunk costs in such
enterprises are negligible, their survival is determined
by government regulations and policies. Privatization
proposals in Jordan, as introduced in 1986, did not
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discuss the factors affecting the operation of this
sector. Neither did the latest development plan (1993-
1997).
There is a need to support such micro-enterprises in
Jordan through a bottom-up approach. Those micro-
enterprises are denied access to credit and financial
assistance as well as the appropriate regulations to
perform efficiently so as to absorb the problems of
unemployment and poverty in Jordan. This is because these
enterprises are working on the fringes of the law. Most of
them have been consistently discriminated against. They do
not have legal protection and often rely on an informal
structure and informal contacts with the formal system in
order to survive. While they rely on indigenous technology
and innovations, which are the basic solutions for curing
the illness of modernization, the decision makers and
Jordanian experts link them with inefficiency and
traditionality which cannot bring about development.
Privatization is one of the policies that can diminish
their contribution because privatization is associated
with large enterprises and modern technology which is
capital intensive. It might be argued that getting the
price right will enhance the possibility of bringing in
labour intensive technology because of the work of the
relative prices mechanism. That probability is so narrow
because privatization is always associated with internal
and external competition. Relying on distorted labour
markets, as is the case in Jordan, with highly educated
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people makes the capital intensive alternative more
attractive to entrepreneurs. Profitability, efficiency and
competition need economies of scale, that is modern
technology, and often "master key" projects in the case of
Jordan. This relies on the assumption proposed by the
proponents of "development from above". That is to say
that those large enterprises are "growth poles" to be
integrated through linkages with other sectors in the
economy. However, that is not the case in Jordan where
weak linkages between and within the different economic
sectors have been an integral character of the economy in
the last three decades.
Privatization seems likely to reinforce the existing
conditions (of formal and informal sectors) by focusing
policy on the critical needs of the formal sector, which
already has access to resources and information as well as
the support of government.
Supporting micro-enterprises which enhance self employment
is not a trade-off between profits and employment, but
rather between private returns and social costs, or
between short-term and long-term growth alternatives as
Dessing (1990,P.7) argues.
Thus, it could be said that promoting informal activities
in Jordan would mean opening the administration gates so
that they can gain access to resources and reduce entry
and participation costs. That is "crowding-in" the
informal sector because markets are restricted in Jordan
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to the benefit of the large enterprises in the formal
sector. Therefore, eliminating the restrictions (i.e.,
huge working papers , ministerial approval, and so forth)
would enhance the informal sector's capacity to produce
and contribute rather than reduce its potential.
The second benefit from expanding the capacity of the
informal activities is that they are naturally more
responsive and flexible to people's needs and demands.
They can reach everywhere whether in urban or rural areas.
This could promote a mixture of the "exit" option with the
"voice" option. Moreover, they usually rely on personal
relations and community communication networks. This can
reduce transaction costs within the community.
Many handicraft activities have been eliminated in Jordan
because of their inability to compete and gain access to
the markets. Two field studies in Jordan found that there
would be a high potential for such small-scale industries
in rural Jordan if they could gain supportive policies
(Sadik and AL-Kasawna,1990) and (AL-Ahmed, et al.,1989).
The elimination of such traditional activities was also a
result of the commercialization of the agriculture sector,
the division of labour and monetization of the economy
where the people devalued their traditional businesses in
favour of new ones that could generate cash.
Traditional products also faced unequal competition from
similar imported goods with cheap origins such as Taiwan
and Hong Kong.
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Their is a need to reshape government policies so as to
emphasize the importance of using endogenous and
appropriate technologies, which people control rather than
being controlled by them. The informal sector is solid
ground for such a take-off point.
People have shared their knowledge and experience for
generations. The efficiency of their technologies might be
unable from the point of view of technical standards to
compete with the western technologies, but it is efficient
enough to generate and express their values, balance,
satisfaction, equity and respect. The latter can ensure
their survival as a community rather than as individuals.
Privatization and market-oriented policies eliminate such
important factors.
7.10.4: Legal Decentralization
In Jordan, there is an excessive centralization of the
judiciary, legislation and executive powers in the hands
of a few government agencies. Privatization does not
eliminate or reduce such powers which have been used
discriminately for the benefit of particular interest
groups. Moreover, privatization increases these powers
enabling the government to conduct its top-down market
oriented and privatization remedies.
There is a need to transfer these powers to decentralized
units, vertically and horizontally, so that power can be
shared rather than concentrated. This requires
decentralization to the territorial units as well as
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within the bureaucratic structure itself.
The strategy of development from below and within depends
primarily on participation. This participation cannot take
place if there is no decentralization of the legal system.
Many powers in Jordan are concentrated in the prime
minister's and ministers' offices. Delays and inefficiency
are features of the state system. However, such transfers
need a complementary policy of training to enhance the
capability and capacity of the decentralized units to work
efficiently on the one hand and to prevent them being
manipulated by small interests on the other.
7.11: Conclusion
In the last three decades Jordanian decision-makers and
planners have tried different approaches towards
development. All these approaches were based on
development theories which originated in Western countries
and were characterised by an emphasis on modernization and
growth. However, they were based on a centre-outwards,
top-down view of development. As a result, Jordanian
policies were based on a vision of imitation and blind
emulation of ideas and devices which were not harmonious
with people's needs, norms, and values. The poor have been
left struggling to survive the high tide of modernization
which has left them worse off. As a result, there is a
desperate need to find an alternative approach which will
enable people to participate and mobilize their
underestimated capacity.
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The view of international agencies such as the World Bank
and the scholars who follow their line of thought is that
decentralization and privatization are synonyms. Both can
be employed to achieve growth and efficiency and as a
result cure the cancer of poverty. Such a view equates
privatization with increasing choice and entitlement,
participation and empowerment. However, in the case of
Jordan the reality is different because it has been found
that what people want is participatory development.
Privatization, however, would open the door only for the
rich to participate and this they are doing even without
such policies.
In contrast to the territorial decentralization emphases
of the fifth development plan (1986-1990) the examination
of the relationship between local village councils and
other central government agencies suggested that no such
decentralization has taken place. Further, the examination
of decentralization ratios before the 1986-1990 plan and
during its implementation found that the modified
expenditure decentralization ratio (MEDR) dropped on
average from 8.3 percent during the period 1980-1984 to an
estimated 4.8 percent in 1988. Likewise, the revenue
decentralization ratio dropped on average from 5.7 percent
during 1980-1984 to an estimated 4.1 percent in 1988.
However the measurement of the financial autonomy ratio
(FAR) which measures the degree of local government
spending control is high in Jordan (on average 99 percent
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between 1980-1984); firstly because local government
spending is very low and secondly because the measurement
of local revenue itself does not discriminate between
revenues collected by local authorities and total local
revenue which includes transfers from central government
as well as other extraordinary revenues (e.g., aid and
loans). If such factors are taken into account the FAR in
Jordan would be reduced from 104 percent (according to the
non-discriminate method of the UNDP) to only 15.5 percent
(after revenue discrimination) in 1988.
Further evidence of the inappropriate outcome of the top-
down approach to investment at the local level suggested
that the allocation of projects through Jordan's Cities
and Villages Development Bank was directed away from the
basic needs approach to development. The detailed data of
allocation notion showed that loans allocated for
investment in basic needs were very small (i.e., 1.5% in
electricity, 0.5% in schools, and no investment in water,
sanitation and health). This result is contradicted by the
UNDP (1993, p.74) evaluation of the bank's role.
Privatization is a functional decentralization based on
the market. Thus, leasing government land to capitalist
farmers, which started before the recent decision in 1991
to lease state lands, led to a more unequal distribution
of wealth and income and with it less empowerment to the
poor which is the objective of decentralization as a
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strategy for development. Furthermore, it led to the
exclusion of small farmers from the decision-making
process with subsequent negative effects on the
development of the agricultural sector in Jordan.
It is often argued in the literature that democracy is an
important mechanism for increasing participation. However,
in the case of Jordan democratization, which was initiated
in 1989 as a response to social dissatisfaction with the
economic reform programme enforced by the IMF, has been
used not to increase participation but to continue the
process of centralization with parliamentary approval. The
chapter has provided a set of evidence including the clear
shift in emphasis on decentralization derived from a
tentative examination of the goals of the more recent
five-year development plan 1993-1997. It is suggested that
democratization and economic reforms including
privatization are state induced and that the state retains
a considerable degree of control when managing them.
Moreover, it is suggested that if the scope of
privatization is expanded to include the provision of
health and education, then Jordan's high achievements in
human development during the last three decades, which
were mainly the result of large windfall external
revenues, may be placed severely at risk.
In its final section, the chapter suggested many factors
which are important to the relationship between the four
elements; privatization, decentralization, participation
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and development. The first is a reform of SOEs in order to
make them more efficient and accountable. By setting new
standards of evaluation as well as allowing employees more
participation and managers more autonomy, reforms may
prove to be a better alternative to poorly designed
privatization.
Reforming the bureaucratic structure is the second factor.
There is a need to decentralize authority from the central
to the lower level agencies. This will involve training
the newly delegated agencies to be more accountable as
they become more autonomous. This in itself requires the
establishment of an efficient information system to
reflect the voice of the people and their evaluation of
the services because bureaucratic reforms have to be
understood in the context of making government agencies
more accountable to the people and more responsive to
their demands.
The third factor which privatization does not take into
account is the development of the informal sector. There
is a need to support micro-enterprises in Jordan because
they constitute the major employer and the provider of
income for a large segment of the population. Their low
sunk costs make them more open to competition and more
flexible in responding to consumer demand. They may appear
to be technically inefficient from the modernization point
of view, but they are efficient enough to reduce
unemployment and provide income if appropriate policies
allow them access to the benefits provided to the formal
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sector (i.e., credit). Their application to simple and
appropriate technology as well as their integration with
the local level are advantages not to be found in the
modern sector in Jordan.
The last factor of importance is legal decentralization
which privatization cannot secure. This requires
decentralization to the territorial units as well as
within the bureaucratic structure.
In summary the chapter suggested that the relationship
between privatization, decentralization, participation,
and development in Jordan is more complex than the
theoretical analysis suggested. Neither the introduction
of democracy nor economic reforms including privatization
have secured participation in Jordan. This is because both
policies have been initiated, planned, implemented,
monitored and evaluated from above. The real need,
therefore, is to renew the emphasis on decentralization as
a developmental approach in which the devolution of power
will enhance the participation, choices, and capabilities
of the Jordanian people. This in itself requires
institutional building wider than that called for in the
implementation of privatization policies.
A self-reliance and basic needs approach through
participatory development is more compatible with the
poverty problem than privatization because the latter will
only serve to marginalize the Jordanian poor in a
restricted market.
537
Selected References 
(*)= in Arabic
Amawi,Abla, "Democracy Dilemmas in Jordan", Middle East
Report, Vol.22, January-February 1992, pp.26-29.
Brynen,Rex, "Economic Crisis and Post-Rentier
Democratization in the Arab World: The Case of Jordan",
Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol.XXV, No.1,
(March 1992), pp.69-97.
Cities and Villages Development Bank, Annual Report
(Amman, Cities and Villages Development Bank, 1987).(*)
Ellayan,A., Report: Conference on the Role of Higher
Administrators in Administration Development (Amman,
Institute of Public Administration, 19117).(*)
Honey,Rex and Abu Kharmeh,Suleiman, "Rural Policy in
Jordan's 1986-1990 Development Plan", Journal of Rural 
Studies, Vol.5, No.1, (1989), pp.75-85.
Interview with Crown Prince Hassan, Middle East Economic
Digest, Vol.32, (19th August 1988), pp.7-10.
Interview with Crown Prince Hassan, AL-Sharq al-awsat,
(23rd April 1989), p.4.
Ministry of Information, National Charter (Amman, Ministry
of Information, 1991).
Nugent,Jeffrey B., "Between State, Markets and Households:
A Neoinstitutional Analysis of Local Organizations and
Institutions", World Development,Vol.21, No.4, (April
1993), pp.623-632.
Owen,Roger, State, Power & Politics in the Making of the
Middle East (London and New York, Routledge, 1992).
Pool,David: "The Links between Economic and Political
Liberalization", in Niblock,Tim and Murphy,Emma (eds.),
Economic and Political Liberalization in the Middle East
(London and New York, British Academic Press, 1993),
pp.40-54.
Robins,Philip, "Jordan's Election: A New Era", Middle East
Report, Vol.20, (May-August 1990), pp.55-57.
Sadik,F. and AL-Kasawna,M., Rural Development and its
Administration in Jordan" (Amman, Royal Scientific
Society, 1990).(*)
UNDP, Human Development Report 1993 (New York and Oxford,
Oxford University Press for the UNDP, 1993).
Chapter 8
Summary of Conclusions
8.1: Conclusions of Part I
8.2: Conclusions of Part II
539
8.1: Conclusions of Part I 
It has been argued by a number of scholars, particularly
those of the Neoclassical Political Economy (NPE) or what
is called the New Institutional Economics (NIE), that
privatization policies are necessary in order to shrink
the governmental apparatus and roll back the boundaries of
state responsibility so as to minimize "government
failure". The survey in chapter 1, of the literature
regarding the role of state in development, revealed that
there has been no agreement between economists on this
point. However, it is possible that the literature is
moving into a cyclical pattern. While the development
theories of the 1940s and 1950s favoured an expanded role
for the state, the NPE or the NIE, which advocated
privatization during the 1970s and 1980s, favoured a
minimalist role. The recent literature of the 1990s,
however, indicates that a minimalist state cannot provide
the conditions required by the neoclassical political
economists, particularly since the evidence from East
Asian countries regarding the state's role does not
support the claims of the NPE scholars. Free market
policies, including privatization, appear to have been not
the only reason for such success; other interventionist
policies have also been required. The focus on "government
failure" overlooked "market failure". Both failures,
therefore, need to be understood if there is to be a
better quality role for the state in development. Such an
understanding would necessitate a revitalization in
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current development studies of the concepts of linkages
and externalities from the high development theory of the
1940s and 1950s.
Given the economic challenges facing decision makers in
developing countries it is unlikely that privatization
will lead to a universal minimalist role for the state in
economic development.
One of the reasons for such a conclusion stems from an
analysis of the factors, theoretical and practical, which
led to the creation and expansion of State-Owned
enterprises (SOEs) in the first place. While the reasons
for market failure provided by the theory of public
economics, such as the existence of public goods and
externalities, economies of scale, information
asymmetries, and uncertainty, are still valid for the
continuous operation of many public enterprises, the real
reasons behind the creation of public enterprises reveal
that different countries and regions in developing
countries exhibit distinctive characteristics. Thus,
privatization through ownership change may overlook the
importance of understanding the context of each country
individually. This is especially the case where the
political, social, historical and economic objectives
behind the establishment of public enterprises in a
country were particularly complex.
Another consequence of understanding the context of
privatization in each country stems from the mixed reports
about the successes and failures of public enterprises.
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The empirical evidence from the three main regions (Asia,
Africa, and Latin America) of the developing countries
revealed that public ownership is not synonymous with
loss. Some empirical studies also show that although some
SOEs were loss makers an examination of their economic
efficiency suggests a different assessment. Likewise, it
is suggested that profitability does not necessarily
equate with economic efficiency.
Thus, it is necessary to understand the reasons behind the
failure of public enterprises and employ the option of
ownership change through divestiture to increase the
efficiency of an enterprise as one among several rather
than the only alternative.
The theoretical presumption that private ownership is
superior was, where investigated, found to be misleading.
While bounded rationality, opportunistic behaviour, and
information impactedness are found in both public and
private organizations, the level of transaction costs
seems to depend on the structure of the organization
rather than the type of ownership per se. Similar
arguments can be traced in the examination of property
rights theory and the principal-agent theory where the
existence of an efficient capital market, efficient
property rights system, efficient incentive systems, and
other ingredients, particularly market structure (i.e.,
competitiveness), and institutions have a greater impact
on efficiency rather than any change in the geometry of
ownership.
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It is established from the review of the empirical
evidence in chapter 3 that there is no clear-cut evidence
for the supremacy of private enterprise efficiency. This
supports our arguments demonstrating the limited effect of
ownership change. The reasons behind privatization in
developing countries are not based on absolute
confirmation of any of the following factors: private
ownership superiority, an over-extended public sector, a
positive relationship between privatization and
development, or large gains for consumers. Rather the
review shows that in a large number of developing
countries privatization is initiated because of deep
financial crisis derived in particular from the negative
impact of public enterprises on the budgetary balance of
central government. Another reason is the pressure
exercised by international aid agencies, such as the World
Bank and the IMF, on those developing countries which
relied on them for finance, particularly in Sub-Saharan
Africa. This means that the conflicts in government
objectives regarding privatization have make economic
efficiency subordinate to the goal of reducing the
budgetary deficit.
The examination of privatization as functional
decentralization reveals an interesting linkage with
participation, decentralization, and development. The
decentralization of decision-making away from monopolistic
centralized bureaucracies and back to the market has
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revealed that there is a need to differentiate between the
income-centred approach to development advocated by the
World Bank and other international aid agencies and the
human development approach which based on Sen's concept of
capability. The difference lies mainly with the means and
ends of development. While the income-centred approach
looks exclusively at the investment in human capital
(education, health, and nutrition) as a way of increasing
income and growth which in turn will reduce poverty, the
capability approach regards the public procm of_ socit:1
services as the principal medium for human development (to
be free to be well, to live longer, be literate, be
healthy, and enjoy a higher quality of life). While
privatization advocates argue that privatization will
increase choice and participation, the experience of many
developing countries has revealed that privatization
reduces the concept of "freedom of choice" and "collective
choice" to the narrower notion of "individual choice",
particularly if pursued as a reaction to financial crisis.
Being free means being able to increase the voice option
rather than escape through the exit option. Unless the
privatization of SOEs is well designed it neither
increases choice nor alleviates poverty. On the contrary,
it concentrates power in the hands of the market place
elite and thus runs counter to the objectives of
development defined as a participatory approach to human
well-being.
What is needed, therefore, is an approach which will
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increase territorial decentralization (devolution) as
opposed to functional decentralization (privatization),
particularly at the local level. Devolution enhances
political participation or democracy as well as economic
participation. Through the devolution of power two
factors, space and the structure of government, come into
play. This neglect can explain why people resist
privatization in developing countries since it appears
unable to deliver participation and the freedom to
increase capability at the local level. Privatization in
developing countries can be perceived as another type of
top-down approach to	 development. The factors of
initiation, design, purpose, objectives, and
implementation rest with the interaction between the
central authority and its interest groups in the market
place. Thus, its implementation in a large number of cases
has led the rich to become richer and the poor poorer.
The examination of the fiscal decentralization ratios in
developing countries revealed that privatization policies
in many countries such as Chile and Brazil, which are
active privatizers, was neither accompanied by further
steps towards territorial decentralization (devolution),
nor by fiscal decentralization to the local governments.
From another perspective, there is only a slight
possibility that privatization, within the context in
which it is currently being implemented, will increase
technological choice within developing countries or
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support a "crowding-in" of the informal sector.
Alternatively, development requires a coordination of
effort at the national, regional, and local levels. There
is still an active role for the state to play in
development but this point of view is contrary to the
beliefs of the privatization proponents and in contrast
with the traditional centralized role.
Development may mean decentralization and the latter
certainly does mean participation, but privatization will
not necessarily secure participation. It depends on how it
is designed and implemented. Privatization, if it is to be
sustainable and people-centred, has to be gradual,
relatively crisis-free, untroubled and unenforced, marked
by a fusion of collective participation from below (i.e.,
grass roots) and individual participation in the market
place. Such an outcome would depend exclusively on the
commitment of the decision makers and their vision of
empowering the people.
8.2: Conclusions of Part II 
The evaluation of the Jordanian economy during the period
1952-1992 revealed that institutional factors played a
major role in the successes and failures of development.
As a small country with a traditional merchant business
culture the Jordanian economy has been hostage to powerful
interest groups which play an important role in shaping
the sectoral structure of the economy. Because traders,
bankers and middlemen are the powerful interest groups the
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economy has been dominated by the services sector. During
the 1950s and 1960s ISI policies were forced on the
country because of the high transportation costs brought
about by the 1948 war with Israel. However, ISI policies
during the 1970s and early 1980s became a choice that had
negative effects on the small economy. Dependency on
external markets to provide inputs and weak linkage
between the productive sectors of the economy represented
the two main negative results of such an industrial
approach. A further negative effect was the deterioration
of the agriculture sector which started in the 1960s as a
result of inappropriate design in the "land settlement"
programme in 1957. This programme was a major factor in
the widening of income and wealth distribution within the
country.
The evaluation has shown that there are internal
constraints on the economy (structural, demographical, and
geopolitical). Other constraints are the exogenous
variables (Arab aid, worker remittances, oil prices and
the spill-over from regional politics).
Because of the major impact of the exogenous factors on
the Jordanian economy, it can be described as a semi-
rentier economy. Its heavy dependency on unstable and
uncontrolled foreign transfers have made the country and
its development dependent on and vulnerable to exogenous
economic and non-economic factors. The dilemma in
development is how to conduct economic policies which suit
a particular country's features and capacities. The
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Jordanian decision-makers, by contrast, have failed to
manage development on such a basis and have utilized
external revenues to cover up their mismanagement of the
economy.
Although health and educational indicators point to some
success in the field of human development, this should be
assessed within the context of dependency on external
sources of finance on the one hand and the government's
distributional role on the other (e.g., 90 percent of
total health expenditure in Jordan was directed towards
non-primary health care services).
The path of dependency has led to an increase in the
economy's external debt of more than twice the GNP.
Meanwhile, the country suffers from a high unemployment
rate and a real crisis of poverty.
In summary, there is a failure in development. This
assessment is based on statistics which reveal declining
per capita income, unequal distribution of income,
increases in the cost of living, polarization of the
economy, and above all the rising proportion of poor
people. Poverty in itself means that poor people cannot
voice their demands and cannot be free to be capable of
being well.
Given such an assessment the neoclassical prescriptions of
privatization, liberalization and openness are seriously
misguided in that they neglect the major roles of
institutions and history.
The role of the state in the Jordanian economy has been
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divided into three types: government spending which is
high in comparison with other East Asian countries and
mainly oriented towards current expenditure; a regulatory
role which revealed that the Jordanian state is a
mercantile state which, although advocating free market
ideology, restricts the market and the initiatives of
ordinary private entrepreneurs who lack access to the
decision making bodies; government ownership of the means
of production is limited but highly important in the
decision-making context of mixed enterprises.
Given these state roles in the economy the important
conclusion is that the decision making process in Jordan
is characterised by over-centralization despite the free
market orientation ideology of the state. This is
consistent with the thesis conclusion presented in chapter
1.
Consequently, the introduction of the privatization plan
in Jordan in 1986 did not represent an ideological shift
but was more a result of the economic recession which
started in 1983 and deepened after 1985, and budgetary
deficit, a debt crisis, the attraction of foreign
investment, and the imitation factor.
Further proof of the importance of the above factors lies
in the fact that there is no clear-cut evidence that
private ownership in Jordan is more efficient than
government ownership. This is consistent with the
conclusions of chapter 3 of the thesis. The case study of
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the Jordan Electricity Authority (JEA) demonstrates that
state ownership can be efficient economically if there is
a hard budget policy and strict monitoring of corporation
expenditure. However, it was found that even with such an
approach the losses incurred by the JEA derived from
factors outside the control of the enterprise. Government
pricing of electricity, devaluation of the Jordanian
currency, and the initiation of prestige projects such as
the linking of electricity lines with other countries in
the region are all factors which increased the losses of
JEA. There are, however, many cases in which the public
enterprise structure has contributed to a deterioration in
the parameters of profitability, but this should by no
means be assessed as a sound reason for privatization.
While the factors behind the introduction of privatization
in Jordan were strong, they were insufficient to induce
the government to start the implementation phase.
Obstacles to the privatization of SOEs in Jordan, as the
record shows, rested on economic factors (the time needed
for the valuation of the enterprises, the need for
restructuring the enterprises, the lack of a regulatory
capacity, and an inefficient capital market) as well as
the non-economic factors in particular those derived from
the special characteristics of the state-society
relationship.
However, the state, even if the privatization programme
were to be implemented in the future, would still retain
ownership and/or control of many strategic industries.
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This corresponds to the findings in chapter 2, namely that
there are many reasons behind the creation of public
enterprises which will continue to influence state
decisions about their retention. However, what is
significant is that privatization in Jordan would also
imply the creation of these institutions necessary for
better government rather than a simple change of ownership
per se. This is so because , because within the current
institutional setting the state would still retain the
power to influence private activities in the same way as
it influences the public sector.
One of the interesting findings of chapter 7 is that
privatization and decentralization in Jordan were designed
in 1986 in a similar context to that conceived by the
international aid agencies such as USAID and the World
Bank. However, territorial decentralization as a means of
increasing empowerment was not the approach conceived by
the central authority. Decentralization was seen as a new
approach to regional planning. Nevertheless, the
implementation of the 1986-1990 plan did not give any
powers to the local level and local governments continued
to be no more than local administrations. The examination
of the relationship between local village councils and
other central agencies suggested that no decentralization
had taken place. Moreover, the examination of the
decentralization ratios before the 1986-1990 plan and
during its implementation found the ratios to have
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deteriorated.
Further evidence of the inappropriate outcome of the top-
down approach to investment at the local level suggested
that the allocation of projects through Jordan's Cities
and Villages Development Bank was directed away from the
basic needs approach to development.
The examination of the relationship between democracy,
participation, and privatization suggested that in Jordan
democratization, which was initiated in 1989 as a response
to social dissatisfaction with the economic reform
programme, has been used to achieve two goals, political
stability and the implementation of the long-delayed
economic reform programme including privatization with
parliamentary approval. It is suggested, therefore, that,
unless the process of political liberalization becomes
able to build democratic grass roots institutions (at the
local level), democratization and economic reform,
including privatization, will continue to be state induced
and the state would retain a considerable degree of
control when managing them.
Chapter 7 has provided a set of evidence, including a
clear shift in emphasis away from decentralization, which
is derived from a tentative examination of the goals of
the 1993-1997 development plan. This is consistent with
chapter 4's perception of the linkages between
privatization, participation, decentralization and
development. The emphasis on privatization in the plan led
decision makers to shy away from committing themselves to
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a participatory approach to development. This is because
the design of privatization, as shown by chapter 6, does
not articulate the interests of underprivileged groups. It
is suggested that, if the scope of privatization is
expanded in Jordan to include the provision of health and
education, then the country's high achievements in human
development during the last three decades may be placed
severely at risk.
The thesis suggested that Jordanian decision makers should
give further thought to reforming public enterprises,
initiating a bureaucratic reform programme, allowing the
informal sector to contribute positively to development,
and introducing some measure of legal decentralization.
These steps towards empowerment should be taken with the
aim of increasing the capability of people to participate
effectively in their destiny.
A self-reliance and basic-needs approach through
participatory development is more compatible with the
poverty problem than privatization as functional
decentralization because the latter will only marginalize
the Jordanian poor in a restricted market.
The conclusions of this study revealed the significance of
studying privatization within a holistic methodology.
Being a part of a whole system, privatization should be
looked at within a package of diversified variables that
cover historical, political, social, and economic factors.
Such an approach can provide a more solid basis for an
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appropriate understanding of the problems and the right
methods of solving them. There is a need to move away from
the simplistic view that privatization increases
efficiency and promotes growth.
There are gainers and losers and there are people who need
to increase their voice rather than to continue living in
ignorance and isolation. Unequal ownership of property is
inconsistent with "equality of opportunity". It is the
notion of property rights rather than participation
because the scale of the first determines the size and
activation of the latter.
The real need, therefore, should be to renew the emphasis
on decentralization as a developmental approach in which
the devolution of power will enhance the participation,
choice, and capabilities of the Jordanian people.
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